Lord Low of Dalston
1. The question of function is prior to those
of powers and composition. The principal function of the House
of Lords is to act as a revising chamber. Though mindful of the
many other issues on which the Joint Committee is seeking evidence,
I just want to address one question—how to achieve a composition
which is most appropriate for a revising chamber. It is submitted
that the qualities required are more those of expertise and experience
than the more nebulous quality of representativeness, and that
these are more likely to be secured by a system of appointment
or selection than one of democratic election. It's more like choosing
the best person for the job—the person whose skills and
experience best match those required—than electing someone
to represent you.
2. That being the case, I would be relatively
content for the method of recruiting to the second chamber to
remain broadly as it is. But it is argued that there is a problem
of legitimacy. I think this is more a matter of perception than
reality. The bases of legitimacy mentioned in the last paragraph
are not inherently better or worse than one another, they are
just different. Whether they are better or worse depends on the
purpose for which they are being employed. It is my contention
that a method of appointment or selection is more fit for purpose
if it is the members of a revising chamber you are selecting.
However it is clear that the idea of election has gained a certain
momentum, and it is the purpose of this submission to suggest
a method of recruitment to the second chamber which, if an alternative
to the present system is to be recommended, would combine many
of the attractions of a system of election with those of appointment
by formalising and greatly broadening the appointment process.
3. But first, the inappropriateness of the present
system of election for Parliamentary elections using geographical
constituencies, even if modified—perhaps especially if modified—to
incorporate an element of proportional representation, cannot
be emphasised too strongly. It would tend to throw up the same
kind of career politicians who stand for the Commons and not those
with the kind of expertise and experience being sought for the
second chamber. The Lords would soon become more politicised and
lose some of the qualities for which it is currently particularly
valued: No single party holds sway there, members are more independent-minded,
and debates are, as Wakeham put it, "less adversarial, better
tempered and better informed" as a result. If the same system
were to be used as is used for electing the Commons, the Lords
would tend to duplicate the Commons and thus not add value. There
would for the first time be the possibility of "turf wars"
at constituency level between MP's and peers, and if a different
system of election were used, especially if it involved an element
of PR, the Lords could soon begin to rival the Commons' primacy.
4. I would propose a system of electoral colleges
covering the main branches of civil society—what might be
termed "constituencies of expertise"—the law,
medicine, the arts, sport, education, the armed services, business,
trades unions, the third sector and so on. They could nominate
direct to a reformed House of Lords or, as I believe happens in
Malaysia, they could submit their nominations to a statutory appointments
commission which would make the final selection. The latter method
would probably be preferable in order that nominees might be independently
and impartially vetted to ensure that they are fit persons to
be appointed. The commission would have the task of determining
the constituencies of expertise and which organisations should
have nominating rights within them. They should also validate
against agreed criteria the procedure which nominating bodies
employed for arriving at their nominations. The new system could
be phased in in much the same way as the Government proposes for
its system based on elections. The constituencies of expertise
would nominate a third of the candidates to which they were entitled
every five years until they reached their total entitlement. They
would then continue to nominate a third of their entitlement as
a third retired every five years in order to achieve a system
of staggering or rotation.
5. I have not gone further in elaborating my
proposal here without knowing whether it is likely to evoke any
interest, but it would not be difficult to do so if there were
to be a positive response either from the Joint Committee or from
Government, when questions such as the size of the House and the
number of constituencies would have to be gone into. The most
authoritative indications to date have not been very encouraging:
The Wakeham Commission was initially attracted, but gave up in
view of what it regarded as insuperable practical difficulties.
The Constitution Unit at University College London have been similarly
dismissive. But I think there is more to be said for the proposal
than these authorities allow. Sir John Major gave his support
to the central idea behind constituencies of expertise when he
spoke to crossbench peers a couple of years ago. When challenged
on grounds of practicality by a member of the Wakeham Commission,
he said he wasn't convinced. He said he didn't think it could
be beyond the wit of man to come up with a workable scheme, and
neither do I. Take the question of determining the constituencies
of expertise. The House of Lords Library has a classification
of peers between 1958 and 2008 in 19 categories (see appendix
1). We could do a lot worse than use this as a starting point.
6. There is more interest out there than it seems
people are aware of. In 2008, Frank Field MP produced a pamphlet
entitled "Back from Life Support: Remaking Representative
and Responsible Government in Britain" which adumbrated a
scheme along very similar lines to that advocated in this submission.
Although it is still very sketchy and has to some extent been
overtaken by events, I attach the key extract at appendix 2.
7. The organisation Respublica has advanced proposals
for a scheme which is a third elected, a third appointed from
civil society and a third nominated by political parties. This
would have the disadvantage of a hybrid model in creating what
would almost certainly be seen as two tiers of members, with implications
for the legitimacy of close votes where the appointed members
appeared to determine the result. But I mention it to draw attention
to the diversity of thinking which exists as an alternative to
the Government's which deserves to be taken account of. I have
also received a number of thoughtful submissions from members
of the public urging an alternative to the traditional election
in traditional constituencies.
