CHAPTER 2: Is it ever justifiable to
hold a terrorist suspect for more than 14 days?|
17. Before considering the draft bills in detail
it is necessary to consider whether we need a contingency plan
for increasing beyond 14 days the maximum period available for
pre-charge detention. This has been subject to exhaustive discussion
in recent years. The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the House
of Commons Home Affairs Committee have previously considered this
issue in detail.
Here we briefly outline the evidence we received on the matter.
18. The Review concluded that 28-day pre-charge
detention is not routinely required but it "accepted that
there may be rare cases where a longer period of detention may
be required and those cases may have significant repercussions
for national security." It recommended that:
"in order to mitigate any increased risk by
going down to 14 days ... emergency legislation extending the
period of pre-charge detention to 28 days should be drafted and
discussed with the Opposition, but not introduced, in order to
deal with urgent situations when more than 14 days is considered
necessary, for example in response to multiple co-ordinated attacks
and/or during multiple large and simultaneous investigations".
Why treat pre-charge detention
of terrorist suspects differently from all other suspects?
19. Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984, people who are reasonably suspected of serious crimes may
be detained without charge for a maximum of 96 hours (with periods
of more than 36 hours requiring special authorization by a magistrates'
court after a contested hearing). In comparison, even a 14 day
maximum is an exceptionally long time. We disagree with the Review's
suggestion that a pre-charge detention limit set at 14 days should
be considered "the norm". As the statistics in paras
14-16 show, neither the police or the CPS treat 14 days as "the
norm". We conclude that any period that exceeds 48 hours
should require specific and clear justification and in all but
the most exceptional circumstances 14 days should be regarded
as a very high level.
20. The arguments for allowing extended pre-charge
detention of terrorist suspects centre around the complexity of
terrorism investigations. Assistant Commissioner John Yates, Head
of Counter Terrorism at the Metropolitan Police, told us:
"In current investigations of an international
nature, the issues to do with technology, translation and interpretation
are matters that concern us. In a very small number of cases,
and we have not used it for four years, there may be a case where
a contingent power is necessary in our view".
21. Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris of
the Police Service Northern Ireland, suggested there was a reasonable
prospect of the powers being needed in Northern Ireland:
"I can see that a time beyond 14 days is a reasonably
foreseeable prospect given the complexity of some of the cases
we take on in respect of terrorist investigations. That can be
to do with multiple sites and multiple suspects, and then forensic
and other examinations that are necessary in respect of that.
Our view is that it is reasonably foreseeable given the terrorist
threat we are now managing."
22. We note that in Northern Ireland, during
the period we were taking evidence, several individuals were arrested
under the Terrorism Act and two of these individuals were detained
for 13 days without charge whilst another was charged on the 14th
day of detention.
23. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, the former Independent
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told us that in his opinion
the nature of terrorist investigations made it very likely that
it will be necessary to hold suspects for more than 14 days at
some point in the future:
"I foresee there may be cases for which ...
it will become apparent, possibly very late in the 14 days, that
more than 14 days is needed. For that purpose, power to go beyond
14 days is required".
24. David Anderson QC, the recently appointed
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and British Irish
Rights Watch both questioned whether there are valid reasons for
treating terrorist suspects differently to those being held under
the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. British
Irish Rights Watch argued that there were no valid reasons.
David Anderson QC said:
"One is aware that there are some factors that
tend to distinguish terrorist cases from others, most relevantly
perhaps the fact that you often have to move in at quite an early
stage before a bomb goes off. You do not have the luxury of waiting,
assembling evidence and then coming in later. But it is still
very striking to see that, even with the most complicated serious
organised crimesif you think of a people trafficking case
or something of that naturethere is a maximum of 96 hours,
which is four days".
25. In 1974, Parliament took the view that it
should be possible to hold terrorist suspects without charge for
longer than other suspects and this view has been reaffirmed in
various pieces of legislation since then. It is nevertheless important
to bear in mind that even 14 days pre-charge detention is an exceptionally
long period to hold a suspect without charge.
