Examination of Witness
Rt Hon Peter Riddell,
Institute for Government.
Rt Hon Peter Riddell (QQ 116-142)
Q116 The Chairman:
Thank you very much for coming. You have seen the nature of the
Committee because you have been sitting there for half an hour.
Peter Riddell:
I have a better view now.
The Chairman:
You know the sort of issues that are disturbing us, so perhaps
I could ask you straightaway: do you think you can preserve the
primacy of the House of Commons by some kind of statutory mechanism
or some kind of provision in the Bill itself?
Peter Riddell:
I think the current Bill is defective. Clause 2 is the major flaw
in the Bill because all it does is state, "Because we believe
it to be so, it will be so." I think that is completely fallacious
because the actual statutory limitations are pretty limited—the
absolute bar on amending designated finance Bills and the one
year suspensory veto—but beyond that it is custom and practice
and what Professor Bogdanor referred to as the self-imposed constraints.
I do not believe that those are sustainable under an altered composition
of the House. How much can be put in statute? I think there would
have to be quite a bit more than is at present in the draft Bill
for it to work. It may well lead in time to new conventions but
it is very difficult to create, devise and initiate them. I looked
at the evidence that Mark Harper gave a week ago and the week
before. He said that there is likely to be increased use of the
Parliament Act and each House testing each other. That relationship
will then settle down and a new set of conventions will develop.
I think there is a lot of hope in that and you could have a very
bruising interlude. I think more has to be stated. There probably
has to be, as Lord Trimble was saying, some kind of resolution
mechanism, such as the one in the US Congress. I do not believe
the current conventions are sustainable if you move to a predominantly
or wholly elected House.
Q117
The Chairman:
You could enact, could not you? For example, the House of Lords
does not vote on Second Readings of Bills that have passed the
Commons.
Peter Riddell:
You get into quite difficult territory there as specifying what
one House does and does not do. I know it applies on finance measures,
but what about saying no to Bills? Do you want a reserve on constitutional
measures, for example? Also, on Second Readings, as we saw two
weeks ago with the NHS Bill, there are all kinds of delaying tactics
that can be proposed that do not involve voting on a Second Reading
but have a similar effect—referral to a Committee or something
like that, looking back at delays on the Bill affecting the senior
judiciary in 2004.
Q118 Mrs Laing:
I share your concerns as set out in your paper about the—I
am sorry, Tom was saying something.
Mr Clarke:
I am sorry. I was trying to catch the Chairman's eye for later.
I do apologise.
Mrs Laing:
I beg your pardon. This room is so big that I thought I was perhaps
speaking out of turn because I could not make eye contact. I beg
your pardon. Sorry, I am wasting time now.
I share your concerns, Mr Riddell,
as set out in your paper, so eloquently put, about the relationship
between the two Houses, and just because it says in the draft
Bill that that will not change does not mean that it will not
change because it is based on convention, and we ought to accept
that point. Can I take you further on that? If in fact what evolved
from the draft legislation before us is a House of Lords that
has equal democratic legitimacy to the House of Commons and therefore
becomes a mirror image of the House of Commons, is there any point
in having a second Chamber at all?
Peter Riddell:
When you say "has equal legitimacy", is it perceived
legitimacy or is it claimed legitimacy? I think there are lots
of arguments there. I certainly think, referring back to something
that Professor Bogdanor said, that any elected Chamber has to
be elected on a different basis from the House of Commons. It
may well lead to claims of equality and legitimacy and I think
there are some very big issues here. However, this is what you
can state in statute. The primacy of the House of Commons can
be maintained on financial measures as now, and I assume that
would continue. That is, after all, pretty central in the history
of Parliament and the practice of Parliament, as you well know.
I think on other measures it will become quite difficult, and
that is why I think it has to be stated in any legislation what
the limitations are on the practical relationships between the
two Houses, because as stated at present I think it is unworkable
and would lead to conflict and certainly would lead to claims
of equal legitimacy. A lot of that is claims and perceptions,
because there is not an absolute on this obviously.
Q119 Mrs Laing:
I suggest that it is a mistake to look at changing one part of
our system of government without looking at the whole of our system
of government as a whole. If the balance between the two Houses
is changed, then are we not changing the whole system of government?
Peter Riddell:
I think there would be a lot of consequentials on that. There
is also an issue, which is in a sense defending the privileges
of Parliament. Once you have something in statute, would the courts
become involved, for example? There are a number of quite big
issues there—and that goes to the core of my evidence. Merely
because the Government says in its White Paper that the present
conventions will all apply, it does not mean they will and it
will be destabilising. Indeed, as Mark Harper admitted—he
used the phrase, "use of the Parliament Act more frequently"—that
would be extraordinarily destabilising for any Government.
