Jesse Norman MP
It is widely recognised that the House of Lords needs
reform. The House of Lords Reform Draft Bill correctly describes
the House of Lords as "a vital part of our constitutional
arrangements". But the Lords as an institution is not working
as well as it should, and there is a clear case for thoughtful
reform, covering issues such as the ending of elections for hereditary
peers; the introduction of retirement ages; a more independent
process of political patronage; and removal of peers who have
committed serious criminal offences. A more radical approach would
also separate the award of a peerage from membership of the upper
house. The present Bill covers all of these areas.
However, there have also been serious concerns about
the proposal in the Bill to make the Lords into an elected upper
House. Critics have claimed that election will change the membership
and method of selection of the upper house, and its powers and
functions. On this view, what emerges will not be a revising chamber,
as at present, but a House of Commons writ small. The additional
legitimacy of the new upper chamber as an elected House will encourage
it to oppose the Commons; the conventions between the Houses will
fundamentally change; and the constitutional balance of the past
100 years will be undermined, and perhaps destroyed.
It is thus of great constitutional importance that
the Joint Committee review these issues, and seek to address them.
In particular, there are several key matters which I would request
the Committee to examine, and take expert advice and if necessary
evidence on:
i) Whether the changes to the second chamber
are likely to affect the status of that chamber as a House of
Parliament or the existing relationship between the two houses
(White Paper, para 7).
ii) What the status will be of the relevant conventions
and statutes governing the relationship between the new Lords
and the Commons. The Bill incorrectly regards the conventions
and statutes as constitutionally final, without recognising that
they themselves rest on assumptions about the relatively greater
legitimacy of the Commons, assumptions which the Bill if enacted
would undermine (para 8).
iii) Whether 300 is an appropriate number of
members for the new Upper House; and in particular, whether the
60 appointed members will be sufficient to cover the range of
expertise and skills currently commanded by the Lords (para 16).
iv) What the likely effectiveness will be as
a revising chamber of a wholly or partially elected upper house.
The Deputy Prime Minister said in testimony to Lord Pannick (Select
Committee on the Constitution, 18 May 2011) that no external research
had been taken on international experience in this area. This
gap needs to be filled
v) How many times and under what circumstances
the existing House of Lords has rejected an amendment or a bill,
only to accept it later on the basis of the greater legitimacy
of the Commons. The
Deputy Prime Minister did not answer this important question in
testimony to Lord Goldsmith (Select Committee on the Constitution,
18 May 2011). Again, this gap needs to be filled.
vi) Whether a member of the new chamber could
in principle become Prime Minister (or a Cabinet minister);
whether this should be democratically acceptable; and if not what
measures should be included to prevent it from occurring. The
Bill does not consider this possibility at all. Yet it is evident
that the modern convention that the PM should be drawn from the
Commons will be thrown into doubt by an elected Upper House. This
raises the further possibility, for example, that a PM from the
Upper House with a 15 year term could have entirely different
priorities to those of a Cabinet drawn from the Commons.
vii) Whether and to what degree any of the party
manifestoes in the 2011 election in fact supported the specific
proposals contained in the Bill; or whether any proposals were
specifically ruled out at any stage by the parties.
viii) What the total likely cost will be of the
new house. The new members will be elected by constituencies that
are twice the size of existing parliamentary constituencies. This
means their constituency expenses are likely to be significantly
higher than those of MPs, perhaps even than MEPs (who have relatively
small postbags). The staffing budget for an MP is £115,000,
and for an MEP, £222,000. How high will or should the staffing
budget be for the members of the new Upper House? What about other
budgets?
ix) What electoral spending limits are likely
to be applied to the new members' constituencies. This issue is
of obvious importance to the democratic process. The limit for
MEPs is £45,000 per person during the long period of the
election. What will or should it be for the new members of the
upper house?
x) What the status of women and minorities will
be within the new house. In the recent past the Lords has been
more representative of women, ethnic minorities and disabled people
than the Commons. It is therefore possible, even likely, that
an elected upper house will revert to levels of representation
of women seen in the Commons. Is there relevant domestic and international
experience which bears on this issue?
xi) Whether the proposed changes may deter good
candidates from trying to become members of the Upper House. The
Bill does not consider this issue at all. Yet at least 80% of
its members will have to stand for election; they will be paid
c. £60,000 per year over a 15 year term, likely to fall during
the highest earning years of their lives; they will be full-time;
and they will be expected to make a 15 year commitment in advance.
It is very likely, therefore, that many of the better candidates
will be put off from applying.
5 October 2011
| 