26. Whilst comparisons are not easy regarding
countries with different legal systems, comparisons to countries
with similar systems are relevant. David Anderson QC pointed out
that in comparison with the United States, Australia, Canada and
Ireland, 14 days pre-charge detention seems an exceptionally long
period. This point
has been made repeatedly by Liberty.
The Review noted the criticism that the UK was out of step with
other Western democracies in this respect but responded only with
the comment that "these comparisons were not always accurate
or appropriate given the differences in the criminal justice systems".
Even in countries with similar legal systems it is hard to make
direct comparisons because of other differences in the way terrorism
cases are handled. For example, in Canada and the United States
the lead body in charge of investigating terrorism cases is a
prosecuting one and
in the United States, intercept evidence can be used in court
and other options to bringing a terrorist charge exist, these
includes the use of holding charges and even extradition to places
such as Guantanamo Bay.
Has it ever been really necessary
to hold a suspect for more than 14 days?
27. Those who oppose extended pre-charge detention
beyond 14 days argue that even in the 11 cases where extensions
beyond 14 days were granted, they may not have been strictly necessary.
Liberty, JUSTICE and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven QC all made
28. Liberty asserted that three of the six people
held for up to 28 days were released without charge and have not
since been placed under surveillance, under a control order or
rearrested. Isabella Sankey, Director of Policy at Liberty, went
on to suggest that the other three suspects, "from speaking
to lawyers involved in those cases, could have been charged at
a much earlier point of their detention based on the evidence
that the police had."
29. The statistics show that, on the occasions
when the power has been used, it has not always led to convictions
even when charges were brought (see para 16 above). Lord Macdonald
of River Glaven QC, who was DPP at the time of Operation Overt,
no longer believes that it was necessary to detain the suspects
in that case beyond 14 days:
"Even in Operation Overt ... I am satisfied
now, having looked at all the documentation and material which
the CPS and police provided, that the job could have been done
within 14 days."
30. David Blunkett MP, a former Home Secretary,
who is firmly of the belief that the powers were needed and will
be needed again, pointed out that this quote from Lord Macdonald
contrasts with his view when he was DPP: he supported the applications
for each of the warrants made in Operation Overt. Lord Goldsmith
QC, who was Attorney General at the time of Operation Overt, told
us that he remembered Lord Macdonald being in favour of 90 day
pre-charge detention and had to intervene to stop him publicly
arguing in favour of 90 days.
Earlier, however, Lord Macdonald told us that although he did
support 28 days when he was DPP, "we never asked for 90 days;
we never asked for 42 days."
31. The CPS strongly disagreed with the suggestion
that they could have managed with 14 days in the 11 cases where
an extension beyond 14 days was requested. The current Director
of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, told us "there was
a genuine need in the past to apply for detention in excess of
14 days". Sue
Hemming, the Head of Counter Terrorism at the CPS, explained:
"I have been back over all the material in all
three cases. I have been back to the original warrants of further
detention and my original notes of everything that was done at
the time in order to assist the Counter Terrorism review, because
clearly they were interested and wanted to know exactly what had
been done in each case. I am satisfied, as was the High Court
judge at the time, that in all three of those cases it was necessary."
32. When trying to make this assessment it would
be useful to have access to a detailed independent review of each
of the 11 cases where an extension beyond 14 days was granted.
No such review was ever conducted and therefore it is very hard
for those outside the police and the CPS to judge whether extended
detention was absolutely necessary.
33. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
had the power to conduct such reviews if he judged them necessary.