Q120
Mrs Laing:
Is a likely consequence of all this that it would take the Government
a lot longer to get its Bills through Parliament and therefore
might we possibly see a very much reduced programme of legislation?
Peter Riddell:
I would not like to speculate on the latter. Of course, you can
build into any Act, and there were proposals by a working group
of Labour Peers a few years ago that there should be a time limit
for the Lords to consider Commons-originated legislation. You
can always build in timetables on that to limit the time in which
legislation is considered, and I think that would be highly controversial.
Whether it would have an impact on the quantity of legislation,
I am always a sceptic. When anyone says, "We are going to
do fewer Bills", we just have to look at each Queen's Speech.
Q121 Lord Tyler:
I appreciate obviously you are not speaking on behalf of the Institute
for Government and indeed Lord Adonis would take a completely
differently view from yours—
Peter Riddell:
Not necessarily. I am not necessarily speaking pro or con an elected
House. I am just saying what the consequences of it would be.
Lord Tyler:
I understand. The point I wanted to make was the institute has
been, I think, remarkable in indicating how incompetent and inefficient
Parliament is at present as a whole, both Houses, in dealing with
the Executive's legislative programme. I wonder whether you would
like to speculate as to whether Robin Cook was right in saying
that Lords reform is not a zero-sum game; it is possible for both
Houses to raise their game in terms of scrutiny of legislation
and of executive action so that Parliament in relation to the
Executive is more effective. That would seem to fulfil some of
the objectives of the Institute for Government.
Peter Riddell:
I am glad that our mission statement is fully appreciated, Lord
Tyler. I think it could do, but equally a lot of the objectives
of improving the scrutiny of legislation and improving scrutiny
of government could be achieved at present without changing the
composition of the Lords. I think it could be a result of it,
but the way to achieve better scrutiny does not lie in necessarily
changing the composition. I think it is a separate subject. Having
more joint working between the Houses, you and I have often discussed
that over the long term in my Hansard Society role and your role
there that can be done. I do not think it is necessarily related
to the composition of the second Chamber. It could be improved
by that, but I think it is something that can be improved now
and should have been.
Q122 Lord Tyler:
But given the elective dictatorship that was referred to in the
previous session, and its impact increasingly in the House of
Commons—although, of course, as we speak it may be unravelling—would
you not accept that that is the context in which we have to look
at this issue, as a holistic problem for the whole of Parliament,
rather than its being one House always against the other?
Peter Riddell:
I agree you have to look at it holistically. I think the elective
dictatorship went out a long time ago, as will probably be demonstrated
at 10 o'clock this evening, and has been true throughout this
Parliament, which has had more rebellions by government Back-Benchers
in the first 16 months of Parliament than any previous one. I
think "elective dictatorship" is a bit of a passé
phrase. But you have to look at the balance between the Chambers,
and that is the essence of my evidence. As I say, it applies whether
you carry on with a predominantly appointed House or have a predominantly
elected House. It applies on both aspects.
Lord Tyler:
And a zero-sum game?
Peter Riddell:
No. It does not have to be zero-sum game. No, I agree with you.
Q123 John Stevenson:
This is obviously about the relationship between the two Houses
and a lot of people are quite excited about the possibility of
the House of Lords being more assertive and having more power,
or using the powers that it does have. Could it not be argued
that a more assertive House of Lords would be a good thing? Looking
at it in the long term, the House of Commons will retain the power
to choose the Government of the day and the Government will come
from there. So the issues of debate between the two Chambers are
about legislation. Ultimately, if there is gridlock, the House
of Commons can win because of the Parliament Act, so there is
always a way through any gridlock that there may be. Let me just
add that if you have a worst-case scenario where everything is
breaking down, ultimately a new Bill could be brought in and put
through to change the relationship.
Peter Riddell:
Yes, but that is pretty nuclear, what you are talking about. The
Parliament Act, I think, on average since 1949 has been used every
five or six years. It has speeded up a bit in the last 15 years
but not much.
John Stevenson:
Do you not think that new conventions would emerge simply because
there would always be that threat of the use of the Parliament
Act?
Peter Riddell:
I think you would have such a period of instability that it should
be built into the legislation and the approach—the recognition
that the past conventions do not apply. They are already being
tested in this Parliament. We are not talking about a stable position.
