UNLOCK DEMOCRACYWRITTEN EVIDENCE
About Unlock Democracy
Unlock Democracy (incorporating Charter 88) is the
UK's leading campaign for democracy, rights and freedoms. A grassroots
movement, we are owned and run by our members. In particular,
we campaign for fair, open and honest elections, stronger Parliament
and accountable government, and a written constitution. We want
to bring power closer to the people and create a culture of informed
political interest and responsibility. Unlock Democracy runs the
Elect the Lords campaign to campaign for an elected second chamber.
For more information about Unlock Democracy please see www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk
About this submission
In addition to writing our own response to the draft
Bill, Unlock Democracy sought the views of our members and supporters.
We ran a brief online survey on the key elements of the draft
Bill as well as handing out leaflets at street stalls. We agreed
to forward any comments people made regardless of whether or not
they supported our policy. Over 4,100 people took up our offer,
either filing in detailed comments on specific aspects of the
proposals or just answering the survey. Many chose to do both.
After discussion with the committee clerks we have submitted over
4100 individual responses as a separate word document but we refer
to the survey results throughout our submission and the data set
is included as an appendix.
Executive Summary
Unlock Democracy supports the following:
i) A fully directly elected second chamber with
broadly the same powers as the current House of Lords;
ii) Members elected in halves for renewable 8-10
year terms;
iii) An electoral system that gives the voter
choice between individual candidates and political parties such
as the Single Transferable Vote or a number of open list systems;
iv) A considerably smaller reformed second chamber,
between 250 and 350 members;
v) Experts should be brought into the second
chamber through the Committee system to consider specific Bills
rather than as full time members of the legislature;
vi) Government Ministers should not sit in the
second chamber so that there is a clear distinction in roles and
powers between the two chambers;
vii) The second chamber should have a role as
a 'chamber of the union' representing the nations and regions
of the UK at Westminster;
viii) Members of the second chamber should be
barred from standing for the House of Commons for a lengthy period;
ix) There should be no places reserved for religious
representatives in the second chamber;
x) The second chamber should be called the Senate;
How the draft Bill fulfils its objects
1. Unlock Democracy very much welcomes the fact
the government has published a draft bill. In the one hundred
years that electing the second chamber has been seriously discussed,
this is the first time that a government has presented a bill
to Parliament. This is a significant step forward in its own right.
We also welcome the fact that the Bill has been published as a
draft and can benefit from pre-legislative scrutiny.
2. Unlock Democracy is broadly supportive of
both the proposals and drafting of the Bill. We are pleased that
the government is moving ahead with plans for an elected second
chamber, selected on a different basis to the House of Commons
and that they are proposing to end the link between the Peerage
and membership of the legislature. The white paper clearly sets
out that some elements of the policy are still open for debate
and we have entered into this consultation in that spirit. There
are some areas where we take a different view from the government.
For example we believe that members of a reformed second chamber
should be elected for terms of no more than 10 years, that they
should be able to stand for re-election once and that the house
should be elected in halves rather than thirds.
3. While we understand the stated logic behind
drafting the legislation for the most complicated options, but
leaving some questions open in the white paper, as an organisation
that supports a fully elected second chamber we would have preferred
to see this included in the draft bill.
4. One criticism that we would make of the white
paper and draft Bill is that they very deliberately sidestep the
issue of the powers of a reformed second chamber. The White Paper
simply states that the powers would be the same as for the current
House of Lords. Unlock Democracy does not accept that an elected
second chamber will undermine the supremacy of the House of Commons
but we think that this concern should have been addressed in these
proposals. We have outlined below how we would do this.
The effect of the Bill on the powers of the House
of Lords and the existing conventions governing the relationship
between the House of Lords and the House of Commons
5. It has been asserted that an elected second
chamber would no longer be bound by the Parliament Acts or the
conventions that currently govern the relationship between the
two chambers. Unlock Democracy does not accept this argument.
6. The example of the Australian Senate also
demonstrates that it is possible for a directly elected second
chamber, even one with more formal powers than the House of Lords,
to be constrained by convention. Even though the Senate can, periodically,
make life very difficult for Australian governments, there is
no attempt to try and move beyond being a reviewing chamber. The
Australian Senate passes 74 per cent of Bills sent to it without
making any changes[37],
leaving the House of Representatives clearly the prime chamber.
The role and functions of a reformed House
7. Unlock Democracy and its predecessor organisations
have long been committed to the reform of the House of Lords.
We believe that a second chamber has a crucial role to play in
the British constitution. Wherever a Parliament has only one chamber,
the dominant party within it is in a position to abuse its power.
Particularly in the UK, where the House of Commons is dominated
by an unusually strong Executive, it is vital that a second chamberdemocratically
legitimate, and constituted differently from the lower Houseexists
to hold it in check.
8. Like the Government, we envisage a reformed
second chamber as a deliberative body, complementing rather than
duplicating the work of the Commons. It should provide additional
capacity to an overburdened lower House, bringing a different
perspective to the review of legislation and serving a discrete
constitutional role.
9. In addition Unlock Democracy believes that
the second chamber should play a specific role in representing
the concerns of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom
at Westminster. As the second chamber is elected on a different
basis to the House of Commons, with considerably larger constituencies
and with no mandate for constituency work, they can take a broader
view when scrutinising policy. This is a role carried out effectively
by the Australian and US Senates, although they do this through
malapportionment of seats whilst we would prefer to use the electoral
system and a minimum level of candidates per electoral district
to ensure fair representation.
10. Unlock Democracy supports a reformed second
chamber exercising the same powers as the current House of Lords.
Specifically we believe the second chamber should be able to delay
legislation for one year as is currently the case. Unlock Democracy
also believes that the reformed second chamber should retain the
power to veto secondary legislation. Secondary legislation receives
very little scrutiny and the power of veto provides an important
if rarely used check on this power.
11. Unlock Democracy believes the second chamber
should develop its current role in protecting certain constitutional
principles. Currently the Parliament Acts give the House of Lords
a specific role in preventing a Parliament being extended beyond
five years without a general election. We believe it would be
beneficial for the second chamber to take on a similar role in
relation to core constitutional documents. There would need to
be extensive consultation over exactly which Acts or constitutional
principles should be included and what the level of protection
there should be. It may be for example that it would be determined
that certain constitutional documents such as the Scotland Act
1998 or the Human Rights Act would be exempt from the Parliament
Acts or could not be repealed without a two-thirds majority in
the second chamber.
