ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY—WRITTEN EVIDENCE
About the Electoral Reform Society
The Electoral Reform Society was founded in 1884
and has over 100 years of experience and knowledge of democratic
processes and institutions.
As an independent campaigning organisation working
for a better democracy in the UK we believe voters should be at
the heart of British politics. The Society works to improve the
health of our democracy and to empower and inform voters. As well
as our campaigns and lobbying, the Society also conducts expert
research on electoral systems and outcomes.
The Electoral Reform Society welcomes the government's
moves on Lords reform.
Lords reform has been characterised as 'unfinished
business' for just over a century. This government has an historic
opportunity to build on cross-party consensus and finally finish
the job of reform.
Key points
The Electoral Reform Society supports the following:
· A
100 per cent elected House of Lords using the Single Transferable
Vote form of proportional representation, with elections by thirds
tied into the European Parliamentary election cycle.
· Codifying
existing conventions to ensure it would be technically and legally
impossible for a new second chamber to bring government to a halt.
· Members
of the second chamber should be banned from standing for the House
of Commons for a period of 4 years.
· There
should be no reserved seats for Bishops of the Church of England,
or indeed for any faith community leaders.
· Thresholds
or other positive measures to ensure diversity of party candidates.
The Case for Reform
The Electoral Reform Society welcomes the government's
moves on Lords reform.
Lords reform has been characterised as 'unfinished
business' for just over a century. This government has an historic
opportunity to build on cross-party consensus and finally finish
the job.
The House of Lords of course cannot be viewed in
isolation. An effective second chamber is part and parcel of an
effective parliament and effective government, and that remains
our chief concern. Reform is a chance to preserve the chamber's
vital scrutiny role and to actively enhance it with the legitimacy
conferred by public election.
There will always be plenty of excuses to put reform
on the back burner. But Lords reform must not burden another parliament.
Much of the work this committee is tasked with has already been
done; there is sufficient time in the parliamentary timetable
and it is impossible to justify wasting any more time on an issue
on which broad agreement already exists.
The Coalition Agreement was unequivocal: it is "time
for a fundamental shift of power from Westminster to
people." And that is precisely what Lords reform means.
Winston Churchill put it well when he detailed his
doubts on the "trumpery foundation" of "mere nomination".
He insisted: "If we are to leave the venerable, if somewhat
crumbled, rock on which the House of Lords now stands, there is
no safe foothold until we come to an elected chamber."[31]
The elective principle offers us a solid foundation.
What other basis for legitimacy and law-making can there be?
How the draft Bill fulfils its objects:
1. The government proposals and draft Bill are
in keeping with the general consensus that has existed on the
issue of House of Lords reform for some time. The basic design
of an elected replacement—a proportional system with choice
of individual candidate, a chamber significantly smaller than
the House of Commons (or indeed the current Lords), long terms
of office with election by parts—is certainly firmly within
the mainstream of thought on the issue.
2. There are certainly areas in which the Society
takes a different view to the government, although these are in
the main points of detail rather than general principles. To that
end we congratulate the government in not attempting to 'reinvent
the wheel' and to respect and build on the consensus established
under past governments.
3. The Society does however feel the government
has failed to give sufficient attention to the question of powers.
Our observations follow in point 4.
The effect of the Bill on the powers of the House
of Lords and the existing conventions governing the relationship
between the Lords and the Commons:
4. On balance the Society feels insufficient
attention has been given to the question of powers. The reliance
on continuation of Parliament Act(s) fails to take into account
impact of the second chamber having strengthened democratic legitimacy.
The proposals seek to leave the Lords' powers unchanged, and there
are mixed messages about whether the conventions will endure.
The Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg has said:
"There are a number of bicameral systems in
democracies around the world that perfectly manage an asymmetry
between one chamber and the next, even though both might, in many
cases, be wholly elected".[32]
But most do that through second chamber powers being
far more limited than those of the House of Lords, or are in presidential
systems quite different to the UK:
a) Poland and the Czech Republic may be overridden
by absolute lower house majority
b) Spain can do the same, or with a simple majority
after two months' delay
c) Japan may be overridden by a two-thirds lower
house majority, and has suffered much recent instability
d) Italy has co-equal powers, but composition
is largely identical
e) Australia is nearly co-equal and its Senate
is very strong, but held back by 'illegitimacy' argument over
equal state seats
f) The United States, Argentina and Brazil have
co-equal powers, but operate under presidential systems.
The Government needs to take into account lessons
from elsewhere on second chamber powers.
5. Before the 1911 Parliament Act, Britain was
in an ambiguous position in that there was nothing to stop the
Lords from breaking convention and denying the government supply
of funds, in effect terminating its existence. A similar ambiguity
persists in Australia, where the Senate attempted to choke off
government funds in 1974, prompting an election, and 1975 culminating
in the fall of the government. The need for the support of both
chambers has been one of the elements encouraging instability
in Italian government, at least until the more majoritarian post-1994
dispensation—although the prospect of hostile majorities
in Chamber of Deputies and Senate still exists.
6. The Society believes it is useless to imagine
when designing a constitutional system that drastic circumstances
will not happen—from time to time they do. A clear choice
should be made giving the responsibility for forming a government
unambiguously to one chamber, to avoid 'unconstitutional' episodes
like those in 1909 in Britain and 1974-75 in Australia.