I do not think there is a status quo. It is a very unstable position
now whatever happens. What I am saying is that it would become
more unstable and probably not sustainable. I do not think any
Government could operate on the basis of a threat to use the Parliament
Act as a regular basis other than the very exceptional use that
has been made of it on some very unusual Bill, not the regular
routine Bills. The balance between the Houses, I think that it
is not just legislation, it is also scrutiny. What would be the
impact of the change in the second Chamber? I do not agree with
the absolutists who say that all expertise would go and all that,
especially if you had a mixed, 80:20 Chamber. There is no reason
to believe that the people who were elected, although they may
be a different type of person, would not be able to exercise that
scrutiny through Select Committees.
Q124 Mr Clarke:
The paper that Mr Riddell presented includes the very interesting
paragraph 9 and I wondered if I have understood it correctly.
It deals with reconciliation but on the second line it talks about
two Houses each claiming to seek—
Peter Riddell:
Sorry, it should say "speak for the people". It is my
misspelling.
Mr Clarke:
So we have that right then. It is "speak for the people".
Can I jump then to paragraph 14 and raise the issue of ageism,
which you have quite properly addressed in the paper. It says,
"Proposals for a moratorium on new creation risk leaving
an ageing Chamber and excluding talented new Members". In
view of what you said elsewhere about America, do you feel that
they have the same emphasis as we have here about getting young
people in? Would not Senator Mitchell and Senator Kennedy be regarded
as people who were still making a very good contribution?
Peter Riddell:
They were elected. It is up to the constituents. The late Senator
Ted Kennedy was elected and re-elected and that was the view of
the citizens of Massachusetts. If at whatever age they are elected,
fine.
Mr Clarke:
Is there not a minimum age?
Peter Riddell:
There is a minimum age for a Senator of 30, yes. But my point
is the problem for the House of Lords now is finding a way to
reduce the size. That should not be done by freezing membership,
because in that way you stop new talent coming in and so on. It
is to find mechanisms, one of which I suggest—I have other
ideas on it too—for reducing the current membership. But
on election, whatever age it may be, elect them. You have some
very distinguished colleagues of mature years on the Labour Benches
in the Commons, Mr Clarke, and no doubt their voters think they
still have considerable merits. That is fine. We should not be
ageist on that at all. I am not arguing that at all.
Q125 Baroness Scott of
Needham Market: Wearing
your Hansard Society hat and thinking about how the voters view
this, do you agree that the voters make it clear where they see
primacy by the fact that they turn out to vote in significantly
larger numbers on a general election day than they do for anything
else? Is there some way in which that expression of what they
think is important—that is, electing a Government—can
somehow be translated into primacy, turning a sort of moral primacy
into an actual primacy? The second point is that there a concern
about having elections on the same day because, in a sense, you
are conferring a kind of second-hand legitimacy on voters for
the second Chamber.
Peter Riddell:
I think that you have put your finger on it because I think the
turnout is to do with the Government. It is not particularly,
however much the MPs think it is, on MPs' merits that people turn
out enthusiastically to return them. I think it is Government,
and that is why you get a higher turnout. It is as simple as that.
The same-day argument is a problem, I think. It goes
back to the democratic legitimacy point. As you know as a former
councillor, it is not much fun standing for the council on the
same day as a general election. It is a pretty secondary matter.
There is ticket splitting, and I have seen some analysis suggesting
that there is about 20 per cent ticket splitting in some parts
of the country. You might get ticket splitting and that might
be regarded as healthy. I think it is very difficult having it
on the same day, but equally your point is valid. If you have
it on an ordinary first Thursday in May, when you have the council
elections, the European elections or whatever, turnout will fall
substantially whether or not you are piggy-backing on it.
But I think you do get the problems, even with phased
thirds, of the most recently elected. If it is a STV system, say,
as proposed in the draft Bill, the STV people will claim more
legitimacy than first past the post if they happen to be Liberal
Democrats or Greens or whatever. There are problems on that, absolutely,
but I think that possibly general election day is the only practical
way to do it to get a reasonable turnout. But it would be quite
difficult in some regions. It is quite interesting. Baroness Shephard
made a point last week. She saw it from the Norfolk perspective.
Who would be the representative of Norfolk? I think there are
difficulties on that score. I think the practical thing would
be that the constituency MP would still come first and there would
be, "Oh yes, we are also voting for the second Chamber."
Q126 Baroness Symons
of Vernham Dean: Let
us go back to the question of the size of a future elected House
of Lords, which the Government has proposed at 300, although Mark
Harper made it clear last week that that might be variable. As
individuals, last week we had a minor discussion about what people
should be called and whether the implication of being a Senator
somehow conferred some special status. It is not so much what
the House of Lords is called that concerns me. It is that if you
have 300 people elected for 15 years and 600 people elected for
five years, it does seem to me as individuals that the 300 elected
for 15 years are over that period going to have a lot more clout
than the ones who are elected for five years, 600 of them. I just
wonder whether you think that is a completely misplaced conclusion
or whether you think there is some validity in it.