The means of ensuring continued primacy of the
House of Commons under any new arrangements
12. The debate on how the primacy of the House
of Commons should be maintained is an important one. Unlock Democracy
is committed to the House of Commons remaining as the prime chamber
within the UK legislature. However we also campaign for a stronger
Parliament and accountable government, and do not accept that
the pre-eminence of the House of Commons should mean that it always
gets its own way.
13. Unlock Democracy accepts that it is likely
that an elected second chamber would be more willing to use the
powers that it has. Dr Meg Russell of the Constitution Unit at
UCL has published a detailed analysis of the Government's defeats
in the House of Lords since the removal of the hereditary peers
in 1999[38]
which suggests that an elected second chamber would be more assertive
in its dealings with the House of Commons. The significance of
this research is not the number of defeats which the last Labour
government suffered, which although high was comparable to other
Labour governments[39].
Rather this research shows quite clearly where the House of Commons
has rejected Lords amendments, the second chamber has, since the
removal of the hereditary peers, become more assertive and has
been more willing to insist upon the changes it wants.
14. However it is important not to overstate
the significance of this change. It is still the case that much
more frequently the House of Lords agrees to give in and accept
the decision of the House of Commons. This is not the second chamber
challenging the primacy of the House of Commons; it is merely
exercising its existing powers. Unlock Democracy sees this as
part of a stronger Parliament using checks and balances to hold
a powerful Executive to account, rather than a challenge to the
primacy of the House of Commons.
15. Unlock Democracy recognises that there will
sometimes be disagreements between the two Houses in Parliament,
as indeed there are now. We believe that there needs to be a formal
process for resolving any disputes that may arise. Currently this
is managed through the use of conventions. Unlock Democracy believes
that an elected second chamber would benefit from a more formal
structure, such as Joint Committee to deal with such issues as
may arise and to foster an effective working relationship between
the two Houses.
16. Joint Committees are a common tool in bicameral
parliaments for resolving disputes between two chambers, although
some are less effective than others. We would be keen to see a
Joint Committee set up along the lines of the German and US models
whereby the committee is permanent, created at the beginning of
each Parliament, with senior members of both houses chosen to
serve on the committee. Although the committee being permanent
means the members may not be familiar with the detail of the Bill
in question, it allows the members of the committee to build effective
working relationships and may also help to take some of the heat
out of the debate.
17. Interestingly in the online survey that Unlock
Democracy conducted, of the 3659 respondents 2690 supported the
creation of a Joint Committee to resolve disputes once a Bill
had been rejected twice by the second chamber. The other popular
option was that the House of Commons should be able to override
a veto with a super majorityif two thirds vote in favour
of the disputed Bill. This system which in Japan and a version
of this is used in Spain. However we believe that negotiation
through the committee rather than a more adversarial super majority
vote is a more constructive way to resolve differences between
the two chambers.
18. Unlock Democracy believes that there should
also be structural constraints built in to the design of a reformed
second chamber to ensure the primacy of the House of Commons.
These are addressed in more detail below but would include the
use of staggered elections and government Ministers being selected
from the members of the lower house.
The size of the proposed House and the ratio of
elected to non-elected members
19. Unlock Democracy supports a fully, directly
elected second chamber. This is consistent with the will of the
House of Commons expressed in the vote of March 2007. Although
both the 80 per cent and 100 per cent elected options received
majorities, it was only the fully elected option that received
an absolute majority from across the House. Also in the immediate
aftermath of the vote in the House of Commons, ICM conducted a
poll for Unlock Democracy that found the public supported a fully
elected chamber by more than 2-1.[40]
In the recent online survey that Unlock Democracy conducted, of
the 3987 respondents that answered this question 57.69 per cent
supported a fully elected second chamber while 29.90 per cent
favoured an 80 per cent elected chamber. Only 12.42 per cent supported
other options for reform.
20. It is often argued, including by those who
support an elected second chamber, that a small number of appointed
members should remain in the second chamber to guarantee an independent,
expert chamber, to allow for the appointment of under-represented
groups and to facilitate the appointment of Government Ministers
to the second chamber. Unlock Democracy does not support these
arguments and we set out alternative responses to these concerns
below.
Independence
21. The House of Lords is often held up as an
example of a less partisan chamber that benefits from the presence
both of members who have no party affiliation and more independent
minded representatives of the parties. Unlock Democracy does not
support this assertion.
22. Dr Meg Russell and Maria Sciara's detailed
analysis of votes in the House of Lords from 1999-2006[41]
showed that while there were various groups from the independent
Crossbenchers and Bishops, to party rebels and opposition parties
that could contribute to a government defeat, the key factor in
most cases was the opposition parties voting cohesively. In other
words the government was more likely to suffer a defeat because
of strong partisan voting than the presence of a significant group
of independents in the chamber.
23. Rebellions in the House of Commons generally
receive more media attention than those in the House of Lords.
In part this is because they are more obvious; there are a number
of reasons, other than a rebellion that governments can be defeated
in the Lords. Party discipline is also generally accepted to be
weaker in the Lords than the Commons so defeats are not seen as
such a threat to the government's authority.
24. The website www.publicwhip.org.uk provides
statistics on the voting records of both MPs and Peers and how
often individuals take a different view from the main party group.
Analysing the number of rebellions in both chambers since 2005,
we found that not only are there slightly more rebellions in the
House of Commons than the House of Lords but also that rebellions
in the House of Commons are more likely to involve more than 10
people than in the House of Lords.
25. Using the public whip data and their definition
of rebellion, we found that in the 2005-2011 period at least one
person rebelled in 50.53 per cent of divisions compared to 47.74
per cent in the House of Lords, although there were fewer votes
in the House of Lords. Dr Alan Renwick has analysed the public
whip data differently, looking at rebellion levels within party
groups and found that although rebellion rates are slightly higher
in the House of Lords they are still very low[42].
26. It is also interesting to note that when
rebellions happen in the House of Commons they tended to be larger17.05
per cent of rebellions in the House of Commons involved 10 or
more members rebelling compared to 10.24 per cent of rebellions
for the House of Lords.
27. It is too early in this government's term
to look for trends in voting patterns, but it is interesting to
note that the chamber does seem to have been more explicitly partisan,
as demonstrated by the response to the Parliamentary Voting System
and Constituencies Act, since the recent appointment of a large
number of former MPs.
28. Unlock Democracy welcomes and supports the
presence of independents in UK politics. However we do not believe
that appointment is either the best nor only means of giving independents
a voice in our legislature. We explore the ways in which independents
can be encouraged through different electoral systems below.
