ARCHBISHOPS OF CANTERBURY AND YORK—WRITTEN
EVIDENCE
General principles
1. More than a decade ago, the then Archbishops'
submission to the Royal Commission on House of Lords Reform said
that the test of reform was whether it would enable Parliament
as a whole to serve the people better. That has remained the
consistent position of Church of England submissions since.
2. As with any constitutional change, it is important,
therefore, that there is clarity over the problems that reform
is intended to address and a reasonable measure of assurance that
the proposed solutions will work and avoid unintended consequences.
Fundamental changes to how we are governed should also command
a wide measure of consent within the country as well as in Parliament.
3. In his initial response of May 2011 to the
White Paper and Draft Bill the Lords Spiritual Convenor, the Bishop
of Leicester, said: "Some reform of the Lords is overdue,
not least to resolve the problem of its ever-increasing membership.
But getting the balance of reform right, so that we retain what
is good in our current arrangements, whilst freeing up the House
to operate more effectively and efficiently, is crucial."[52]
In particular, the proposal to reduce the overall size of the
House is welcome. But it is far less clear that wholesale reform
of the House of Lords along the lines now envisaged gets the balance
right.
4. For so long as the majority of the House of
Lords consisted of the hereditary peerage there was manifestly
a compelling case for reform. Whatever the arguments for appointment
as against election there was no cogent case for a legislature
where the hereditary voice was potentially predominant—indeed
still around two-thirds of the total membership in 1997.
5. The 1999 legislation has, however, largely
addressed that issue. The appointed component of the House has
now increased from around a third in 1997 to around 85 per cent.
A case can certainly be made for completing the process of reform
and ending the practice of reserved places for hereditary peers.
Introducing retirement ages for appointed peers and the ability
for them to resign also makes sense.
6. The more fundamental issue however, is the
rationale for going beyond this and substantially reducing—or
even abandoning—the appointed component in favour of a partly
or wholly elected House of Lords.
7. We recognise both the nature of arguments
for election motivated by concerns for democratic legitimacy,
and the political consensus reflected in the 2010 General Election
manifestoes. Any reform that enables parliament as a whole to
maintain a wide and enduring level of public respect is likely
to attract our support. However, the declared view of the three
main parties that the Upper House should be wholly or mainly elected
does not appear to proceed from any settled view as to the fundamental
purpose of the second chamber of the legislature, what its powers
should be and—crucially—what its relationship should
be with the House of Commons.
8. The Church of England and its bishops claim
no special expertise in relation to systems of governance. The
sheer diversity of constitutional arrangements across the democratic
world should, however, in our view, instil a sense of humility
in relation to claims that any one approach is manifestly superior
to another. It also makes us cautious of changes which derive
their justification from abstract theory or supposed universal
norms.
9. Constitutions appear to reflect the particular
histories, cultures and circumstances of each nation. The fact
that ours has evolved over a particularly long period is not an
argument against its further significant evolution. But it does
seem to us to create a presumption in favour of adaptation and
specific reforms to address manifest problems rather than far-reaching
changes which sweep away all the familiar landmarks.
10. At a time of considerable public concern
over our national political life and the conduct of those who
serve the nation in Parliament, it must at the very least be highly
questionable whether a reformed House consisting very largely
or wholly of those elected from party lists would increase public
confidence in our constitutional arrangements, or be a recipe
for effective and accountable government.
11. Nor at a time of great economic uncertainty,
when very substantial sums are being removed from the public purse,
does it seem easy to justify a salaried House at substantially
increased cost to the Exchequer, in the process, depriving Parliament
of the expertise (brought far less expensively) by a very substantial
appointed component.
12. In summary, if, as we believe, the second
chamber should remain essentially a revising chamber and if, as
we also believe, the primacy of the House of Commons is to be
maintained, the argument that such a chamber can only be effective
and have proper legitimacy if it is wholly or mainly elected is
no more than an assertion.
Powers, Functions and Legitimacy
13. In their speeches in the House of Lords on
29th June the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of
Leicester argued that there was a compelling case for retaining
a second chamber that, both in its powers and composition, was
distinctive from the House of Commons.