Peter Riddell:
Remember, a very high proportion of the 600 elected every five
years get re-elected. About two-thirds of them, leaving aside
the boundary changes and all that, can normally expect to be re-elected,
and they will of course on the whole have longer careers because
of not having a 15-year cut-off. I think the issue that was debated
with Mark Harper of legitimacy versus accountability is a good
one—claim legitimacy through election, but if you are elected
for 15 years without any discipline at all, what will happen on
accountability? I think there are some quite interesting issues
there which I know people raise about changing party and all that
stuff. I think it is quite difficult. Will people say, "I've
got elected, now I can do what I want to do"? That may be
asserted as wonderful because it is demonstrating independence.
It could also be interpreted as perversity and maverick and all
that, so you have a difficult balance there. On the whole, I am
in favour of a single, non-renewable term, possibly 10 years.
That would argue for a 50:50 basis of election but I do not think
someone elected for longer than a five-year period could really
claim more legitimacy, because of the nature of the Commons.
Q127 Baroness Symons
of Vernham Dean: But
would not that mean that the House of Lords would automatically
only have rather older people? Who is going to take a 10-year
or 15-year chunk out of a career to sit in the House of Lords
at the age of 30, say, and be kicked out at 45, or even at the
age of 40 and be kicked out at 55? It seems to me to be an extraordinary
thing to think that anybody would want to do.
Peter Riddell:
I wonder on that. I think it might be a rather healthy thing that
people regard themselves as having a period as a legislator and
then go off and do other things. You might say an unhealthy aspect
of the Westminster system is that it is regarded so much in career
terms. Various MPs have stepped down in their late 40s and 50s
and gone on to do other things, some quite successfully, for all
kinds of reasons. I think that is rather healthy, that instead
of staying on—it is the converse of Mr Clarke's point—to
their late 60s or 70s, they get out in their late 40s or 50s.
I do not see any harm in that.
Q128 Lord Trefgarne:
I want to pick up the point that you made earlier about whether
it is impossible to enshrine, for example, the Salisbury convention
in legislation. Would it not be possible to say that the Salisbury
convention applies except in some categories of Bills, such as
extending the life of the Parliament or some other serious categories
of that kind?
Peter Riddell:
I think it is possible to do it. What I am saying is the issue
has to be addressed. One category one might look at, Lord Trefgarne,
is constitutional measures. I know there are problems defining
what is a constitutional measure but the same problem applies
on finance measures. As has been seen in the last year or 18 months,
it is not always possible to define them as clearly as everyone
would agree, with the Speaker's certificate. But if you had a
similar thing on constitutional measures, that would give the
second Chamber additional power I think you could enshrine some
of the Salisbury convention. You could also build into legislation
the length of time that a Bill is in the House, or something like
that. I think you could address that.
Q129 Dr Poulter:
I have a couple of points to raise. First, you raised what the
Minister said last week about the Parliament Act being used more
frequently. Is it your view that you would see a more fractious
relationship under the current proposals between the two Chambers?
Peter Riddell:
To go back to the last question from Lord Trefgarne, that is why
I regard the current Clause 2 as defective. There would be a very
fractious relationship. There would be claims of more legitimacy
by the second Chamber. There are also issues about the transitional
phase, but essentially there would be claims of more legitimacy.
There would be more resistance—the ping-pong would break.
I know there are conventions about how often ping-pong can be
done. You would have many more problems. That is why this has
to be addressed, I think, in any legislation. To rely on the Parliament
Act is just completely unworkable for a coherent Government.
Q130 Dr Poulter:
Whenever there is a period of transition there is always a period
of difficulty with transition fractiousness in some environments
or more difficulty with new arrangements coming into place. In
respect of that, would you say that by drafting legislation in
an effective way—by ensuring that the roles of the two Chambers
were well defined—that would help to avoid that sort of
fractious relationship and the need to use the Parliament Act?
Peter Riddell:
I think there are limits to the definition but I think they have
to be clearer than now and more explicit than now.
Dr Poulter:
But that would be a helpful step?
Peter Riddell:
Yes, absolutely. I do not think you can over-restrict, but you
have to have fairly broad parameters because Bills vary in lengths
and controversy and all that stuff. I saw some raised eyebrows
when I said that you could limit the time the second Chamber would
have a Bill. It would have to be fairly long and that would be
to prevent a complete obstruction, but I think you would have
to be more explicit than now. I think it is unavoidable if a new
system is going to be made to work and then to have new conventions
growing up because you are fundamentally altering a lot of the
century-old assumptions about the relationship between the Houses.