Expertise
29. Unlock Democracy agrees that the legislative
process can benefit substantially from the involvement of experts.
We do not, however, agree that such experts must be full-time
members of the legislature in order to have an influence.
30. It has also been argued that a reformed chamber
must include an appointed element in order to ensure that the
chamber has sufficient expertise to perform its deliberative duties.
31. This idea is to be rejected. Firstly, the
current House of Lords is the clearest sign that appointment is
not by any means a foolproof way of introducing expertise. A large
plurality of sitting life peers41.57 per centare
drawn from active party politics, having served as MPs, MEPS,
councillors or party officials; only 26.51 per cent are current
'experts'. When we look at the Crossbenchers as a group who are
appointed for their independence and expertise, only 45.71 per
cent of Crossbenchers are expert (10.5 per cent of the House of
Lords as a whole).
32. Our full analysis of expertise in the House
of Lords is included in Appendix 2[43].
It is very difficult to objectively assess expertise and there
is a risk that any such classification can become arbitrary. However
we used publicly available biographical information to assess
seniority in a career before entering the House of Lords and the
length of time since that position was held. This meant that peers
who continue to practice their main career whilst also attending
the House of Lords received higher scores than those who had retired.
33. One of the arguments in favour of retaining
an appointed element to the second chamber is that experts would
not be willing to stand for election. We do not find this a compelling
argument. Two-fifths of the current membership of the House of
Lords have either worked in politics or already stood for elected
office so it is reasonable to assume, this experience could be
gained through election.
34. We also question the idea that a chamber
needs an internal cohort of experts to perform a deliberative
role, and doubt their general value to such a chamber once appointed.
Many expert members have a valuable contribution to be made in
their fieldsuch as sociology, or human fertilitybut
would be expected to vote on all issues whether versed in them
or not. It is far preferable to have a chamber where expert advice
is sought externally as neededfor instance, through the
use of select committees or special Bill Committeesand
where the final vote falls to democratically elected representatives
of the people, who have been suitably informed.
35. One ongoing issue regarding the presence
of independent experts in the House of Lords is the levels of
attendance that are expected. One reason for the relatively low
impact of the Crossbenchers on votes in the House of Lords is
that with some notable exceptions they attend and vote far less
frequently than party appointees. Dr Meg Russell and Maria Sciara[44]
found that crossbenchers voted on average in just 12 per cent
of the divisions they could have voted in between 1999 and 2007,
compared to 53 per cent of divisions among Labour members, 47
per cent for Liberal Democrat members, and 32 per cent for Conservative
members.
36. Unlock Democracy believes that expertise
can more effectively be brought into the legislature though the
appointment of special advisers to select committees or to committees
to consider specific bills rather than through full time membership
of the second chamber. This would ensure that the expertise called
in was always relevant and up to date and would not mean that
experts had to choose between their existing careers and advising
on legislation in their field.
Gender and Ethnicity
37. Some have suggested that an appointed element
should be preserved because it will allow for the adequate representation
of women and ethnic minorities in the reformed chamber.
38. It is absurd that a chamber composed entirely
of elected representatives should be rejected on the grounds that
it will not be representative enough. As Unlock Democracy outlined
in its evidence to the Speakers Conference on the Representation
of Women and Ethnic Minorities in the House of Commons, the most
effective means of increasing the representation of under-represented
groups is to move to a proportional electoral system with multi-member
constituencies.
39. Internationally, the countries that have
more representative politics also have multi-member constituencies.
This is the case even where there are no quotas in operation.
Where parties have the opportunity to nominate more than one candidate
they are more likely to nominate a balanced slate than if they
can only nominate one candidate. If only one candidate can be
nominated, parties will often choose the white, male candidate
as he is seen as the more broadly acceptable candidate. The myth
that women candidates lose votes has wide currency in constituency
parties. Often discrimination is justified by blaming the voters,
arguing (incorrectly) that the voters would not vote for a woman
and the relevant Party could not risk losing the seat. However
the Fawcett Society has shown that voters do not penalise women
candidates. The problem is that political parties do not select
women in sufficient numbers in safe or winnable parliamentary
seats[45].
40. Multi-member seats also offer parties the
choice of a number of different pro-active measures for selecting
candidates from under-represented groups. In the UK, All Women
Shortlists are the most well known and controversial form of positive
discrimination but there are other mechanisms for encouraging
selection of women candidates. For example in list electoral systems
some parties 'zip' the party list so that every other candidate
is female. Other parties use quotas, often thirds, for candidate
selection so that at least a third of the list must be male and
a third must be female. Of course it is not just getting on the
list that is important but the position on the list which is why
this technique is often combined with a quota for the top of the
list so that at least one of the top three candidates also has
to be female.
41. It should also be noted that these measures
can also be used for electoral systems, like STV and open lists,
that allow voters to choose between candidates as well as parties
and not just closed list systems. Voters of course have the prerogative
to choose not to elect female candidates but evidence suggests
that this is not the main barrier to women's' representation.
Indeed in Norway in 1971 women's organisations took advantage
of an open list system used in local government elections to dramatically
increase the level of women elected. They were able to do this
because the type of open list system that was in use, allowed
voters to strike through the names of candidates they did not
want to support. So although the parties chose the orders of the
list campaigners urged voters to go down the list of the party
they wanted to support and cross out the male candidates until
they reached a female candidate. As a result of this campaign
the number of women elected to Councils in some cities rose from
around 15-20 per cent to a majority of the Council. Although there
was some backlash to this campaign at the next election it changed
the way in which political parties in Norway approached drawing
up party lists.[46]
42. Unlock Democracy does not believe that reform
of the second chamber should be entered into on the assumption
that the process by which 80 per cent of members are elected is
so drastically flawed and unrepresentative as to need external
correction. The focus should be on establishing an electoral system
that takes proper account of voters' needs and wishes, rather
than adding undemocratic buttresses to account for an existing
system's flaws.
43. Unlock Democracy hopes that the opportunities
implicit in creating a new chamber, to ensure that the chamber
is more representative and takes advantage of more modern family
friendly working practices, are seized. It is very rare in the
UK context to consciously design a legislative chamber rather
than seek to reform something that has evolved over time. We already
have evidence from the creation of the Scottish Parliament, as
well as the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies, that new bodies
can lead the way both in increasing the level of women represented
in politics but also in modernising working practices such as
the reporting of expenses and engaging the public through the
use of petition committees.