7. The implication of this position is the carrying-over
of the provisions of the Parliament Act relating to money bills
and conceivably—given the relatively small number of bills
certified as money bills—a broadening of the class of legislative
business that is the sole preserve of the House of Commons.
The Society believes it should be technically and legally impossible
for a revised second chamber to bring government to a halt.
The role and functions of a reformed House:
8. The Society has long argued for a reformed
House of Lords. We do not support elections for elections sake,
but as a means to preserve and enhance the chamber's vital constitutional
role.
9. After the work of the Wakeham Commission and
the two parliamentary committees (Joint, and Commons Public Administration),
a fair degree of consensus about the role for a second chamber
exists. The government's proposals broadly reflect this.
10. Like the government, we envisage the second
chamber is intended to be primarily a revising and debating chamber
with real but limited powers making it an effective part of a
constitutional system rather than a source of authority in its
own right. It is intended to be a more reflective, less tribal
political environment than the Commons, with a measure of independent
judgement and seniority. Independence means that, while many members
will generally follow their party whip, the ethos and rules of
the House should tolerate judgement and dissent and members should
not be influenced by patronage (either in gratitude or expectation)
or fear reprisals. Many argue that independence should also mean
that the parties are not the only pathways into the second chamber.
11. In addition, the Society is part of the long
term consensus that a reformed second chamber should represent
the regions and nations of the UK, and that it should fairly represent
the UK's diversity. No party should have an overall majority and
its composition should be roughly representative of the strengths
of the parties in the country. It should be a forum where all
interests are heard but none dominate, unlike even the present
appointed House of Lords. Again the government's measures on direct
elections broadly reflect this.
The means of ensuring continued primacy of
the House of Commons under any new arrangements:
12. The Society does not accept the argument
that a largely or wholly elected Lords would challenge the primacy
of the Commons. Local authorities and devolved assemblies are
wholly elected, as are MEPs. These bodies do not undermine the
role of MPs in the areas they represent because the jobs they
are elected to do are sufficiently different from those of MPs.
Whilst it is inevitable that tensions will arise between different
levels of government from time to time, it is clearly understood
that, in the last resort, the Commons is the paramount authority.
13. The role differentiation between members
of the Commons and the second chamber are broadly clear in the
government's proposals. Members of the upper house are elected
to scrutinise legislation. There is no obligation—and more
importantly no incentive—for constituency casework. Election
by thirds also ensures that a clear majority of the chamber have
been elected longer ago than the previous General Election and
therefore have a weaker mandate than the Commons.
14. As we have stated before, codifying the powers
and conventions governing the second chamber would help remove
potential ambiguity from this relationship.
The size of the proposed House and the ratio
of elected to non-elected members:
15. The Society agrees with the government that
the House of Lords is too large and believes that a smaller chamber
is necessary to provide an effective and efficient second chamber.
The current House is grossly oversized and growing unstably as
each incoming Prime Minister moves to restore party balance.
16. The Society agrees that a smaller second
chamber is compatible with its intended role and would support
a more collegiate style of working.
17. This noted, the Society is not persuaded
that 300 is the optimal size for a new second chamber. Given the
government's intention to have elections by thirds, there must
be concern not only that the elections produce results that are
proportional between parties and members drawn from different
geographical subdivisions of the United Kingdom, but that they
are more broadly representative as well. Our concern is that elections
for 80 or 100 members at a time may result in parties not providing
sufficient choice and diversity in their slates of candidates;
international evidence tends to show, for instance, that representation
of women is improved when a party must choose more than one candidate
at a time and where more than one candidate of a party is elected.
We fear that 80-100 members at a time may be too few to produce
a fully representative institution. For this reason, we submit
that a chamber of 450 members (either 120 or 150 elected at a
time) would be more likely to be socially representative and therefore
more likely to be the basis for a permanent solution.
18. On balance the Society supports a fully,
directly elected second chamber. There are many scenarios in which
appointed members could prove decisive in divisions and we would
regard this to be problematic. Should the final proposals recommend
a proportion of non-elected members, we would see 20 per cent
as a tolerable maximum.
19. The Society does not accept the logic or
necessity of a corrective appointed element to support expertise
and independence.
Independence and 'independents':
20. The Society welcomes the government's determination
to preserve and enhance the 'independence' of the second chamber.
However, we note that independence can be characterised in several
ways, which are related but not the same. Institutional
factors in the organisation of the House, such as control over
timetabling, the functioning of the party whips, the extent of
consensus working through committees, and so on will affect the
collective independence of the House as a whole.
21. Independence can exist within the party system.
Not everyone elected to a body on a party ticket sees their role
identically. Every elected representative has to weigh the respective
strength of:
a) their party loyalty,
b) their moral conscience and ideological principles,
c) their conception of the national interest,
and
d) the interests and views of the constituency
for which they are elected.
Any legislature will cover a number of views about
how this balance should work. In the House of Commons, party discipline
is arguably important because, after all, people do elect governments,
not just MPs. In the Lords, it should be different. The forces
of party loyalty and constituency interest should be weakened
and the members' independent judgements about morality, ideas
and the national interest should be relatively strong.