Q131 Dr Poulter:
I just want to pick up very quickly, if I may, on one other point.
Lord Tyler made the point that it is not necessarily a zero-sum
game in reform. I think that was a very good point. There is a
legitimate concern about the attendance of some Members of the
current House of Lords. Would it not be the case, in terms of
having effective scrutiny, while accepting the role of Cross-Benchers
and what they can bring to the House of Lords, that having a House
that is committed to turning up on a regular basis in its composition
is quite a good step in the right direction?
Peter Riddell:
I am not sure I should answer that one.
Dr Poulter:
It is clear from the attendance records that some people do not
turn up very regularly.
Peter Riddell:
I know exactly what you are getting at. The working assumption
has been for some of the appointments to be the Cross-Bench Peers—Vernon
Bogdanor gave the example of Lord Rees of Ludlow, who was President
of the Royal Society, and whose contributions are extraordinarily
perceptive, but he is not expected to vote on the Education Bill
all the time. Sometimes the occasional seems to be taken to extremes
by, let us say, some of the more celebrity Peers whose appearances
are infrequent to probably a question of non-recognition of who
they are, but now one understands that there are expectations
for the new Cross-Bench Peers that they do turn up more and so
on. I think there is also a cycle here that after all, because
they are life Peers, there is a certain point of age when people
are not going to come so often, and this is where some form of
stepped-up retirement is desirable.
Q132 Dr Poulter:
I am sure we can all accept the fact that some Peers will contribute
and provide a very useful contribution—while turning up
infrequently, when they do turn up they can provide that contribution.
But I think if we are looking at having consistency and quality
of legislation and we want to have good scrutiny, there is a case—I
do not know if you agree with this—that we would like those
people who are scrutinising to be committed to scrutinising on
a regular basis.
Peter Riddell:
Absolutely. If you move to a predominantly elected House, which
after all would be paid—leaving aside ambiguities about
the way the allowance system works now, which is a whole different
area—and that is recognised in the Bill, even if the figures
are not there, that would involve a much greater time commitment,
merely by definition. It is an interesting question: what would
be expected of the 20 per cent appointed, if you had an 80:20?
What would be the expectations there? I think that so far that
has not been sufficiently addressed.
Q133 John Thurso:
Is it not the case that the current settlement in the way in which
both Houses operate is quite young in that a great deal of haphazard
changes have taken place that have affected the way we do business,
particularly knives, guillotines, things like that? So how we
operate today is at best 15, 20, 25 years old.
Peter Riddell:
And it is constantly changing. I think the impact of the 1999
legislation and the creation of the coalition introduced changes.
That is why I say one is not talking about a status quo; one is
talking about an unstable position anyway. The point I make at
the beginning of my evidence is that a lot of these issues have
to be addressed even if you retain a predominantly appointed House,
because it is unstable and it is evolving. I agree with you there.
Q134 John Thurso:
One of the impacts of that is that the sheer volume of legislation—the
number of Acts of Parliament that get passed in any given Session—has
been rising inexorably over the last 20 or 30 years. We have sort
of replaced effective scrutiny of the Administration, the Executive,
with legislative incontinence. Is that the way we should be going?
Should we not be looking at creating a Parliament that spends
less time legislating and more time scrutinising?
Peter Riddell:
I would agree with that, but that is completely separate from
the Bill. It is desirable in its own way.
John Thurso:
Is that not an effect of where the Bill is going, that by making
it more difficult to legislate it would focus our attention on
scrutiny rather than putting the whole game into legislation?
Peter Riddell:
All I can say is I have heard those aspirations many times in
the past and they are never fulfilled.
Q135 Bishop of Leicester:
I wanted to pick up your intriguing speculation about the ultimate
destiny of this Bill in paragraph 12 of your evidence, where you
regard it as highly unlikely that it is going to be enacted. You
go on to say that there is a strong argument that a fundamental
constitutional change should be subject to a referendum. I wanted
to invite you to speculate with us about the consequences of a
referendum and whether you endorse the view that I think Ann Coffey
put earlier that there is overwhelming electoral support for an
elected upper House and whether you think that would be the consequence
of a referendum on this issue further down the track.
Peter Riddell:
Looking at the report which the Constitution Committee of the
Lords did on what should be subject to a referendum, I think changing
the second Chamber and, to go to all the points that have been
made before, therefore changing the balance and looking at it
in a holistic way should be subject to referendum. I also agree
with Professor Bogdanor that this is far more important than the
AV Bill. But we also have to bear in mind what happened with the
AV referendum, which was basically a vote on the coalition. It
was not really a vote on AV, it was a vote on people's views about
the coalition, and that is always liable to happen with any referendum.