Lord Carlile of Berriew QC did not judge them necessary. When
asked about this, Lord Carlile told us he did not consider it
necessary because nobody suggested to him that the police had
"The reason I did not investigate those three
instances was because nobody suggested to me that the police had
acted inappropriately. Furthermore, if you look at transcripts
and accounts of the trialsto the extent that those persons
were triedthat was never part of any attack on the admissibility
of evidence. Indeed, I can go further than that. It was asserted,
when 28 days was permitted, that the police would treat 28 days
as the norm. It never happened. The police have always tried to
keep the period of arrest down to the minimum. If you look at
the Operation Pathway report I prepared, you will see why. These
extended periods have been supervised most diligently by the judiciary."
34. He also said:
"There didn't seem to me to be any need because
there was absolutely no complaint, at any stage, about the process
that had been followed. I did follow those cases in some detail.
Had I thought there was a need for a review, as I did, for example,
in Operation Pathway where nobody was charged, I would
have carried one out."
35. Lord Carlile did produce a detailed report
on the Operation Pathway case. Operation Pathway did not involve
pre-charge detention of suspects beyond 14 days, but did involve
the pre-charge detention of 11 individuals for up to 14 days,
none of whom were charged. The Joint Committee on Human Rights
has previously recommended that similarly detailed reviews should
be conducted in respect of the all operations that lead to pre-charge
detention of more than 14 days. That Committee said that such
reviews were necessary to ensure that Parliament has the information
required to evaluate properly the need for the power.
We agree that it would have been useful had independent reviews
of cases of extended pre-charge detention beyond 14 days been
conducted. We think it is essential that if any suspect is ever
held beyond 14 days in the future that detention is followed by
a detailed independent review (see paras 122-125). While there
is a proven need for the power to detain terrorist suspects for
longer periods than is generally allowed for within the Criminal
Justice System, the existence of that power needs to be balanced
by the certainty of keen scrutiny.
36. We note the different views held about
those cases where detention has gone beyond 14 days. In the absence
of independent reviews we decided that rather than form our own
view on each case we should concentrate on whether it may be necessary
in the future to detain terrorist suspects for more than 14 days.
Do recent changes eradicate the
need for extended pre-charge detention?
37. We were told of several changes which have
reduced the likelihood of needing to detain people for over 14
- The improved relationships between the police
and the CPS;
- The CPS's accumulation of "a wealth of experience"
in dealing with terrorism investigations;
- The Threshold Test, enabling earlier charging;
- Improved resources being made available for investigations;
- 'Lower level' terrorism offences having been
introduced, such as doing things preparatory to an act of terrorism
(section 5 of the 2006 Act).
38. Keir Starmer QC said that these factors had
all mitigated but not extinguished the need for extensions beyond
"Ultimately, we think that, although those things
mitigate the need for anything beyond 14 days, they do not extinguish
the need for some sort of contingency because there is nothing
in the four years that we can identify, such as a different type
of investigation technique and a different approach to terrorist
cases, to which we can point to say that, while it was genuinely
needed then, there is no prospect of it ever being needed in the
future. We cannot find a piece of evidence in what has happened
in the past four years to say that no contingency can conceivably
be needed going forward. Therefore, on that analysis, we arrive
at the view that some contingency may be needed in the future.
39. David Anderson QC agreed that these changes
make it "easier for the Crown Prosecution Service to manage
within 14 days." He also said, however, that they did not
allow him to "utterly rule out the possibility that a longer
period might be necessary".
40. The police took a similar view. Assistant
Commissioner John Yates told us:
"The expertise and resources that have been
applied to counter-terrorism over the last five years have grown
hugely. We have 3,000 or 4,000 counter-terrorist officers working
in England and Wales and high-tech units; we have a much better
working relationship with the CPS born of the experience of numerous
cases. The expertise has developed considerably, which is probably
why in the past four or five years fewer cases have gone beyond
the threshold of 14 days. That does not take away from the fact
that I think it would still be wise to have a contingent capability
in case of some extraordinary circumstances if we needed to go
41. We note that there are a number of possible
future changes which could further minimise the need for extending
the pre-charge detention maximum beyond 14 days. These include
the use of intercept evidence, if the difficulties inherent in
that could be overcome, and post-charge questioning, which was
included in section 28 of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 but which
has not yet been commenced. We also note the suggestion made particularly
by Lord Carlile of a system of judge supervised bail.
