Letter to the Chair of the Committee from
the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice, dated
26 January 2010
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND GOVERNANCE BILL:
AMENDMENTS FOR COMMITTEE STAGE TO IMPLEMENT CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE'S REPORT ON MP'S
EXPENSES AND ALLOWANCES
Following the written statement by the Leader
of the House on 10 December, I have today tabled Government
amendments to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill to
implement ten of the recommendations of the Kelly report on MP's
expenses and allowances. I am satisfied that the provisions are
compatible with the Convention rights. The attached memorandum
details our assessment of the human rights issues arising from
the amendments.
Annex
ECHR MEMORANDUM: AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM AND GOVERNANCE BILL WHICH IMPLEMENT THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE
1. This Memorandum addresses human rights
issues arising in relation to provisions which implement the report
of the Committee on Standards in Public Life ("CSPL")
on MPs' expenses, the committee chaired by Sir Christopher Kelly
("the Kelly report").[31]
The provisions are to be inserted into the Constitutional Reform
and Governance Bill by amendment ("CRAG").
INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND
2. Last year, in response to the MPs' expenses
scandal, Parliament passed the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 ("the
2009 Act") to an accelerated timetable. That Act:
(a) establishes the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority ("the IPSA") to:
(i)administer MPs' pay;
(ii)prepare and administer an MPs' allowances scheme;
(iii)prepare and administer an MPs' code of conduct
relating to financial interests ("the financial code");
(b) establishes an independent office holder,
the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations ("the Commissioner"),
to investigate breaches of the MPs' allowances scheme and the
financial code and refer findings to the House of Commons Committee
on Standards and Privileges for the House to decide whether to
take disciplinary action;
(c) establishes the Speaker's Committee for the
IPSA, made up of MPs, which agrees selections of members of the
IPSA and the Commissioner and has a role in the financial accountability
of the IPSA;
(d) creates an offence for an MP who provides
information which that MP knows to be false or misleading for
an allowances claim;
(e) makes provision about the transfer of further
functions to the IPSA or Commissioner;
(f) provides a sunset clause which would result
in provisions of the 2009 Act which relate to the Commissioner
and financial code expiring (subject to a power to extend) two
years after the commencement of the financial code provisions.
3. The Kelly report was published on 4 November
2009. It contains 60 recommendations. Many of these recommendations
relate to the type of allowances scheme that should be established
by the IPSA and which are within the existing powers of the IPSA.
However, there are other recommendations which could not be implemented
without primary legislation which the provisions, described below,
address.
THE PROVISIONS
4. The amendments make provision concerning
the following:
(a) Amendments 01 and 16: The independent
Commissioner would be replaced by a Compliance Officer appointed
by the IPSA through a process of fair and open competition. The
powers of the Compliance Officer to investigate complaints would
be similar to those presently vested in the Commissioner.
(b) Amendment 2: The Speaker's Committee on the
IPSA would include three lay, voting members drawn from outside
Parliament.
(c) Amendment 3: The general duties of the IPSA
are enhanced in several ways, in particular to enhance transparency
of the new system. Specifically:
(i)The IPSA would be given a duty to support MPs
to carry out their parliamentary duties in an efficient, cost
effective and transparent way.
(ii)The IPSA would be required to give reasons for
adopting an allowances scheme.
(iii)The IPSA would be required to publish claims
for allowances made and allowances paid, with such details as
it considers appropriate.
(d) Amendment 4: The IPSA is given the power
to set, as well as to administer, the MPs' pay system, after consulting
the Review Body on Senior Salaries and others.
(e) Amendment 5: A power is provided so that
the IPSA is able to give effect to exercises of the disciplinary
power of the House of Commons in relation to allowances (including
resettlement grant). Under the 2009 Act, this power exists
only in relation to salaries (see section 4 of the 2009 Act).
This would enable the IPSA, for example, to reduce or remove an
allowance payable for future breaches of the House of Commons
conduct rules.
(f) Amendment 7: The provisions of the 2009 Act
in relation to the financial code will be repealed.