44. Finally, while the present House of Lords
is slightly better in terms of gender balance and ethnic diversity
compared to the present House of Commons, it is worth noting that
it is only recently that levels of female representation in the
House of Lords have begun to improve. Despite having none of the
barriers frequently ascribed to elected chambers, the appointment
process has repeatedly failed to produce a genuinely representative
second chamber; if appointment worked, there is no reason why
it should not produce 50:50 gender balance. There is certainly
no evidence that appointment is inherently better for women or
ethnic minorities, significant progress can be made in elected
chambers if political parties are willing to act.
Size
45. The UK is unusual in having a second chamber
that is considerably larger than the first. Unlock Democracy supports
the view in the White Paper that the current House of Lords is
too large. Partly this is a result of the differing views of membership
in the House of Lords and the conflation of the honours system
with membership of the legislature. We therefore welcome the fact
that the government proposes to break this link.
46. Unlock Democracy agrees that the second chamber
should be smaller than the House of Commons in recognition of
its different functions and the lack of any constituency role
for members of the second chamber. A smaller chamber would also
encourage deliberation and a more collegiate method of working
than the adversarial House of Commons.
47. Average daily attendance in the House of
Lords has increased by 26.3 per cent to 497 in 2010/11 from 394
in 2009/10[47].
Even if the reformed second chamber were reduced to the 2009 figure,
this would still leave the UK with one of the largest second chambers
in the world. Unlock Democracy believes that the scrutiny and
revision functions required of the second chamber could be delivered
by a full time chamber of between 250-350 members. Therefore we
are content with the government's proposal for a chamber of 300
members. Although this would be a significant reduction in the
size of the second chamber, we do not believe this would not undermine
the current structures and methods of working. Rather it would
take into account that all members would serve on a full time
basis and would be given adequate staffing support to carry out
their roles.
48. Part of the reason why the House of Lords
relies heavily on part-time professionals who work outside the
House is that members are not paid a salary, receive only a small
attendance allowance and have little research and administrative
support. Lack of salary also reinforces the metropolitan, affluent
profile of the membership of the House of Lords.
A statutory appointments commission
49. Unlock Democracy supports a fully elected
second chamber. However if we were to retain an element of appointment
we would expect this process to be managed by an Appointments
Commission rather than by political patronage. Equally we believe
that any members appointed to the second chamber should be from
a non-party political background.
50. We share the concerns of many at the way
in which large numbers of political appointments were made after
the last election. David Cameron has created more peers more quickly
than any of his post-war predecessors, having ennobled 117 people
in less than a year. This is unsustainable in an already overly
large chamber. We also note the concern of Peers at the "fractious
atmosphere"[48]
created by the appointment of so many ex-MPs to the second chamber.
The electoral term, retirement etc
51. The government proposes that members of the
second chamber should be elected in thirds for, periods of the
15 years and that they should not be able to stand for re-election
at the end of their term. Unlock Democracy is sympathetic to the
thinking behind these proposals although we do not come to the
same policy conclusions.
52. It is common in elected second chambers for
elections to be staggered. This helps to ensure that although
both chambers are have elected members and therefore have legitimacy
the second chamber's mandate is never more recent than the first.
It also ensures that there is an element of continuity and institutional
memory as it is not possible for all members to be replaced in
one election.
53. There are also examples of elected second
chambers where the term of office in the second chamber is longer
than in the first. This helps to differentiate the two chambers
and longer terms can help to create a different culture in the
second chamber, as members are not so focused on seeking re-election
and can take a longer term view.
54. However a 15 year term is exceptionally long,
even for a second chamber. It is two or three times the length
of term for many elected second chambers around the world and
over a third longer than the longest term currently in operation8
years in Brazil and Chile[49].
While France used to have terms of 9 years in the second chamber
this has been reduced to six years which is only one year longer
than the lower house.
55. Whilst we understand how the government came
to this proposal by wanting staggered elections and a link to
the term of the House of Commons which has now been fixed at five
years, we believe that 15 years is too long and does not provide
for any accountability.
56. Unlock Democracy would prefer 8 year term
of office, linked to two 4 year terms of the House of Commons,
however that is no longer appropriate as the term for the House
of Commons has been set for 5 years. Therefore we recommend that
members of the second chamber should serve for a 10 year term
with 150 members being elected every five years.
57. Interestingly of the 3866 people who answered
the question on length of term in our online survey, 51.24 per
cent supported a term of less than 10 years, while only 9.21 per
cent supported 15 year terms. Although we have used 10 year terms
for modelling purposes in this submission we would hope that if
the term limit for the House of Commons were reduced, this would
be re-visited.
58. The lack of accountability is further exacerbated
by the proposal that members of the second chamber should not
be able to stand for re-election. Whilst we are sympathetic to
the desire to promote independence among members of the second
chamber we believe this has to be balanced with accountability.
The only element of accountability on the current proposals is
that members will be able to be recalled on the same basis as
members of the House of Commons if recall proposals are introduced.
We do not believe that this is acceptable.
59. Unlock Democracy believes that members of
an elected second chamber should be able to stand for re-election;
but only once. This allows for some accountability but also ensures
that members of the second chamber will move on. Of the 3921 people
who answered this question in our online survey a significant
majority, 76.46 per cent supported members being able to stand
for re-election.
60. If the reason for non-renewable terms is
to promote independence and try and prevent members from using
the second chamber as a means of launching a wider political career,
then there are other ways that this can be achieved. It is already
proposed that there should be a period of time after leaving the
second chamber during which former members cannot stand for elections
to the House of Commons. We would also support a similar bar on
members of the House of Commons moving straight to the second
chamber as we would not want to import the culture and working
practices of the House of Commons into a reformed second chamber.
However we recognise the difficulty that this would pose for political
parties who wish to encourage some members of the House of Commons
to retire. Our proposals of holding the elections to the second
chamber on the same day as the elections to the European Parliament,
rather than the House of commons would also have the effect of
creating a short quarantine.
61. Unlock Democracy would also recommend that
members of the second chamber be resourced in such a way that
discourages them from establishing constituency offices and competing
with members of the House of Commons for casework. We recognise
that it is impossible to entirely prevent this from happening;
it is as much to do with the culture of political parties who
will expect members of an elected second chamber to support their
campaigning work for other elections and bodies, as the career
aspirations of the individual concerned. However we do believe
that this can be discouraged in more nuanced ways, that also allow
for some element of accountability, rather than the blunt tool
of non-renewable terms of office.
Recall
62. The White Paper proposes introducing a system
of recall, along the same lines as the system to be introduced
for the House of Commons. While Unlock Democracy supports recall
in principle, particularly in the case of an elected second chamber
in which members will be elected for extended time periods, we
do not believe replicating the model proposed for the House of
Commons would be sufficient.