These suggestions are beyond the remit of our inquiry but we note
that the DPP and the police did not think that future changes
could completely remove the need for a contingency provision.
Might a power be needed in the
42. The statistics on the number of applications
for warrants of extended detention (given in paras 14-16) show
that there is not a regular need to hold terrorist suspects for
more than 14 days. The majority of witnesses did, however, think
that there may be circumstances in the future when the need might
again arise. There was less consensus around what those circumstances
43. Some witnesses could only envisage the powers
being justified in truly catastrophic circumstances. Professor Clive
Walker of the University of Leeds, Professor Conor Gearty
of the London School of Economics, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven
QC, David Anderson QC, Liberty and JUSTICE all shared the view
that the only circumstances in which pre-charge detention beyond
14 days would be necessary would be in the case of a major emergency
that would completely overwhelm the police. The sort of situation
they were envisaging was "the kind of situation where there
are threats of nuclear bombs in five British cities"
or "a mass casualty attack simultaneously on a number of
large cities within the United Kingdom".
Lord Macdonald said:
"... in reality the only circumstances in which
we would need to do this would be if we were involved in a national
catastrophe, a serious national state of emergency, therefore
justifying emergency legislation.
I do not think this is a case of the police, after
seven days, saying, "well, we might not quite be able to
manage it in 14; we might need 15 or 16." If that is the
case, the answer is to put in more resources and work harder to
meet the law as it stands."
44. Other witnesses envisaged a wider range of
situations being relevant. Lord Carlile thought it was possible
that the police would need the power to detain terrorist suspects
for more than 14 days if major public events, such as the Olympic
Games, led to multiple plots and a diversion of resources. He
could also envisage needing the power in relation to a particularly
complex investigation of a single individual.
Keir Starmer QC also challenged the suggestion that the powers
would only be needed in a catastrophe:
"In our view it is a little hard to say that
it is only the "catastrophe" situation that would need
a contingency because, if you look at what you might call catastrophes
where bombs have actually gone off, in one case it was not available
to us and was not used, while in two cases it was, and in one
of those we used it and in one we did not. Therefore we are driven
back to the fact that this is about very challenging cases where
there is a peculiar combination of circumstances and, doing the
best we can, it is very difficult to predict when, if ever, you
are likely to need a contingency power in relation to those challenging
cases. But, for my own part, I think that, historically, the "catastrophe"
analysis has some difficulties".
45. Several witnesses, including Lord Macdonald
and the police, made the point that the size of an actual or possible
terrorist incident does not necessarily correlate with the length
or complexity of the investigation. They used the Mumbai terrorist
attacks as an example and agreed that, although they were significant
atrocities, they would not require extended detention.
Assistant Commissioner John Yates said:
"It was an awful incident, but the evidence
available to charge Kasab would probably have been available in
about two or three days in terms of CCTV, eyewitnesses and the
like. You cannot necessarily correlate the nature of the catastrophe
with what you require for the investigation."
46. The Home Secretary emphasised that "It
is not possible to set out in very specific terms the exact circumstances
in which it would be necessary to move to 28 days" but she
went on to suggest three broad scenarios:
- When the nature of the threat level made it likely
that a number of very complex investigations would be required;
- When several complex investigation were under
way but no arrests had yet been made;
- Part-way through an investigation in relation
to one or more individuals when it became clear that more time
47. The draft Bills themselves do not include
a 'trigger' which would indicate when the Government intends the
powers to be introduced. The Home Secretary explained that this
is because it is not "possible to define an absolute set
of criteria for the use of 28 days ... I also tend to the view
that once you try to enshrine something like that in legislation
very often you can create more difficulties than you solve".