(g) Amendment 6, 8 and 17: The Compliance
Officer would be given the power to impose sanctions, namely a
civil penalty, as well as requiring the restitution of wrongly
paid allowances. Repayments, monetary penalties and costs would
also be made recoverable through the county court. The Government
would provide a route of appeal from decisions of the Compliance
Officer to the First-tier Tribunal. The MP or Compliance Officer
can appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper
Tribunal on any point of law with permission, pursuant to section
11 of Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ("TCEA").
There is then a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal with permission
on a point of law pursuant to section 13 of the TCEA. There
is also the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court.
(h) Amendment 12: The sunset clause would be
repealed.
(i) Amendment 19: The IPSA is given the power
to make a scheme about the administration of the Parliamentary
Contributory Pension Fund and to make provision about MPs' pensions
in a MPs' pensions scheme. The Minister for the Civil Service
is given the power to make a scheme making provision about Ministers'
etc pensions in a Ministers' etc pension scheme.
5. The amendments would also provide for
the possibility of a protocol between the IPSA and the new Compliance
Officer and other enforcement bodies, including the non-statutory
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and prosecuting authorities
(see amendment 10). There are also minor and consequential amendmentssee
amendment 11 (repeal of section 11 of the 2009 Act)
and amendments 13 and 18 (consequential amendments).
ECHR ISSUES
6. In outline, the key human rights issues
in respect of the above amendments are as follows:
(a) whether the enforcement powers of the Compliance
Officer (contained in amendments 6, 8 and 17) give rise to
issues under Article 6 ECHR and Article 1 of the First
Protocol;
(b) whether the IPSA's powers to give effect
to the exercises of the disciplinary powers of the House in relation
to the MPs' allowances scheme and pay (contained in amendment
4 and 5) are compatible with Article 6 and Article 1 of
the First Protocol;
(c) whether the provision (contained in amendment
4) that no payment of salary is to be made before an MP has taken
the oath required by the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866 (or
the corresponding affirmation) is compatible with Article 1 of
the First Protocol;
(d) whether the duty on the IPSA to publish such
information as it considers appropriate in respect of each claim
for an allowance and each payment (contained in draft amendment
3) are compatible with Article 8 ECHR; and
(e) whether the provisions in relation to the
making of pensions schemes (contained in amendment 19) are compatible
with Article 1 of the First Protocol.
7. We address each of these issues below.
ECHR COMPATIBILITY
(a) Compliance Officer and enforcement
8. Article 6 provides that where there
is a determination of a civil right/obligation, or a criminal
charge, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. Importantly,
that right: (a) contains certain procedural guarantees concerning
the determination of civil rights or obligations; and (b) guarantees
a right of access to court for such determinations.
9. Article 1 of the First Protocol
provides that no one is to be deprived of his or her possessions
except in the public interest and subject to conditions provided
by law.
10. As stated above, the Compliance Officer
would be given the power to impose sanctions, namely a civil penalty,
as well as requiring the restitution of wrongly paid allowances.
Repayments, monetary penalties and costs would also be made recoverable
through the county court. These functions may give rise to issues
under Article 6 and Article 1 of the First Protocol,
which we detail below. The Compliance Officer's investigation
powers may give rise to issues under Article 8 which are
also discussed below.
Repayment Direction and Enforcement
11. The enforcement powers of the Compliance
Officer give rise to issues under Article 6 ECHR. This is
because the making of a direction to repay overpayments ("a
repayment direction") under new Schedule 4 may amount
to the determination of a civil right or obligation. Such a repayment
direction would require an MP to repay overpayments, interest
on those overpayments and costs incurred by the IPSA or Compliance
Officer in relation to the overpayment. A repayment direction
would require the repayments by a certain time. The main way of
enforcing a direction would be to recover the amount against future
payments of allowances and salaries. However, they would also
be recoverable through the county court.