14. The Archbishop of York identified three objectives
for the second chamber: to ensure the just use of power entrusted
to the government of the day, which necessarily commands a
majority in the House of Commons; to ensure true and impartial
accountability; and to represent the breadth and diversity
of civil society and intellectual life.
15. Consistent with this, the Bishop of Leicester
underlined the crucial role of the second chamber in scrutinising
and revising government legislation with a degree of independence
not possible in the House of Commons.
16. It seems to us that reforms which bring the
second chamber further under the control of the main political
parties, especially if the governing party or coalition can rely
on a majority in the second chamber, will inevitably damage the
independence of the House of Lords and its ability to require
governments to think again about specific legislative proposals.
17. There are several conclusions that could
fairly be drawn from the claim made in that debate that over the
past five years some 40 per cent of the legislative amendments
passed by the Lords against the advice of the Government have
subsequently passed into law. They do not include casting doubt
on the effectiveness of the present House of Lords as an effective
second chamber.
18. The objective embodied in Clause 2 of the
draft bill- to maintain the present relationship between Commons
and Lords- seems to us to be right but inconsistent with the rest
of the legislation. Once the second chamber were granted electoral
legitimacy- not least under a proportional system which many would
see as conferring greater democratic legitimacy than the first
past the post system- the two Houses would over time increasingly
find themselves in conflict with each other. In this respect we
concur with the relevant conclusion of the November 2006 report
of the Joint Committee on Conventions, chaired by Lord Cunningham.
19. Moreover, it seems to be the common experience
with all legislative assemblies created in recent times (the European
Parliament, the devolved bodies) that the moment their members
are elected they demand more powers. The Royal Commission expressed
its strong opposition 'to a situation in which the two Houses
of Parliament had equivalent electoral legitimacy. It would represent
a substantial change in the present constitutional settlement
in the United Kingdom and would almost certainly be a recipe for
damaging conflict.'[53]
Whatever reservations there might now be about the specific proposals
of the Royal Commission, its conclusion on this point seems to
us compelling.
20. Speaking in the Lords in 2009 the Bishop
of Liverpool described the value of the present arrangement in
the following way: "We need to recover the unity of Parliament
in the constitutional debate—two Houses, but one Parliament:
a Commons that is elected and with the authority of having the
last word, and a revising Chamber to advise, revise and refine
the legislation….A mutuality between the two Houses, each
distinctive in character and composition but mutually dependent,
the elected looking to the other for the wisdom of experience,
the appointed deferring to the elected and acknowledging their
authority to have the last word as the voice of the people: one
Parliament of two Houses under the Crown, as a sign that our own
accountability is in two directions; below to the people, above
to the source of our moral intuition."[54]
21. We are concerned that the proposals in
the Draft Bill may, by leading inevitably to a more assertive
approach to conflict and disagreement with the Commons, make it
harder for the institution as a whole to sustain the trust and
confidence of the electorate. The then Bishop of Durham, also
speaking in the Lords in 2009, said: "Legitimacy does
not arise just from having people vote for you. Legitimacy is
also sustained by doing the job and being trusted. Public consent
and approval can come through the ballot box, or in other ways.
When you do not get the second form of legitimacy, sustained trust,
people lose interest in the first, the ballot box." [55]
22. Selection as a party candidate for election
to a second chamber of the kind proposed in the draft bill would
in all probability become a consolation prize for those who failed
to gain selection for a seat in the House of Commons. Whilst the
provision in Clause 55 to introduce restrictions on former members
being elected as MPs is a useful guard against the use of the
House of Lords as a springboard to launch a bid to become an MP,
the lack of any similar restrictions on MPs seeking to stand for
election to a reformed House of Lords is notable. It is not clear
what substance there is to the assertion in paragraph 146 of the
White Paper that the reformed House of Lords should "attract
individuals with different qualities from members of the House
of Commons".
