The Viscount Younger of Leckie
For the Attention of the Committee
I wish to submit my views on the future make up of
the Lords for your consideration in your discussions on House
of Lords Reform.
Elected or Appointed?
My strong preference is for an appointed and not
an elected Upper House. A wholly or partly elected House of Lords
would destroy the delicate and effective Constitutional balance
between both Houses: the Commons as the Executive, where (soon
to be) 600 Members are elected by the people, for the people;
and the Lords whose prime role is to scrutinize and tighten legislation
without the diversion of "vested interests" including
being answerable to an electorate in constituencies around the
UK.
There is no question that a new Lords or Senate made
up of elected Senators would make for a less effective Upper Chamber:
Senators would be too distracted by constituency demands, they
would become too politicised (akin to MPs) and it would be necessary
to pay salaries and allow for staff which would make for a more
expensive alternative to the status quo.
It is important to decide what the appropriate method
is for entry to the Upper House to ensure that its effective purpose
is fulfilled within the Constitution. It is irrelevant and inappropriate
to wholly change: to create an elected process just to appease
the public in presenting on a platter a fully democratic system,
which so demonstrably seems to be the case in the proposals outlined
in the draft bill; from this direction there is no evidence of
a public clamour.
Appointments Commission
To avoid any criticism of appointment by patronage
where an Appointments Commission is a group made up of a small
number of people, I believe there should be a panel system. This
would involve a limited number of appointment panels set up to
represent key sectors nationally in the UK: eg: industrial, financial
services, agricultural, charitable, medical, sporting... to name
a few. Names of potential members of the House of Lords could
be submitted (with CVs and proposed party allegiance) to these
panels for initial scrutiny. The Appointments Commission, made
up of the Chairmen of each sector panel, would then decide who
to appoint from a short-list.
I do not believe this would be either a lengthy or
costly process. It would certainly be considerably cheaper than
running full elections for the Upper House around the UK in constituencies
(as at the General Election)
The result would better ensure a national coverage
in the Lords in breadth and depth, by designated sector. It would
have the broadest coverage in that any individual could be put
forward for consideration to the sector panels which would then
assess and select for consideration to the Appointments Commission.
It is also highly relevant to appoint on the basis of seeking
out the best people in terms of their expertise, sector or "issue"
knowledge and not on the basis of geographical representation.
The question then arises as to who appoints the sector
panels? I believe the government of the day must decide but there
should be a process of cross party consultation and agreement
of proposed names to avoid accusations of party bias or lack of
balance.
Size of a future House of Lords
The House must be effective as a revising body; it
needs to be full of enough peers at any one time who carry the
depth and breadth of experience and knowledge necessary to scrutinize
legislation whatever sector, ministry or subject is being debated
or considered.
The current size at over 820 is untenable beyond
the main reason of the strain on House of Lords facilities. Even
at times of crucial votes and maximum whipping (excluding for
this purpose the crossbenchers and Bishops) the House has barely
reached 550. Consequently I believe the total numbers should not
exceed 500.
The proposed figure in the White Paper states 300.
I believe this is too low on the grounds that from this number
it is likely that considerably less might appear at any one time
due to illness, travel, or diverted by other business. This would
be too low a number to provide the effective breadth and depth
of scrutiny required, not least if there was business in the Chamber,
Moses Room or elsewhere going on at the same time. A certain quorum
of peers is required to ensure the full and effective work of
the Select Committees and the All Party Groups.
In conclusion I therefore believe that 400 represents
an optimum and appropriate number for the Upper House. I offer
no solution as to how you proportion the numbers of peers on each
bench, between parties and crossbench; however I am comfortable
with the figure of 12 Bishops.
Length of Appointment
I do believe that it makes sense to appoint peers
for a limited period. I see 15 years as reasonable (This view
for appointment only, not election). This is on the basis that
a contribution can be seen to be meaningful over such a period
bearing in mind the longevity of certain issues debated or discussed.
More importantly, it is highly desirable in the Upper House to
have continuity for building a "library" of experience
and knowledge; "people assets" are required in the Upper
House over the longer term not just for scrutiny purposes but
for process and procedural reasons.
On the basis there is a compelling argument for the
"peer for life" decision. However it is not in the peers'
interest, or in the public interest, for a peer to remain a member
if he or she is unable to contribute through long term illness,
old age, or permanent disinterest.
A Peer can withdraw from the House but in reality
this rarely occurs. I suggest a more formal and pro-active approach,
for clarity, as to who is a working member and who is not.
It makes sense to have a 15 year term after which
each position becomes vacant. If the peer seeks to continue, the
first stage is that all members of the peer's party (or crossbench)
then vote (secret ballot) on whether the peer in question should
remain—for a further 15 years; if so carry on as before.
If unsuccessful then the peer has to retire and the appointments
panel is consulted to fill the vacancy.
In this way there is no perceived ageism or automatic
age threshold for retirement. For example, if a peer reaches,
say 67, after a 15 year stint and is voted by his party (or crossbench)
peers as fit to stand for a further 15 years (therefore up to
age 82... and it is noted that there are a few vigorous 80 year
olds in the Upper House!) then well and good.
Hereditary by-elections
I entered the House as a result of a successful hereditary
by-election. Although I am grateful for this, and the enabling
process, I recognise that reform is required in that the by-election
process is an anachronism; if retained it would maintain, undesirably,
the two-tier process of entry.
I believe that the Upper House was effective pre-1999
in that it was largely made up of Members in their place as a
result of an inheritance, but nevertheless representing a considerable
breadth and depth of experience and knowledge. We must now move
on and the best way to replicate is to utilise and expand on the
appointments principle and process.
I believe that, were the House to be elected, it
would be a narrower and shallower house made up more of those
seeking political careers and of those with more political backgrounds.
In addition the danger is that candidates could be largely confined
to only those comfortable in seeking election and running a campaign.
The question has to be asked: how many of the candidates who should
be on the short list would in reality present themselves if election
rather than appointment was the chosen entry method?
Conclusion
I feel certain that a move to an elected House, with
the ensuing upheaval and change of personnel, is not reform; it
is the dismissal and consequent abolition of the Upper House;
as such it is a dangerous experiment with our unique Constitution.
I believe that the provisions in the Steel Bill broadly
reflect my views and this Bill represents the best measured and
sensible way forward for reform at this time.
26th October 2011
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