6 Conclusions and recommendations
Functions, Role, Primacy and Conventions
The principle of an electoral mandate
1. Differences of perception as to the need for
an electoral mandate exist within the Committee too, as well as
within political parties and across the two Houses. They will
doubtless condition the debate when the Bill is introduced and
considered in both Houses. The Committee, on a majority, agrees
that the reformed second chamber of legislature should have an
electoral mandate provided it has commensurate powers. (Paragraph
23)
Functions, powers and role
2. The Committee agrees with the Government's
view that in order to enhance the effectiveness of the parliamentary
process it is appropriate that a reformed House should perform,
but not be constrained by, the functions of the present House
of Lords—including initiating and revising legislation,
subjecting the executive to scrutiny, and acting as a forum of
debate on matters of public policy. Indeed, the Committee agrees
that for the first time the reformed House will, in respect of
its elected members, acquire a representative function. (Paragraph
33)
3. The Committee is firmly of the opinion that
a wholly or largely elected reformed House will seek to use its
powers more assertively, to an extent which cannot be predicted
with certainty now. (Paragraph 34)
4. The Committee considers that a more assertive
House would not enhance Parliament's overall role in relation
to the activities of the executive. (Paragraph 35)
5. Any overall strengthening of Parliament would
have to be subject to a defined understanding of the relationship
between the Commons and the reformed House and of any conventions
governing that relationship. (Paragraph 36)
Primacy of the House of Commons
6. The inclusion of conventions alongside the
powers, rights, privileges, and jurisdiction of either House of
Parliament in subsection (1)(c) of Clause 2 lays these conventions
open to judicial intervention. The Courts could infer that if
Clause 2 were passed that Parliament intended the courts to have
the authority to determine what those conventions (and indeed
the powers, rights, privileges, and jurisdiction) were. The Committee's
view is that no provisions in the Bill should afford the opportunity
for judicial interference in a manner inconsistent with Article
9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. (Paragraph 49)
7. We concur with the overwhelming view expressed
to us in oral and written evidence that Clause 2 of the draft
Bill is not capable in itself of preserving the primacy of the
House of Commons. (Paragraph 55)
8. We agree that the existing primacy of the
Commons rests on a number of factors including, but not limited
to, the self-restraint of the current House of Lords. (Paragraph
64)
9. We are wary of according too much weight to
claims about the relative strength of individual mandates, not
least in relation to the passage of time. A mandate is a mandate
for the period for which a member is elected. An MP's mandate
is no weaker in the fourth or fifth session of a Parliament than
in the first. (Paragraph 65)
10. We agree that following election the increased
assertiveness of a reformed second chamber will affect the balance
of power between the two chambers in favour of the House of Lords.
(Paragraph 66)
11. Opinion within the Committee varied as to
the impact which any shift in the balance of power would have
on House of Commons primacy. Some members believed that Commons
primacy would remain absolute, buttressed by the provisions of
the Parliament Acts: some believed that an electoral mandate would
inexorably lead to claims of equal primacy with the Commons. Some
believed that that no attempt should be made to preserve Commons
primacy, while others believed Commons primacy would be undermined.
A majority, while acknowledging that the balance of power would
shift, consider that the remaining pillars on which Commons primacy
rests would suffice to ensure its continuation. (Paragraph 67)
Primacy: additional statutory provision
12. A majority of the Committee does not advocate
any proposals for making statutory provision to entrench Commons
primacy. These ideas and others in the same vein may be brought
forward during the legislative passage of the Bill through Parliament.
If such proposals are advanced, it may be expected that they will
meet opposition on the grounds that they would diminish the powers
of an elected House of Lords too greatly, that they would weaken
scrutiny of the Executive, or that they would be meaningless and
unworkable. Such proposals may also give rise to the possibility
of judicial intervention which the Committee considers to be profoundly
undesirable. (Paragraph 74)
Conventions
13. We agree with the weight of the evidence
we have received which suggests that the conventions governing
the relationship between the two Houses will evolve further once
the House of Lords is reformed and would need to be re-defined.
(Paragraph 91)
14. The essential character of conventions cannot
be preserved if they are defined in legislation. The Government's
approach in Clause 2(1)(c) of the Bill of simply referring to
conventions in a general Savings Clause is not only ineffective
but risks judicial intervention in the most highly-politicised
circumstances of all, a dispute over the conduct of business between
the two Houses. This would be a constitutional disaster. (Paragraph
92)
15. We think it inevitable—and desirable—that
following any reform the two Houses will need to establish a means
of defining and agreeing the conventions governing the relationship
between the two Houses and thereafter keeping them under review.