They are a vote on extraneous political circumstances.
If I may take up Ann Coffey's earlier point when
she was questioning Professor Bogdanor, opinion polling evidence
is totally contradictory. People say, "Yes, we want an elected
House because we believe in election" but they also say they
want to retain the expertise of the Cross-Benchers and they want
independence. To be frank, it is an issue that 99 per cent of
the public have not thought about or addressed. The polling evidence
shows terribly shallow political engagement—the Hansard
Society does an annual audit of political engagement. Knowledge
about what the Lords does is pretty low, and knowledge of what
the Commons does is pretty low too. I think people have contradictory
views on it.
I think there should be a referendum because it is
very important but, as for predicting the result, you have to
say what are the political circumstances at the time and what
would it be fought on. It also depends on which way the parties
line up. The AV referendum was almost certain to go down when
you had only one party enthusiastically in favour, one lukewarm
and one hostile. So we do not know what the balance would be.
Q136
Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield:
Peter, I was very struck by the force with which you said, "I
do not think there is a status quo. It is very unstable now."
It is quite plain from the thrust of your evidence that you do
not think the Bill before us is a solution to the question of
the House of Lords, as it has been posed since 1911. So what is
the Riddell solution? What is the cunning plan? You have a sense
of urgency about this. It has been quite plain this evening. You
do not think we can hang around but you do not like what is before
us.
Peter Riddell:
I think there are two answers to that. One is that Clause 2 of
the current Bill has to be addressed—the relative powers
between the two Houses have to be addressed. Even if you fully
believe that either 100 per cent or 80 per cent are elected, I
do not believe it is workable unless you address the Clause 2
problem.
Point two is that in practice, for all kinds of obvious
political reasons that are familiar to everyone round the room,
I think that the current Bill is unlikely to be carried in the
current Parliament, but there is a need to address some obvious
problems in the Lords, notably size. There are other issues, such
as the fact that you have two convicted prisoners returning to
be Members of your House, which is a disgrace. There are issues
like that, which have always been put off. They should be tackled.
There is also, I believe, the Appointments Commission
issue. Of course, my evidence was written before Lord Steel's
debate, the debate on Friday, which I read. I think Lady Bracknell
would call it probably rather extreme reading and too shocking,
but I read it. Dropping the statutory point, I understand why
Lord Steel has done it for both tactical reasons and other reasons.
I think the issue is not whether you should convert the current
commission into a statutory one, but does it have the power of
appointing the political Peers? That is the issue. I think the
Appointments Commission should do broadly what it does now, which
is probity for political Peers and appointing the Cross-Benchers,
but it should be kept more accountable than it is now. It is just
odd to have an unofficial committee doing that. So you would have
that.
The other thing where I would be much more radical
is break the link between the peerage and membership of the second
Chamber. At present, there are many more hereditary Peers—people
with a perfect entitlement to hereditary peerages—who are
not Members of the House of Lords now. Of Lord Trefgarne's colleagues,
only 92 remain. There are many, many more outside. I would break
that connection, which I think incidentally would for ever solve
the loans for peerages and cash for peerages problem, and would
be a step towards recognising reform of the second Chamber, which
would not in any way affect existing titles if people care to
use them or the position of hereditary Peers, which is a separate
one.
Q137
The Chairman:
Could I ask a question on the Steel Bill, since you have raised
it? If the Appointments Commission is taken out of it, there is
not very much left, is there? There are the hereditaries you are
dealing with and the criminals—
Peter Riddell:
Sorry, the issue I left out was retirement. Basically, the Lords
are entitled to retirement. As far as I understand, only two Peers
have opted for permanent retirement. I think you have to have
a compulsory scheme—you need that anyway to amend the 1958
Act—and I would have a compulsory retirement scheme. The
Steel Bill proposes that this be done by attendance, or you have
elections.
The Chairman:
It is not in the Bill.
Peter Riddell:
I would have that in addition to the Bill, I am saying, Lord Richard.
The Chairman:
I am sorry. I was talking about the Steel Bill because people
have been talking about the Steel Bill almost as an alternative
to the Bill that is in front of us.
Peter Riddell:
No, I do not think it is an alternative. What I am saying applies
whatever happens to the big Bill, the Bill in front of you, which
you are considering. Given that I think politically it is unlikely
to pass before the election, the Steel Bill should be taken up
probably by the Government and augmented in the way that I was
suggesting. To answer Lord Hennessy's point, whatever you do you
have to have a version of the Steel Bill. I would have an augmented
version of the Steel Bill.
Q138 Lord Trimble:
I want to go to the issue of election and the methodology there.