63. We support a model of recall in which, if
5 per cent of an electoral district calls for it, a recall ballot
must be held on the same day as the next second chamber election.
Only members of the second chamber not up for election in this
election could be recalled in this way. Petitioners must give
a reason for recalling the member, but it could be for any reasonnot
restricted to parliament having already disciplined the member.
64. If 50 per cent of voters support recalling
the individual, that member will be excluded from the chamber
and the number of members to be elected for that constituency
in the subsequent election will be increased by one.
65. We believe this model would ensure accountability
throughout the member of the second chamber's term of office without
adding an unnecessary administrative burden or disadvantaging
minority candidates.
66. The system of increasing the number of members
to be elected for that particular constituency could also be used
to fill casual vacancies at the next opportunity.
Retirement
67. Unlock Democracy welcomes the government's
proposal that members for the reformed second chamber should be
able to retire. This is a particularly important provision when
combined with long terms of office as it is possible a members
circumstances may change during a 10 year period, in ways that
they could not have predicted when they stood for office.
The electoral system preferred;
68. Unlock Democracy is pleased by the Government's
recognition that members of the reformed upper chamber must be
elected on a different basis from members of the House of Commons.
There is widespread consensus that the second chamber should have
a different culture and outlook from the House of Commons, and
that members being able to exercise independence of judgement
is essential. If the reformed chamber is to complement the work
of the House of Commons it must be able to address legislation
from a different perspective.
69. Unlock Democracy welcomes the rejection of
closed list systems such as is used for elections to the European
Parliament. Closed list systems encourage candidates for the second
chamber to focus on the political party rather than the general
public as a means of getting elected. Under such schemes, political
parties have a huge degree of control over the chamber's final
membership. This is unhealthy for a democracy; it would lead to
what is essentially a system of political appointments by another
name.
70. Unlock Democracy does not endorse any particular
electoral system. Electoral systems can be modified to achieve
different ends and as such we assess any proposed system on the
effects that it will have rather than just its name. We support
the use of a proportional electoral system that gives the voter
the opportunity to choose between different political parties
and individual candidates. The government has proposed that either
the Single Transferable Vote or Open List system should be used
to elect members of the second chamber. We have outlined our views
on these systems below. However, we note that there was a very
strong preference among the 3671 respondents who answered this
question on our online survey, with 86.33 per cent favouring the
use of STV.
Single Transferable Vote (STV)
71. STV uses preferential voting in multi-member
constituencies. Each voter gets one vote, which can transfer from
their first-preference to their second-preference and so on, as
necessary. This means that fewer votes are 'wasted' (i.e. cast
for losing candidates or unnecessarily cast for the winner) under
STV. Therefore most voters can identity a representative that
they personally helped to elect. Such a link in turn increases
a representative's accountability. This strengthening of accountability
would be particularly beneficial if, as we recommend, members
of the second chamber served for long non-renewable terms of office.
72. With STV the design of the ballot paper has
a significant impact on the way the electoral system is used by
voters. STV ballot papers can range from a larger version of that
already used in UK general elections to a ballot organised by
party groups where the candidates are listed in the order chosen
by the political parties. Ireland, Australia and Malta all use
versions of STV to very different effect because of the different
designs of the ballot paper.
73. STV in large multi member constituencies
is a proportional system that allows voters to choose between
political parties and individual candidates. It is also successfully
used in the UK already (for Northern Irish local and assembly
elections and Scottish local elections). Unlock Democracy would
therefore support the use of STV for elections to the second chamber.
74. We would strongly oppose the introduction
of Australian-style STV, in which voters have to choose between
essentially voting for a closed list, or voting "below the
line" and having to express a preference for every single
preference. In practice, this is a closed list system by another
name. Voters should only have the option of voting for candidates
and should be free to express as many or as few preferences as
they desire.
75. However, one of the issues with STV is that
voters are presented with a large number of individual candidates
from which to express a preference for. Larger multi-member constituencies
are not significantly more proportional than medium sized ones
yet have the potential to cause unnecessary confusion for voters.
We therefore recommend that, if STV is used, constituencies are
limited to between 5 and 7 members.
Open Lists
76. Party-list systems guarantee a high degree
of party proportionality and ensure that every vote has equal
value. Across the globe, list systems exhibit a lot of variation,
chiefly determined by the size of districts, thresholds for securing
seats and the manner in which the seats are allocated.
77. There are large numbers of open list systems
that allow voters to choose between both candidates and parties.
However, in some list systems the choice is more formal than real.
If a list system were to be used it should be a completely open
list system. The system used in Finland where voters can vote
for an individual candidates and the vote also counts towards
the party total, may be of interest. This was the system supported
by the Conservative Party during the debates on the European Parliamentary
Elections Act 1999.
78. There are a number of systems that can be
used to translate votes into seats depending on whether you wanted
to weight the system in favour of encouraging smaller parties
and minority voices or to ensure that parties received a significant
level of support before wining seats. Where list systems are used
in the UK the D'Hondt method is used but the Sainte-Laguë
method, the Huntington-Hill method and the largest-remainder method
would also be possible. Overall we would recommend that Sainte-Laguë
is used as it would produce a more proportional result than the
D'Hondt method, which tends to benefit larger political parties.
Constituency Size
79. As already outlined Unlock Democracy believes
that the second chamber should be constituted differently from
the House of Commons to emphasise the different role that it plays
in the governance of the UK.
80. Currently membership of the House of Lords
is disproportionately skewed towards London and the South East.
We do not believe this would be desirable in a reformed chamber.
In particular Unlock Democracy believes that the second chamber
should be a 'chamber of the union' and play a role in representing
the nations and regions of the UK at Westminster. This regional
voice would emphasise the representativeness of an elected second
chamber, without being seen to compete with the House of Commons.
81. When considering constituency size it is
necessary to balance the needs of effective electoral administration
with the need to create constituencies that have some meaning
for the public. Regional boundaries are often seen as arbitrary,
created for the ease of administrators with no regard for the
sense of identity of local communities. It is not always easy
to find a balance between these competing factors.
82. Unlike members of the House of Commons members
of the second chamber will not be responsible for casework; therefore
it would be feasible to have large regional constituencies. We
do not believe that counties would be large enough units to work
with a proportional multi-member system and so we do not consider
this to be a viable option. The alternative would be to use the
existing regional boundaries used for the European Parliamentary
elections, or to create some entirely new constituencies.