48. The lack of a trigger was of primary concern
to some witnesses. Liberty said: "Our fear, with a Bill of
this kind, would be that, because there is no trigger in legislation,
this could be something which is brought forward when it is not
Amnesty International argued that this Committee could not conduct
scrutiny of the draft bills "at least from the point of view
of their human-rights-consistency, in the absence of particular
circumstances of emergency against which the measures contained
in the bills could be meaningfully assessed; and second, on the
basis that passing draft legislation through the committee processes
in the absence of any meaningful specification of the circumstances
in which the laws would be enacted can only be prejudicial to
the proper processes to be followed in the event of an actual
emergency in which legislative amendments might be proposed".
49. Whether it is ever necessary to detain
a terrorist suspect for an extended period before charging them
is an issue that has been exhaustively covered in reviews and
debates over recent years. The balance of opinion in the evidence
we received was that a maximum period of 14 days is adequate save
in exceptional circumstances, and no such circumstances have arisen
since 2007. It is very difficult, however, for those outside the
police and prosecution services to judge whether it might ever
again be necessary to extend pre-charge detention beyond 14 days.
Having heard the views of the Government, the police and the Crown
Prosecution Service we agree that it would be irresponsible not
to provide for a power to extend the maximum period beyond 14
days in exceptional circumstances. We have therefore concentrated
on the question how power for such an extension should be provided.
Is a new contingency provision
50. Once it is accepted that a power may in exceptional
circumstances be needed to allow longer than 14 days pre-charge
detention, it is necessary to consider whether this requires new
legislation or whether the powers can be provided under the United
Kingdom's existing framework for emergency law-making: the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004.
51. Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act empowers
the Queen in Council (or a senior Minister of the Crown) to make
emergency regulations "for the purpose of preventing, controlling
or mitigating an aspect or effect" of an emergency.
The person making the regulations must therefore be satisfied
that certain conditions have been met. These are:
- that an emergency has occurred, is occurring
or is about to occur; and
- that it is necessary to make provision for the
purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect of
the emergency (necessity being defined by reference to the risk
of serious delay if another course is chosen); and
- that the need to make such provision is urgent.
52. 'Emergency' is given a very broad meaning
by section 19 of the Act; the threshold for saying that an emergency
exists is fairly low. Therefore emergency regulations could
deal with a broad range of circumstances. They can be made if
it is necessary to make provision for the purpose of 'preventing,
controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency'
and the need to make such provision is 'urgent'.
It is necessary if existing legislation 'cannot be relied
upon without the risk of serious delay', or 'it is not possible
without the risk of serious delay to ascertain whether the existing
legislation can be relied upon', or 'the existing legislation
might be insufficiently effective'.
53. Several witnesses argued in favour of relying
on the Civil Contingencies Act if it is ever necessary to extend
the maximum period available for pre-charge detention. JUSTICE
and Liberty both like the fact that the Civil Contingencies Act
has clear triggers for use and they believe that this provides
a significant safeguard. JUSTICE argued that:
"if it were ever thought necessary to extend
the maximum period of pre-charge detention in an emergency, then
we believe it should be effected by way of the Civil Contingencies
Act rather than by enacting special emergency legislation. As
flawed as the Civil Contingencies Act is, it nonetheless contains
greater protection for fundamental rights than either of the draft
Bills. Bespoke legislation should only be used where it improves
on the existing statutory framework, not as a means to evade the
safeguards it contains".
54. Professor Walker thought that the Civil
Contingencies Act is assurance enough and that there is no need
for an "in-between" like the draft Bills:
"I prefer, therefore, that there should be quite
a large gap between 14 days and what you might see as the next
step. If 14 days is not enough, then the Civil Contingencies Act
is quite long distant from 14 day detention in terms of the kind
of triggers, proof and processes that have to be gone through,
which make it quite difficult to use. There is thereby on purpose
a cost to using the Civil Contingencies Act. It is not a cost
free option and it is a more costly option than using the draft
Bills. I find that attractive because, like Professor Gearty,
I am not currently persuaded that there is a need for this in-between
option, which is the draft Bills, which does not have the same
range of triggers and safeguards. At present, I prefer the position
in the Protection of Freedoms Bill, which talks about the permanent
reduction of section 14. I think the Government should have the
courage of its convictions and implement a permanent reduction
without having this contingency of the draft Bills. It already
has the assurance of the Civil Contingencies Act if doomsday happens."