22. The Society believes that some features
of the draft Bill aim to encourage this form of independence—long,
non-renewable terms of office mean that members will be insulated
from the pressures of party and constituency which would apply
if they were seeking to be re-selected and then re-elected. This
will encourage independent behaviour once a representative is
elected. This will encourage senate membership to be either at
the end of a political career, or to appeal to those who wish
to engage in public service without having the aspiration for
a lifetime career in politics. We support these features of the
draft Bill.
23. The provisions on the electoral system
also reflect this by helping to select the type of person elected
to the second chamber. Some electoral systems encourage the
balance to be struck against these independent qualities which
one seeks in the second chamber. For instance, closed list PR
makes party loyalty an absolute priority in seeking election.
First Past the Post and the Alternative Vote can encourage an
excessive constituency focus, and also the desire to be mainstream
within a political party (to maximise chances of selection) rather
than independence of mind. It is therefore welcome that the
government has narrowed the effective choice down to two sorts
of system—the Single Transferable Vote (STV) or a form of
list PR that gives voters an effective choice between candidates
as well as parties.
24. Looking beyond the idea of independence within
the larger political parties, an independent-minded second chamber
should contain viewpoints with support in the country which are
independent of the structure of major-party politics. There are
a number of ways in which a perspective somewhat distanced from
party politics may be brought in to a second chamber and independents
come in several varieties:
a) Disaffected former members of political parties
who already have a political profile. This may arise as a result
of deselection or selection disputes, or ideological or disciplinary
disagreements with the party. The classic cases of this would
be people like Eddie Milne (1974) or Dennis Canavan as an MSP
(1999-2007) who fell out with their parties but defeated them
in an election. Being an independent in this sense can be a transition
stage to membership of another party.
b) Representative of a local cause whose importance
is concentrated in the immediate area being contested—the
classic example here being Richard Taylor (2001-10).
c) Representative of a national cause, often
supported by one or more political parties which has withdrawn
from the contest in order to support the independent; classically,
Martin Bell (1997-2001) and often with independent candidates
between the wars in by-elections such as Oxford and Bridgwater.
d) Parties of either small but genuine parties
(like the Greens in the Commons at the moment) or parties that
are vehicles for a single politician (like the labels under which
Kilfedder and McCartney won election in North Down).
e) Non-party but political—such as several
independent MPs between the wars, most notably but atypically
Eleanor Rathbone and A.P. Herbert (elected under STV in the University
seats).
f) Eminent persons in fields other than politics,
such as scientific and religious leaders appointed to the current
House of Lords.
25. Two more detailed features of electoral system
design, beyond the requirement for minority representation and
therefore proportionality, would probably lead to more independent
and small party candidates. Large district size (perhaps whole
region for list PR) would bring down the barriers to entry. Because
of this phenomenon, and the fear of 'wasted votes' under small-area
list PR, we argue that there should be a presumption, if list
PR were to be used, to have larger districts than would be required
under STV.
26. Electing small parties under list PR is not
problematic, provided that the districts are large enough and
there is sufficient support. The Greens have had a constant presence
in the Scottish Parliament thanks to the list component of the
Scottish electoral system, and the 'rainbow parliament' of 2003
saw a short-lived breakthrough of smaller parties on the lists.
Interestingly, an independent, Margo MacDonald, has been elected
from the list vote to the Scottish Parliament three times since
2003. Under list PR, an independent candidate stands as a 'list
of one' (unless there is some sort of voluntary slate of independents).
However, winning is relatively unusual. MacDonald had been elected
as an SNP candidate originally and was already a well-known Scottish
political and media figure before winning as an independent. But
it clearly can be achieved, particularly if the electoral dynamics
for senate elections turn out like mayoral elections, when voters
seriously consider unusual options.
27. STV, on the other hand, makes life significantly
easier for independents. Preferential voting would mean that
independent-minded candidates with a base of sympathy that crosses
political divisions would attract transferred votes as the count
progressed and unsuccessful party candidates were excluded. Preferential
voting also means that people will not be deterred from looking
seriously at, and supporting, small party and independent candidates
through fear of wasting their vote. Independent candidates are
placed on the same basis as major party candidates.
28. There is considerable evidence
that STV is favourable to independents and small party candidates
from the recent history of the Republic of Ireland and the
contrast between its election results and those in the United
Kingdom. See appendix 1.
Expertise:
29. The Society agrees with the government that
a second chamber's deliberative function is greatly enhanced by
the involvement of substantial expertise. However, we do not agree
that experts need to be sitting members of the legislature.
30. The Society notes and accepts the broad conclusions
of Professor Hugh Bochel and Dr Andrew Defty:
"Whilst there is certainly a great deal of expertise
in the House of Lords, it is not clear that this makes the House
as a whole more expert".[33]
In key policy areas such as welfare there are clear
gaps in the chamber's expertise, limited to a relatively small
number of peers. More broadly, while many expert members have
a valuable contribution to make in their specific fields, all
are expected to participate on and vote on all issues, regardless
of specialism.
31. The Society would strongly encourage other
methods for deepening the expertise of the chamber in toto
via the committee system and that external advice is open to all
members as a matter of course.
