Lord Lucas
1. I think that the House of Lords is in need of
reform, at least along the lines of the Steel Bill, and I suspect
that the Draft Bill is the only one which is likely to pass Parliament
before the next election. However, I think that the present Draft
Bill would result in a much weakened House of Lords, or one engaged
in political combat with the House of Commons—with such
a radical change it is not possible to predict the outcome.
2 This submission explores the scope for amending
the Draft Bill to produce an elected House of Lords which would
retain the virtues of the present house, and would be unlikely
to challenge the Commons.
3. My proposed amendments to the bill are:
3.1 Membership of the new House should be (say) 600
part-time members rather than 300 full-time. This has a radical
effect on the character of those likely to seek membership, requiring
in effect that they have reached a point in their careers where
they have command of their time. Lord Tyler waxed eloquent at
our last debate on this subject, and I support everything that
he said then:
"Parliament as a whole benefits from having
a proportion of Members who retain an active involvement in other
walks of life...
Given the relatively long but one-term limited service,
it would be difficult to recruit candidates who were prepared
to be full-time parliamentarians while they were not able to take
part in other activities and go back to another career.
[In a house of 300 full time members] it will be
quite difficult to get diversity-indeed, even gender balance-in
the membership of this House. If only 80 Members are elected in
each tranche there will be relatively small multi-Member seats
and it will be quite difficult to get the sort of diversity and
gender balance that I know many Members of your Lordships' House
wish to have."
3.2 At a general election any political party wanting
to gain seats in the upper house should publish an ordered list
of people whom it would intend to appoint, and their curriculum
vitae.
3. Together, I think that those two changes to the
Draft Bill would produce a house that could reasonably be called
elected, would have a composition close to the current house with
a reasonable chance of preserving its virtues, and that would
be most unlikely to challenge the Commons for supremacy.
4. The magnitude of the change overall would be small
enough for us to be reasonably certain of how the House would
behave, and how well it would perform its functions.
5. Once these changes had bedded in, moves to more
direct election methods could be made gradually and incrementally,
without the dangers of catharsis that the Draft Bill courts.
6. I have a number of other suggestions which I think
would you add to the effectiveness of the above proposals.
6.1 Electors should be able to tick a box for the
party that they supported for the upper house election on the
basis of the published candidate lists, rather than their preference
being inferred from their choice of MP.
6.2 Each party should have one list for the entire
UK—this makes it much easier to produce the balanced lists
that Lord Tyler talks about, and removes all formal geographical
links, making campaigning impossible (and thus not off-putting
to good candidates) and removing the threat (to MPs) of double
representation. The implied (by the mechanics of regional elections
in the Draft Bill) threshold of ~10% of votes cast to achieve
any seats in the upper house should be made explicit. Parties
that only field candidates in a restricted region of the UK should
be able to elect for the 10% hurdle to be calculated in respect
of that region only.
6.3 The potential blow to a candidate's esteem resulting
from allowing their name to go forward and then they're not being
elected should be softened. The likelihood of rebuff could be
reduced by allowing parties only to put forward names for a proportion
of the seats that they were likely to be awarded (on the basis
of the votes at the previous general election) (say two thirds
or a half); this would also allow space for unannounced senior
appointments after an election.
6.4 New members would not all join the upper house
immediately, but their appointments would be spread throughout
the period of the parliament. This is not an essential feature
of my scheme but it allows resignations, deaths and ministerial
appointments to be dealt with more smoothly than the proposals
in the Draft Bill. It avoids a hiatus in the spirit and behaviour
of the house resulting from a sudden influx of new members, which
would provide a quinquennial opportunity for the house to decide
to challenge the Commons, and I think that it works better with
part-time members as it allows some of them time to rearrange
their lives to accommodate membership of the house.
6.5 In a five-year Parliament, 20% of new members
would join in each year. If a party member resigned or died, he
would be replaced by a member sitting for the remainder of the
retiring member's term, if this was over eight years, or 15 years
plus the remainder of the retiring members term if eight years
or less. If a crossbench member resigned or died they would just
be replaced by a new member sitting for a 15 year term—the
crossbenches do not have the same incentive to game the system
as parties, and it is not of great consequence if the number of
crossbench peers to be appointed varies from year to year.
6.6 Inclusion of a candidate in a party list at the
previous general election should be all that is required by way
of quality control of membership, but if a party wishes to appoint
someone who was not on such a list, and for all crossbench appointments,
the Appointments Commission should certify that the candidate
is of suitable quality.
6.7 Part time should not mean 'when I feel like it'.
There should be a clear job specification including an attendance
requirement, with resignation the default course of action if
it could not be complied with.
6.8 Members should be paid. The rate of pay should
be determined by the SSRB. As part-time members I see no justification
for catering for second homes, indeed members from outside London
should be encouraged to spend time away from the capital. Expenses
should be limited to reimbursement of vouchered travel and accommodation
costs within a specified limit and evidenced by invoices. We should
avoid IPSA.
6.9 Members' pay should incorporate an allowance
for staff of, say, half a man year. Actual staff costs would be
a matter between the member and the Inland Revenue. It might be
appropriate for the house to run an internship scheme, providing
young people with a basic income and experience of working in
Parliament, and making such interns available to members in exchange
for reimbursement of salary costs.
6.10 Transition arrangements should immediately reduce
the size of the house to the agreed limit, and provide for existing
members to retire evenly over the next 15 years. I suggest that
this is done by the voting system used in the 1999 hereditary
peers election. I would also encourage peers not to put themselves
down at all for the new house by offering those do not the possibility
of converting their life peerage into a hereditary peerage.
6.11 I see no objection to the possibility of reappointment
for a second term. There will be little enough of it. What party
leader, faced with a chance to appoint someone to the upper house,
will not most naturally turn to someone fresh and new, of his
own choosing, rather than an old warrior with fifteen years accumulated
bad habits? It will only happen in cases of great merit.
5 September 2011
| 