We agree that any new conventions or modifications of existing
conventions should be promulgated by the adoption of a "concordat"
in the form of parallel, identical resolutions prepared by a Joint
Committee and adopted in each House. We note, however, that any
concordat will only have force so long as both chambers continue
to accept its terms. (Paragraph 93)
16. We agree with the Cunningham Committee report,
noted with approval by both Houses of Parliament, that as there
are now firm proposals in this draft legislation to change the
composition of the House of Lords preliminary work should begin
as soon as possible. We recognise, however, that it cannot be
completed until after 2015. There would be little point in finalising
a concordat to which elected members of the second chamber were
not a party. (Paragraph 94)
Electoral System, Size, Voting System and Constituencies
Ratio of Elected to appointed members
17. Some members of the Committee would prefer
a fully appointed House. They hold the view that as the House
of Commons has primacy it holds ultimate responsibility for legislation.
That being the case, they do not consider it necessary for the
members of the House of Lords to be elected. However, a fully
appointed House is not being proposed in the draft Bill. (Paragraph
106)
18. If there are to be elections, the Committee
agrees on a majority with the proposal for a 80 per cent elected
and 20 per cent appointed House as a means of preserving expertise
and placing its mandate on a different footing from that of the
Commons. (Paragraph 107)
Size
19. The Committee agrees that a House of 300
members is too small to provide an adequate pool to fulfil the
demands of a revising chamber, for its current range of select
committees, and for the increasingly common practice of sitting
as two units: the main chamber and Grand Committee. In addition,
we have recommended that appointed members should not have to
attend as frequently as those who are elected. Accordingly, we
favour a House of 450 members. (Paragraph 114)
The electoral system
20. The Committee would like the Government to
give further consideration to a nationally indirectly elected
House as an alternative in the event that Parliament does not
support direct elections with geographical electoral boundaries.
(Paragraph 120)
21. A majority agreed with the Government's proposal
to use a form of proportional representation for elections to
the House of Lords. A proportional system will best preserve the
independence and political diversity of the current House of Lords
and ensure that it retains a different character from that of
the House of Commons. It is less likely to lead to elected members
challenging the link between MPs and their constituents. We consider
these issues in more detail below. Most importantly, however,
it makes it unlikely that any one party will achieve and maintain
a majority in the upper chamber. (Paragraph 124)
22. We do not support the introduction of a closed
list system for the sort of regional elections proposed in the
draft Bill. (Paragraph 129)
23. The Committee considers that it will be for
the political parties to address the diversity issue in their
selection of candidates so that a reformed House will be no less
diverse on gender, ethnic or disability grounds than the present
one. (Paragraph 143)
24. A proportional system of election based on
STV or open lists will be new to English voters, less so to voters
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Government must publicise
the new system so as to maximise electors' understanding and to
avoid confusion arising from the use of different voting systems
on the same day. (Paragraph 146)
25. In the Committee's view, the voting system
chosen should give voters the widest choice possible of where
to cast their preferences, whether that is within a single party
or across candidates from multiple parties and yet be as intelligible
as possible to the voter. We also believe that voters who wish
to simply vote for a political party, rather than individual candidates,
should be free to do so. We looked into the potential, therefore,
for a voting system that would encapsulate these two conditions.