8. I am also aware that the Joint Committee has
received two further submissions in a similar vein—from
John Smith and Martin Wright. My ideas are closer to those of
Mr Smith than those of Mr Wright, which I think create another
complex layer of administration in trying to bring the general
public into voting, ask too much of voters and for these reasons
do verge on the impractical. But the submissions of Mr Smith and
Mr Wright do enable me to make a couple of other points:
8.1 I have deliberately spoken of "expertise
and experience" as the qualities which qualify a person for
membership of the second chamber. By experience I really mean
experience of government, and this is important. There is some
tendency for people to speak as if the ideal House of Lords would
be a politician free zone. I do not take that view. I think the
peers who come to the House after a career in politics, often
at the highest level, contribute a vast amount to our debates
and we would lose it at our peril. It is just one of the many
merits of Mr Smith's proposal that he recognises this and in fact
proposes a "Parliamentary College" twice the size of
all his other colleges except his General College.
8.2 We should not delude ourselves that a system
of the kind I am suggesting makes universal suffrage in nominating
to the House of Lords possible. But in being much more broadly
based and diversified than the present appointments process it
goes much further in the direction of popular involvement than
anything we have known to date.
9. I hope the Joint Committee will give serious
attention to the unsuitability of "traditional" electoral
systems for populating the House of Lords and to proposals for
alternatives based on the "constituencies of expertise"
idea, and that it will have things to say about them should a
system of election be decided upon. I can only speak for myself
of course, but I should be happy to come to meet the Committee
to discuss the proposals contained in this submission if that
were thought to be helpful, and it seems to me that a session
involving Messrs. Smith and Wright as well as myself could well
make a very useful session.
Appendix 1: Categorisation of Peers
The following 19 categories are used to classify
existing peers in the House of Lords Library Note Peerage Creations,
1958-2008 (LLN 2008/019)
| Background | Description | % |
| Finance | Banking, insurance, accountancy etc. | 3 |
| Industry | Senior position in the manufacturing or service industries | 11 |
| Media | Senior executive position in television, radio, newspapers, publishing, advertising, public relations or other media organisation | 4 |
| Land etc. | Landowner or farmer | 1 |
| Academic | Academic (including scientists but excluding those specialising in law or engineering etc. —see below) | 7 |
| Teaching | Teacher or other worker in the education sector (not higher education) | 1 |
| Medical | Medicine, nursing and associated professions | 3 |
| Military | Serving member of the regular armed forces | 2 |
| Civil Service | Senior diplomat or civil servant | 5 |
| Legal | Judge, solicitor, barrister, or academic specialising in law | 5 |
| Journalism etc. | Journalist, writer or broadcaster | 1 |
| Engineer etc. | Engineer, architect, surveyor or similar (or academic specialising in these areas) | 1 |
| Arts | Musician, or visual and performing arts | 1 |
| Voluntary | Voluntary or charitable work | 3 |
| Trade Union | Trade unionist | 4 |
| Local government | Local politics or administration | 4 |
| Other public sector | Public sector position not covered above (includes membership of quangos) | 3 |
| Politics | Member of parliament or involved in political activity (but not at a local level only) | 39 |
| Other | Miscellaneous (including widows of prominent persons, and retiring senior church figures) or no stated occupation or activity | 3 |
Appendix 2
Extract from "Back from Life Support: Remaking
Representative and Responsible Government in Britain"
By Frank Field MP
"There is general consent that the lords should
be elected, but the Government is understandably anxious that
an elected body may begin seriously to challenge the supremacy
of the Commons.
"Here then is a three point programme of reform.
The first is that the powers of the Lords should be enshrined
in legislation and a key point of that legislation should be to
formalise the position of the Lords as an inferior chamber in
power to those exercised by the House of Commons. Second, in such
legislation, a revised Lords needs to be given clearly the powers
that Bagehot gave to the Monarch. It should have the right to
be consulted, the duty to advise and similarly be charged to warn
the Commons on proposed legislation. Third, the Lords should become
the depository once again of group interests in our legislative
system.
"Until recently two groups interests were formally
represented in the Lords. The Lords of Appeal form the first group.
This group is to be moved from the Lords into a UK supreme court.
Existing members, who are life peers, will remain in the House,
but new Lords of Appeal will not be made life peers. The loss
of this legal expertise in probing and amending legislation will
be huge. The other group represented in the Lords comes from the
26 Anglican bishops who by virtue of their office have seats in
the upper chamber.
"The representation of these two groups should
become the prototypes for increasing group representation in our
society. A radical Lords reform would be based on seeking the
representation of all the major legitimate interests in our society.
There would be the need, of course, to establish a reform commission
whose duty would be to begin mapping out which group interest
should gain representation, and at what strength. So, for example,
the commission would put forward proposals on which groups would
have seats to represent women's organisations and interests, the
interests of trade unions, employers, industrialists and businesses,
the cultural interests of writers, composers and communicators,
the interests of the professions including those involved in health
and learning. The representation specifically of local authority
associations would ensure that the different regions of the country
have voices in the upper chamber. And so the list would go on
with the seats for Anglican bishops shared between other denominations
and faiths.
"The commission's second task should be to approve
the means by which each group elects or selects its own representatives
and would then have the duty to review the lists. The commission
should be encouraged to approve a diversity of forms of election.
Some groups may involve the whole of the membership in a selection
process. Others might adopt a form of indirect election. The commission's
task would be to ensure that, whatever method is proposed, it
is one with which the overwhelming majority of the members are
happy."
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