12. Arguably, a repayment direction under
the new Schedule 4 does not amount to a determination of
a civil right or obligation for Article 6 purposes. This
is because there is clear authority to the effect that disciplinary
functions in relation to members of Parliament do not engage Article
6 because of the public law nature inherent in being a member
of Parliament. For example, the Strasbourg court has held that
Article 6 is not engaged in cases where members of Parliament
were automatically disqualified after being found bankrupt and
removed for exceeding the level of elections expenses (albeit
in the latter case after a court finding to that effect).[32]
An earlier case decided that there is authority that the right
to participate in a legislative chamber (in that particular case
the House of Lords) "falls into the sphere of 'public law'
rights outside the scope of Article 6."[33]
13. The question is how far these authorities
apply in the case of what is essentially a repayment, rather than
disciplinary scheme. In the context of other obligations to make
payments to the state (for example, obligations under tax legislation),
the Strasbourg court has held that the fact that a dispute is
pecuniary is not sufficient to show that there is a determination
of a civil right or obligation. The question is whether the private
law features predominate over the public law features.[34]
14. In this case, there are arguments that
the pecuniary interest involved in making a repayment here is
so closely related to each MP's responsibilities as an MP that
the interests affected here are public in nature. On the other
hand, there are weaknesses with this argument because the features
of the allowances scheme are likely to have the features of other
expenses schemes in private employment. It may be thought that
the pecuniary interest affected is analogous to pecuniary interests
affected in a private law context. Nevertheless, there are arguments
that the public nature of these matters means that Article 6 is
not engaged.
15. Even if a court were to find that a
repayment direction did determine civil rights or obligations,
there are a range of safeguards to ensure that the process behind
the repayment direction is compatible with Article 6. In particular:
(a) The Compliance Officer will be independent
and impartial. In particular, the Compliance Officer is appointed
by the IPSA on the basis of fair and open competition and is independent
of the executive. A person appointed to this position is appointed
for a fixed term of five years, after which a person appointed
to this role may not be re-appointed. Furthermore, the person
appointed can only be removed during the fixed term on very limited
grounds, for example because they are declared bankrupt or unfit
to carry out the functions of their office. These safeguards ensure
that the role of Compliance Officer is independent and impartial
for Article 6 purposes.
(b) A repayment direction will only be made after
the investigation process by the Compliance Officer set out in
amendment 8. As part of that process, the MP would be given an
opportunity to make representations as part of the investigation.
The MP would also be given an opportunity to make further representations
about the Compliance Officer's provisional findings.
(c) A decision by the Compliance Officer to impose
a repayment direction would be subject to appeal to the First-tier
Tribunal. The MP would also be able to appeal against the imposition
of interest or costs. That appeal would be by way of a full rehearing.
Repayments, interest and costs would not be recoverable until
the appeal proceedings were completed. These appeal rights are
sufficient to ensure that the provisions are compatible with Article
6 by providing a right of appeal which stands free of any
additional right to seek judicial review. This ensures that matters
which may involve the determination of a civil right or obligation
are decided by an independent and impartial tribunal which has
"full jurisdiction" to rehear all issues of law and
fact.
(d) An MP may also apply to the Compliance Officer
to extend the period in which a repayment should be made. An MP
may also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in respect of the Compliance
Officer's decision not to extend the repayment period.
(e) The IPSA would be required to set out other
procedures in relation to investigations by the Compliance Officer
and complaints to the Compliance Officer and set guidance about
the imposition of costs as part of a repayment direction. In doing
so, the IPSA, a public authority for the purpose of section 6 of
the Human Rights Act 1998, would be required to act compatibly
with the Convention rights.
(f) The Compliance Officer will also be a public
authority and required to act compatibly with the Convention rights.
16. Accordingly, we consider that the provisions
relating to repayment directions and their enforcement are compatible
with Article 6.
Imposition of a Monetary Penalty
17. Part 2 of new Schedule 4 would
provide the Compliance Officer with powers to impose a monetary
penalty. The Compliance Officer would be able to impose a penalty:
(a) where the Compliance Officer has made a finding that an MP
has without reasonable excuse failed to comply with a request
for information; and (b) where the MP has without reasonable excuse
failed to comply with a repayment direction. The penalty is limited
to £1,000. As with the repayment direction, the penalty would
be recoverable against future payments of pay or allowances, but
would also be recoverable through the county court.
