North Yorkshire for Democracy
The following is a response intended for the Government
consultation on House of Lords reform, to be included by Unlock
Democracy in their compilation of responses (for which, thanks).
House of Lords reform has been discussed within North Yorkshire
for Democracy, but the following views have not been endorsed
and should be seen as an individual contribution.
An opportunity for higher resolution, higher fidelity,
representation of the electorate in the system of government.
The design of the reformed House of Lords presents
an opportunity for better representation of the public which seems,
unfortunately, to have been met with a singular lack of imagination.
There are perhaps those whose vision for unlocking democracy goes
no further than extending the extremely low resolution two party
system, with its choice of just two political package deals, by
giving a significant voice to a third and perhaps a fourth party.
Our paradigm for democracy is the ancient Athenian
model, with direct participation of all citizens, allowing each
a separate vote on every question. This may be considered impractical
for our size of population, and might well have been so for Athens
had it chosen to include non-citizens in the process. It might
also be argued, in both cases, that there is not the degree of
interest, or the leisure to reflect and become informed, for the
general population to be involved in the detail of government.
(Alternatively one might argue about cause and effect between
not being consulted and not being interested).
For us, general participation on single issues is
limited by practicality to very occasional referenda, and even
then the practicality and effectiveness are questionable. One
path that is open to us is to greatly increase the number of package
deals on offer, giving each voter a better chance of finding a
close match to his or her own position. Another is to break down
the full range of political issues into a small number subject
domains. Having a separate vote on each domain would allow the
voter a large number of possible vote combinations, again allowing
a much closer match to his or her own position.
The role of the House of Commons places major constraints
on the way it is elected and operates. It has to support a single
government, making it desirable that it be dominated by a single
party bound by a single manifesto. It traditionally has a local
constituency link, greatly limiting the range of positions which
are likely to gain representation and fixing in advance the number
of members to be returned. The House of Lords serves to complement
the Commons, or in counterpoint to it, avoiding some constraints
on its election and operation. Indeed it is rather important,
with the introduction of an electoral mandate for the Lords, that
there are very clear differentiators which prevent the two houses
becoming rivals for the same role. Not serving to underpin the
government allows the design of the Lords a greater flexibility
which can be exploited in making it more representative.
System of Election
Better representation means returning members whose
positions cover as wide a range and as fine a granularity as possible.
Some may object that this would let in 'extremists'. But this
misses the point. Democracy is not about the competence of the
voters or the acceptability of their views. It is about inclusion
and choice.
Achieving greatest variation suggests using a proportional
system with as large a constituency as possible ( i.e. a single,
UK wide, constituency). Having within this a Party List system,
even an open one, would tend to undermine the chances of individual
positions being considered on their merits and could result in
a large proportion of members being bound to conform to a group
line on most issues.
Rejecting party lists, however, leaves a major problem
of getting the voter to make informed and considered comparisons
among a large number of individual candidates. He/she may be prepared
to put in the time and effort to order his/her 1st
and 2nd choices meaningfully, but it may be the allocation
of the 53rd and 54th places which actually
counts. To overcome this we need to look outside the box of conventional
PR systems, such as STV, with their (in this case very long) listing
of preferences followed by complex and to some extent arbitrary
post-processing. (They take us very usefully beyond the effective
2 candidate limit of FPTP, but not into the hundreds.)
We can exploit the fact that there is no correct
number of seats (the figure of 300 is an arbitrate one) and no
constituency link driving that number. This allows us to define
in advance the quota or threshold number of votes to win a seat.
This can be based on the desired number of members and the expected
turnout, but with no great problem arising if the outcome is different.
As some people don't want a House of Lords, this actually affords
an additional dimension of democratic choice, the option of returning
fewer members.
We also have scope to use Internet voting, from home
(at no greater loss of secrecy than with the postal vote system),
from the public library computer network, or via computers in
the conventional polling stations. This offers a system in which
votes cast can be counted in real time. Coupled with the predefined
quota, this would allow the system to recognise when votes for
a candidate have reached that figure and stop accepting votes
for that (now elected) candidate. (It would also warn voters to
wait for confirmation that their vote has been accepted if they
have tried to vote for someone who is close to the quota).