Proportional representation is suggested. That results in very
large constituencies and with constituencies of that size it is
going to be very difficult for the independent candidate to register
with the electorate. In fact, the elections are likely to be similar
to the way in which European elections are conducted, where there
is a greater predominance of party, and it is the party that gets
the person elected because the individual is not going to have
the support and the machine to register with people, unless of
course that individual already has a very high profile. The result
of this, I am suggesting, is that you are going to get an election
dominated by party candidates with the occasional celebrities.
But when you come to look at the selection of the party candidates,
the party will know that that person is in for a 15-year term
and does not have any sanction, as that person does not come up
for reselection and so they cannot be sure that that person will
adhere to the party line the whole way through. Trying to get
someone who will adhere to the party line, then, is going to be
the primary consideration for selection. So we are going to get
people who are dedicated party hacks and who are not likely to
exercise any independent judgment.
Peter Riddell:
It is surprising the difference between when people are selected
and how they behave when they arrive here. I found over my many
years when I was a political journalist watching people in the
House of Commons that people whom they might have thought would
be suitably controlled turned out rather different in practice.
On your size of constituencies, Lord Trimble, my calculation is,
if you go on a third, and given a maximum size of 300, even if
it is all elected, the minimum constituency, even under first
past the post, would be six times the size of a parliamentary
seat, by definition. If you operate PR it is probably going to
be much bigger—as you say, the European election parallel
is about 30 times the size of the parliamentary seat. But I think
you would have that problem anyway. What you say is they try to
maintain loyalty. As I say, that can often break down in practice.
Lord Trimble:
From a political party, and people who manage political parties,
that is going to be the overriding consideration. The odd maverick
might get through or a person might change, but it does not hold
out much prospect for having a high-quality House.
Peter Riddell:
I think you are being too censorious there because I think, looking
at the selection for the House of Commons, that people on the
whole are always going to be selected because they are going to
be loyal supporters. They do not always turn out to be. There
is an unpredictable element between selection, election and subsequent
behaviour.
Q139 Ann Coffey:
I was very sad to hear that you think that what I did in my constituency
in an assiduous way did not bear any relation on my election at
the general election. I think it is quite important that part
of the constituency issue is that people do believe that they
make a difference and it is part of that individual accountability.
Peter Riddell:
Yes, but the primary motive is government.
Ann Coffey:
I understand that. I just want to believe something different.
But I was interested in this issue about size. If we are going
to have a House of Lords that is 300, how do we have enough regional
representatives so regions are properly represented and how do
we make sure that the diversity of the public is also represented?
How can we bring that together with a House of only 300?
Peter Riddell:
I think 300 is too small—not for that reason, for a different
reason. If you are going to have a House, which everyone says
they want, which is able to maintain the scrutiny function, it
needs to be larger, although not dramatically larger. Even if
it is, to go back to one of the earlier questions, I think you
probably need 450 full-time Members, or something like that, because
otherwise I just do not think you have the number of men and women
to do it. You need more to do that. Diversity is an argument in
favour of probably STV because proportional systems can produce
more diversity. I agree that the record under first past the post,
as you well know, has been pretty minimal and it has essentially
been an appointed House that has produced a more diverse second
Chamber—it was the method of appointment that achieved it,
not elections. I think there is a tension there, absolutely. There
is a tension between election and diversity, and just the same
applies on the point of getting expertise from someone.
The Chairman:
I have four questioners on the list. We were supposed to be having
an adjournment from 6.45 pm to 7 pm and Dawn Oliver was supposed
to start at 7 pm. What I would suggest is we go straight on and
perhaps she can start at about 7.10 pm, in which case the four
questioners have two and a half minutes each.
Q140 Tristram Hunt:
Do you regard the ambition to have, following on from Ann, a greater
regional diffusion of power as one of the potential upsides of
the Bill—that is, not having such a concentration of Peers
from London and the south-east?
Peter Riddell:
Perhaps because I have been a Londoner since I was six, I do not
necessarily regard that as such an enormous priority. Professor
Bogdanor made a good point that most countries where there is
a vibrant second Chamber are regionally based—obviously
Germany, the US and Australia—and reflect a federal structure.
We do not have a federal structure. We are not likely to have
a proper federal structure for a very long time, and ours is totally
asymmetrical, with England being 85 per cent of the UK. So I think
it is to secure more regional voices rather than regional representation.
I think that would be an undoubted advantage. However, sometimes
I am sceptical of London-based people going out and rediscovering
their regions. If you look, for example, among your fellow new
entrants in your House, they may have been born outside London
but they have spent most of their careers in London. One can be
a bit sceptical about that.