18. We consider that it is likely that the
powers to impose a penalty will engage the civil limb of Article
6 ECHR as being the determination of a civil right or obligation.
However, we consider that there are tenable arguments that the
monetary penalty regime would not engage the criminal limb of
Article 6. The test for whether there is a determination of a
criminal charge is whether an act is classified as criminal for
the purpose of domestic law; the nature of the offence; and the
seriousness of the penalty, Engel v Netherlands (1976)
1 EHRR 647. Here, the penalty is of a civil nature in domestic
law and it is imposed for failure to comply with the requirements
of the Compliance Officer which are in the nature of sanctions
for administrative wrongdoing rather than having the characteristics
of criminal misconduct. The penalty is also designed to ensure
compliance with the scheme rather than being of a punitive nature.
In addition, the penalty is capped at £1,000. There is no
direct connection between the circumstances in which a penalty
is imposed and the criminal offence provision in section 10 of
the 2009 Act (offence of providing false or misleading information
for allowances claims).
19. The following safeguards are available
concerning the imposition of a penalty:
(a) A penalty will only be imposed after a finding
that the MP has failed to provide information to the Compliance
Officer or after a failure to comply with a repayment direction.
Both circumstances will only arise after there has been an investigation
by the Compliance Officer in relation to whether an MP has been
overpaid, as set out in substituted section 9. The MP will have
the opportunity to make representations during that process.
(b) The Compliance Officer would be required
to provide a penalty notice setting out information about the
penalty imposed.
(c) As with the making of a repayment direction,
the MP would have a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
against the imposition of a penalty. That appeal would be by way
of a full rehearing; the First-tier Tribunal would therefore have
"full jurisdiction" to rehear all issues of law and
fact. The penalty would not be recoverable while an appeal against
the penalty is on foot.
(d) The IPSA would be required to prepare guidance
about the imposition of penalties. In doing so, the IPSA would
be required to act compatibly with the Convention rights.
(e) As noted above, the Compliance Officer will
be required to act compatibly with the Convention rights.
(f) The Compliance Officer would be able to review
a decision to impose a penalty and would be able to cancel or
reduce the amount of the penalty.
20. Even were the criminal limb of Article
6 engaged, we consider that this would be at the less serious
spectrum of what constitutes a "criminal charge". Strasbourg
authority suggests where an "offence" is a lesser criminal
charge, fewer safeguards may be needed to secure Article 6 compliance.[35]
We are therefore confident that the safeguards outlined above,
and in particular the right of access to the First-tier Tribunal,
would be adequate.
21. Accordingly, we consider that the monetary
penalty provisions are compatible with Article 6.
22. Article 1 of the First Protocol
may also be engaged by the repayment direction and the imposition
of a monetary penalty, given that these will involve the interference
with an MP's pecuniary interests. However, we consider that any
interference is clearly justified given the public interest in
MPs not being overpaid allowances, there being appropriate sanctions
to enforce such a principle and given the safeguards that surround
any interference with the pecuniary interest.
23. Accordingly, we consider that the monetary
penalty provisions are compatible with Article 1 of the First
Protocol.
Investigation powers and Article 8
24. As noted above, the investigation powers
of the Compliance Officer are very similar to the investigation
powers of the Commissioner under the 2009 Act. In particular,
the amendments replicate the power of the Compliance Officer/Commissioner
reasonably to require information of MPssee section 9(3)
of the 2009 Act and the substituted section 9(3) contained
in amendment 8. This is likely to engage Article 8.
25. Article 8 is intended to protect
individuals from arbitrary interference in their private and family
life, home and correspondence. To be permissible, any interference
with this right must pursue one of the legitimate aims laid down
in Article 8(2), such as the prevention of disorder and crime,
and must be "necessary in a democratic society", that
is proportionate to the aim pursued.
26. We are confident that the power of the
Compliance Officer reasonably to require MPs to provide information
in respect of his or her allowances is compatible with Article
8. This is because a request for such information is justified
as being necessary in the public interests of the prevention of
disorder or crime. It would be impossible for the Compliance Officer
to conduct investigations and enforce the new system without such
powers. Moreover, the requirement that the request for information
must be reasonable means that the power can be exercised compatibly.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights made no objection to the equivalent
power reasonably to require information during the passage of
the Parliamentary Standards Bill.
27. Accordingly, we consider that this provision
is compatible with Article 8.