It would:
- allow voters the option of
casting a simple party vote; and
- allow voters to express preferences among individual
candidates across, as well as within, parties. (Paragraph 147)
26. The Committee recommends that the Government
should consider introducing the version of STV currently used
in New South Wales, as an alternative to the pure STV system currently
proposed in the draft Bill. (Paragraph 152)
27. Given the relative complexity and novelty
of the system, compared with first-past-the-post, we recommend
that the Government should ensure that ballot papers are not regarded
as spoiled where a clear intention has been expressed, reflecting
the practice at other UK elections. (Paragraph 153)
Non-renewable terms
28. Non-renewable terms have the potential to
make members of a reformed House of Lords more independent, both
from public opinion and from party structures (since they would
not be standing for re-election on a party ticket). They would
do much to distinguish the character of the reformed House from
that of the House of Commons. Although political parties would
continue to be accountable to the electorate at the ballot box,
individual members would not. (Paragraph 164)
29. Allowing members to stand for re-election
would make them feel more individually accountable, but would
have the disadvantage of members of the reformed House of Lords
having a similar electoral mandate to those elected to the House
of Commons and might encourage them to undertake more constituency-based
activities. It would, however, allow the electorate the choice
of keeping an elected member of the Lords they support rather
than being deprived of that option. (Paragraph 165)
30. The Committee is divided on whether election
should be for a non-renewable term or whether a single further
term—say for ten years—might be available for any
member wishing to stand again. (Paragraph 166)
31. A majority of the Committee agree with the
Government's proposal for non-renewable terms. (Paragraph 167)
Length of term
32. The Committee considered the arguments in
favour of 15-year terms. It should be noted that the transition
period will be determined by the length of term, and as such was
a significant factor in the Committee's deliberations. With a
15-year term, transition would end in 2025, allowing for more
members of the current House to remain for longer thus guaranteeing
continuity and the preservation of the current ethos of the House.
Fifteen-year terms would also enable election by thirds, which
make it less likely that short-term electoral swings would shift
the party balance in the reformed House dramatically. And the
longer the term, the weaker the mandate of the House of Lords
as a whole compared with the House of Commons. (Paragraph 171)
33. A 10-year term would have some of these characteristics,
but to a lesser degree. On the other hand, a 10-year term might
be more appealing to candidates who wished to stand for election
in mid-career. It would also make the House as a whole more accountable,
allowing the electorate to influence its composition to a greater
extent at each election since half of the House would be elected
at each general election. (Paragraph 172)
34. A majority of the Committee consider on balance
that a 15-year term is to be preferred. (Paragraph 173)
The timing of elections
35. We recognise the concerns expressed by some
witnesses over the prospect of holding elections to the House
of Lords at the same time as elections to the House of Commons,
in particular the likelihood that it might lead to elections to
the Lords being overshadowed by the general election. On balance,
we consider that the arguments in favour of doing so—the
reduced cost, the avoidance of mid-term 'protest voting' and minimum
disruption to the Government's legislative programme—outweigh
these drawbacks. We support the Government's proposals to hold
elections to both Houses of Parliament at the same time. (Paragraph
181)
Accountability mechanisms
36. We observe that under the provisions of the
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 there are circumstances in which
general elections could take place before five years have elapsed.
Those circumstances are covered in the draft Bill. (Paragraph
182) We consider that a recall mechanism would be an appropriate
way to ensure elected members can be held accountable by the electorate
in exceptional circumstances. We do not attempt to set out the
details of a scheme in this report, but we recommend that the
Government make provision in the Bill for a recall mechanism,
tailored to multi-member constituencies, based on constituency
petitions that could force members serving the first ten years
of their 15-year term to stand for re-election at the next set
of elections to the House of Lords. The Government should consider
how to minimise the risk of the recall mechanism being manipulated
for frivolous or vexatious reasons. (Paragraph 188)
37. We agree that members should be required
to participate regularly in the work of the House. We recommend
below that appointed members should not have to commit to the
same level of activity as elected members of the House. Elected
members, however, will be salaried and expected, as a general
rule, to spend most of their time on their parliamentary duties
while the House is sitting. In addition, unlike members of the
House of Commons they will not have to deal with a large volume
of individual casework. We consider it reasonable, therefore,
to set high expectations for their expected level of participation.