83. On balance Unlock Democracy agrees with the
government proposal that the 12 electoral regions already used
to elect members of the European Parliament should also be used
as constituencies for members of the second chamber, although
these will need to be subdivided into 1-3 constituencies if STV
is used. While they are too large to reflect more than the most
basic regional identities they are easy to understand and are
already in use.
How many members should each constituency elect?
84. As already outlined, Unlock Democracy supports
the use of a broadly proportional electoral system using large
regional constituencies and electing more than one representative
per election.
85. For this to be effective and proportional
in practice there would need to be a minimum number of representatives
per constituency elected at each election. Currently for the European
Parliament elections the minimum per region is three MEPs. It
would be possible to use this as the minimum for elections to
the second chamber, but this would not allow for the expression
of political diversity in the smaller regions. As we want the
second chamber to have a particular role in representing the regions
we do not think this would be appropriate.
86. While we would support allocating members
of the second chamber to each region in broadly the same way that
the Electoral Commission currently allocates members of the European
Parliament, Unlock Democracy would support five being the minimum
number of candidates being elected to the second chamber at each
election. This would mean that the smallest region in the UK,
Northern Ireland, would have a minimum of 10 representatives in
the second chamber, with five being elected every five years.
This would be sufficient to be proportional but would also allow
the political diversity of smaller regions to be reflected in
the second chamber. We would also recommend using the Sainte-Laguë
method as this would marginally benefit smaller regions.
87. The maximum number of representatives per
constituency can either be determined by the population of the
area, as is currently the case for elections in the UK, or on
the basis of strict equality for each area regardless of population,
as is the case with the US Senate.
88. The system used in the US Senate guarantees
equal representation for each state regardless of the size of
population. It was known to be distorting when the system was
created and has become more so over time. In 1787, the factor
was roughly ten times (Virginia to Rhode Island), whereas today
it is roughly 70 times (California to Wyoming, based on the 1790
and 2000 census). Unlock Democracy does not believe this would
be a suitable system for the UKespecially since the current
governmental regions in England were created primarily for administrative
convenience.
89. As already mentioned, the current House of
Lords is dominated disproportionately by members from London and
the South East which emphasises a general perception that governance
in the UK is very London-centric. If the number of the representatives
per constituency were determined purely on the basis of population
then this would give London and South East far more members than
other less populated areas of the UK. This would not facilitate
the second chamber playing a role as a 'chamber of the union'.
90. Any system based on population will inevitably
give a large number of representatives to London and South East
as they are the most populous areas the UK. However it would be
possible to use a degressive system so that the difference between
the representation of the most populous and least populous regions
was less extreme.
91. Below, we have included two models: the first
assumes that half of the chamber is elected every five years (150
members to be elected per election) while the second assumes that
one third of the chamber is elected every five years (100 members
to be elected per election). In each, we have assumed that regions
should have a minimum of five members and have allocated seats
using the Sainte-Laguë method.
92. This model highlights some of the problems
with the government's proposed model of electing the chamber in
thirds. The 100 seat model would make it harder for parties to
ensure their candidate lists ensure gender balance and include
sufficient representation of other under-represented groups. To
ensure sufficient political plurality, the smallest regions would
have to be significantly over-represented compared to the rest
of the country. It would also be significantly harder to introduce
STV using this model as constituencies would either be less proportional
or harder to manage. In addition to the undesirability of long,
non-renewable terms, we believe this demonstrates the desirability
of adopting the half-elected model.Table
1Half elected every 5 years
Region | Population (millions)
| Seats per region per election
| STV Constituencies |
North East | 2.638
| 6 | 1
|
North West | 7.193
| 17 | 3
|
Scotland | 5.206
| 12 | 2
|
Northern Ireland | 1.812
| 5 | 1
|
Yorkshire and The Humber
| 5.621 | 13
| 2 |
Wales | 3.038
| 7 | 1
|
West Midlands | 5.662
| 13 | 2
|
East Midlands | 4.825
| 11 | 2
|
East of England | 6.179
| 14 | 2
|
South West | 5.62
| 13 | 2
|
London | 8.114
| 19 | 3
|
South East | 8.871
| 20 | 3
|
Totals | 64.779
| 150 | 24
|
Notes:
The effect of allocating a minimum of five seats
per nation/region is that Wales and the North East get an additional
seat each, and Northern Ireland would get two additional seats.
Assumes that between 5 and 7 members are elected
to each STV Constituency.
The D'Hondt method yields exactly the same result
in this case.
Table
2One third elected every five years
Region | Population (millions)
| Seats per region per election
| STV Constituencies |
North East | 2.638
| 5 | 1
|
North West | 7.193
| 11 | 2
|
Scotland | 5.206
| 8 | 1-2
|
Northern Ireland | 1.812
| 5 | 1
|
Yorkshire and The Humber
| 5.621 | 8
| 1-2 |
Wales | 3.038
| 5 | 1
|
West Midlands | 5.662
| 9 | 1-2
|
East Midlands | 4.825
| 7 | 1
|
East of England | 6.179
| 9 | 1-2
|
South West | 5.62
| 8 | 1-2
|
London | 8.114
| 12 | 2
|
South East | 8.871
| 13 | 2
|
Totals | 64.779
| 100 | 14-19
|
Notes:
The effect of allocating a minimum of five seats
per nation/region is that Northern Ireland gets an additional
seat while the South East gets one fewer.
Allocating between 5 and 7 members to each STV
Constituency would be impossible using this model; the range would
have to be extended to either 4-7 (which would be less proportional)
or 5-9 (which would be less manageable).
If D'Hondt is used, the South East would gain
a seat while the West Midlands would lose a seat.
Independents
93. Unlock Democracy does not accept that it
is necessary to retain an appointed element in the second chamber
to ensure that independents have a voice. It would be possible
for independents to be successful in either of the proposed electoral
systems.
94. The evidence of elections to the devolved
chambers and the European Parliament, has already shown that voting
habits are different depending on the chamber. For example the
SNP received 45.4 per cent of the votes cast in the 2011 Scottish
Parliament elections and was able to form a majority administration
in Scotland, despite only receiving 19.9 per cent of the vote
in the 2010 House of Commons election. Equally UKIP gained 16.5
per cent of the votes cast in the 2009 European Parliamentary
election but only gained 3.10 per cent votes in the 2010 general
election. In part this reflects differences in electoral systems
however it is also clear that there is a public desire to support
parties other than the three largest UK parties.
95. Neither open lists nor STV would disadvantage
independent candidates in the way single member plurality (the
system used to elect the House of Commons) does. STV would enable
voters to express preferences between both independent and partisan
candidates without having to worry about their vote not counting.