The significance of this is that the voter need only
choose one of the currently remaining candidates and not concern
him or her self immediately with hypothetical transfers of the
vote if their candidate does well enough to be elected without
it or badly enough to be eliminated. The options facing the voter
may well not be the ones he/she had thought seriously about before
the polls opened, suggesting the need for more time to consider
them. Unlike elections to the House of Commons (determining the
incoming government) there is no pressure to get most of the results
out quickly. There is no need for a deadline within hours or days
of the start. Voters can be allowed to cast their votes, or to
transfer them if their candidate is languishing short of the quota,
at their leisure.
Nor is there a need to take the transfer process
out of the voter's hands. If large numbers of votes remain with
candidates who are not returned that represents a choice on the
part of the voters.
Extending the process over days and weeks allows
media attention to focus on the remaining candidates. This enables
the choices made among the large number of options to be well
informed and considered to an extent which would not be possible
if they were made simultaneously.
There is of course some significance in the choice
of whether to vote early or vote late. There may be some small
tactical advantage in voting late and a considerable psychological
advantage in voting early. But, importantly, that choice is made
by the voter.
These innovations are offered not for the sake of
innovation but so that the election of around 300 members can
represent that many individual options rather than a small number
of clone types in varying quantities.
Multiple (Parallel) Upper Chambers
We shall be electing representatives to speak and
vote on our behalf in debates across the whole range of public
affairs. If you could choose the person most suitable to represent
you in each debate it seems highly implausible (unless you hold
very stereotypical views) that you would choose the same person
for each and every debate. Such a degree of choice may be impractical,
but suppose we categorise these debates into half a dozen different
subject domains, with some debates perhaps falling into more than
one domain. Might you not want a different representative for
each domain? Would that not potentially give closer representation
of your views? Here we are seeking to design from scratch the
most appropriate system for House of Lords. Why would you choose
not to make it as representative as possible?
In a single 300 member chamber 300 different positions
can be represented. Consider instead 6 parallel chambers of 50
members each, with each chamber dedicated to its own particular
subject area. For a voter who considers one member in each chamber
to be representing him, that amounts to 50 to the power 6 possible
combinations. That's enough to represent a unique position for
each UK voter. (In fact it's enough to represent a unique position
for each person in the world, even if the population doubles.)
Under such a system we would no longer need to sacrifice
our position on other subject domains in order to have influence
on the domain which is currently of greatest importance to us.
Everyone could have equal influence on all domains. This moves
us on from sectional politics where single issue and often vested
interest voters can dominate.
A fully or mainly elected House?
While it is of course desirable to bring wisdom and
expertise to bear on issues of state, it is highly questionable
whether these things exist in a pure form, independent of political
philosophy or perspective. Even if they do, we could hardly rely
upon those making appointments to a reformed House of Lords to
be without such perspectives or vested interests. Even if we could
assemble a selection of pure experts on a range of subjects, any
topic discussed is likely to fall within the specialist field
of only some of them. It is hard to see the special significance
or virtue of their aggregate voting upon an issue which is outside
the expertise of most.
A case can be made for the elected members of the
reformed House of Lords to have easy access to the knowledge and
opinions of some who are unlikely to seek or gain election to
the House. But that is not to say that the views of these people
should be weighed directly in the voting and decision taking of
the House. If there are appointed members they should be non-voting
members. But this role could equally be filled be guest speakers
nominated by the House itself.
Tenure of Members
As pointed out by UD, 15 years seems rather a long
time to go without renewal of mandate. Mandatory retirement after
a single term seems unnecessary when it is possible to let the
electorate decide.
Naming
It would be possible to keep the name House of Lords
without its members being titled as 'Lord'. After all, members
of the House of Commons do not carry the title 'Common'.
| 