Other provisions in the draft bill
23. The proposal to establish a statutory
Appointments Commission to appoint non-party political members
of the Lords is welcome. Our support for this measure dates back
to the Church's response to the Royal Commission in 2000.
24. Whilst we understand the rationale for the
powers in Part 5 of the Draft Bill to enable the Prime Minister
to appoint Ministers to a reformed House of Lords supernumerary
to overall numbers, it is crucial that such powers are used sparingly
and not as a means to ensure majorities in the Upper House. There
is a case for inserting a maximum number in the bill for Prime
Ministerial appointees rather than leaving this for secondary
legislation.
25. Retaining the peerage as an honour and breaking
its link to membership of the second chamber seems right.
26. We note that the White Paper leaves the question
of identifying the best transitional arrangement between
the existing and reformed House of Lords to peers to decide collectively.
Of the options set out, we believe that on balance the one used
in the Draft Bill is the most preferable, though we have some
points of detail in relation to the transitional arrangements
for the Lords Spiritual (see Annex).
27. We note the disqualification provisions
in Part 7 of the Draft Bill. The serious offence condition
in Clause 47 sets a sentence of more than 12 months as the bar
for disqualification. This seems too high in the interests of
retaining public confidence and propriety.
28. We welcome the measures in Part 8 that allow
for the expulsion, suspension and retirement of members of
a reformed House of Lords. Lords Spiritual have advocated
for the early and separate adoption of similar provisions by Government,
the speedy introduction of which would be in the best interests
of both the House of Lords and Parliament more widely. In that
regard we would suggest that the Private Member's Bill of Lord
Steel (which also contains provision to end hereditary peer by-elections)
is worthy of Government support.
29. If fundamental rather than evolutionary reform
of the House of Lords is to be examined, the question of civil
society representation does, in our view, require closer deliberation
than is evident in the Draft Bill and White Paper. The need is
to see how this might be further broadened. It is significant
that the Lords already does well across a range of diversity indicators,
particularly when compared with the Commons. As the Bishop of
Leicester said in his response to the publication of the Draft
Bill: "at its best the House of Lords is uniquely a national
forum in which the voices and concerns of all strands of civil
society can be convened and heard." [56]
30. The White Paper and Draft Bill focuses in
large part on questions of election and appointment, predicated
on existing systems of party political representation. If there
is to be far reaching reform, we would wish to see wider exploration
of the possibilities for parliament to increase the breadth and
diversity of representation by civil society and intellectual
life.
31. Responsibility for ensuring a breadth of
civil society representation is already a matter for the existing
Appointments Commission. It may become harder for civil society
bodies in the voluntary, community and charitable sector to have
a voice in parliament if the proportion of appointed members is
to be so radically reduced.
32. The rooted presence of the Church of England
in every community of England and its committed membership of
nearly one million regular weekly attendees give its bishops personal
access through their diocesan networks to a wider spread of civil
society organisations and experience than many other comparable
public figures. That informs the distinctive role they are able
to play as Lords Spiritual and underpins the willingness of the
Established Church to continue to make a contribution to a reformed
Upper House in which there should continue to be a voice for civil
society.
The Lords Spiritual and religious representation
33. We welcome the proposal in the White Paper
and Draft Bill for continued Spiritual representation and a role
in a reformed House of Lords for the Church of England as established
by law (paragraph 92 of the White Paper). We also wish to see,
through the appointments process, the presence of leaders from
other denominations and faiths.
34. Speaking in a parliamentary debate on House
of Lords reform in 2007, the Archbishop of York described the
constitutional and historical place of the Lords Spiritual as
follows: "The Queen in Parliament is sovereign, but is
also Queen in law, in council, and in the Executive. That is the
constitutional Arrangement…The Lords Spiritual remind Parliament
of the Queen's coronation oath and of that occasion when the divine
law was acknowledged as the source of all law. We do not see ourselves
as representatives, but as connectors with the people and parishes
of England. Ours is a sacred trust—to remind your Lordships'
House of the common law of this nation, in which true religion,
virtue, morals and law are always intermingled; they have never
been separated." [57]
35. By their presence and in leading the House
in prayer at the start of each sitting, the Lords Spiritual are
a reminder of the historic understanding that, as a people, we
are still governed 'by the Queen in Parliament under God'. Their
presence is a further reminder that our key constitutional institutions,
the monarchy, our systems of justice, education, healthcare and
our charitable sector were all shaped by the Christian tradition.