(b) Provisions to enable the IPSA to
give effect to exercises of the disciplinary powers of the House
in relation to the MPs' allowances scheme and pay
28. Because the present system of MPs' allowances
is based on resolutions of the House of Commons, it is possible
for the Commons to withhold those allowances by resolution. This
provision would enable the IPSA to respond to any such disciplinary
measures imposed by the House of Commons.
29. Although it may be argued that this
proposal gives rise to Convention rights issues in relation to
Article 6, we consider that there are arguments to suggest that
Article 6 may not be engaged at all by this provision. As
outlined above, there is clear authority that the exercise of
certain disciplinary functions in relation to members of Parliament
does not engage Article 6 because of the public law nature
inherent in being a member of Parliament. Case law supports an
argument that conduct and discipline concerning a member of a
legislature is a matter of public law rather than private law
rights. The Strasbourg court has shown reluctance to consider
internal disciplinary functions as engaging Article 6, unless
the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is decisive of the
individual's right to practice his or her profession.[36]
30. Even assuming that there is a determination
of a civil right and thus Article 6 is engaged, we consider
this provision is compatible with that Article. This is because
this amendment merely provides a mechanism through which the disciplinary
sanctions of the House may be operated. Accordingly, the compatibility
of this amendment would be determined by the existing conduct
and discipline mechanisms in place for the House of Commons. In
this respect, there are safeguards concerning the way in which
the House operates. Furthermore, the current conduct procedures
in the House of Commons were designed with an understanding of
the potential Article 6 issues involved in conduct and discipline
matters for members.[37]
This suggests that those functions and any implementation by IPSA
of sanctions would be exercisable in a compatible way. We also
note that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has recently observed
that the procedures adopted by the House of Lords in its code
of conduct satisfy the common law requirements of fairness.[38]
We consider that the Commons procedures are comparable to those
in the Lords, and in some respects superior, for example, in having
the Parliamentary Commissioner of Standards as an independent
investigator of standards issues.
31. Accordingly, assuming that Article 6 is
engaged by this amendment, we consider that the provision is compatible
with Article 6 ECHR.
32. This amendment may also give rise to
issues concerning Article 1 of the First Protocol. This is
because the functions of the IPSA may affect certain propriety
interests of MPs. For example, withholding an allowance payment
may affect the way in which an MP enjoys pecuniary interests under
the allowances scheme or in relation to their salaries.
33. However, we consider that any interference
with rights contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol
would be justified as being in accordance with the law and in
the public interest. This is because it is manifestly in the public
interest for the House of Commons to continue to have meaningful
sanctions powers in relation to MPs. In any event, the sanction
functions of the House of Commons are discretionary and are capable
of being exercised compatibly.
(c) Payment of an MP's salary dependent on
taking the oath
34. Amendment 4 contains provision
that an MP's salary is to be withheld until they have made and
subscribed the oath required by the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866 (or
the corresponding affirmation). This is the oath of allegiance.
This provision may give rise to issues concerning Article 1 of
the First Protocol as the withholding of salary may affect the
way in which an MP enjoys pecuniary interests in relation to their
salaries.
35. By long custom, going back to a Speaker's
ruling in 1924, any MP who has not made and subscribed the oath
(or corresponding affirmation) is not entitled to receive a salary.
The requirement to take the oath is found in section 1 of
the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866 and not amendment 4 itself.
The requirement to take the oath, along with the Speaker's Statement
in 1997 that MPs who had not taken the oath would not be
entitled to the other services available to all other MPs from
the House, has previously been subject to challenge on the basis
that Articles 9, 10 and 13 of the Convention were infringed.
The arguments were rejected by the European Court of Human Rights.[39]
36. We consider that any interference with
rights contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol would
be justified as being in accordance with the law and in the public
interest. As the European Court of Human Rights has previously
held; "the requirement that elected representatives to the
House of Commons take an oath of allegiance to the reigning monarch
can be reasonably viewed as an affirmation of loyalty to the constitutional
principles which support the workings of representative democracy.
