Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice Bill - Human Rights Joint Committee Contents

7.  Procedural Changes

Bail in murder cases

1.183 In most cases, a defendant accused of a crime benefits from a presumption in favour of bail, subject to certain considerations, including the risk of failure to surrender to custody, the risk of committing other offences, interfering with witnesses or otherwise obstructing justice. This is in keeping with the requirements of the right to liberty as protected by Article 5 ECHR and the common law. Article 5(3) ECHR provides that an individual accused of a crime is entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. This has been interpreted as a clear entitlement to release pending trial unless there are relevant and sufficient reasons to justify continued detention.[168]

1.184 The Bill would appear to reverse this presumption in murder cases and would not permit bail to be granted unless the court was of the opinion that there was no significant risk of the defendant committing, while on bail, any offence that would, or would be likely to cause, physical or mental injury to any person other than the defendant. The Explanatory Notes explain the Government's view that these provisions are consistent with Article 5 ECHR:

That Article, amongst other things, sets out the circumstances in which a person may be detained pending trial. This provision does not affect most of those circumstances, it simply adds a test in murder cases in relation to a particularly serious category of prospective further offences - those which would, or would be likely to, cause harm. The similar test in section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended) was found by the House of Lords in O v Crown Court at Harrow [2006] UKHL 42 to be compatible with Article 5 rights.

1.185 This underestimates the strength of the right of release guaranteed under Article 5 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights has stressed that concrete facts outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities:

Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases.[169]

1.186 A similar provision in section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended) permitted the court in certain cases only to grant bail where it was "satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify it". In O v Crown Court at Harrow,, the court accepted that any presumption against bail would be incompatible with Article 5(3) ECHR. Argument centred around whether the relevant provisions should be read down to achieve compatibility (section 3 HRA) or that compatibility did not arise in that case as the requirements of the provision should not be read as a presumption against bail. On the latter analysis, the court still retained the power to grant bail generally and an "exceptional circumstance" included that the court thought that the individual should be at liberty. On either reading, the provision would have little or no practical effect. For the avoidance of doubt, the Court made clear that the provision should be read down to ensure that it was compatible with Article 5(3) ECHR.[170]

1.187 Both these arguments have been made in submissions by the Law Society and Liberty on this section of the Bill (a) that it cannot lawfully have any practical effect and (b) if the Government intends the provision to create a presumption against bail, that the courts are likely to be required to read these provisions down to make them compatible with the right to liberty.[171]

1.188 The language in this provision is not as stark as the provision in section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (as amended) (in that case, exceptional circumstances had to exist, here there must be no significant risk of violence to others; in that case the court had to be satisfied, here it must only have an opinion).

1.189 We wrote to the Minister to ask for further information about the intended effect of this provision. In his response, the Minister told us:

  • These proposals were drafted with the case of O v Crown Court at Harrow in mind; and
  • The Government does not intend this provision to reverse the burden of proof in respect of bail. Instead, the Government explains, the test in murder cases will be different from other cases, but the burden of proof will remain with the prosecution. In ordinary bail applications, the Government will need to prove that the defendant poses a risk to the administration of justice, that there is a risk that he will commit further offences or that there is a risk that he or she will abscond, and that bail conditions would be inadequate to meet that risk. In murder cases, the prosecution will need to establish that there is a significant risk of violence to others. As the Minister explains, "establishing that there is such a risk effectively precludes bail".

1.190 We welcome the Government's reassurance that clause 98(2) is not intended to create a presumption against bail or to reverse the burden of proof in bail applications in murder cases. In either case, we consider that there would be a clear risk of a breach of the right to liberty (Article 5(3) ECHR). We remain doubtful whether clause 98(2) can have any practical effect on bail decisions.

Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses


1.191 Current criminal procedure provides for special measures to apply in respect of evidence given by certain vulnerable witnesses in criminal proceedings. A witness will be eligible for assistance if the court is satisfied that the quality of his or her evidence would be reduced on the grounds of fear or distress about testifying. These include measures such as giving evidence by video link or behind a screen. In determining whether to apply special measures, the court must take into account a number of factors and the views of the witness. The Bill proposes to extend eligibility for special measures automatically to proceedings in relation to certain types of offences.[172] The relevant offences would include specified gun and knife crimes listed in schedule 12 (a number of more serious offences related to gun and knife crime have been specified by Government amendments during the passage of the Bill).[173] The Government will be able to add additional offences by secondary legislation following the negative resolution procedure.