36. While much voluntary and charitable activity
takes place under the auspices of the large service-delivery (and
now largely secular) charitable organisations, a substantial proportion
of voluntary and community activity in this country continues
to be carried out under the auspices of the Church of England,
other Christian denominations and other faiths.
37. There is therefore a compelling case for
maintaining within the second House the presence of religious
leaders who can speak for that substantial part of civic society,
as well as contribute thoughtfully on matters of ethical importance..
38. The trend towards increasing engagement and
participation by Lords Spiritual in the day to day business of
the House—identified in our submission to the 2008 White
Paper—has continued in recent years. At present Lords Spiritual
are to be found on four parliamentary committees, including the
Joint Committee to which this submission is made.
39. Whilst the Lords Spiritual are bound together
by their collective identity as bishops of the established Church
of England, they come to parliament not as peers but through their
historic identity as independent 'Lords of Parliament'. There
is no 'Bishops' Party' and whilst bishops take advice, no whip
is either imposed or observed that binds their activities to the
expressed view of their diocese, the General Synod or Archbishops'
Council.
40. On legislative matters Lords Spiritual are
as much to be found taking divergent views as uniform ones—and
the parliamentary record shows that they will speak and vote accordingly.
As the Lords Spiritual do not conceive of themselves as a 'bloc',
or behave as one, there has been only a handful of occasions when,
in very close votes, their votes have been decisive.
41. The number of Lords Spiritual has remained
constant at 26 since the Diocese of Manchester Act of 1847, but
that number has, over time, represented a varying proportion of
the total membership of the House as its size has ebbed and flowed.
Before the introduction of life peers in 1958 it represented just
over 3 per cent of a total House of around 800. By 1999 it was
a mere 2 per cent, but following the removal of most of the hereditaries
it rose again to 4.2 per cent. Since then it has gradually declined
as the size of the House has increased.
42. Through its established position, and through
generations of hard work building bridges inside and between mixed
communities, the Church of England is a key agent of interfaith
dialogue and cooperation in all the major cities of England. The
Government-backed Near Neighbours programme is both an acknowledgement
and a consequence of the value and strength of those networks.
Many leaders of other faith communities value the fact that we
have an established Church with a role in Parliament. The Lords
Spiritual also fulfil an important role in the legislature as
an enduring voice for the concerns of people of all faiths, especially
at a time of increasingly secularising currents in our public
institutions and services.
43. Ever since our May 1999 submission to the
Royal Commission chaired by Lord Wakeham, the Church of England
has, however, been consistent in its view that an increased presence
from other denominations and faiths would be welcome in a reformed
House of Lords.
44. In 2000 the Archbishops endorsed the view
of the Royal Commission that there should be broader denominational
and faith representation in the House of Lords, and in their response
to the 2003 Government consultation explained some of the rationale:
"in an era of growing interest and concern about relations
between faiths, their approach to moral and ethical issues and
their impact on the modern world, the House of Lords has considerable
potential as a forum for serious and well-informed debate on these
matters."[58]
45. Like the Commission—and successive
Government documents—we acknowledge that providing reserved
places for formal representatives of other denominations and faiths
would be problematic in practice. But we believe that there
is a strong case for placing the Appointments Commission under
a duty to ensure, among other things, the presence of those from
across the United Kingdom who have or have had senior responsibility
in churches and faiths other than the established Church.
46. If, as successive governments have accepted,
there is a continuing benefit to this country in having an established
Church, the presence of the Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords
is one of the most important manifestations of that special relationship
between Church and State.