The Chairman:
May we break, please?
The Committee was suspended
for a Division in the House of Lords.
On resuming—
Q141 Lord Norton of Louth:
Perhaps I could bring
you back to two of your paragraphs. In paragraph 9 you refer to
the relationship between the two Chambers and say that there needs
to be some additional or different dispute resolution to that
which exists at present. I wondered what form that would take
and how that would work out. To come back to paragraph 4, you
refer to Clause 2 as it presently stands as a nonsense and you
have just alluded to the fact that there is a statutory reference
to primacy but no definition. So I am wondering how you feel that
would play out in terms of how you define primacy. The same clause,
of course, makes reference to conventions. We have occasionally
had an attempt to convert a convention into statute, but is this
not the first time there is actually a reference to conventions
in statute? What are the implications?
Peter Riddell:
I bow to you on the latter point, Lord Norton, but I think it
is a classic use of the phrase, "Because we say it is so
it will be so". I think that fallacious. We all know what
is laid down in the Parliament Act 1911 as amended in 1949—that
is clear—but the conventions are not. The conventions, by
definition, evolve; they depend on an agreement. My belief is
that that agreement will undoubtedly be undermined. It has already
been undermined after 1999 and with the creation of the coalition.
So merely stating the existing position is a purely circular point.
That is why I say either there has to be—which I think is
improbable—an informal agreement between all parties on
what the conventions mean or, as I said to Lord Trefgarne, more
has to be included in the statute itself about how the relationship
between the two Houses would be governed, because otherwise I
think it will be even more unstable.
On the reconciliation mechanisms, there may be something
like what happens in the US Congress. Lord Trimble asked Professor
Bogdanor whether you would have the two Houses meeting together.
I do not think that is feasible, but I do think you could have
a system like that of the US Congress. They nominate in relation
to the party balance in each House and then they meet and try
to produce a reconciliation. Then it has to be subject to a vote
in either House. It is going to be pretty cumbersome but I do
not see any easy alternative to it.
Lord Norton of Louth:
No. Of course, 1911 was the alternative to the suspensory veto,
actually having a joint sitting, although there were fewer numbers
on the Lords' side, but it foundered in part for the reason you
have just touched on of reaching an agreement of what the numbers
would be.
Peter Riddell:
I favour more the US example but, again, it illustrates the difficulties.
I think they are dealable with. My point goes back to what I was
saying to Lord Tyler: you just have to recognise that those problems
exist and address them, otherwise it could be very unstable between
the Houses. I think an important point is the Commons feeling
that it could be interpreted as an act to weaken the relative
power of the Commons. That is quite an important aspect of the
debate. It is not a zero-sum game, but if you get a more assertive
Lords holding up legislation, more Members of the Commons will
say, "Hold on, they are breaching the previous understandings
because they are on a different basis and they are a more difficult
House to deal with." It need not be like that, but I think
that is why these problems have to be addressed before you legislate.
Q142 Laura Sandys:
In many ways what we have now with conventions and the way Government
uses those Chambers creates some very sort of perverse actions.
For example, there will be Members of Parliament who will put
forward amendments and those amendments will be overturned in
the House of Commons and the Minister will get up and say, "Don't
worry, this will be dealt with in the House of Lords." When
you start to look at the public perception of this, what it conveys
to the public is this wonderful House of Lords, totally independent,
fantastically innovative in the amendments that it comes forward
with, and this rather sort of patsy House of Commons that has
no mind of its own and merely just follows the Whips. That is
because that is how Government uses those Houses; it is not to
do with either House. But if we were looking at an elected Chamber,
it would, in many ways, normalise that relationship. As I say,
I think in the public's mind the House of Lords has primacy over
the House of Commons in perception and reputation. Do you not
see that real reform might readjust that?
Peter Riddell:
Yes, a lot of what you have described is to do with time. The
Minister gets up and says, in the Report stage, which is undoubtedly
under guillotine with all the things in the Commons, "I have
not got time to get it right now but I'll make sure it's put right
in the Lords." I agree that is a very fair point.
Laura Sandys:
It is very bad. It is very bad to have the Commons—
Peter Riddell:
I could not agree more. It is bad, but that goes back to a point
Lord Tyler made about the problems of dealing with legislation.
That is a problem that has to be addressed anyway, whatever you
do with composition. I think that should be tackled anyway but
it certainly would have to be tackled if you had a change in composition
and a different Lords.
The Chairman:
Thank you very much. We have finished our list. We have not finished
our questions but we have finished the list of people whom we
had to speak. Thank you very much for coming and giving us your
time. It was very helpful indeed.
Peter Riddell:
A pleasure.
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