First review of the National Security Strategy 2010 - Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy

First review of the National Security Strategy 2010 - Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy Contents

3 Government decision-making on national security

The National Security Council

ESTABLISHMENT

76. On 12 May 2010 the Government announced that the Prime Minister had appointed Sir Peter Ricketts as the first National Security Adviser, a new role based in the Cabinet Office. Sir Peter was charged with establishing the new National Security Council (NSC) structures, to "coordinate and deliver the Government's international security agenda".[122] The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and made up of Cabinet ministers (although in the past it has included non-Cabinet ministers). Others can be invited to attend, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Heads of the Security and Intelligence Services, the Attorney General, the Leader of the Opposition or outside experts.

77. The Cabinet Office's written evidence states that the NSC had several sub-committees: NSC (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies), NSC (Nuclear), NSC (Emerging Powers), and NSC (Libya) each with a different membership and including some Ministers who are not members of the NSC. The NSC meets weekly. Lord West noted that the NSC consisted of similar people and had a similar meeting schedule to the NSID (National Security International Relations and Development Cabinet sub-Committee) which operated under the previous Government (although NSID did not have an official with the title of National Security Adviser).[123]

78. The 2010 NSS and SDSR were prepared by the NSC's staff. The NSC decided what "priority risks" the NSS would cover.[124] It also agreed the NSS, and the "adaptable posture" set out in the SDSR.[125]

ROLE OF THE NSC

79. We were told that the NSC's role was to look at "strategic questions of Government policy, including those related to our active deployments". It has a separate role from COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room—the Government's crisis management facility), which focuses on crisis management and co-ordination.[126] While there are clearly strategic implications to some decisions made in a crisis, we were told that this distinction worked well in practice.[127] Oliver Letwin told us that COBR was:

there to receive information, to make operational decisions.... That is completely separate from the NSC except in so much as the NSC will have, with the approval of Cabinet, determined the resources that are being used to deal with the operational questions that are before COBR and will have set the main policy lines that may be being applied.[128]

LESSONS FROM LIBYA

80. The NSA's Libya crisis report made it clear that NSC (Libya) (NSC(L)) looked at both strategic and tactical issues.[129] NSC(L) alone met 62 times[130] and in addition there were meetings of the NSC and NSC(Officials). The report said that "A clear lesson is that the conduct of modern conflicts [...] requires Ministers to be abreast of the tactical as well as strategic issues".[131] Real time military, intelligence and diplomatic assessment (including from theatre) was made available to Ministers. NSC(Officials) co-ordinated implementation of decisions and development of policy, including holding video conferences with key UK missions overseas.[132]

81. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that in a new conflict like Libya there were far more decisions to make policy on than with a more established conflict (such as Afghanistan) where the policies and structures were settled.[133] He described NSC(L) as a "more operational forum" and said that this was how things had been done during the Second World War.[134] He said that:

Ministers are very careful to respect the operational responsibilities of, say, the senior police commander of a terrorist operation or the Chief of Defence Staff in relation to the Armed Forces, but they want to set the political direction on each of the operational issues that come up.[135]

82. It is clear to us that any committee meeting over 60 times in a relatively short period to discuss one topic is doing far more than looking at the strategic direction of the campaign. We have not taken detailed evidence on the management of the Libya campaign, and so we are not in a position to pass judgement on how it was handled, or on whether the NSC (or NSC(L)) was the correct organisation to take the lead. What we can say is that the NSC, through its Libyan sub-committee, has clearly devoted considerable time and resources to non-strategic issues, and that this inevitably must have increased pressure on the time, resources, and focus available to devote to strategic issues.

83. We welcome the introduction of an NSC to give strategic direction to the Government's national security agenda, but we are not convinced that the NSC has successfully maintained its strategic focus. We are left with the distinct impression that is has been deeply involved in operations and this may have reduced its ability to think strategically.