1.192 The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill provide no explanation of the Government's view that the automatic application of special measures in any case would be compatible with the right of the defendant to a fair hearing for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR. This proposal, and omission from the Explanatory Notes, raises particular concern in light of the right of the defendant to cross examine witnesses against him (Article 6 ECHR and the common law).

1.193 We asked the Government for further information. The Minister told us:

The availability of special measures are not incompatible with the defendant's right to fair trial in that the defendant is fully able to examine the witnesses against him or her. There are also a number of safeguards. Courts must determine special measures applications, opposing parties must make representations against applications and before reaching a decision, the court is required to consider whether the proposed measure(s) might tend to inhibit the evidence being effectively tested (Section 19 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999). The courts may also discharge a direction if it appears to be in the interests of justice to do so. Additionally, by virtue of Section 32 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 judges must warn the jury as they consider necessary to ensure that the fact that special measures have been made available to a witness should not prejudice any conclusions that they may draw about a defendant.[174]

1.194 The Minister also explained that the court will retain control of the decision over whether to apply special measures in any individual case and which measures would be appropriate.[175]

1.195 During Public Bill Committee, it was suggested that offences related to gun and knife crime could comprise up to 24% of all proceedings.[176] The only witnesses currently automatically eligible for special measures are children and witnesses in sexual assault cases. For example, in cases where individuals affected by disability seek special measures, the court must be persuaded that their disability will diminish the quality of their evidence. In cases where an automatic eligibility is not established, a witness who is frightened or distressed by the process of giving evidence must establish that fear or distress will diminish the quality of evidence given in order to establish eligibility. If eligibility is automatically established by reference to the type of offence under consideration, the court will not need to consider whether fear or distress will diminish the quality of an individual's evidence, but only whether any of the special measures available would be likely to improve the quality of evidence given. We recognise that the court will retain control over whether or not special measures will be in the interests of justice in an individual case. We accept that this discretion will provide a valuable safeguard for the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR and the common law. However, we remain concerned by the decision of the Government to provide blanket eligibility for special measures to any witnesses in proceedings related to a whole category of offences and the power to extend eligibility to a wider category of offences without further parliamentary debate. The Minister should explain clearly why automatic eligibility is necessary when the existing law already provides for special measures in cases where witnesses' fear or distress is likely to diminish the quality of his or her evidence.

Extension of availability of intermediaries to vulnerable defendants

1.196 Under existing law certain vulnerable witnesses can be supported to give evidence by an intermediary. This provision - or any other special measures - does not currently apply to evidence given by the accused person. The Bill proposes to extend the assistance of intermediaries to certain defendants, which would include anyone with a mental disorder or a significant impairment of intelligence or social functioning.[177] We received significant evidence during our inquiry on the human rights of adults with learning disabilities that a substantial number of adults with learning difficulties were being processed by the criminal justice system without a full understanding of the process or the evidence against them.[178] The Prison Reform Trust (PRT) told us that it would be beneficial for some defendants with learning difficulties to be supported at trial by an intermediary or some form of appropriate adult.[179] In their evidence to the Public Bill Committee, PRT express cautious support for these proposals, while emphasising the importance of ensuring that only those whom it is appropriate to prosecute stand trial:

Although this measure is clearly designed to help vulnerable adults, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances where it is ever right to prosecute in a criminal court someone accepted to have a mental disorder (as defined by the Mental Health Act 1983) or a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning. PRT believes the emphasis for this group should be diversion away from the criminal justice system into appropriate mental health or social care and on assessing individual's fitness to plead.