We recommend that elected members should have to stand for re-election
at the next general election if they fail to attend over 50 per
cent of sitting days in a session. A decision to force a member
to stand for re-election on these grounds would have to be agreed
to by the House, on a report from the Privileges and Conduct Committee,
to ensure that members with extenuating circumstances were not
penalised inappropriately. (Paragraph 190)
Filling vacancies
38. We agree with the Government's view that
by-elections should not be used to fill vacant seats. The multi-member
constituencies proposed by the Government would contain millions
of voters making by-elections extremely expensive, and they would
violate the principle that members of the reformed House of Lords
should be elected by proportional representation. (Paragraph 196)
39. In the circumstances, we agree with the Government
proposal to replace departed members with substitute members only
until the next set of elections to the House of Lords. (Paragraph
197)
40. The Committee recommends, however, that if
a vacancy should occur within a year of the next set of elections
to the House of Lords, the seat should remain vacant and an additional
member should be elected at the next election to fulfil the remainder
of the departed member's term. (Paragraph 204)
41. A "count
back" system in which the original election is re-counted
ignoring votes for the departed member has some merit, but we
do not consider that it is feasible given the long, multi-parliament
terms of elected members. If a vacancy arose 13 years into a 15-year
term, it would mean re-running election results from over a decade
ago. Apart from any other considerations, we think it unlikely
that many of the candidates from the original election would be
in a position, or willing, to take up a seat in Parliament for
a relatively short interim period such a long time after the election
took place. (Paragraph 205)
42. Of the options available, the Committee prefers
the Government's preferred option—in which the seat would
go to the candidate with next highest number of votes in the same
party at the last election. This would not disrupt the party balance
in the House mid-term. (We note that an exception to this rule
might occur if a seat was vacated by an independent member. Under
the Government's proposals the seat would be filled by the candidate
with the next highest number of votes at the last election, irrespective
of party. This could result in a change to party composition).
Even this arrangement has its shortcomings in that sometimes reliance
will have to be placed on electoral information several years
old. (Paragraph 206)
Constituency issues
43. The Committee considers that elected members
will inevitably be concerned with, and be approached about, regional,
local and legislative matters. (Paragraph 221)
44. The Committee believes that in general it
would be inappropriate for elected members to involve themselves
in personal casework of the kind currently undertaken by MPs on
behalf of their constituents. (Paragraph 222)
45. The Committee observes that the level of
engagement with constituency work will be governed by the resources
available to elected members. Accordingly, we recommend that IPSA
should make no provision for members of the reformed House to
deal with personal casework, as opposed to policy work, or to
have offices in their constituencies. The Committee believes that
the practical difficulties of large regional constituencies, together
with a lack of resources, will make any substantial level of individual
casework less likely. We anticipate, however, that some elected
members will seek to carve out a constituency role for themselves
even without dedicated resources and we do not see how this can
be prevented. (Paragraph 223)
46. The Committee considers that no further action
should be taken to define the manner in which elected members
of the reformed House carry out their representative role. As
the Minister suggested it will be for the members of the two Houses
to come to a mutual understanding on these matters. (Paragraph
224)
Appointments, Bishops and Ministers
Appointments
47. We agree that the Appointments Commission
should be placed on a statutory footing. (Paragraph 231)
48. We support the establishment of a statutory
Joint Committee of members of the two Houses to oversee the Appointments
Commission, as proposed in the draft Bill. This Joint Committee
should oversee the governance of the Commission in addition to
the responsibilities set out for it in the draft Bill. (Paragraph
232)
49. We support the Government's proposal that
the Appointments Commission could appropriately include former
and current members of the House of Lords, but not serving MPs
or Ministers. (Paragraph 233)
50. We consider that independence, expertise
and experience, and diversity should form the core values around
which the Appointments Commission should construct its criteria
for appointing members to the House of Lords. While we recognise
that the Appointments Commission should apply its criteria independently,
we believe that it is appropriate that Parliament should have
the final say on the criteria devised by the Appointments Commission,
and the guidance it produces on how it will apply those criteria.
(Paragraph 248)
51. We consider that there would be merit in
placing on the face of the Bill certain broad criteria to which
the Appointments Commission "should have regard" when
recommending individuals for appointment. We recommend that these
should be: an absence of recent overt party political affiliation;
- the ability and willingness
to contribute effectively to the work of the House;
- the diversity of the United Kingdom, in the broadest
sense;
- inclusion of the major faiths; and,
- integrity and standards in public life. (Paragraph
249)
52. Variations of the Appointment Commission's
criteria, or guidance produced under them, should be subject to
parliamentary approval through the super-affirmative procedure.
(Paragraph 250)
53. We consider that the advantages of having
part-time appointed members (the maintenance of professional expertise
and the ability to attract individuals who would not want to commit
to a full-time role) outweigh the possible disadvantage (that
it might result in a two-tier House). We recommend therefore that
appointed members should not have to commit to the same level
of activity as elected members of the reformed House of Lords.