HORIZON-SCANNING

84. We asked the Cabinet Office for examples of longer term strategy work carried out by the NSC (and a guide as to what was considered long term) and were told "NSC discussions regularly look at strategic issues—HMG's policy position for Afghanistan post 2014, for instance, and its strategy for managing a range of bilateral relations."[136] We also asked for examples of "blue skies thinking", and were advised that:

The NSC draws on a wide range of advice and analysis produced by departments on the NSC. Departments frequently engage outside experts and consider alternative approaches when formulating policy advice to the Council. Separately, the NSC Officials (non-ministerial) group meets quarterly in an informal setting to reflect on issues outside the rhythm and routine of the regular NSC schedule.[137]

85. We asked how the agenda was shaped and were told that:

The NSC agenda is produced by the Secretariat of the National Security Council on a quarterly basis for submission to the Prime Minister. The agenda is shaped by proposals from departments, as well as in consultation with Number 10 and the Deputy Prime Minister's office, and is kept sufficiently flexible to respond to urgent priorities and enable the NSC to oversee HMG's policy response to national security crises.[138]

The Cabinet Office told us that, while the NSC shaped intelligence collection priorities through the annual Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Requirements and Priorities round, there was "no comprehensive process for the NSC itself to identify emerging risks".[139]

86. We are concerned that the Cabinet Office was unable to provide us, either in public or in confidence, with concrete examples of "blue skies" discussions by the NSC. Coupled with its failure to discuss the national security implications of either the Eurozone crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence, it is apparent that there are major problems in the way that the NSC selects topics for discussion.

The National Security Adviser

87. Sir Peter Ricketts was NSA from May 2010 to the end of 2011 when he was replaced by Sir Kim Darroch. As the first NSA, Sir Peter was charged with establishing the new NSC structures and helped produce the 2010 NSS. He told us about his role:

I have three hats. One is I am the secretary of the National Security Council and I prepare the meetings; [...] I have a meeting of Permanent Secretary representatives of all the departments on the NSC; we meet before the NSC to prepare the papers and the agenda; and then I am secretary of the meeting and responsible for implementation and follow up.[...] The second role is effectively as a foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister. Because of my background, he looks to me for advice; I attend his meetings in London; I travel with him when he goes overseas; and I act as his senior adviser on foreign affairs. The third function is heading the [National Security] Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.[140]

88. It is notable that both Sir Peter and his successor, Sir Kim Darroch, have been drawn from the FCO. Lord West said that this was "probably quite a damaging thing".[141] Baroness Neville-Jones thought the Civil Service needed deliberately to develop a pool of people with experience in various departments who could be considered for the role because "it will not happen by accident".[142]

89. Oliver Letwin did not see it as a problem that both NSAs were from the Foreign Office. He told the Committee that Sir Peter's background had not led to:

any prejudice against being concerned with domestic security. On the contrary, he has been very concerned indeed with domestic security, as well as international security. [...] I have dealt a good deal with his successor in his capacity as the UK Representative to the EU and my impression is that he is of the same cast of mind—I am sure that the Prime Minister would not have appointed him if he had not been.[143]

In his evidence Sir Peter Ricketts drew attention to the range of experience that both he and his successor had, and the impossibility of any candidate having a range of experience covering the whole national security spectrum.[144] In its written evidence the Cabinet Office said that "future appointments [as NSA] could be drawn from a range of Departments and Agencies."[145]

90. We also discussed the ideal length of appointment for an NSA (Sir Peter Ricketts was in post approximately 20 months). Baroness Neville-Jones said that she thought that a parliament [five years] was a good length for the appointment of a NSA.[146] Sir Peter Ricketts told us that: "I suspect that Sir Kim will spend longer [as NSA]. I came to this job having already done four years as Permanent Secretary in the FCO; he will come back fresh from a posting overseas". [147]

91. We acknowledge Sir Peter Ricketts' significant contribution as NSA in setting up the NSC and launching the 2010 NSS. Sir Kim Darroch also brings a distinguished record to the office. We hope that Sir Kim Darroch will be able to remain in post long enough to complete the next NSS.