Open list systems do not allow for voters to transfer their vote
in this way, but larger seats would ensure that independent candidates
with broad support could still get elected. In addition, independents
would also have the option of standing on a slate, as the Jury
Team[50]
demonstrated in the 2010 election. We are confident that if the
public wants to elect independent members to the second chamber
they will do so.
Timing of elections
96. The government has proposed that elections
to the second chamber should be held at the same time as those
to the House of Commons. This would have the advantage of reducing
the costs of the elections to the second chamber and potentially
increasing turnout, as the country would already be going to the
polls. We agree with the government that combining elections is
a sensible strategy. However we would prefer that the elections
for the two chambers of Parliament are not held on the same day.
In part this is a means of reinforcing the primacy of the House
of Commons and emphasising the different roles that the different
chambers play in the legislature.
97. Therefore, for as long as the House of Commons
term is fixed at 5 years we believe that elections to the second
chamber should be held on the same day as those for the European
Parliament. This would mean the first elections being held in
2014. If the term of the House of Commons is reduced to 4 years,
then we would suggest holding the elections on a day when most
people in the UK are already going to the polls. We would suggest
holding them on the same day as the Greater London Assembly, Scottish
and Welsh local electionsmost English local authorities
outside of London also have elections on this day.
Transitional arrangements;
98. The government has set out a number of options
for moving forward to an elected second chamber. We support the
government's view that having a period of transition would be
welcome and beneficial for the elected members. As it is intended
that members should be elected in tranches, a transition in stages
should be feasible and the government has shown how this can be
achieved at different speeds.
99. Unlock Democracy's strong preference is to
move more quickly to a smaller chamber, and to reduce the current
members of the House of Lords down to 150 when the first elected
members first take office (assuming a model in which half are
elected every five years). This would help to establish a new
culture within the reformed chamber and establish new working
practices. It would also dramatically reduce the costs of the
new chamber. It is for others to explain how the cost of more
leisurely transitional arrangements can be justified.
100. It would be a matter for the existing members
of the House of Lords to determine who should remain as transitional
members of the second chamber. We note that a similar process
was successfully undertaken when the majority of the hereditary
peers left the chamber in 1999.
101. The only option we believe to be impracticable
is for all current Peers who wish to remain in the chamber to
do so for a full electoral cycle. We are already in a situation
where the numbers in the House of Lords can make effective working
difficult. This model would lead to the second chamber growing
even larger in size, guarantee that the unelected members continue
outnumber the elected members for more than a decade and ensure
that the costs of the second chamber would rise exponentially
before coming down again, to no identifiable purpose.
The provisions on Ministers and Bishops and Hereditary
Peers
102. Unlock Democracy does not support specific
places for religious representation in the second chamber. Rather
we believe that these views can be represented byand toelected
members.
103. Unlock democracy agrees with the government
proposal that hereditary peers should not have reserved places
in a reformed second chamber, although we agree that they should
be able to remain as transitional members and be free to stand
for election. The agreement in 1999 was that 92 hereditary peers
would remain in the chamber until the second stage of reform.
When we move to an elected second chamber that condition will
have been met and it would be inappropriate for the hereditary
peers to remain. Unlock Democracy does not believe that a seat
in the legislature should be a birthright.
104. Unlock Democracy believes that government
ministers should not sit in the second chamber. Confining government
ministers to the Commons would help to distinguish the two chambers,
secure a degree of independence for the second chamber and emphasise
the primacy of the Commons. It would also end the current absurd
practice whereby ministers who happen to be members of the Lords
cannot be held to account by the House of Commons.
105. The scrutiny of government activity should
be a task undertaken primarily by the specialist committees in
the second chamber. Specialist committees should have the power
to question ministers, and call for papers and evidence from government
departments. Individual members would continue to have the right
to ask written questions of government ministers. We would also
support ending the convention whereby ministers who are also members
of the House of Commons cannot take questions in the second chamber.
106. The White Paper proposes that the Prime
Minister should retain the right to appoint people directly to
the second chamber as ministers. Unlock Democracy believes that
this is an unacceptable retention of prime ministerial patronage
and that all government ministers should be elected.
Other administrative options such as pay and pensions
Name
107. Unlock Democracy is concerned that the second
chamber should be fully elected on a proportional system and have
broadly the same powers as at present. We have a preference for
it being a called a Senate but we recognise that it may be controversial
in some quarters and that there are a number of other names that
would be adequate. Our prime concern is the democratic mandate
of the second chamber rather than its name.
Salary
108. Members of the second chamber should be
paid the same salary and allowances as MPs, reflecting the greater
amount of specialist committee work they would be expected to
undertake as opposed to the large constituency caseload of MPs.
109. Committees should also have greater financial
resources to employ specialist staff or consultants to advise
members. The example of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which
has paid specialist advisers, should be replicated. Committees'
administrative resources should also be increased.
Is a referendum needed?
110. Unlock Democracy is sympathetic to the argument
that significant constitutional changes, such as House of Lords
reform should be subject to a referendum. The case for a referendum
is certainly strengthened by the holding of the referendum on
the Alternative Vote, which was in many ways a much less significant
change to our system of government. However, unlike in the case
of electoral reform for the House of Commons, there has been political
consensus on this issue for some time. Indeed a predominantly
elected second chamber was a manifesto commitment of the three
main parties at the last two general elections.
111. Unlock Democracy believes that referendums
should be triggered by a popular process rather than by the government
of the day. If a minimum of 5 per cent of UK voters petitioned
for a referendum on whether to proceed with House of Lords reform,
we believe that Parliament should respect that and trigger a referendum.
However as we believe this issue is settled and has broad popular
and cross-party support, we do not believe the government needs
to hold a referendum to legitimise the change.
Tax status
112. Unlock Democracy agrees with the government
that all members of a reformed second chamber should be resident
in the UK for tax purposes. We think it is regrettable that members
appointed to the current chamber have not been held to this standard.
Franchise
113. Unlock Democracy supports the proposal that
when the honour of a peerage is separated from membership of the
legislature it would be entirely appropriate for the franchise
to be changed to allow peers to vote.
Disqualification
114. Unlock Democracy supports the government's
proposals on the disqualification regime for the reformed chamber.
Although it is unusual in elected second chambers for the age
restrictions on candidates to be the same for both chambers, we
very much welcome this proposal. Unlock Democracy believes it
should be up to voters to decide whether or not an individual
candidate has the right skills and experience to serve in the
legislature.