Representation of Women and Black and Ethnic
Minorities:
32. The Society has stated repeatedly that consensus
dictates a reformed second chamber should fairly represent the
diversity within the UK. That diversity should rightly include
gender and ethnicity alongside other aspects of a person's identity
and background.
33. While the Society welcomes agreement on
a proportional voting system, we recognise that PR is not a silver
bullet. It is best characterised as a facilitator—not
a guarantor—of better representation for women[34]
and other under-represented groups.
34. We believe that serious consideration
should be given to require parties to achieve a rough gender balance
in their candidates for each region. It seems reasonable to
ensure that at least 30 per cent of the candidates presented in
each region should be either male or female.
35. If an appointment commission is to remain
in place, the Society believes there is a strong case for a statutory
requirement to appoint equal numbers of women and men.
A statutory appointments commission:
36. As stated previously, the Society sees a
case for a fully elected second chamber. An appointed element
may form part of the final proposals, but is not required as a
corrective influence to provide either independence or expertise.
The electoral term:
37. The Society believes that electing a second
chamber by thirds is a reasonable proposition. It means that two
thirds of the chamber is elected longer ago than the previous
General Election, which means that the second chamber will be
less likely than otherwise to think it has a mandate to challenge
the supremacy of the Commons.
38. We do note that 15 years is exceptionally
long by international standards. However we recognise that this
is a side effect of the 5 year fixed term measures brought forward
for the Commons, not the Lords design per se.
39. A more sensible Lords term (12 years) would
be the consequence of a more sensible Commons term (4 years) but
we appreciate that we are not starting from an ideal situation.
40. A single non-renewable term of office is
clearly compatible with the desired character of a reformed second
chamber—i.e.: members insulated from the pressures of party
and constituency work, neither seeking re-selection nor re-election.
Quarantine:
41. The Society believes that the ban on standing
for the Commons for 4 years is a welcome—nigh essential—part
of the proposals. Quarantine measures avoid significant problems
observed in overseas chambers:
a) Ireland's Seanad has often proved a 'stepping
stone' to the Dáil, e.g. in 1997, 16 senators (of 60) were
elected as MPs.
b) In Canada, a similar phenomenon is developing
in 2011 with members departing the Senate to run as MPs and returning
if defeated.
This provision also rightly limits temptation to
undertake constituency work.
Recall:
42. The Society notes the government's consideration
of recall measures for a reformed second chamber. While we are
sympathetic to the challenges presented by one long single term
of office, the Society is strongly opposed to recall on principle.
43. Recall was originally part of the progressive
government reform package in the United States in the early decades
of the 20th century, along with primary elections and the direct
election of senators. But in practice recall has proved reactionary
rather than progressive. It has given well-organised interest
groups the ability to target public figures who oppose their agenda.
While the overthrow of Governor Gray Davis of California in 2003
is probably the most famous example, recall has become a conventional
partisan campaign tool at state level.
44. The Society believes strongly that the chamber
requires correct and proportionate sanctions that bypass the need
for recall. Members should simply be subject to rigorous and properly
enforced standards of conduct, including attendance, and be subject
to criminal laws of fraud and corruption.
The electoral system preferred:
45. The Society welcomes the government's acknowledgement
that members of the upper house must be elected on a different
basis to the House of Commons. It is a matter of general consensus
that the upper house should represent the regions and nations
of the UK, and that it should fairly represent the diversity within
the UK. No party should have an overall majority and its composition
should be roughly representative of the strengths of the parties
in the country. It should be a forum where all interests are heard
but none dominate, unlike even the present appointed House of
Lords. The government's choice of systems reflects this.
46. The Society applauds the government's rejection
of closed lists (as used in European Parliamentary elections).
The degree of party control possible under a closed list system
would simply replace one form of political appointments with another.
47. The Society welcomes the government's
proposal to use of STV system for elections to a reformed second
chamber. The key differences between STV and Open Lists are
noted throughout this submission, and are perhaps best expressed
by Paul Tyler, Kenneth Clarke, Tony Wright, Sir George Young and
the late Robin Cook in Breaking the Deadlock (2007):
"We believe that the electoral system for the
second chamber should maximise voter choice, and we therefore
reject the idea of closed party lists. We thus propose that elections
should be carried out using either open lists or STV. On balance
we believe that STV is more in keeping with the needs of the second
chamber." [35]
48. STV, as a candidate-based multi-member system,
is the most friendly there is to independent candidates.
a) Voting is for candidates
rather than party lists.
i) This puts independents on an equal footing
to political party candidates—in list PR elections, independents
are often placed below the parties on the ballot paper with a
blank box next to them where parties have an emblem, and the task
of independents in communicating what they each stand for is harder.
ii) STV encourages parties to offer candidates
who differ a bit from each other in order to maximise their vote
and encourages candidates to highlight what is distinctive about
themselves, which means allowing them some latitude. It also means
that community leaders who agree with a party most of the time
but do not want to take a whip are able to stand as independents
without harming the party's chances.
b) Voting is preferential,
i.e. 1, 2, 3… rather than a single X as is usual in FPTP
or list PR.
i) Voters do not have to worry about wasting
their vote or splitting the vote of the section of the electorate
they belong to because it can transfer to their next choice of
candidate if their first choice does not have sufficient support
to get elected. One of the barriers to voting for independents
under FPTP (and even many forms of list PR) is the fear that one's
vote will be wasted. STV removes this barrier.
ii) Preferential voting affects the behaviour
of parties and candidates in that it makes it harder for parties
to deselect or discipline candidates. Attempts to insist on conformity
will founder because rebels will be more willing and able to stand
as independents without splitting the vote.