92. We welcome the appointment of a National Security Adviser, though we still have questions about the nature of the role, and its status. We have concerns too that the current and former NSA both have a FCO background. The Government has assured us that this has not led to a lack of focus on domestic issues, but this was not a view that all our witnesses shared. In addition we noted a lack of military focus in the NSA's Libya Crisis report. We welcome the Government's commitment that future appointments could be drawn from a range of Departments and Agencies. We shall be monitoring this.

LINE MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HEADS

93. Baroness Neville-Jones told us in her evidence that the Heads of the three Security and Intelligence Agencies "are in attendance at the NSC and are invited to speak, and they speak frequently".[148] Oliver Letwin told us that the NSC had given the Heads of the Agencies greater opportunity to talk to Ministers and the Prime Minister.[149] Under the governing legislation, the Heads are required to provide an annual report to the Prime Minister.[150]

94. Sir Peter Ricketts told us in oral evidence that "I hold the budget for the intelligence agencies; I am the principal accounting officer for that, and I do the line management, the annual appraisal and oversight of the three agency heads."[151] He also told us that: "I have a responsibility for the intelligence community; while each of the three agency heads has their own responsibilities in their own fields, I have the responsibility to make sure they are working effectively together."[152] The Cabinet Office told us in written evidence that Sir Peter Ricketts was responsible for writing the personal annual staff reports for the three Heads.[153] We asked if Sir Kim Darroch would have the same responsibility and were told that he would and the job had been passed from the Cabinet Secretary to the NSA when the role was created.[154]

95. It is important that the Heads of the Security and Intelligence Agencies have access to, and are directly accountable to Ministers, and we have been told that this remains the case. We think it wrong that the performance of the three Agency Heads should be reported on by anyone other than the relevant Minister.

A National Security Minister?

96. Lord West was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Security and Counter-terrorism), a role based at the Home Office under the previous Government. Baroness Neville-Jones was Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism, at the Home Office from the Election until May 2011; she was not replaced. She had a seat on the NSC but was not in the Cabinet. The current situation is that there is an International Security Minister at the Ministry of Defence (Mr Gerald Howarth MP), and a Counterterrorism Minister at the Home Office (Mr James Brokenshire MP).[155] Neither sits on the NSC. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that James Brokenshire had taken over most of Baroness Neville-Jones's role at the Home Office but that Francis Maude had taken over responsibility for cyber security at the Cabinet Office (he also does not sit on the NSC).[156] He assured us that there was a Minister responsible for all the different parts of Baroness Neville-Jones's portfolio.

97. In oral evidence we heard arguments for a National Security Minister, rather than, or in addition to, an official as NSA. Lord West told us that "the Prime Minister is so tied up with others things that I felt that you needed someone who had his eye on the ball all the time", and that the job required someone with "political antennae" as well.[157] The minister's job would be to make sure the Prime Minister was aware of important issues, but that the person needed to be a minister because he "just felt that one would have much more ability to make sure that departments worked together".[158] The House of Commons Defence Committee has said that:

we believe that a dedicated, powerful and independent long-term voice for national security should exist within Government and recommend that the Prime Minister appoint a National Security Minister, separate from the Home Office, to act as National Security Adviser with a seat on the National Security Council.[159]

98. Sir Peter Ricketts saw potential problems in having a cross-cutting security Minister:

If you have a Minister, they will inevitably overlap at ministerial level with the responsibilities of the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Development Secretary and the Home Secretary. I have great respect for Ministers, but my experience is that, if you give two Ministers overlapping responsibilities for the same thing, it is not always a recipe for harmony.[160]

Baroness Neville-Jones felt that there could be constitutional problems, as well as the risk of damaging the Foreign Secretary's status abroad.[161] Even Lord West, who was in favour of a minister, recognised that a National Security Minister would have to be carefully chosen to ensure that he or she did not become overly powerful and upset the current system of ministers being responsible for departments.[162]

99. The current Prime Minister takes a keen interest in national security and regularly chairs the NSC. The Government does not see the need for a National Security Minister at present, and we can see the clear advantages to the NSA being an official. However, the Prime Minister's active involvement is a key element of the current arrangements. Were this to change, and were the right person available, the question of appointing a National Security Minister would need to be reconsidered.

