6 PROTECT: THE DUTIES OF THE
UK
130. The duty on states to protect human rights may
include the responsibility to regulate the behaviour of businesses
and other private entities to safeguard the rights of others.
The means by which states meet their duty cannot be prescribed
and could vary from state to state. In his April 2009 report,
Professor Ruggie explained:
states are not held responsible for corporate-related
human rights abuse per se, but may be considered in breach of
their obligations where they fail to take appropriate steps to
prevent it and to investigate, punish and redress it when it occurs.
Within these parameters, states have discretion as to how to
fulfil their duty. The main human right treaties generally contemplate
legislative, administrative and judicial measures.[180]
131. We called for evidence of specific gaps in the
legislative and regulatory framework in the UK and we consider
three significant issues raised with us in this Chapter:
- The application of the Human Rights Act 1998
for the businesses performing public functions;
- Forced labour in the UK; and
- The recognition of labour and union rights.
The application of the HRA 1998
to the private sector
132. In our March 2007 Report, The Meaning of
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act,[181]
we called for the Government to take legislative steps to
clarify the scope of the HRA 1998, to ensure that all private
providers performing a public function would be subject to the
direct application of the Act and the duty in Section 6, to act
in a manner compatible with Convention rights, as Parliament originally
intended. We considered the impact of the gap in the law created
by the unduly narrow interpretation of 'public function' adopted
by the UK's domestic courts and concluded that a legislative solution
was necessary.[182]
Subsequent to our Report, in YL v Birmingham, the House
of Lords, confirmed this line of case law and concluded
that private providers of publicly funded residential care were
not performing a public function and the HRA 1998 did not apply
to their activities. [183]
The Government introduced amending legislation in the Health
and Social Care Act 2008 to remedy the immediate problem by deeming
the provision of publicly funded residential care in private care
homes a public function for the purposes of the HRA 1998.[184]
133. No witnesses to this inquiry argued that the
scope of the HRA 1998 should be restricted any further. The Institute
of Directors (IoD) expressed concern about the "serious danger
of extending the language and the legislation of human rights
to areas where they do not belong". Although it did not
identify any particular danger the IoD argued that there was a
risk that extending human rights obligations directly to service
providers could reduce the ability of the private sector to provide
public services in the most efficient way possible "without
being burdened by a civil service mentality". It also thought
that this could lead to contracts failing to define service standards
appropriately, allowing contracting public bodies to rely on minimum
standards in the Convention rather than setting individual contractual
standards. The IoD added that in its view, some breaches of service
standards may be considered breaches of human rights, but may
not be sufficiently grave for human rights legislation to apply.[185]
134. Professor Ruggie stressed that, in his view,
it was important to remember that the state can never contract
out of its human rights obligations. It remains the responsibility
of the state to ensure that any private provider continues to
operate to standards that meet those obligations.[186]
Although Professor Ruggie said that this could be achieved through
the use of contractual obligations, he conceded that he was not
familiar with the arguments raised in the UK in respect of this
issue.[187]
135. In its response to our 2007 Report, published
two years late, on 28 October 2009, the Government criticised
our approach to the concerns of private sector providers.[188]
It agreed that some private sector concerns were "exaggerated
or overstated". However, the Government argued that we had
failed to recognise that Government must "take into account
the need to maintain a functioning market for the provision of
public services" and so must provide "reassurance"
to current or potential service providers.[189]
136. We have heard nothing new in this inquiry
to suggest that we should change our view that legislative change
is necessary to restore the original intention of Parliament,
that all private bodies performing public functions should be
subject to the duty to act compatibly with human rights. We are
concerned that the Government's approach panders to the unjustified
concerns of some in the private sector in order to maintain the
market for contracted-out services and represents a significant
shift from its earlier view that the scope of the HRA 1998 should
be clarified. In our view, this apparent change of policy represents
a failure of leadership by the Government on such an important
human rights issue.