How many STV seats are needed for reasonable
proportionality?
49. The government has reasonable concerns
about providing for electoral areas with sufficient 'district
magnitude' (i.e. the number of representatives elected from
each district) to provide a fair degree of overall proportionality.
The general principle is that the larger the district magnitude,
the closer the system overall gets to proportional representation
of the votes cast.
50. However, it is not necessary to insist,
as the government suggests, that there should be a 'floor' of
5 members elected at a time per seat. Research shows that
a fair degree of major-party proportionality, and lower barriers
to entry for smaller parties and independents, do not require
a high district magnitude under STV.
51. In the Scottish local authority elections
of 2007, a mixture of three- and four- member wards was able to
achieve a level of proportionality which was comparable to that
achieved by list PR or Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), namely
a DV score of around 8. The least proportional results were in
authorities which had a uniform pattern of three members per ward.
In the Scottish local elections, 74 per cent of first preferences
elected a candidate, and if second and third preferences are taken
into account perhaps up to 90 per cent of voters had a say in
electing someone.
52. In dealing with small seats, list PR can
sometimes involve considerable numbers of 'wasted' votes cast
for unsuccessful candidates, which can distort representation.
For instance, 6-member list PR in South West England in the 2009
European Parliament election resulted in 30.5 per cent of votes
cast failing to elect anyone.
53. Allowing a few seats electing three or four
members would enable electoral boundaries to be more consistent
over time and more coterminous with regional boundaries.
54. The Society recommends that the normal
minimum size for STV electoral districts be three, not five, seats,
provided that the average size is around five or more.
What number of STV seats is the practical maximum?
55. The government proposes to create subdivisions
where using whole regions would result in an STV election of more
than 7 members at a time. This is reasonable given that a larger
figure may result in very long ballot papers and that, except
in Scotland and Northern Ireland, preference voting will be initially
unfamiliar to voters. The size of the quota for election, and
thus the 'barrier to entry', also falls more slowly when there
are more seats. For instance, increasing the number of seats from
three to four means that the quota drops from 25 per cent to 20
per cent, while increasing it from 6 to 9 only achieves a reduction
from 14.3 per cent to 10.0 per cent. Using international comparisons,
normal STV district magnitudes are as follows:
a) Republic of Ireland: 3-5 seats
b) Republic of Ireland local government: normally
4-7 seats
c) Malta: 5 seats
d) Australian Senate: 6 seats
e) Northern Ireland Assembly: 6 seats
f) Northern Ireland local government: 5-7 seats
g) Tasmania: 5 seats
h) Australian capital territory: 5-7 seats
There are some elections with larger STV districts
than this, including some smaller local authorities in the Republic
of Ireland and the occasional 'double-dissolution' Australian
Senate election, and of course frequently for elections of executive
committees in voluntary organisations and trade unions. But international
experience, and common sense, suggests that a district magnitude
of 7 is a reasonable ceiling for the UK's second chamber.
The Society agrees with the draft Bill's proposed
maximum of 7 seats per electoral district.
How does one allocate seats to parts of the
United Kingdom?
56. An allocation method for seats which is consistent
with the government's broad approach and established policy as
regards the distribution of seats for MEPs and, under the 2011
Act, 596 of the 600 MPs, would involve the following procedure:
a) A minimum of three seats per nation, and the
remainder (68 or 88 seats) allocated using the Sainte-Laguë
divisor method
b) The English seats allocated between the nine
regions, again according to the Sainte-Laguë divisor method
However, we note that international experience suggests
that seats in elected second chambers are rarely allocated with
sole reference to population (leaving aside the problems in matching
population to registered electorate). Elected second chambers
usually reflect the make-up of federal or multi-national states
and are seen as a balance to prevent the interests of 'big states'
overriding those of 'small states'. This is the pattern in the
Senates of the United States and Australia, and also with the
indirectly elected Bundesrat of Germany.
Applied to each tranche of seats, based on the proposed
three hundred members, election by thirds and the alternatives
of 80 per cent and 100 per cent elected, the above formula gives
the following distribution of seats in proportion to the 2011
electorate figures (as compiled December 2010).
| 80 seats per election
| 100 seats per election
|
| Northern Ireland | 3
| 3 |
| Wales | 4
| 5 |
| Scotland | 7
| 9 |
| England | 66
| 83 |
| Of which… |
| |
| East Midlands | 6
| 7 |
| Eastern | 7
| 9 |
| London | 9
| 12 |
| North East | 3
| 4 |
| North West | 9
| 11 |
| South East | 11
| 14 |
| South West | 7
| 9 |
| West Midlands | 7
| 9 |
| Yorkshire/ Humber | 7
| 8 |
If more precise equalisation is required, and if
future adjustments are needed, there is no reason why the number
of people elected from the same area should not be allowed to
vary slightly in successive elections. The following two tables
indicate how the allocation of seats to regions might vary to
give each region a more precise degree of equality, under 80 per
cent or 100 per cent election. However, the instability of
the electoral register, and the long terms of office for members
of the second chamber, suggest that there are dangers to excessive
precision.