CLARITY OF RESPONSIBILITY

100. We took evidence from Oliver Letwin, Minister for Government Policy Advice at the Cabinet Office, as we were advised that he was the most appropriate minster to give evidence. He told us that:

I have no direct reporting relationship to the National Security Secretariat, which reports to the Prime Minister. The National Security Adviser, whom I am sure you will be interviewing in due course, reports directly to the Prime Minister

He went on to say that "I suppose that my role there is to look across the pattern of policies that emerge from the National Security Council and to observe how they connect with the rest of our strategies and policies, because my role in the Government is to do that in general". [163]

101. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that the Government had noticed that there was a lack of a ministerial lead on cyber security once Baroness Neville-Jones had left and that that had led to the appointment of Francis Maude. It had also organised a ministerial lead for space strategy. He was unable to tell us who was the ministerial lead on electromagnetic pulses.[164] We were subsequently told that there was no ministerial lead; different elements were handled by different departments.[165]

102. We are not convinced that all involved in Government are clear on which Minister is accountable for which elements of the NSS and NSC. It is even harder for those outside Government, including Select Committees, to identify who is accountable. This confusion over responsibility is not indicative of a well functioning organisation and the Government needs to address this.

The National Security Secretariat

103. The NSA leads a secretariat (NSSec) comprised of approximately 200 individuals across several teams (although around 70 of these work in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, dealing with domestic resilience).[166] The rest of NSSec "coordinates the development and implementation of policy for decision-making at the NSC, delivers specific projects, for example on cyber security". The Cabinet Office told us in its submission in February 2011 that structural changes were underway, which would see a reduction in staff by around 25%. The NSC and its subcommittees are supported by a small Council Secretariat (with a core of two people) responsible for coordinating operational matters. As a result:

The National Security Secretariat (NSSec), has a limited capacity to undertake analysis and commission wider work. But the primary role of the Secretariat is to support the NSC rather than to duplicate the work of other departments.

104. Lord West thought that the current level of resources was not acceptable saying that, despite the potential to draw on the work of departments, "you probably need a slightly stronger secretariat within the Cabinet Office [...] with more authority to do certain things and to draw on this information".[167]

105. Other Select Committees have raised concerns about the current arrangements. The Defence Committee noted that if work was commissioned from departments there was a danger it would not be independent and would push departmental agendas.[168] It called for more "resources to undertake its own analysis and commission research".[169] The Public Administration Select Committee made a similar point:

We remain concerned that without this capacity the NSC can only broker compromises between departmental views based on incompatible principles [...] The NSC is not "a powerful centre of strategic assessment" as the [Government's] response claims because it lacks virtually any staff to undertake such work.[170]

106. Sir Peter Ricketts told us in oral evidence that the NSC could draw on other resources:

we have recently formed a team in the Cabinet Office bringing together experts from the MoD world, the commercial space world and other civil servants to produce a national space strategy under the leadership and co-ordination function of the Cabinet Office. That is an ad hoc team that has come together, will produce a strategy and will then disperse again.[171]

He described the current capacity as "limited" but "extremely high quality" and noted that "provided you can bring together the really good people thinking about research and policy in the Home Office, in DfID, the MoD and the FCO, and draw on the best of them, you do not actually need a large staff in the Cabinet Office to do it as well".

107. Baroness Neville-Jones felt that it was important that the departments did the work:

It is very important that other departments are also thinking. I would like to see all departments have some think-tank element within them. [...] it is important that departments should maintain an open dialogue and allow themselves to talk to experts in their area so that the Government do not cut themselves off from expertise.[172]

She went on to stress that it was important that departments did policy thinking to ensure that Secretaries of State were in charge of that thinking and that Cabinet Government remained vibrant. She also wanted departments to be able to stand up to the NSC.[173]

108. We share Baroness Neville-Jones's view that the departments should maintain the primary responsibility for thinking within Government. However we do not see that departments are at any risk of not being able to "stand up to" the NSC. The NSC has relatively few resources to develop a view different from that of departments.

