Binyam Mohamed
10. Binyam Mohamed is an Ethiopian national who was
resident in the UK before being arrested in Pakistan as a terrorism
suspect in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2004
before being released in February 2009.[23]
11. The US brought terrorism charges against Mr Mohamed
in May 2008, as a result of which Mr Mohamed brought proceedings
against the UK Government seeking disclosure of potentially exculpatory
material.[24] This led
to a series of High Court judgments relating to the case, which
is still continuing. In August 2008, the High Court found that
the UK security services "facilitated interviews" in
Pakistan of Binyam Mohamed, the only remaining former British
resident then being detained at Guantanamo Bay, while he was being
detained unlawfully and without access to a lawyer, by providing
information and questions. The High Court found that:
by seeking to interview BM in the circumstances described
and supplying information and questions for his interviews, the
relationship of the United Kingdom Government to the United States
authorities in connection with BM was far beyond that of a bystander
or witness to the alleged wrongdoing.[25]
12. This judgment, and some of the evidence on which
it was based, particularly the evidence of a security service
agent, "Witness B", led the Home Secretary in October
2008 to refer the question of possible criminal wrongdoing to
the Attorney General. On 26 March 2009, she invited the Metropolitan
Police to commence a criminal investigation.[26]
Mr Craig Murray
13. Mr Craig Murray was the UK ambassador to Uzbekistan
from 2002 to 2004. His memorandum and subsequent oral evidence
alleged that:
- the Uzbek authorities used
torture to a "staggering extent" against suspected political
or religious dissidents;[27]
- the information provided under torture was largely
planted by the Uzbek authorities, to exaggerate the scale of the
terrorist threat in central Asia and provide a firm link to Al-Qaida;[28]
- the CIA intelligence from Tashkent "was
giving precisely the same narrative" and therefore may also
have been derived from torture and be inaccurate;[29]
and
- the US Embassy confirmed to Mr Murray's deputy
that the CIA intelligence "probably did come from torture"
but, in the War on Terror, this was not considered to be a problem.[30]
14. Mr Murray raised his concerns with the FCO and
was recalled to a meeting on the issue in March 2003. He stated
that he was told:
- there was nothing in UNCAT
to prohibit receipt, or possible receipt, of information obtained
using torture. This view was latter confirmed in a telegram from
Sir Michael Wood, the Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office;[31]
- the UK had a valuable intelligence sharing agreement
with the US covering all material and it would not be in the UK's
interest to restrict this agreement to specific categories of
material;[32]
- the Security Services regarded the Uzbek intelligence
as useful;[33] and
- the final intelligence report issued by the Security
Services excluded the name of the detainee interrogated, so it
was not possible to prove that torture was involved in any particular
piece of intelligence.[34]
Mr Murray went on to argue that the policy on the
use of intelligence had changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.[35]
He recalled a "clear direction" from the then Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher "not to use any intelligence that
might have come from torture" in the run up to the first
Gulf War.[36] In his
view, Ministers were aware that they were receiving intelligence
material derived from torture and Jack Straw MP, the then Foreign
Secretary, had read and discussed his telegrams on the subject.[37]
15. Mr Murray's allegations are significantly different
to those relating to the possible use of torture in Pakistan and
Egypt outlined above. He said there was no evidence of British
nationals or residents being mistreated in Uzbekistan and no suggestion
that British agents were meeting detainees in Uzbekistan or passing
on questions for use by interrogators.[38]
His claim, supported by the memorandum from Sir Michael Wood,
is that the UK Government turned a blind eye to the provenance
of intelligence which was almost certainly derived from torture
in Uzbekistan, partly because it might have been useful but principally
to preserve a valuable intelligence sharing agreement with the
US. The importance of this agreement to the UK Government has
also been a factor in the litigation involving Binyam Mohamed.[39]
16. Mr Murray was a convincing witness when he appeared
before us and his allegations are supported by some documentary
evidence. His credibility has not been enhanced by his somewhat
bizarre dealings with the Committee, however. When he first approached
us about giving oral evidence we asked him for a written memorandum,
which is standard practice for select committees. His response
was to publish a story on his blog entitled "Parliamentary
Joint Human Rights Commission Struck By Cowardice" which
alleged that we were consulting party whips about how to deter
him from giving oral evidence.[40]
This was entirely untrue, as our subsequent decision to ask him
to give oral evidence, despite his comments, demonstrated. In
May, Mr Murray published further comments on his blog, suggesting
that our Chair was a "stooge" of the Uzbek regime and
had somehow been implicated in his dismissal as UK ambassador.[41]
Again, these comments are entirely without substance and may only
serve to damage Mr Murray's credibility and reputation.
6 Ev 30. Back
7
Ev 46, paragraph 1. Back
8
Annex to Ian Cobain memorandum, January 2009, p. 47, paragraph
24, and see Ev 79-81 and oral evidence given by the Foreign Secretary
to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 June 2009, HC557-ii, Q112. Back
9
Ev 47-48, paragraphs 16-25. Back
10
Ev 48-49, paragraphs 26-37. And see Ev 34. Back
11
HC Deb, 7 Jul 09, cc940-48. Back
12
Ev 49, paragraphs 38-43. Back
13
Ev 39-40, paragraphs 44-48 and see Ev 34. Back
14
Ev 50, paragraphs 49-53. Back
15
Ev 50, paragraphs 54-55. Back
16
Ev 50-51, paragraphs 56-59. Back
17
Annex to Ian Cobain memorandum, January 2009, p. 46-47, paras
20-23 and see letter from the Home Secretary, 22 December 2008,
Ev 31. Back
18
Ev 45-46, pp12-13. Back
19
Ev 43, p6. The ISI is the Pakistani intelligence service. Back
20
Ibid. Back
21
Ev 51, paragraph 5. Back
22
Ev 54, paragraph 29. Back
23
For information about his release, see HC Deb, 24 Feb 09, cc18-19WS. Back
24
HC Deb, 5 Feb 09, c989-91. Back
25
R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin)
(21 August 2008) paragraphs 87-88. Back
26
HL Deb, 26 Mar 09, cWS51. Back
27
Ev 55. Back
28
Ibid. Back
29
Ibid. Back
30
Ibi. Back
31
Ev 55-56 and Q98. Back
32
Ev 56 and Q150. Back
33
Ev 56 and Qq87-90. Back
34
Ev 56 conclusion 4. Back
35
Q114. Back
36
Qq85-86, 94. Back
37
Q120 and Qq96, 103. Back
38
Qq 80, 82-3. Back
39
For example, see HC Deb, 5 Feb 09, c990. Back
40
www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2009/03/parliamentary_j.html. Back
41
www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2009/05/andrew_dismore.html. Back