| 80 seats per election
| Seats per election—uniform electoral cycle
| Total seats -uniform electoral cycle
| Total seats -variable electoral cycle
| Term A | Term B
| Term C |
| TOTAL | 80
| 240 | 240
| 80 | 80
| 80 |
| Northern Ireland | 3
| 9 | 9
| 3 | 3
| 3 |
| Wales | 4
| 12 | 12
| 4 | 4
| 4 |
| Scotland | 7
| 21 | 20
| 7 | 6
| 7 |
| England | 66
| 198 | 199
| 66 | 67
| 66 |
| Of which… |
| | |
| | |
| East Midlands | 6
| 18 | 18
| 6 | 6
| 6 |
| Eastern | 7
| 21 | 22
| 7 | 8
| 7 |
| London | 9
| 27 | 27
| 9 | 9
| 9 |
| North East | 3
| 9 | 10
| 3 | 4
| 3 |
| North West | 9
| 27 | 27
| 9 | 9
| 9 |
| South East | 11
| 33 | 33
| 11 | 11
| 11 |
| South West | 7
| 21 | 21
| 7 | 7
| 7 |
| West Midlands | 7
| 21 | 21
| 7 | 7
| 7 |
| Yorkshire/ H | 7
| 21 | 20
| 7 | 6
| 7 |
| 100 seats per election
| Seats per election—uniform electoral cycle
| Total seats -uniform electoral cycle
| Total seats -variable electoral cycle
| Term A | Term B
| Term C |
| TOTAL | 100
| 300 | 300
| 100 | 100
| 100 |
| Northern Ireland | 3
|
9 | 9
|
3 |
3
|
3 |
| Wales | 5
| 15 | 15
| 5 | 5
| 5 |
| Scotland | 9
| 27 | 25
| 8 | 9
| 8 |
| England | 83
| 249 | 251
| 84 | 83
| 84 |
| Of which… |
| | |
| | |
| East Midlands | 7
| 21 | 22
| 7 | 7
| 8 |
| Eastern | 9
| 27 | 28
| 9 | 9
| 10 |
| London | 12
| 36 | 35
| 12 | 11
| 12 |
| North East | 4
| 12 | 13
| 4 | 4
| 5 |
| North West | 11
| 33 | 34
| 12 | 11
| 11 |
| South East | 14
| 42 | 41
| 14 | 13
| 14 |
| South West | 9
| 27 | 26
| 9 | 9
| 8 |
| West Midlands | 9
| 27 | 27
| 9 | 9
| 9 |
| Yorkshire/ H | 8
| 24 | 25
| 8 | 8
| 9 |
However, the technique of varying the numbers elected each election
can allow more freedom to draw sub-divisions, where needed, which
comprise sensible groupings of whole counties.
57. One should not become unduly concerned with the issues
of the subdivision of regions for an STV election; it is very
much a subsidiary matter. The draft Bill suggestions on this
point are unsatisfactory for two reasons:
a) There is no need to create a new institution to draw
boundaries of sub-divisions. The Boundary Commissions for
England and, if necessary, Scotland, could easily perform this
rather simple task. There is no need for frequent boundary adjustments.
b) The draft Bill leaves open the possibility
that the electoral regions for the second chamber may cross the
boundaries between English regions. This is undesirable, in that
the regions are now accepted units for the European Parliament
and drawing House of Commons constituencies, and electoral administrators
are familiar with co-operative working within them. It is also
unnecessary.
Good proportionality is perfectly consistent with
having a few districts smaller than 5 seats in magnitude. A close
relationship between size of registered electorate and number
of representatives is also easier to achieve in multi-member than
single-member seats.
Model electoral districts for STV election for both
80 (80 per cent elected) and 100 (100 per cent elected) seats
per election are provided in appendix 2.
Vacancies:
58. The Society agrees that given long terms
of office interim appointments should not persist for more than
the period until the next partial election.
59. The Society notes that proposals for filling
casual vacancies are crude—i.e.: the candidate with the
'highest vote without being elected'. Under STV, a first preference
count does give one measure of support, but can produce unusual
results. The final preference count—i.e. the total reached
by the candidate in the last stage of the count before exclusion—is
another.
60. The system of increasing the number of
members to be elected for that particular constituency—as
used in Liberal Democrat internal elections—is the best
way to represent the views of the overall electorate.
Timing:
61. The Society notes the government's preferred
option is concurrently with General Elections. We accept that
this has the advantage of maximising turnout and that is important.
The point that mid-term second chamber elections will disrupt
the legislative process is also not a trivial one. However,
the Society believes there are significant drawbacks to running
alongside General Elections:
a) Prominence.
Holding the second chamber election on the same day as the General
Election would mean that the more decisive and important election
(for the Commons) would dominate media and public attention. Given
that the government seeks, and we agree, an independent-minded
chamber of expertise and legislative revision, the electoral timetable
should allow a considered assessment by the electorate of the
qualities of those seeking election.
b) Political. It would
seem likely that the voting patterns in second chamber elections
would be fairly close to those for the election to the House of
Commons given that they would reflect the same state of political
opinion and be strongly influenced by views on national issues.