137. In our Report on the Health and Social Care
Bill, we said that the resolution of the immediate problem of
publicly funded care in private residential homes did not deal
with the broader uncertainty of the meaning of public function.[190]
We asked Michael Wills MP, the Minister for Human Rights, about
this during our inquiry on a Bill of Rights for the UK, in May
2008, and he was clear that there was a wider constitutional issue
beyond the issue of private care homes that needed to be taken
seriously. He reassured us that the Government intended to move
as quickly as it possibly could to consult on the broader issue
of the scope of the HRA 1998:
We also accept that there is a wider issue
.
It is not easy to resolve. Everyone wants to resolve it. There
is no issue between us on where we want to end up. We want to
end up at a proper definition which covers contracted-out public
services in a way that Parliament originally intended but we must
be certain we are not going to end up with unintended and perverse
consequences.
We are going to consult on this ... Please
do not have any illusion that we do not take this anything other
than extremely seriously.[191]
138. This assurance was repeated to us in January
2009[192] and in the
House of Commons in June and July 2009.[193]
Given this history, we were amazed that the Government's written
evidence to this inquiry downplayed the significance of the problem,
arguing that:
For the most part, it is clear both in law and
in practice when a function should be considered a function of
a public nature. It is only at the very margins of the concept
that certainty may not exist; however, such marginal uncertainty
would be an inevitable consequence of the duty having been defined
in any manner other than by reference to a list of those subject
thereto.[194]
139. The EHRC disagreed strongly with this position.
It said the voluntary sector found the continuing uncertainty
particularly difficult.[195]
The SHRC told us that:
There is uncertainty in practice, if not legally
about this question of whether this is settled in a legal sense
or that it is an area of marginal uncertainty. The key areas
that we have picked up on would be other vulnerable groups, such
as detainees in the broadest sense and those detained under mental
health legislation.[196]
140. Business for Social Responsibility argued that
clarity in this area would add legal certainty for businesses
and would be a 'valuable contribution' to this debate.[197]
Other witnesses told us that uncertainty in the existing law
was bad for business and bad for the protection of individual
rights. Clifford Chance explained:
If satellite litigation on the issue of what
is and is not a public authority has to go to the Court of Appeal
or the House of Lords before a claimant can even be sure that
a claim can proceed, that is a significant barrier to a remedy
for that claimant, who may struggle to fund even a straightforward
claim.[198]
141. Leigh Day told us that uncertainty was still
leading to litigation:
A key area in which the protection of the HRA
fails (and in which Leigh Day & Co are often instructed) is
in relation to private companies running immigration detention
centres and providing escort services for removals and deportations.
The Home Office argue that it is not responsible for the
actions of private companies and hence rigorously defend HRA claims,
and the companies themselves state that they are not subject to
the HRA. This issue has yet to be determined by the Court and
highlights the unnerving ability of public authorities to contract
out of their human rights obligations.[199]
142. We are particularly concerned to hear evidence
from public law solicitors that cases are being litigated over
the exercise of compulsory powers in immigration detention. In
our previous correspondence with the Government, we understood
that the exercise of any compulsory powers associated with detention
would be subject to Section 6 of the HRA 1998.[200]
This evidence clearly illustrates the need for clarification of
the scope of the HRA 1998. Although the Government considers
that the legal position in respect of these cases is settled,
we maintain that legislation is urgently needed to resolve the
existing uncertainty surrounding the meaning of public authority,
putting beyond doubt, in statute, Parliament's original intention.
In the meantime, we recommend that the Government produce clear
and detailed guidance to relevant Government departments and agencies
in order to ensure that all public authorities and relevant contractors
understand the scope of their duties under the HRA.
143. We asked the Government to confirm how many
arguments had arisen over the scope of Section 6(3)(b), including
in litigation and were told that the Government was only aware
of one contested case that had proceeded since the case of YL.
This case involves a decision of the Court of Appeal that the
allocation and management of social housing by a registered social
landlord was a public function for the purposes of Section 6,
HRA 1998.[201] It
was subject to appeal and the sub-judice rule of both Houses
during our inquiry, so we did not take evidence on the case.