47. The Church of England, by law established,
holds central to its mission a commitment to minister to the whole
community, to people of all faiths and none. According to Professor
Tariq Modood: "the minimal nature of the Anglican establishment,
its proven openness to other denominations and faiths seeking
public space, and the fact that its very existence is an ongoing
acknowledgement of the public character of religion, are all reasons
why it may be far less intimidating to the minority faiths than
a triumphal secularism."[59]
Whilst in his submission to the Royal Commission, the Chief Rabbi,
now Lord Sacks, said "disestablishment would be a significant
retreat from the notion that we share any values and beliefs at
all. And that would be a path to more, not fewer, tensions. Establishment
secures a central place for spirituality in the public square.
This benefits all faiths, not just Christianity."[60]
48. The established status of the Church would
not be at an end if the Lords Spiritual no longer had a place
in parliament but its character would be significantly changed
and weakened.
49. Some consequential issues would also have
to be addressed. Since 1919 the Church of England has, through
its own national legislature (now the General Synod) had power
to pass Measures which, once they have obtained Parliamentary
approval and Royal Assent, have the equivalent effect to Acts
of Parliament. Draft Measures are scrutinised by the Ecclesiastical
Committee of Parliament, consisting of 15 members of each House,
and are then submitted to the House of Commons and House of Lords
for approval.
50. In the Commons the relevant motion is then
moved by the Second Church Estates Commissioner—traditionally
a member of the governing party who is appointed by the Queen
and must be a communicant Anglican. In the House of Lords the
relevant motion is moved by one of the Lords Spiritual.
51. More detailed comments on Part 4 of the draft
bill, paragraphs 91-103 of the White Paper and paragraphs 194-226
& 488-492 of the Explanatory Notes are in the attached Annex.
6 October 2011
Annex: The Lords Spiritual—Detailed Comments
1. We agree with the proposals in the Draft Bill
(Clause 65 (3)) that the Lords Spiritual should continue to be
diocesan bishops of the Church of England. This is both a continuation
of a longstanding constitutional arrangement and a reflection
of the historic settlement that bishops come to the House as individual
Lords of Parliament and not formal 'representatives of the Church
of England'.
2. The ambiguity in the definitions contained
in paragraphs 91 and page 8 of the White Paper is not entirely
helpful (they say respectively: "Although historically
they sit as independent members of the Lords they are widely regarded
as representatives of the Church of England" and "in
the reformed House of Lords, there would be up to 12 places for
representatives of the Church of England").
3. We welcome the proposed continued parity between
the rights and powers afforded to the Lords Spiritual and those
enjoyed by all other members of the House, appointed and elected.
The Lords Spiritual are committed to playing a full and active
role in the life and work of the House and this will enable that
role to be performed to its fullest potential.
4. We agree that, as with the proposal for
Government Ministers in the Lords, the numbers of Lords Spiritual
should be supernumerary to the overall size of the House.
5. The Draft Bill proposes that after all reforms
have been completed the House should contain 12 Lords Spiritual,
with the reduction from the present 26 being introduced in three
stages across the transitional period. The draft bill proposes
that 12 would comprise five "Named Lords Spiritual"
(those who have existing membership of the Lords by virtue of
their occupancy of senior sees, namely the two Archbishops and
the Bishops of London, Durham and Winchester) and seven "Ordinary
Lords Spiritual" (diocesan bishops of the Church of England).
6. In both our response to the Royal Commission
and to the 2008 White Paper, we expressed our view that any reduction
in the number of bishops below 20 would pose difficulties in terms
of maintaining current levels of service to the House. It would
place greater burdens on the remaining bishops in balancing their
diocesan and parliamentary responsibilities, necessitate a change
in the seniority system by which bishops come into the House,
and require an overhaul of the duty bishop system that has been
in place for over a century.
7. However, given the proposed reduction in the
size of the House we accept that these difficulties will have
to be faced and that the Church of England will have so to arrange
matters that 12 of its bishops will be able to serve the reformed
House effectively.
8. We note that the White Paper (paragraph 12)
states that "the Government expects members of the reformed
House to be full-time Parliamentarians", but also the
passing reference within the explanatory notes (paragraph 490)
to the membership of the Lords Spiritual being "both ex
officio and part-time".