Where diversion to a health or social care setting is not appropriate, support in the criminal justice system for vulnerable people is much needed.[180]

1.197 Justice is "strongly opposed" to the inclusion of these proposals in the Bill. They rightly told us that Article 6 ECHR requires that an accused must be able effectively to participate in their trial. This includes understanding the nature of the trial process, and he significance of any penalty imposed. An individual must, if necessary through the use of an interpreter, lawyer, social worker or friend, be able to "understand the general thrust of what is said in court". [181] They stress:

If the defendant is unable to do all these things then the mere presence of an intermediary when he gives his evidence cannot cure this defect. We also believe that there are inherent dangers in the use of an intermediary when a defendant gives evidence; the intermediary may not be independent of the defendant or the case (for example, a parent or carer) and may, whether independent or not, misinterpret the defendant's speech and that of those asking him questions. If an individual is mentally compromised to the extent that they cannot understand and answer questions in simple language from a lawyer to a judge, then we believe that they will not be able to participate effectively in their trial and should not therefore be judged fit to plead.[182]

1.198 Some concern has been expressed about the scope of these provisions, which refer to an intermediary having the power to "explain questions to a defendant" by Liberty, arguing that this could undermine an individual's right to a fair trial when an intermediary is introduced.[183] On the other hand, the Law Society has expressed some concern that the proposals should make clear that an intermediary's duties to support a defendant extend to support the accused to understand the proceedings and to facilitate consultation and communication with his or her legal team.[184]

1.199 Like other special measures provisions, these will be within the grant of the court. A direction may only be made where "necessary in order to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial". The court may discharge or vary a direction when it is no longer necessary to achieve a fair trial or where a further direction or variation is necessary to achieve a fair trial for the accused.

1.200 We share the concerns of the Prison Reform Trust, Justice and other witnesses that individuals who cannot effectively participate in criminal proceedings, whether as a result of any mental health disability, intellectual impairment, or otherwise, should not be subject to prosecution, but should be diverted from the criminal justice system. The right to a fair hearing, guaranteed by the common law and Article 6(1) ECHR requires nothing less. However, we welcome the aim of these proposals to support vulnerable defendants when the court considers that an intermediary would be "necessary" to secure a fair trial. We consider that this provides a valuable safeguard against the use of these provisions in circumstances which would lead to prosecutions of individuals who should rightly be considered unfit to plead. We recommend that the Government consider asking the CPS and the Judicial Studies Board to consider issuing guidance to accompany these proposals, making clear the scope of the right to effective participation in criminal proceedings and highlighting circumstances where the use of an intermediary would be inappropriate. We understand that intermediaries will be funded by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). We recommend that the Government monitor and review how these provisions operate in practice. We consider that this monitoring exercise could be conducted effectively by the CPS or by the CPS with the input of information from PCTs, individual intermediaries, defence lawyers and defendants.

Live links

1.201 The Bill amends the Crime and Disorder Act 1989 in relation to the use of live video links for the purposes of conducting preliminary hearings and sentencing in criminal proceedings. Currently, a defendant must generally give his or her consent for these hearings to take place by live link. The Bill proposes to remove the requirement for consent and places the decision to use a live link entirely at the discretion of the judge involved.[185]

1.202 The Government accepts that the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6(1) is engaged by the removal of consent. The Explanatory Notes explain that the Government considers that the requirements of Article 6(1) are satisfied because:

  • for the purposes of these provisions, the accused will be treated as present in court when, by virtue of a live link direction he attends a hearing through a live link and there is nothing to stop the accused participating effectively in the conduct of his case;
  • the court retains a discretion whether to give live link directions;
  • the court can rescind the live link direction at any time during the hearing; and
  • the court may not give or continue a live link direction unless satisfied that it is not contrary to the interests of justice.