Our view - that the provision of social housing further to statutory
arrangements is a public function - is already a matter of record.[202]
On 6 November 2009, the Supreme Court refused permission
to appeal in Weaver. The Court of Appeal judgment - that
the allocation and termination of social tenancies by the defendant
housing association was a public function - stands.
144. In its response to our 2007 Report, the Government
reiterates the view that after the decision in YL, the
law is largely clear and any uncertainty is marginal. It considers
that this issue, although "frustrating" should not be
allowed to "detract from the overall success" of the
HRA 1998 or "give the impression that the scope of its protection
has been significantly truncated".[203]
It argues that there is a "serious misconception" about
the extent of the effect of the YL judgment:
Many people receiving publicly-arranged social
care were under the impression that, as a result of YL, they
had "lost their human rights". Even before the legislative
response to that judgment came into force, this was an incorrect
assessment of the position. The rights of every person in the
United Kingdom are secured by the European Convention on Human
Rights, and every person may bring proceedings under the Human
Rights Act. The issue addressed in YL was only whether
those proceedings could be brought directly against the service
provider in question.[204]
145. We are concerned by the Government's analysis
of the House of Lords decision in YL. In our first report
on this issue, we explained that unless private providers could
be directly challenged on human rights grounds, service users
could face difficulties in challenging the public authority who
contracted out the service. These difficulties included proximity
to the harm which occurred under the care of the private provider
and whether the public authority knew that the actions of the
private provider were likely to endanger service users' rights.[205]
These concerns are highlighted by the evidence provided by Leigh
Day, that the Home Office has argued that it is not responsible
for the activities of private contractors when faced with potential
HRA 1998 claims.
146. The Government's view that YL was only
about the right to bring legal proceedings is a disappointingly
narrow interpretation of the public duty to act in a Convention
compatible way. In numerous reports, we have reported that this
duty is intended to improve the way that those bodies performing
a public function provide their services. It is not just a cause
of action, but a positive duty designed to protect individual
rights and improve service delivery, without recourse to law.
Although Section 7 HRA 1998 provides a right for individuals
to enforce that duty by seeking a remedy for failure to act in
a Convention compatible way, the duty is not just about the right
to litigate.
147. The Government's view that the scope of the
HRA 1998 is subject only to marginal uncertainty is not correct.
We accept its view that in the wider context of the operation
of the Act against core public authorities, the application of
the HRA 1998 is settled and clear. We also agree that this issue
should not detract from the overall success of the HRA 1998.
However, we find unacceptable the Government's attempt to dismiss
the outstanding problems created by the decision of the House
of Lords.[206]
148. We asked Michael Wills MP to confirm the Government's
position. He said that settling the issue of the scope of the
HRA was important, but that a promised consultation was not imminent
while litigation was continuing.[207]
Without a legislative solution to the current state of case law
on the scope of the Act, repetitive litigation on a case-by-case
and sector-by-sector basis is inevitable. Continued delay can
only exacerbate the problem. The Supreme Court is bound by House
of Lords precedent in YL.[208]
The courts will be bound to move further away from the original
definition intended by Parliament, unless they decide to distinguish
YL and all other earlier authorities in favour of a more
functional test.
149. The Government has broken its promise to
consult speedily on the scope of the HRA 1998. It is disappointing
that the Government now relies on further litigation to justify
its procrastination. In the time since the passage of the Health
and Social Care Act 2008, a consultation could have been completed.
An interpretative provision could still be inserted in the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Bill. Instead, uncertainty continues for
both business and the users of public services, who are forced
to litigate to seek clarity.
150. The Government's decision to delay is unacceptable,
particularly as it has already published its broad view on the
sole issue currently before the courts, and on the wider debate.
The litigation in Weaver is over. It is inevitable that
litigation on other issues will surface. We are not persuaded
that any further public consultation on this issue is necessary
and call on the Government to bring forward a legislative solution
as soon as possible. If the Government insists on publishing
a formal consultation document, we recommend that they do so without
delay. Any consultation should be short in duration and focus
on a proposed legislative solution.