55. Lord Carlile told us that, in his opinion,
the Civil Contingencies Act is a "non-starter". He did
not understand why Liberty and JUSTICE proposed the use of the
Civil Contingencies Act as suspects detained under that Act would
not be protected by any of the safeguards contained in Schedule
8 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
We do not agree with this interpretation as any Civil Contingencies
Act regulation could simply amend 14 to 28 days in Schedule 8
and therefore all the same safeguards would apply. Regulations
made under the Civil Contingencies Act would reduce the level
of judicial and other protection for suspects only if they did
so expressly and unambiguously.
56. There are however significant problems with
using the Civil Contingencies Act to cover all of the situations
when the Government think it could prove necessary to extend the
maximum period available for pre-charge detention. In an Opinion
provided for Liberty, Lord Pannick QC and Mr Javan Herberg
said that in the right conditions the Civil Contingencies Act
could be used for extending pre-charge detention but also said
that the detention of suspects would have to be "necessary
to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or
mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency".
Therefore: "if the emergency no longer existed and there
was no continuing threat, it would be difficult to contend that
the aim of processing suspects through the criminal justice system
of itself amounted to mitigation or control of an aspect or effect
of the emergency. The criminal justice aspect is separate from
57. Many of our witnesses opposed the use of
the Civil Contingencies Act for extending the maximum period available
for pre-charge detention on the grounds that it was not designed
for the purpose and might not cover all the circumstances in which
it could be necessary to seek to extend the maximum. Keir Starmer
QC explained the view of the CPS:
"Our view is that there are circumstances in
which the Act might be useful but, looking at its provisions,
it certainly was not intended as a measure to deal with pre-charge
detention. In a sense, we would not rule out that it might be
of some use if necessary, but it is clearly not designed to deal
with this specific issue and there may be some difficulties in
using it to that effect".
He went on:
"The one [problem] that appears to us is that
it may well be that, by the time arrests are carried out, any
emergency is over and what you are dealing with is the fast real-time
investigation and prosecution of those you think may have been
responsible for some atrocity. I am not here to talk about the
vires of anything that can be done under the Act because that
is a very complicated matter of law and we have not looked into
it, but we would have some concerns that it was not really intended
as a vehicle for this sort of provision".
58. An additional issue is that section 23 of
the Civil Contingencies Act states that regulations may not alter
procedure in relation to criminal proceedings.
The Civil Contingencies Act does not define 'criminal proceedings'
and some have questioned whether pre-charge detention is not part
of such proceedings. The Opinion of Lord Pannick QC and Mr Javan
Herberg notes that in other statutes 'criminal proceedings' usually
begin when someone is charged, concluding that this is the better
interpretation of the words in the 2004 Act.
If this interpretation were correct it would mean that section
23 would not prevent the use of Civil Contingencies Act regulations
to amend the permitted period of pre-charge detention.
59. Although the Civil Contingencies Act does
not require a formal declaration of a state of emergency, emergency
regulations must be prefaced by a statement specifying (inter
alia) the nature of the emergency in respect of which the
regulations are made. This would make it politically very difficult
to use the Civil Contingencies Act for the purpose of extending
pre-charge detention in any scenario that was not recognised by
the nation as being an emergency situation.
60. We note the possible problems with using
the Civil Contingencies Act for the purposes of extending pre-charge
detention. We also note, and have some sympathy with, the view
of the House of Lords Constitution Committee which argued that
"If there is doubt about the scope or utility of the UK's
framework for emergency legislation, this strongly suggests that
that framework needs to be revisited. From a constitutional point
of view it is hardly satisfactory for a framework for emergency
law to have been created (in 2004) only to find (in 2011) that
it is not clear whether it can be used to make rules specifically
designed to deal with one aspect of an emergency".