1.203 Article 6(1) ECHR includes the individual right to be present and to participate freely in the determination of a criminal charge. The European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that the use of a live link is not inherently incompatible with the right to a fair trial, provided the operation of such a link ensures that the accused is able to follow the proceedings, to be heard without technical impediments, and that effective and confidential communication with a legal adviser is provided.[186] An individual retains due process rights under the common law which UK courts have held are no less extensive than those in Article 6. We have written separately to ask the Minister for Security, Counter-terrorism, Crime and Policing why the Government considers that the proposals for the introduction of live links to extradition hearings in the Policing and Crime Bill are considered necessary.[187]

1.204 We have raised similar concerns in respect of the compatibility of pre-charge detention hearings with the requirement of Article 5 ECHR, which protects the right to liberty, in cases involving alleged terrorism offences by live link.[188] Both the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the European Court of Human Rights have determined that an accused who is detained pending charge or trial has the right to be brought physically before a judge who is capable of ordering his release (Article 5(3)).[189]

1.205 Both Justice and the Law Society have raised concerns about the removal of consent in respect of these provisions. Justice calls for the retention of consent:

These provisions will extend the circumstances in which criminal proceedings can take place via live link. This is an ongoing trend in recent legislation, against which we counsel caution. The physical presence of the accused in court is a very important safeguard not only against physical ill treatment of persons arrested and detained, but also against police and prosecutorial oppression and misconduct in the investigation.[190]

1.206 The Law Society stresses that these proposals may include hearings while an individual is still detained at a police station. These hearings might take place shortly after charge and the Law Society notes that at these hearings little time will have been available for legal advice to be taken or to seek proper disclosure from the prosecution. Information relating to bail or to support a bail application may not be available and, in these circumstances, the individual will face a significant barrier to their ability to participate in the hearing. In addition, it may be difficult for a solicitor to take instructions from a client or to assess their well being if not able to meet face to face. The Law Society expresses particular concern about the use of live links in preliminary hearings when bail applications may be made. In these circumstances, the right to liberty, as guaranteed by Article 5 ECHR would be engaged.[191] It recommends that the requirement for consent should remain until a further pilot to assess the capabilities of existing technology is completed.

1.207 The Explanatory Notes explain the Government's view that the accused will be considered present when a live link takes place and "there is nothing to stop the accused participating effectively in the conduct of his case".[192] However, there is nothing on the face of the Bill which makes clear that a live link will not be adequate where a person is restricted in his ability to participate. Although the judge will have the power to stop a hearing, or to refuse a live-link, where the link would not be in the interests of justice, there is no clear direction on the face of the Bill that the interests of justice require that the accused must be able to participate fully in the hearing. We wrote to the Minister to ask for further information, including on why these proposals were considered necessary and compatible with Article 6(1); why the Government considered a person "present" at a hearing when participating by live link; and whether the Government considers that the production of a defendant at court could provide a valuable safeguard against abuse. We also asked whether the Bill should be amended to make it clear that a live-link would not be in the interests of justice in any case where the link would restrict the ability of the accused to participate fully in the hearing.

1.208 Responding to our request for justification, the Minister explained:

Live-link hearings are of benefit to the criminal justice system generally and to defendants themselves. Those benefits are maximised if the links are available for use in as many as possible of the cases for which they are suitable.[193]

1.209 The Minister's response does not help us understand the benefits which the Government consider will flow from the increased use of live link hearings, only the Government's view that live links should be used in as many cases as possible. In the context of pre-charge hearings in cases involving individuals suspected of terrorism, the Government has suggested that security concerns justify the use of live links. When we visited Paddington Green Police Station, counter-terrorism officers told us that live-links were not used for security reasons, but to serve the individual choice of those being held.[194] In relation to the proposals currently being considered in the Policing and Crime Bill, the Minister has explained that the financial and administrative burdens associated with travel to short hearings justify the increased use of live links.[195] We recommend that the Government provide evidence of the benefits which it considers will flow from the increased use of live links.

1.210 In addition, the Minister's view was that:

  • The person is present for the limited purposes proposed by the Bill, because they are able to "see and hear and to be seen and heard by the court during these hearings."
  • "As a matter of general practice, the need for participation by the defendant in the sorts of hearing that can take place by live link is limited; but to the extent that the need for such participation arises, the court will as a matter of course have regard to it in assessing whether to give a live link direction."
  • An express statement that a live link would not be in the interests of justice where participation would be impaired would be unnecessary as this will automatically be considered by the court as part of the right of the accused to a fair trial.[196]

1.211 We remain concerned that the Government has not yet provided a full explanation of its view that these provisions will be compatible with Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. We accept that the control of the court and the restriction of live link orders to cases which serve the interests of justice provide valuable safeguards for the right to liberty and the right to a fair hearing. We are particularly concerned, however, that the removal of the requirement for consent to a live link hearing may lead to circumstances where the right to liberty will be engaged, but may be overlooked in the interests of administrative convenience.