Offence of forced labour in the
UK
151. Anti-Slavery International highlighted the issue
of servitude and forced labour in the UK. Despite many efforts
by the UK Government over the past decade, it told us that gaps
in the law were allowing forced labour and modern slavery to continue
in the UK. particularly in the agriculture and food packaging
industries.[209]
152. It told us that forced labour generated high
profits for those involved. It was often difficult to detect
as it most often involved migrant workers in the informal labour
market:
The forms of coercion in recruiting forced labour
are relatively subtle. Actual physical violence is rare. The person
may be deceived into a situation of exploitation by accepting
an initial promise of work and finding on arrival, that the work
or working conditions do not meet that promise but the person
has little or no choice but to accept it. Manipulation, psychological
pressure and threats or simply the retention of their identification
documents, are tactics used to coerce the person to accept inferior
(and often exploitative) working conditions than what they had
previously agreed. This is often combined with debt bondage, which
is exacerbated by the obligation that the worker accepts further
services at inflated prices such as accommodation and transport.[210]
153. The principal gap in the law identified by Anti-Slavery
International is the failure to criminalise the act of using a
person for compulsory or forced labour, as distinct from the act
of trafficking. Article 25 of ILO Forced Labour Convention (Convention
29) provides that the UK must penalise these offences. Article
4 ECHR prohibits servitude and forced labour. The European Court
of Human Rights considers that a failure to criminalise these
acts can amount to a failure to provide specific and effective
protection for victims.[211]
Together with Liberty, Anti-Slavery International proposed amendments
to the Coroners and Justice Bill to make it an offence to hold
another person in servitude or subject a person to forced or compulsory
labour.[212] At Third
Reading in the House of Lords, the Government brought forward
its own amendments to introduce an offence of slavery, servitude,
forced or compulsory labour.[213]
Introducing the amendments, Lord Tunnicliffe explained that the
offence would be brought into force "as soon as practicable".
The Government anticipated that guidance and training would be
provided for the police on the scope of the new offence. The
Government committed to work with stakeholders and others to raise
awareness of the offence.[214]
154. We commend the Government's acceptance that
a specific offence of servitude and forced labour was necessary
to meet our international obligations to prohibit and prosecute
these acts of modern slavery and welcome the provision included
at a late stage in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
155. We note that the Government "anticipates"
that guidance and training will be provided on the scope of the
new offence. We welcome the Government's commitment to promote
awareness of this offence. We recommend that the Government works
with the Association of Chief Police Officers and other relevant
stakeholders, including business organisations, to ensure that
adequate guidance is produced for both police and the wider community
in an accessible way.
Labour and Union Rights
156. A number of trades unions and trades union
associations told us that existing laws in the UK do not go far
enough to protect employees' labour rights or their trades union
rights, as guaranteed by the right to freedom of association (which
is protected by Article 11 ECHR and the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)); the rights guaranteed
by the ILO Conventions (specifically, the Conventions on freedom
of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98)), and the European Social Charter.[215]
Broadly, they argued:
- states, including the UK, must treat certain
labour rights as human rights with the appropriate degree of protection.
These labour rights include the right to strike, the right to
collective bargaining and the right to organise, including through
a trades union.[216]
- states should not be permitted to ignore their
obligations under existing human rights instruments in respect
of labour and trades union rights.[217]
- The UK Government has responded to criticism
by the supervisory bodies of the ILO and the UN on these issues
by asserting that existing laws are compatible with the relevant
Convention obligations, despite repeated criticisms of the UK
Government approach by those bodies.[218]
- The UK should ratify the revised European Social
Charter to allow collective complaints against the UK to be brought
before the Council of Europe Economic and Social Rights Committee.[219]
This reiterates a recommendation of our predecessor Committee
in its 2005 report on the review of international human rights
instruments.[220]
157. The IER and the TUC argued that the right to
collective bargaining through an independent trades union is inadequately
protected in the UK. They maintain that the existing statutory
recognition procedure for trades unions is overly complicated,
does not extend to small businesses, and allows many businesses
to avoid collective bargaining. In October 2004, in its report
on the ICESCR, our predecessor Committee concluded that inconsistencies
in the provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999 could lead
to breaches of the ICESCR and the right to respect for private
life under Article 8 ECHR.[221]
It concluded that the existing law was inadequate and criticised
the consistent failure of the Government to answer the criticisms
of the relevant international monitoring bodies.