But the newly elected tranche of senators would arguably have
a superior mandate given that its composition would more closely
resemble the votes actually cast in the election because of the
proportional system. It may or may not be considered desirable,
but the prospect of eroding the supremacy of the Commons throughout
each government's term exists with this proposal.
c) Public understanding.
It will be easier to promote knowledge and understanding of the
new electoral system used for the Lords away from the General
Election campaign period.
d) Administrative.
General Elections involve a complex and heavy administrative load
already, and a second chamber election using a new electoral system
and new boundaries will add massively to this problem. There may
well be cases where the boundaries of Commons constituencies and
sub-regional senate electoral districts do not match up as well
as the complexities of English local elections on the same day.
62. The Society sees two possible alternatives:
a) To hold second-chamber elections on the
same day as the European Parliament election.
This has the merit of combining two UK-wide second-order elections.
The European Parliament election is also already conducted on
a regional, proportional basis and it may therefore be simpler
from the point of view of voter education and administration.
It will also mean substantial coverage and awareness of the distinctive
nature of the election for the second chamber. However, this would
mean (assuming that the five-year term is a permanent fixture)
second-chamber elections taking place late in each term of the
House of Commons and perhaps therefore to them being regarded
as surrogate General Elections by the public.
b) Establishing a new mid-term date, for instance
2017-2022-2027. This would certainly be
more costly than the alternatives, as there would be no other
UK-wide national election on that date.
There is no strong international evidence for one
solution or another. Italy, Australia and the United States directly
elect their Senates in whole or in part alongside their lower
chambers. In Japan, House of Councillors elections take place
in mid-term, although with both Japan and Australia the elections
are legally capable of being separate or combined, and the difference
just depends on the timetable of early dissolutions of the lower
houses.
63. On balance, we would argue that timing second
chamber elections alongside the European Parliament election would
be the best option, although we recognise that all the possibilities
have pluses and minuses.
Transitional arrangements:
64. A period of transition is necessary to ensure
the upper house's operational continuity. Using elections by thirds,
the government has indicated how the change can be achieved at
different speeds.
65. On balance, the Society believes a brisk
move to a smaller chamber is desirable. While we appreciate the
need for continuity, a critical mass of elected peers will be
necessary to establish the chamber's new working practices. As
such the Society sees no merit in allowing all current peers to
remain for a full electoral cycle.
The provisions on Bishops:
66. The Society does not accept that there is
a case for reserved seats for Bishops of the Church of England.
Britain is a multi-faith and multi-denominational society and
we do not believe it is acceptable for one denomination to receive
such representation.
67. The Society therefore recommends that
reserved seats for the Bishops are removed.
Other administrative matters like pay and pensions:
68. The Society believes that remuneration for
members of the second chamber should be such that people from
all social backgrounds and all regions of the UK can serve in
the chamber without facing financial hardship.
69. We agree with the Wakeham Commission's conclusion
that "payment should be made for the time members of the
second chamber devote to their parliamentary duties". But
given the valuable and distinctive nature of members "duties"
from those in lower house—the stronger focus on deliberation
and the absence of casework—we would, on balance, recommend
giving members the same basic salary and allowances as MPs.
70. We continue to support the Wakeham Commission's
recommendations that additional office and secretarial resources
should be provided to enable members to fulfil those duties more
effectively.
71. The Society agrees with the government that
all members of the second chamber should be resident in the UK
for tax purposes. Appendix
1: Independents in Ireland and UK
| Independents
| Minor parties |
Combined | Combined per cent
| UK number | UK per cent
|
| 1981 | 6
| 2 | 8
| 4.8 | 1 (1979)
| 0.2 (1979) |
| 1982 Feb | 4
| 3 | 7
| 4.2 | -
| - |
| 1982 Nov | 3
| 2 | 5
| 3.0 | 1 (1983)
| 0.2 (1983) |
| 1987 | 3
| 5 | 8
| 4.8 | 1
| 0.2 |
| 1989 | 8
| 5 | 13
| 7.8 | -
| - |
| 1992 | 4
| 6 | 10
| 6.0 | 1
| 0.2 |
| 1997 | 6
| 8 | 14
| 8.4 | 2
| 0.3 |
| 2002 | 13
| 14 | 27
| 16.2 | 1 (2001)
| 0.2 (2001) |
| 2007 | 5
| 10 | 15
| 9.0 | 2 (2005)
| 0.3 (2005) |
| 2011 | 14
| 19 | 33
| 19.9 | 3 (2010)
| 0.5 (2010) |
(Major parties defined as Fianna Fail, Fine Gael,
Labour and Progressive Democrats in Ireland, and the leading four
in each part of the United Kingdom—i.e. Conservative, Labour,
Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru, DUP, UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein).
Arguably, Sinn Fein (14 seats) should be counted as a major Irish
party in 2011.