In the Court's view it must be open to a member State to attach
such a condition, which is an integral part of its constitutional
order, to membership of Parliament and to make access to the institution's
facilities dependent on compliance with the condition".[40]
We thus consider that provision that no payment of salary is to
be made to an MP before they have made and subscribed the oath
(or corresponding affirmation) would be in the public interest.
(d) The duty on the IPSA to publish such
information as it considers appropriate in respect of each claim
for an allowance and each payment
37. As stated above, Article 8 is intended
to protect individuals from arbitrary interference in their private
and family life, home and correspondence. To be permissible, any
interference with this right must pursue one of the legitimate
aims laid down in Article 8(2), such as the prevention of disorder
and crime, and must be "necessary in a democratic society",
that is proportionate to the aim pursued. It is well established
that personal information is protected as part of an individual's
private life and that the release of such information without
the individual's consent will engage Article 8.
38. The duty on the IPSA to publish such
information as it considers appropriate in respect of each claim
for an allowance and each payment may engage Article 8 ECHR.
This is because those duties are likely to require the IPSA to
publish personal information concerning MPs.
39. However, we are satisfied that the requirement
to publish information in respect of claims for an allowance and
each payment is compatible with Article 8. This is because the
publication of such information is justified as being necessary
in the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime. In turn,
this is because we consider that having a transparent system is
a crucial part of ensuring that MPs and the IPSA comply with the
rules for the new system.
40. Furthermore, the requirement to disclose
information is also proportionate to the aim of preventing disorder
and crime. This is because the duty on the IPSA to publish only
extends to publishing some information about each claim and each
payment. This gives the IPSA areas of discretion about what to
publish and the way in which the information is published. The
IPSA can therefore decide not to publish highly sensitive information
in respect of a claim. This therefore means that the power can
be exercised compatibly.
(e) Powers to make MPs' and Ministers' etc
pension schemes
41. It is likely that Article 1 of
the First Protocol is engaged in relation to the provisions dealing
with pension schemes for MPs and Ministers etc (amendment 19).
However, we do not consider that there is any interference with
these rights. The new provisions are based on the existing provisions
of the Parliamentary and other Pensions Act 1987 which currently
deal with pension schemes for MPs and Ministers etc. In particular,
section 2(6) of the 1987 Act currently provides the circumstances
in which accrued rights, as defined in section 2(10) of the 1987 Act,
may be adversely affected. These provisions, and the definition
of accrued rights in section 2(10) of the 1987 Act, is replicated
in amendment 19.
42. The other powers given to IPSA and the
Minister for the Civil Service to make pension schemes in relation
to MPs, Ministers and other office holders largely replicate those
powers found in the 1987 Act and we consider that these are
capable of being exercised compatibly.
25 January 2010
31 Committee on Standards in Public Life, MPs' expenses
and allowances: Supporting Parliament, safeguarding the taxpayer
(12th report 2009) Cm 7724. Back
32
See also Tapie v France Application No. 32258/96 (a
Commission decision that an application by a former Member of
Parliament who was automatically disqualified from elected office
for five years after becoming insolvent was inadmissible) and
Estrosi v France Application No. 24359/94; Pierre-Bloch v France
(1997) p 16 (two cases in which the candidate declared elected
was removed by the Conseil Constitutionnel for exceeding the maximum
level of elections expenses). Back
33
X v United Kingdom (1978) Application No. 8208/78. Back
34
See Schouten v Netherlands (1994) 19 EHRR 432; and see Pierre-Bloch
v France (1997) p 17. Back
35
See for example Duhs v Sweden (No. 12995/87), where a parking
offence was imposed before a hearing. Even though this was a criminal
charge for Article 6 purposes, the imposition of a penalty
before a hearing was not a breach of Article 6 because the
offence was minor and the fine was repayable if the applicant's
objection succeeded. Back
36
Demicoli v Malta (1992) 14 EHRR 47, §33. See
also Tapie v France Application No. 32258/96; Estrosi v France
Application No. 24359/94 and Pierre-Bloch v France
(1997) p 16. Back
37
See the report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege
(1998-99) §284. Back
38
See the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny:
Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (4th Report of 2009-10)
HL Paper 33; HC 249 §1.72. Back
39
See McGuinness v United Kingdom (1999) ECHR No 39511/98 Back
40
Ibid Back
|