158. The IER and the TUC said that the right to strike
is undermined by the operation of the common law, which provides
that strike action is a breach of the employment contract. Although
domestic law currently provides for a 12 week protected period
during which dismissal will be deemed unfair, the IER calls for
the law to be amended to provide that strike action suspends rather
than breaches the contract of employment. They point out that
this is consistent with a number of recommendations of international
human rights bodies, including the UN Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Committee.[222]
159. The right to freedom of association, the
associated right to strike, the right to trade union membership
and the right to collective bargaining are rights recognised in
the international human rights obligations of the UK and overseen
by the European Court of Human Rights, the ILO and the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the ILO Committee of
Experts considers that current domestic law on the right to strike
and the right to collective bargaining places undue restrictions
on those rights. The UK Government has failed to take the recommendations
of those Committees seriously. We reiterate our predecessors'
recommendation that the UK Government review the existing law
in the light of those recommendations.[223]
We note that the European Court of Human Rights is increasingly
citing the findings of the UN Committee and the ILO in its interpretation
of the right to freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11
ECHR.[224]
This jurisprudence may be relied upon in the domestic courts to
challenge the compatibility of existing law with Convention rights
protected by the HRA 1998. This provides an added incentive to
the Government to conduct a review without delay.
160. The IER argued that enabling trades unions to
complain of breaches of the European Social Charter would increase
the relevance to the UK's domestic courts of the jurisprudence
of the ILO Committee and the Social Rights Committee of the Council
of Europe in a way that had not previously been considered relevant.
They agreed that the indirect effects of ratification were important:
The direct legal effects may not be massive but
the indirect legal effects are very important and significant
we
think that trade unions in this country, as they have in Ireland
and as they have in other countries of the Council of Europe should
have the same opportunity to ventilate and give publicity to particular
grievances.[225]
161. In 2004, our predecessor Committee called on
the Government to ratify the Revised Social Charter at an early
date. It made this recommendation after receiving the Government's
reassurance that it intended to ratify.[226]
The Government said in 2004 that it intended to ratify the
Charter. We recommend that it explain why it has not done so.
We repeat the recommendation of our predecessor Committee in
2004: the UK should ratify the Revised Social Charter.
162. The IER and the TUC argued that the Information
Commissioner's recent discovery of an unlawful "blacklist"
database of construction employees should prompt the Government
to use existing regulation making powers under Section 3 of the
Employment Relations Act 1999 to create a new framework to stop
the blacklisting of employees involved in trade union activity.
In July 2009, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
(BIS) published draft regulations for consultation.[227]
The IER and other unions, particularly UCATT, have criticised
the draft Regulations. Professor Keith Ewing of the Institute
of Employment Rights dismissed the draft Regulations as "hopeless
and inadequate".[228]
UCATT consider that the proposals do not go far enough to stop
blacklisting trades union members and that they fail to establish
a compensation scheme for those individuals who have already been
affected by blacklisting.[229]
The Government is expected to introduce regulations before the
end of 2009.
163. We doubt the compatibility of the Government's
blacklisting proposals with the UK's international human rights
obligations. We recommend that the Government provide a full
explanation of its argument that the proposals are compatible.
This should include a response to the criticism of the Institute
of Employment Rights, that these proposals fail to provide an
adequate remedy for those individuals who have already been affected
by blacklisting. In the light of the Government's explanation,
we anticipate revisiting this issue.