1.212 The European Court of Human Rights has stressed that the operation of live links in practice will be key to their impact on the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR). The Minister should be able to explain why the Government considers that there is adequate evidence to show that in the circumstances in which live links may be implemented more widely, they are currently operating in a manner which allows the defendant to participate in the hearing and to consult and instruct his legal adviser in confidence.

1.213 We welcome the Minister's reassurance that the Government's view is that the court would automatically consider the defendant's capacity to participate when considering whether a live link was in the interests of justice.

Criminal memoirs

1.214 The Bill proposes to enable the Serious Organised Crime Agency or other specified enforcement officers to apply to the High Court for "exploitation proceeds orders" (EPO) to recover benefits accrued by certain offenders through exploitation of material relevant to their offence.[197] This EPO is designed to allow recovery of profits made by convicted offenders publishing their memoirs, giving paid interviews or participating in paid speaking events. The Explanatory Notes explain the Government's view that it is "arguable" that these provisions could engage the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. They explain that, if Article 10 is engaged, it is the Government's view that any interference is justified:

Article 10 is a qualified right and may be subject to restrictions that are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in pursuance of a legitimate aim. These proposals will be prescribed by law with precision in primary legislation. Preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes by receiving benefits for, for example, writing books has the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others (including the victims of those crimes and their families) and protecting morals. They meet the pressing social need to allay public concern about criminals profiting from their criminal behaviour and are both necessary to achieve that aim and proportionate in doing so. The scheme only relates to those who have committed crimes and would not prevent publication of relevant material but provide for a means for the benefit to be recovered. Only the High Court can make an order and determine the amount payable…In doing so it will be expressly required to consider factors including any public interest in the publication and any social, cultural or educational value, and may also consider other relevant factors.[198]

1.215 The right to free expression is engaged by attempts to recover proceeds or benefits accrued as a result of any form of expression, even where that action does not prevent the individual from expressing him or herself. So for example, in a previous case where the UK Government obtained a civil order to deprive a former double agent of the proceeds of his memoirs, this engaged Article 10 ECHR and required justification.[199]

1.216 The issues which the High Court must consider when deciding whether to make an EPO include "the extent to which any victim of the offence, the family of the victim or the general public is offended by the respondent obtaining exploitation proceeds from the relevant offence". This consideration is in addition to "the extent to which the carrying out of the activity or supplying of the product is in the public interest" and "the seriousness of the relevant offence to which the activity or product relates". Discretionary powers may be sufficiently precise to meet the "prescribed by law" standard, but only where the way in which the discretion should be exercised is indicated with sufficient clarity to enable someone to regulate their conduct (if necessary, with advice) and to give adequate protection against arbitrary interference.[200] The requirement that the High Court considers whether individual persons or the general public might be offended introduces an entirely subjective element to the determination of whether an order would be appropriate and one which will make it difficult to ascertain in which circumstances an order will or will not be imposed. This ambiguity raises questions over whether the proposed interference with Article 10 ECHR is adequately "prescribed by law".

1.217 We wrote to the Secretary of State, asking for a further explanation of the Government's view that these provisions are "prescribed by law" in the light of the requirement that the Court take into account whether individual victims, their families, or the general public may be "offended" in the absence of any order. In response, the Minister told us that:

It is perfectly legitimate (and indeed right) for the court to take into account the impact of publication on victims and the wider public at the same time as considering, for example, the social, cultural and educational value of the publication.[201]

1.218 The Government argues that there are adequate safeguards in the proposed provisions to guard against arbitrary interference, including that the order remains within the discretion of the court (subject to further appeal) and that a great deal of detail is provided on the face of the Bill.