9. We believe that, alongside the professional
full-time politicians, there should be ample room within a reformed
House of Lords for a significant number of members who are informed
by a diverse range of outside experiences and interests. We hope
that a reformed House along the lines proposed would continue
to respect and understand that many amongst its number, including
bishops, will continue to have regard to their significant outside
commitments—and that this should be considered a positive
attribute for informed parliamentary debate.
10. We support the continuation of the principle
that translation from one diocese to another should not affect
a Lord Spiritual's continued membership of the House.
11. We agree with the Draft Bill's proposal (Cl.
26) that there continue to be a distinct category of Lord Spiritual
(described as "Named Lords Spiritual") with membership
linked to occupancy of a senior see. We agree that Named Lords
Spiritual should continue to receive a writ of summons automatically,
mirroring the present arrangement.
12. We have more doubts whether continuing
with the arrangement of five reserved places for the occupants
of the senior sees would still be right for a Bishops' Bench rather
less than half its former size.
13. Occupants of senior sees inevitably have
greater competing outside commitments than other bishops, and
in the interests of maximizing the continued effectiveness of
the service that the Lords Spiritual offer parliament there may
be a case for a greater proportion of the membership of the Bishops'
Bench to be drawn from the numbers of the other diocesan bishops
(categorized as "Ordinary Lords Spiritual").
14. We recognize that this is a matter on which
the Archbishops, Lords Spiritual and wider Church would wish to
reach a settled view before a final figure for Named and Ordinary
is commended to the Government. But we note that there are three
Lords Spiritual (the Archbishops and the Bishop of London) who
are members of the Privy Council and one alternative to the provisions
in the draft bill would be for these three sees to be Named, leaving
nine places to be filled from the other 39 English diocesan sees.
15. The Draft Bill proposes that the reduction
from 26 to12 Lords Spiritual should be introduced over the two
transitional periods, with 21 bishops entering the first period,
16 entering the second and 12 entering all subsequent parliaments.
Clause 30 (7) prevents the Church replacing any of the Ordinary
Lords Spiritual during the transitional periods unless a failure
to do so would result in the total number of bishops falling below
12.
16. The Government has proposed that the present
number of 26 Lords Spiritual would reduce to not more than 21
at the beginning of the reform process, not more than 16 at the
end of the first Parliament and not more than twelve at the end
of the second Parliament. Given the pattern of episcopal retirements
in recent years the inevitable effect of Clause 30 (7) would be
to hasten the timescale in which that baseline of 12 would be
reached.
17. As an illustration, in the years 2006-2011
there were 20 departures from the Bishops' Bench, 18 of which
would be categorized as from the 'Ordinary Lords Spiritual'. The
combined transitional period outlined in the Draft Bill is for
a maximum of ten years.
18. Clause 30 (7) could therefore mean a more
rapid transition from the current to the reformed House for the
Lords Spiritual than for those on other benches. This is probably
an unintended consequence of what the Government has proposed
and, without changing the overall numbers, we believe that some
greater flexibility over the transitional mechanism may be needed.
19. The White Paper and Draft Bill (at Clause
27) place a requirement on the Church of England to make the selection
of diocesan bishops to serve as Ordinary Lords Spiritual "in
whatever way it considers appropriate".
20. 27 (7)-(9) sets out a mechanism by which
the Church of England's choices would be formally notified; namely
by requiring the Secretary General of the General Synod to notify
the Clerk of Parliaments before the beginning of each electoral
period (or as soon as practicable if during an electoral period)
who the Church had selected as its Ordinary Lords Spiritual for
the next Parliament.
21. We agree that it is sensible for the legislation
to specify a notification mechanism and not to seek to prescribe
the mechanism adopted by the Church for making appointments from
among its diocesan bishops.
22. These provisions would afford the Ordinary
Lords Spiritual the opportunity to consider the natural break
offered by 5-yearly elections to the House, to decide whether
to continue their membership into the next electoral period, or
whether to resign their membership of the House at that point
(whilst potentially continuing as a diocesan bishop).