180 Ruggie Report 2009, para 14 Back
181
Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, Meaning of Public Authority under
the Human Rights Act, HL Paper 77/HC 410. Back
182
Ibid, see paras 135 - 136. Back
183
YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 Back
184
Health and Social Care Act 2008, Section 145. Back
185
Ev 108, paras 7 - 12 Back
186
QQ 7-8 Back
187
Q10 Back
188
Cm 7726, Ministry of Justice, Government Response to the Joint
Committee on Human Rights' Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, October
2009. Herein "The Government Response". Back
189
The Government Response, para 89 Back
190
Eighth Report of 2007-08, Legislative Scrutiny: Health and Social
Care Bill, HL Paper 46/HC 303, paras 1.22 - 1.24. Back
191
Q470, Twenty-ninth Report of 2007-08, A Bill of Rights for the
UK?, HL Paper 165-II/HC150-II. Back
192
HC 174-I, Uncorrected transcript, oral evidence given by Rt Hon
Jack Straw MP and Michael Wills MP, QQ 78-79. Back
193
HC Deb, 25 June 2009, Cols 344 WH - 345 WH; HC Deb, 3 July 2009,
Col 659. Back
194
Ev 85 Back
195
Q295 Back
196
Q295 Back
197
Ev 290 Back
198
Ev 197 Back
199
Ev 293 Back
200
Eighth Report of 2007-08, Legislative Scrutiny: Health and Social
Care Bill, HL Paper 46/HC 303. Back
201
Weaver v London Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587. Back
202
Seventeenth Report of 2007-08, Legislative Scrutiny: (1) Employment
Bill; (2) Housing and Regenteration Bill; (3) Other Bills, HL
Paper 95/HC 501, paras 2.9 - 2.21. Back
203
The Government Response, para 49. Back
204
The Government Response, para 50. Back
205
Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, The Meaning of Public Authority
under the Human Rights Act, HL Paper 39, HC 382, paras 78 - 85. Back
206
YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27. Back
207
Q364 Back
208
See Price v Leeds; Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council, [2006]
UKHL 10. Back
209
Ev 211.Liberty and Anti-Slavery International Joint Briefing on
the Coroners and Justice Bill for Report State of the House of
Lord, Servitude and Forced Labour amendment, October 2009. Back
210
Ev 211 Back
211
Siliadin v France, App No 73316/01, 26 July 2005. Back
212
Amendment 74, Second Marshalled List, 22 October 2009 Back
213
Amendment 15. HL Deb 5 Nov 2009, Col 399 - 401. Back
214
Ibid, Col 400. Back
215
Ev 241, Ev 250, Ev 354 Back
216
Q85 (Professor Keith Ewing), See also Q86 (John Hendy QC) Back
217
Q 87 (Owen Tudor, TUC) Back
218
Q95 Back
219
QQ 97-98 Back
220
Seventeenth Report of 2004-05, Review of International Human Rights
Instruments, HL Paper 99/HC 264, paras 42-44. Back
221
Twenty-first Report of 2003-04, The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras 143-144. Back
222
Ev 245 - 250 Back
223
Twenty-first Report of 2003-04, The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras 143-144. Back
224
Demir and Baykara v Turkey, App No 34503/97, Judgment 12 November
2008, para 154 (recognition that the right to collective bargaining
was protected by Article 11 ECHR); Enerji Yapi-Yol v Turkey, 21
April 2009 (recognition that the right to strike is recognised
by Article 11 ECHR).Contrast the decision of the Court of Appeal
in R (NUJ) v Central Arbitration Committee [2005] EWCA Civ 1309,
para 35, which concluded that the right to recognition for the
purposes of collective bargaining was not protected by Article
11 ECHR. Back
225
Q98 Back
226
Seventeenth Report of 2004-05, para 44. Back
227
BIS, The Blacklisting of Trade Unionists: Revised Draft Regulations,
July 2009; http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page52145.html
Back
228
http://www.ucatt.info/content/view/765/30/
Back
229
See for example, UCATT and IER, Ruined Lives: Blacklisting in
the Construction Industry, October 2009. Back
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