1.219 Given that these proposals are designed to protect the rights of others (being victims and their families) and to protect morals, we accept the Government's view that the Court will need to consider evidence demonstrating that one of these aims will be served by the order being sought. We agree that it would be "perfectly legitimate" for the court to take into account the impact of publication itself, or the knowledge that an individual had profited financially from a publication or an activity. Unfortunately, the Bill does not require the court to consider the degree to which an order would be necessary to protect the rights of others or to protect morality. Nor does it enable the court to consider the impact which an order may have on the public interest or individual victims or their families. Instead, the Bill requires the court to take into account the extent to which victims, their families and the wider public are offended by the profit made in a particular case. There is no Convention or common law right to be protected from offence. The Bill introduces a degree of legal uncertainty which will be entirely dependent on the subjective reaction of a small group of people or the wider public to an individual's actions (the latter being more difficult to assess). This legal uncertainty may be resolved by subsequent decisions of the court, but we are concerned as to how the court is expected to gather adequate evidence to consider the relevant "degree of offence" in any particular case. Aside from evidence from victims and their families, in notorious cases would the court be bound to take into account campaigns by national newspapers in order to determine the extent to which the general public was offended?

1.220 We remain concerned that making an Exploitation Proceeds Order (EPO) in part dependent on the degree to which a victim, their family or the general public are offended in a particular case could unnecessarily risk arbitrary application of these proposals. We recommend that the Government should consider an amendment to the Bill to remove any reference to the degree of offence aroused by the relevant profits, while retaining the ability of the court to consider the wider public interest in making an EPO.

168   Wemhoff v Germany (1968) 1 EHRR 55, paragraph 11; Yagci and Sargin v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 505, paragraph 52. Back

169   Ilijkov v Bulgaria, App No 33977/96, dated 26 July 2001, paragraph 84. Back

170   Ov Harrow Crown Court, [2006] UKHL 42, paragraph 35 Back

171   Law Society, Second Reading Briefing, January 2009, page 7; Liberty, Second Reading Briefing, January 2009, pages 34 - 35. Back

172   Clause 83 Back

173   Ev 26 Back

174   Ev 26 Back

175   Ev 26 Back

176   PBC, 5 March 2009, Col 569 Back

177   Clause 88 Back

178   Seventh Report of Session 2007-08, A life like any other? Human rights of adults with learning disabilities, HL Paper 40-I, HC 73, paragraphs 210-212. Back

179   Ibid, Annex 3. Back

180   PBC, 5 Feb 2009, Written Evidence (CJ08) Back

181   Ev 57 Back

182   Ev 57 Back

183   Liberty, Second Reading Briefing, January 2009. Back

184   Law Society, Second Reading Briefing, January 2009. Back

185   Clause 90 Back

186   Sakhnovskiy v Russia, App 21272/03, Judgment 5 February 2009, paras 43 - 44, 54. Back

187   Our correspondence on this Bill is available on the JCHR website: http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/joint_committee_on_human_rights/policingandcrimebill.cfm  Back

188   Article 5 requires that an individual detained for the purposes of criminal investigation ought to be brought promptly before a judge. See Nineteenth Report of 2006-07, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights, 28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning, HL Paper 157, HC 790, paragraphs 74 - 80. Back

189   Report to the UK Government on the visit to the UK carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2 - 6 December 2007, CPT/Inf (2008) 27, paragraphs 8 - 10; See also Ocalan v Turkey (GC) , App No 46221/99, 12 May 2005, where the ECtHR determined that the purpose of Article 5(3) ECHR was to "ensure that arrested persons are physically brought before a judicial authority promptly" Back

190   Ev 57 Back

191   Ev 59 Back

192   EN, paragraph 914 Back

193   Ev 27 Back

194   See Nineteenth Report of 2006-07, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights, 28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning, HL Paper 157, HC 790, paragraphs 74 - 80. Back

195   Our correspondence on this Bill is available on the JCHR website: http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/joint_committee_on_human_rights/policingandcrimebill.cfm Back

196   Ev 26 - 27 Back

197   Part 7; Clauses 135 - 152 Back

198   EN, paragraphs 955-956 Back

199   Blake v UK, App No 68890/01, judgment dated 25 October 2005, paragraph 131. Back

200   Tolstoy v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 442, paragraph 37.  Back

201   Ev 28 Back

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