61. It may be possible in some circumstances
to use the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to make emergency regulations
to extend the maximum period available for pre-charge detention,
although it is not clear that its use would be appropriate even
in those circumstances. It is not however certain that the provisions
of the Civil Contingencies Act could be used in all the circumstances
when such an extension might be needed. We conclude therefore
that, if it is considered necessary to have available at all times
a contingency provision to increase the maximum pre-charge detention
period, the Civil Contingencies Act cannot be relied upon.
17 Relevant JCHR reports include: 5 December 2005,
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and
related matters, 3rd Report, session 2005-06. 1 August 2006, Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and pre-charge detention,
24th Report, session 2005-06. 30 July 2007, Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Human Rights: 28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning,
19th Report, session 2006-07. 14 December 2007, Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Human Rights: 42 days, 2nd Report, session 2007-08.
7 February 2008, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Eighth
Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill, 9th Report, session 2007-08.
14 May 2008, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Tenth
Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill, 20th Report, session 2007-08.
5 June 2008, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Eleventh
Report): 42 Days and Public Emergencies, 21st Report, session
2007-08. 30 June 2008, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights
(Twelfth Report): Annual Renewal of 28 Days 2008, 25th Report,
session 2007-08. 8 October 2008, Counter-Terrorism Policy and
Human Rights (Thirteenth Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill, 30th
Report, session 2007-08. 24 June 2009, Counter-Terrorism Policy
and Human Rights (Fifteenth Report): Annual Renewal of 28 Days
2009, 18th Report, Session 2008-09. 25 March 2010, Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Human Rights (Seventeenth Report): Bringing Human Rights
Back In, 16th Report, Session 2009-10. Relevant Home Affairs Committee
Reports include: 3 July 2006, Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth
Report, session 2005-06, HC 910-I (concluding 28 days detention
may not be enough); and 13 December 2007, The Government's Counter-Terrorism
Proposals, First Report, session 2007-08, HC 43-I. Back
The Review, para 29. Back
Q 320 Back
Q 321 Back
Q 65 Back
DTS 5 Back
Q 248 Back
Q 248 Back
See, for example, Liberty, Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention Comparative
Law Study, July 2010. Back
The Review, para 12 Back
Q 109 Back
Q 142 and Q 174 Back
Q 108 Back
Q 1 Back
Q 139 Back
Q 4 Back
Q 194 Back
Q 205 Back
Q 67 Back
Q 90 Back
JCHR, 30 July 2007, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:
28 Days, Intercept and Post Charge Questioning, Nineteenth Report,
Session 2007-08, HL 157/HC 790, paras 42-44; Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Human Rights (Seventeenth Report): Bringing Human Rights
Back In 25 March 2010, HL 86/HC 111, para 14. Back
Keir Starmer, Q 198 Back
Q 198 Back
Q 248 Back
Q 248 Back
Q 65 Back
JUSTICE Q 107 Back
DTS 8 Back
Q 1 Back
Q 66 Back
Q 199 Back
QQ 3 & 320 Back
Q 320 Back
Q 365 Back
Q 366 Back
Q 107 Back
DTS 6 Back
Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Section 2 Back
Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Section 21 Back
Section 21(3) Back
Section 21 Back
JUSTICE DTS 8 Back
Q 186 Back
QQ 93-95 Back
Civil Contingencies Act, Section 21(3) Back
Lord Pannick, QC and Mr Javan Herberg, Joint Opinion, Re
Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention and the Civil Contingencies Act
2004, 13 July 2007. Back
Q 232 Back
Q 233 Back
Civil Contingencies Act, Section 23(4)(d) Back
Lord Pannick, QC and Mr Javan Herberg, Joint Opinion, Op Cit. Back
DTS 3 Back