(Paragraph 255)
54. To ensure that there is a mechanism to remove
appointed members who fail to contribute to the work of the House
as expected, we recommend that appointments made by the Commission
should be for an initial term of five years, with the expectation
of reappointment up to the maximum limit of an elected term. (Paragraph
257)
55. The Committee expect that the Appointments
Commission will use its discretion to decide what they consider
to be an appropriate "contribution to the work of the House,"
and that such a definition will be published. (Paragraph 258)
56. Finally, the Committee note that appointed
members wishing to leave the House at the end of a five-year period
could do so by giving notice to the Appointments Commission that
they did not wish to be reappointed. (Paragraph 259)
Appointed Ministers
57. We recommend that a reformed House of Lords
should continue to contain Ministers of the Crown to represent
the Government. In a fully-elected House, there should be no power
to appoint additional members to carry out ministerial roles.
(Paragraph 266)
58. We agree that the Prime Minister should be
able to appoint a small number of additional members to a hybrid
(part-elected, part-appointed) House as Ministers of the Crown.
We believe that these members should have the right to sit, but
not to vote, in a reformed House. (Paragraph 267)
59. We acknowledge that the appointment of ministers
to the Lords is a significant power of patronage. We have recommended
that such appointees should not vote. Were the Government not
to accept this recommendation, however, we would recommend that
the number of additional ministerial appointments should be limited,
to no more than five at any one time. This limit should be on
the face of the Bill. (Paragraph 268)
60. We also agree that Members appointed to the
House of Lords specifically as Ministers of the Crown should cease
to be Members on the termination of their ministerial appointment.
This reflects the special circumstances under which they come
to be Members. (Paragraph 269)
61. The House of Lords Appointments Commission
should vet the individuals appointed as Ministers of the Crown
for probity. In this capacity, it should act only as an advisory
body to the Prime Minister. It should not have the power of veto
over ministerial appointments. (Paragraph 270)
Lords Spiritual
62. The Committee agrees that, in a fully elected
House, there should be no reserved places for bishops. (Paragraph
288)
63. The Committee agrees, on a majority, that
bishops should continue to retain ex officio seats in the reformed
House of Lords. (Paragraph 289)
64. The Committee agrees, on a majority, with
the Government's proposal that the number of reserved seats for
bishops be set at 12 in a reformed House. (Paragraph 290)
65. The Committee recommends that the Appointments
Commission consider faith as part of the diversity criterion we
have recommended above. (Paragraph 291)
66. The Committee recommends that the exemption
of bishops from the disciplinary provisions be removed, as requested
by the Archbishops. (Paragraph 292)
67. The Committee recommends that any approach
to the Government by the Church to modify the provision on the
named bishops be looked upon favourably. (Paragraph 293)
68. The Committee recommends that Clause 28(4)
be left out of the Bill so as to allow greater flexibility in
transition arrangements so that any women bishops and the wider
pool of diocesan bishops can be eligible for appointment in the
second transitional parliament. (Paragraph 294)
Transition, Salaries, IPSA, Disqualification, etc
Transition
69. Of the options set out in the White Paper,
the Committee considers option 1 the best of those canvassed.
(Paragraph 312)
70. The Committee agrees that the House of Lords
should itself, through the medium of the political parties and
the crossbench peers, be responsible for establishing the selection
of transitional members. (Paragraph 313)
71. The Committee recommends an alternative fourth
option with three characteristics:
a) a transitional membership in 2015 equal to
a benchmark figure derived from the total number of members attending
66 per cent or more of sitting days in the financial year 2011-12.
These transitional members will remain in place until the final
tranche of elected members arrive in 2025, at which point they
will all leave;
b) an allocation of the transitional seats to
parties and crossbench peers in proportion to their current membership;
and
c) parties and crossbench peers to determine
for themselves the persons to serve as transitional members. (Paragraph
317)
72. The Committee further recommends that, if
this option finds favour, parties and crossbench peers should
have regard in particular to a member's attendance record over
a designated period for determining who should remain as a transitional
member. (Paragraph 318)
73. The Committee strongly suggests that, as
in 1999, the authorities of the current House of Lords may wish
to consider the extension of certain club and access rights to
those members who are not selected as transitional members. (Paragraph
319)
Salaries, etc
74. We recommend that transitional Members should
receive a per diem allowance rather than a salary. We further
recommend that IPSA should consider whether appointed members
may elect to receive a per diem allowance if it better reflects
their level of participation in the work of the House. The Bill
should leave it to IPSA to set the level of those allowances.