As Irish political scientist Michael Gallagher observed
'independents represent a face of Irish politics that simply will
not go away. Whereas independents are almost unknown in most European
counties, they have proved tenacious in Ireland.'[36]
Ireland does have a distinctive political culture but STV plays
a significant part in explaining why Ireland elects so many independents
and minor parties to its lower House. By contrast, the number
of independents has varied from zero to two in the same period
in the UK's considerably larger parliament, and those of minor
parties also from zero to two (currently two, one Green and one
Alliance Party). Significantly, Northern Ireland, whose political
culture is affected by STV which is used in all other elections
in the province, has provided one of the four candidates elected
as an independent since 1983 (Hermon, the others being Bell, Taylor
and Law), and three of the four small party MPs (Kilfedder, McCartney
and Long, the other being Lucas). Ireland's parliament has the
highest proportion of independent members in Europe.
The Irish Senate is mostly indirectly elected, but
there are six seats elected using STV by graduates of the Irish
universities, who are usually all independents although occasionally
party candidates can win.Appendix
2: Model STV electoral districtsModel electoral
districts (80 seats per election)
Regions elected as a whole without subdivision:
· Northern
Ireland (3)
· Wales
(4)
· Scotland
(7)
· East
Midlands (6)
· Eastern
(7)
· North
East (3)
· South
West (7)
· West
Midlands (7)
· Yorkshire
and the Humber (7)
Subdivided regions:
London:
North London (5 seats, technical entitlement 5.20)
South London (4 seats, technical entitlement 3.80)
South London, for these purposes, would be all boroughs
south of the Thames, plus Hounslow and Twickenham north of the
river.
It would be possible, however, to use the fact that
the elections will take place by thirds to draw more meaningful
boundaries for these subdivisions. There is no need, for instance,
to add Hounslow to South London if one varied by 1 the number
of seats elected from each subdivision at different elections.
London south of the Thames (plus Twickenham) could elect 4 for
term A, 3 for term B and 4 for term C, and North London would
elect 5 for term A, 6 B and 5 C.
North West:
Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire (6 seats,
technical entitlement 5.93)
Cheshire, Merseyside (3 seats, technical entitlement
3.07)
South East:
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Surrey (4
seats, technical entitlement 4.28)
East Sussex, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, Kent, West
Sussex (7 seats, technical entitlement 6.72)
Electoral districts (100 seats per election)
A wholly-elected chamber would involve more subdivision
of the regions.
Whole regions:
· Northern
Ireland (3)
· Wales
(5)
· East
Midlands (7)
· North
East (4)Subdivided
regions:
| Seats—even distribution
| Entitlement |
Variable term A | Variable term B
| Variable term C |
| EASTERN |
| | | |
|
| Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire
| 4 | 3.80
| 4 | 3
| 4 |
| Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk
| 5 | 5.20
| 5 | 6
| 5 |
| LONDON |
| | | |
|
| North London | 7
| 7.31 | 7
| 8 | 7
|
| South London | 5
| 4.69 | 5
| 4 | 5
|
| NORTH WEST |
| | | |
|
| Cumbria, Lancashire |
3 | 3.15
| 3 | 3
| 4 |
| Greater Manchester |
4 | 4.10
| 4 | 4
| 4 |
| Cheshire, Merseyside |
4 | 3.75
| 4 | 4
| 3 |
| SOUTH EAST |
| | | |
|
| Berks, Bucks, Hants, IoW, Oxon
| 7 | 6.77
| 6 | 7
| 7 |
| E Sussex, Kent, Surrey, W Sussex
| 7 | 7.23
| 8 | 7
| 7 |
| SOUTH WEST |
| | | |
|
| Avon, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire
| 5 | 4.84
| 5 | 5
| 5 |
| Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Isles of Scilly
| 4 | 4.16
| 4 | 4
| 4 |
| WEST MIDLANDS |
| | |
| |
| West Midlands, Warwickshire
| 5 | 5.14
| 5 | 5
| 5 |
| Herefordshire, Worcestershire, Shropshire, Staffordshire
| 4 | 3.86
| 4 | 4
| 4 |
| YORKSHIRE/ HUMBER
| | | |
| |
| Humberside, South Yorkshire, York
| 4 | 3.77
| 4 | 4
| 3 |
| North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire
| 4 | 4.23
| 4 | 4
| 5 |
Several divisions of Scottish local authorities and other administrative
geographies are possible; there may be merit in dividing the country
into two blocks, each containing four Scottish Parliament regions,
for the purpose of electing second chamber representatives.
The workings demonstrated here should give a clear
indication that the Single Transferable Vote in seats, each contained
within a European Parliament region, electing for the most part
from 4 to 7 members at a time, is a workable system for filling
either an 80 per cent or 100 per cent elected second chamber
31 Public Record Office CAB 27/502, Cabinet committee
HL(25); Churchill memorandum HL(25)13 Back
32
Evidence to House of Lords Constitution committee, 18 May 2011,
q217 Back
33
A Question of Expertise? The House of Lords and welfare policy.
Professor Hugh Bochel and Dr Andrew Defty Back
34
Childs, 2008 as quoted in Evans, E & Harrison, L. Candidate
Selection in British Second Order Elections: A Comparison of Electoral
System and Party Strategy Effects, 2011. Back
35
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/119.pdf Back
36
M. Gallagher 'The Results Analysed' in M. Marsh and P. Mitchell
How Ireland Voted 1997 p136. Back
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