23. They would also provide the Church with the
ability to select diocesan bishops for membership of the House
on the basis of a range of factors including, though not exclusively,
any particular expertise, national roles held within the Church,
diversity of Spiritual representation, the requirements of the
diocese, and geographical variation.
24. The method by which the Ordinary Lords Spiritual
would be selected requires further reflection on the part of the
Archbishops, Lords Spiritual and the wider Church, given that
the inevitable move away from the present, automatic, seniority
based system raises a number of important issues.
25. At Clause 28 (1) the Draft Bill proposes
that going in to the first transitional period, a person can only
be selected as an Ordinary Lord Spiritual if "immediately
before the relevant Parliament is dissolved, the person is entitled
by virtue of being a bishop to receive writs of summons to attend
the House of Lords".
26. Going in to the second transitional period
the Draft Bill states at Clause 28 (4) that Ordinary Lords Spiritual
must be drawn from the existing pool of Lords Spiritual. After
the transitional periods, in a fully reformed House of Lords,
there is no requirement for the seven Ordinary Lords Spiritual
to be drawn from those already sitting in that capacity in the
preceding parliament. The effect of this is to afford the Church
of England thereafter the opportunity to determine which seven
diocesan bishops will make up the Ordinary Lords Spiritual at
the beginning of each parliamentary term, for the duration of
that term.
27. Given the intention expressed in Clause 27
(6) and elsewhere to allow the Church of England to determine
its own method of selection for Ordinary Lords Spiritual for each
coming parliament in a fully reformed Upper House—and replacements
for those that retire or resign mid-term—there is a case
for affording the Church the broadest possible choice from among
its diocesan bishops at an earlier opportunity than at the end
of the two-term transitional process. This would require the
removal of Clause 28 (4) and clarification that Clause 28 (1)
referred to all diocesan bishops and not simply existing Lords
Spiritual.
28. This would enable the Lords Spiritual in
the transitional parliaments to be selected from the widest possible
pool of those who were diocesan bishops at the time. This could
be of particular significance that if the General Synod were to
approve the present draft legislation to enable women to become
bishops.
29. We agree with the proposal that in a fully
reformed House of Lords and during the transitional periods Ordinary
Lords Spiritual should be permitted to retire from the House of
Lords whilst continuing as a diocesan bishop of their see.
30. We agree that Lords Spiritual should not
receive a salary given the special (ex-officio and part time)
status of the bishops in the House. We agree that Lords Spiritual
should continue to be allowed to claim reimbursement for expenses
necessarily incurred in the course of their parliamentary duties.
31. We agree that the Lords Spiritual should
be subject to the same disqualification provisions as other members
of the reformed House of Lords. We question whether the exemptions
proposed by the Government for the Lords Spiritual from the tax
deeming provisions, the serious offence provisions and those on
expulsion and suspension are necessary. We did not seek them and
unless there are legal or constitutional reasons of which we are
not aware, we believe that the Lords Spiritual should be in the
same position as other members of the House on these matters.
52 Statement on Government white paper on House
of Lords reform, 17/5/11, online at: http://bit.ly/l0oR2u
Back
53
11.6, A House for the Future, report of the Royal Commission
on the Reform of the House of Lords (2000) Back
54
Lords Hansard, 11/6/09, Col. 760 Back
55
Lords Hansard, 11/6/09, Col. 765 Back
56
Statement on Government white paper on House of Lords reform,
17/5/11, online at: http://bit.ly/l0oR2u Back
57
Lords Hansard 13/3/07, Col. 580. Back
58
Response from the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, on behalf
of the Church of England, to the Consultation Document Constitutional
Reform: next steps for the House of Lords, December 2003. Back
59
Tariq Modood, "Establishment, Multiculturalism, and British
Citizenship", Political Quarterly, 65 (1994), Back
60
Written submission to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the
House of Lords by Dr. Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United
Hebrew Congregations of Britain and the Commonwealth (1999). Back
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