(Paragraph 327)
75. We agree that, as proposed in the draft Bill,
IPSA should determine the level of salary and allowances. Membership
will likely entail for many members the need to maintain a second
home in London. We concur with the Electoral Reform Society that
the salary and allowances should be set at such a level as to
enable people from all social backgrounds and all parts of the
United Kingdom to serve in the second chamber. (Paragraph 331)
Disqualification
76. There are sound constitutional arguments
for avoiding fettering the discretion of Parliament by statute
law. On balance, we consider the provisions of the draft Bill
which allow the reformed House to resolve to disregard some grounds
for disqualification are appropriate. We expect this power is
most likely to be used (if ever used) in cases where a member
of the House has been convicted in another jurisdiction for behaviour
which would not be criminal in the United Kingdom, or where the
judicial process is open to serious criticism. (Paragraph 336)
77. There are good reasons for different disqualification
regimes for elected and appointed members. Otherwise, the disqualification
regime would permit those with significant private sector interests
to serve, but exclude those with experience drawn from important
public sector posts. Since elected members will be full-time,
professional politicians they should be subject to the same disqualification
regime as Members of the House of Commons. Part-time appointed
members should be allowed to keep their outside interests and
should instead be subject to a code of conduct on similar lines
as that applying to current members of the House of Lords. (Paragraph
342)
78. The disqualification scheme for elected members
of the reformed House is based on that for the House of Commons,
which rests on clear and long established principles. Moreover,
the electorate has power to ensure that candidates it considers
have a conflict of interest are not elected. It is appropriate
for the reformed House to approve changes to the lists of disqualifying
offices for elected members just as the Commons approves changes
to the relevant schedules of the House of Commons Disqualification
Act. There is as yet little clarity about the principles which
might underpin the disqualification regime for appointed members.
We consider that the Government should set out what it thinks
those principles should be. The Government should also reflect
on whether it is in fact appropriate for a single House to determine
the disqualification regime for appointed members. (Paragraph
344)
Parliamentary Privilege and the draft House
of Lords Reform Bill
79. We recommend that Clause 56 should be restricted
to providing that the House of Lords has power to expel or suspend
its members. We are confident that the House will use that power
responsibly and make appropriate provision itself. (Paragraph
352)
80. We consider that Clause 58 of the draft Bill
is unnecessary and should be omitted. (Paragraph 355)
81. The sub-paragraphs in paragraphs 3 and 5
of Schedule 9 which go beyond prescribing that "selection
is to be made in accordance with standing orders of the House
of Lords" are unnecessary and should be omitted, reflecting
the approach of the House of Lords Act 1999. (Paragraph 357)
82. We further recommend that for the avoidance
of doubt the Government should consider the insertion into the
Bill of a general saving provision, like that used in the Parliamentary
Standards Act 2009, as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall
be construed by any court in the United Kingdom as affecting Article
IX of the Bill of Rights 1689". (Paragraph 358)
The Parliament Acts
83. It is not for this Committee to give legal
advice on the applicability of the Parliament Acts to a reform
Bill. We leave the evidence of Lord Pannick and Lord Goldsmith
to speak for itself. (Paragraph 367)
84. If the Government wish to ensure that the
Parliament Acts apply to a reformed House, they should make statutory
provision for it. (Paragraph 368)
Dispute Resolution
85. We agree that dispute resolution procedures
should be a matter for the two Houses of Parliament, not for the
courts. Nonetheless, we believe that the Government should consider
proposing improved dispute resolution procedures as part of the
process of reforming the House of Lords. We have already recommended
that a Joint Committee be established to consider the conventions
which should govern the relationship between the two Houses; it
should also examine the ways in which differences might be resolved
without resort to the Parliament Acts. (Paragraph 371)
Referendum
86. While our primary task is to review the draft
Bill in the White Paper referred to us, it is highly probably
that a desire will be expressed in both Houses to debate whether
a referendum ought to be held on the House of Lords reform proposals.
Even if the Government were to decide to make no such provision
in the Bill itself, they would in our view nonetheless be well
advised to facilitate debate before the Bill goes into Committee
in the House of Commons on whether it be an Instruction to the
Committee on the Bill that it may make provision in the Bill for
a referendum on House of Lords reform. (Paragraph 384)
87. The Committee recommends that, in view of
the significance of the constitutional change brought forward
for an elected House of Lords, the Government should submit the
decision to a referendum. (Paragraph 385)
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