Expulsion or suspension for misconduct
115. Unlock Democracy believes that the expulsion
regime for misconduct for members of the reformed second chamber
should, as a minimum, be the same as for the House of Lords. However
we welcome the fact that the reformed chamber will have the opportunity
to go further than this if it wishes.
Disqualification of former members of the House
of Lords standing for election as MPs
116. Unlock Democracy agrees with the government
that the reformed second chamber should be a scrutinising and
revising chamber and should as far as possible be prevented from
becoming a training ground for aspiring MPs. We would not want
to see situations like in Canada where MPs can lose their seat,
be appointed to the Senate, resign their seat to fight an election
for the lower chamber and then be re-appointed to the Senate when
they are unsuccessful[51].
117. We believe that it is essential that there
is a quarantine period during which it is not possible for former
members of the second chamber to stand for election to the first.
This will help to limit the temptation to do constituency work
and with other measures outlines above will help to differentiate
the second chamber from the House of Commons.
118. Unlock Democracy also supports there being
a period of time during which former members of the House of Commons
cannot stand for election to the second chamber.
Lobbying
119. Currently, as long as they do not votes
on the issue concerned, it is possible for members of the House
of Lords to act as paid advisers on government and legislation.
Unlock Democracy does not believe that this is an appropriate
role for a members of the legislature and hopes that this practice
will not be permitted in a reformed chamber.
Appendix 1
Results of the Online Survey conducted by Unlock
Democracy 14 September5 October 2011
1. The government has proposed that the reformed
second chamber should be either fully or 80 per cent elected.
Do you think it should be
Fully elected | 2300
| 57.69 % |
80 % elected, 20 % appointed
| 1192 | 29.90 %
|
Other | 495
| 12.42 % |
Total number of responses
| 3987 |
|
2. If some members of the second chamber are to be appointed,
what types of people would be acceptable?
Anglican Bishops | 385
| 10.64 % |
Representatives of all faiths
| 1263 | 34.89 %
|
Specially appointed government ministers
| 401 | 11.08 %
|
People appointed by political parties
| 425 | 11.74 %
|
People appointed by an independent body for their professional/academic expertise
| 2970 | 82.04 %
|
Representatives of professional bodies (eg. British Medical Association, Royal College of Nursing)
| 3190 | 88.12 %
|
Representatives of trade unions
| 1745 | 48.20 %
|
Members of the public randomly selected from the electoral roll
| 1269 | 35.06 %
|
Other | 361
| 9.97 % |
Total number of responses
| 3620 |
|
3. MPs are currently elected for up to 5 years
at a time. This is usually longer for elected second chambers
and the government has proposed they should be elected for 15
year terms. How long do you think members of the second chamber
should be elected for?
15 years | 356
| 9.21 % |
10 years | 1529
| 39.55 % |
less than 10 years |
1981 | 51.24 %
|
Total number of responses
| 3866 |
|
4. Should elected members of the second chamber be able to
stand for re-election?
Yes | 2998
| 76.46 % |
No | 923
| 23.54 % |
Total number of responses
| 3921 |
|
5. The government is considering using two voting systems
to elect the second chamber: the single transferable vote (STV),
in which voters can rank any or all candidates in order of preference;
or open lists, in which voters put an "X" beside the
candidate they most prefer. Both systems are broadly proportional.
STV offers more choice and ensures that more votes will count.
It is also better for independent candidates. However, the open
list system is significantly simpler to vote in. Which system
would you prefer:
Single Transferable Vote
| 3169 | 86.33 %
|
Open Lists | 502
| 13.67 % |
Total number of responses
| 3671 |
|
6. The current House of Lords can delay government legislation
by up to a year. However, the House of Lords rarely exercises
this right, and has only used it four times in the past 60 years.
Most experts agree that a wholly or mainly elected second chamber
is likely to want to use this power more frequently. Should the
powers of the second chamber be changed to reflect this?
No, the current rules should stay.
| 1734 | 44.61 %
|
Yes, the current rules should change.
| 2153 | 55.39 %
|
Total number of responses
| 3887 |
|
7. Which of the following proposals to alter the second chamber's
existing powers to delay legislation would you find acceptable
(tick all that apply)?
Reduce the amount of time the second chamber can delay legislation by.
| 781 | 21.34 %
|
Allow the House of Commons to overrule the second chamber if two-thirds of MPs vote to do so.
| 2085 | 56.98 %
|
Only allow the House of Lords to block legislation on more than one occasion if two-thirds of its members vote to do so.
| 1388 | 37.93 %
|
Require both chambers to set up a joint committee to work out a compromise if the second chamber rejects the legislation a second time.
| 2690 | 73.52 %
|
Total number of responses
| 3659 |
|
23 July 2011
37 Stanley Bach, "Senate Amendments and Legislative
Outcomes in Australia, 1996-2007", Australian Journal of
Political Science 43, no. 3 (September 2008), p 409 cited in Renwick,
A House of Lords Reform Briefing, Political studies Association
2011 Back
38
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/house-of-lords/lords-defeats Back
39
http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/lords-govtdefeats/
accessed 1 October 2011 Back
40
Asked "MPs have recently decided that the House of Lords
should be fully elected. Do you approve of this decision or disapprove?"
the survey of 1,003 people polled by ICM found that 63% supported
the reform, compared to just 26% who disapproved. See http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/?p=710
for full details Back
41
Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, "The Policy Impact of Defeats
in the House of Lords", British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 10 (2008), 517-89 Back
42
Alan Renwick House of Lords Reform Briefing Political studies
Association 2011p16 Back
43
Unpublished Back
44
Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, "Independent Parliamentarians
En Masse: The Changing Nature and Role of the 'Crossbenchers'
in the House of Lords", Parliamentary Affairs 62, no. 1 (2009),
32-52, at p41 Back
45
J. Lovenduski, and L. Shepherd Robinson, Women and Candidate
Selection in British Political Parties, Fawcett Society (London:
2002). Back
46
For more information see Maitland, Richard E, Enhancing Women's
Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Electoral
Systems http://www.onlinewomeninpolitics.org/beijing12/Chapter3_Matland.pdf Back
47
House of Lords Briefing Note System of financial support for Members
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-finance-office/2011-12/briefing-note-april.pdf
Back
48
Russell, Meg House Full: Time to get a grip of Lords Appointments
Constitution Unit 2011 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/unit-publications/152.pdf
Back
49
source Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database: www.ipu.org
accessed 15 September 2011 Back
50
http://www.juryteam.org/ Back
51
Senators Fabian Manning and Larry Smith both did this in 2011. Back
|