109. We accept that the NSC should primarily draw on, and synthesise, the work of other departments, rather than seek to duplicate the analytical capabilities of other departments and agencies. However, the NSC was set up to ensure that things do not fall into the gaps between departments, and in this context we recommend that the NSC should have some resources to undertake its own analytical studies and to commission research from outside Government. It may need to provide alternative viewpoints to those of departments.

Outside expertise

110. We examined what use the NSC had made of outside experts, both during the completion of the NSS and since. The House of Commons Defence Committee has said that "given the speed of the [SDSR] we are not convinced that the best use was made of experts from outside the Department"[174]. Similarly the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has expressed concern that the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser had not been adequately involved in drawing up the NSRA.[175] Baroness Neville-Jones told us that the UK's allies were consulted, and suggested that for the next NSS the then Government might like to consult experts. [176]

111. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that there had been consultation with experts: "when we were doing the National Security Strategy or the SDSR, [...] we drew heavily on the expertise of RUSI, Chatham House, IISS and a number of other outside commentators and researchers in the national security area."[177] We challenged the Minister on this and in written evidence after his oral evidence, Oliver Letwin told us that during the development of the NSS "There were extensive and ongoing discussions with key think tanks and academic institutes, NGOs, industry organisations and international partners (notably the US and France)".[178] Specifically he told us that there had been three meetings with "senior representatives from Chatham House, RUSI, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Kings College London, as well as other influential individuals within the national security community".

112. The current Government discontinued the National Security Forum, which was introduced by the previous Government, consisting of outside experts chaired by a Minister.[179] Lord West, who chaired it, told us that "we were able to have debates about that with a fantastic mix of people—Nobel Prize winners, previous diplomats, the military, top industrialists et cetera".[180] As well as holding debates it:

set tasks to these people to come up with papers on how important sovereignty is in certain areas, such as in crypto or in nuclear submarines or whatever it might be. They would go away and not just do the work themselves but the deep specialists who had friends within academia, and so on, would go and get work sucked in from them and you would get some very useful input.[181]

113. In written evidence the defence and securities industry trade body ADS said that:

ADS's principal recommendation is that the NSC should develop stronger mechanisms of engagement with the UK-based defence and security industries. [...]There would be value in the National Security Adviser and/or his deputies engaging with the defence and security industries on a regular basis; taking account of the risks and opportunities that industry sees in the area of national security.

114. We discussed with witnesses whether Ministers were being "protected" from the views of outside experts. We asked how often the NSC heard from outside experts in person. Sir Peter told us that it was "not day to day but from time to time we have drawn on, for example, outside experts in talking about Afghanistan. We have brought in experts who are knowledgeable about Afghanistan to participate and make sure that we are taking the full range of views that are available on Afghanistan policy."[182] We asked again for examples in written evidence and were again given the example of Afghanistan and told that "Ministers on the NSC may of course consult experts in preparation for the NSC and the normal conduct of their business".[183]

115. Given the timescale of the 2010 NSS, it is perhaps not surprising that the involvement of outside experts was limited. However, given the much longer lead time for the next NSS, we would expect more detailed input throughout the process.

116. We have concerns about the limited extent to which the NSC has in practice drawn on non-governmental advice. Clearly some good work has been done but we are not convinced it is varied or frequent enough. Given the decision to abolish the National Security Forum, measures must be put in place to ensure that Ministers have regular exposure to advice from outside experts.

122 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/establishment-of-a-national-security-council/ Back

123 Qq 66-8 Back

124 NSS, para 3.14. Back

125 SDSR, p9. Back

126 Cabinet Office 02. Back

127 Oliver Letwin Q109 and Lord West Qq 70-1 Back

128 Q 109 Back

129 Libya crisis: national security adviser's review of central coordination and lessons learned, p 7. Back

130 Libya crisis: national security adviser's review of central coordination and lessons learned, p 19. Back

131 Libya crisis: national security adviser's review of central coordination and lessons learned, p 19. Back

132 Libya crisis: national security adviser's review of central coordination and lessons learned, p 3. Back

133 Q 155 Back