First review of the National Security Strategy 2010 - Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy Contents


Conclusions and recommendations


1.  It is significant that the NSS and SDSR were produced in parallel with the Spending Review—rather than guiding or following it—and after a review of just five months. (Paragraph 6)

2.  We welcome the Government's decision to produce the SDSR at the same time as the NSS. In principle, this should allow us to see, alongside the Strategy, what impact it will have on policy priorities and resource allocation. (Paragraph 10)

3.  We also welcome the Government's commitment to review the NSS and SDSR regularly. A five yearly review cycle, as is currently proposed, seems to us appropriate. However, producing a new Strategy shortly after a General Election—as this timetable suggests—raises the danger of a hurried review process, particularly if there is a change of Government. (Paragraph 11)

4.  The order in which the NSS, SDSR, and CSR are begun is not particularly significant. What is crucial is that all three are able to influence each other, in a process which is begun in plenty of time. The timing of the Election led to the 2010 NSS, SDSR and CSR being completed in a relatively short timescale, with little consultation. We urge the Government to plan for a much longer lead time for the 2015 review. (Paragraph 12)

5.  We welcome the decision of this Government and the last to publish an NSS. We believe that producing and publishing an NSS can help to play an important role in identifying likely future threats to, and opportunities for, the UK. This allows the UK to prepare for them and, in an era of scarce resources, to prioritise effectively. This is important to maintaining the security of the country. (Paragraph 16)

6.  We regret that the Government's unwillingness, to date, to provide us with all the information we requested about the NSRA, means that we are not in a position to give the two Houses any assurance about its adequacy. We urge the Government to reconsider its position on this. We need this information if we are to do our job properly, as a Joint Committee tasked with scrutinising the NSS. (Paragraph 23)

7.  We remain to be convinced of the Government's reasoning for not including Afghanistan in the NSRA. The Government has said that it is not including "immediate security issues" but terrorism, accidents, flooding and cyber attack are included, though they are all current threats. While the date of troop withdrawal may be a firm policy, we take the view that Afghanistan and the surrounding region remain an area of risk for the UK's security and this ought to be reflected in the NSRA. (Paragraph 24)

8.  In principle, we welcome the development of the NSRA but the Government must ensure that it does not lead to a false sense of security. Any forecasting tool, however well designed, is imperfect and speculative, and the results produced should be treated with caution and used as a support for, not a substitute for, good judgement. The NSRA will not always predict the next big problem: resources must be allocated to continual horizon-scanning, and must be available to deal with unpredicted risks as they emerge. (Paragraph 25)

9.  A key point of the NSS is to set priorities, and to guide choices in an era of diminished resources. While such a strategy may contain aspirational elements it must also be realistic. The NSS simultaneously recognises the rise of new global powers, shifts in the centres of economic activity, and reduced resources in the UK, while at the same time asserting "no reduction in influence". This is wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term and the UK needs to plan for a changing, and more partnership-dependent, role in the world. (Paragraph 30)

10.  We are concerned that the Government has not done enough in the NSS and SDSR to articulate its concept of what influence is, why it is needed, or what the most cost-effective way is of achieving it in different circumstances and regions. The NSS mentions many different forms of "soft power" but could do more to spell out the different roles of organisations such as the BBC World Service and British Council. We believe that greater clarity over exactly what we are seeking, and why, could enable resources to be better targeted. (Paragraph 35)

11.  We welcome the idea of an "adaptable posture" in principle. But in a world in which it was deemed right in principle to intervene militarily in Libya but not, for instance, in Syria, we would welcome more clarity on how this principle shaped decisions on the mix of capabilities to be maintained. We call on the Government to elaborate on the thinking linking the NSS, the "adaptable approach" and the capabilities decided upon. (Paragraph 40)

12.  We accept that the NSS is not a "recipe book" which dictates our response to every event, but we would have expected to have seen some evidence that it had influenced decisions made since the SDSR, including the Government's responses to the Arab Spring. We have found no such evidence. As the NSS states, "a strategy is only useful if it guides choices"; it is about thinking in the longer term, and not simply doing what is in the UK's short-term interest. If the current strategy is not guiding choices then it needs to be revised. (Paragraph 41)

13.  In the NSS, the Government has started to set out crucial statements which can guide future policy. However it does not yet present a clear overarching strategy: a common understanding about the UK's interests and objectives that guides choices on investment across government departments, including domestic departments, as well as guiding operational priorities and crisis response. Such a strategy must be based on a realistic vision of the UK's future position in the world. This vision will both shape, and be shaped, by the UK's interests and objectives. (Paragraph 46)

14.  We are concerned that the NSS's focus on bilateral relations with large emerging powers—and concomitant investments in diplomatic and capacity-building activities—should not be at the expense of strengthening relations with the Commonwealth and with key regional organisations such as ASEAN, the Arab League and African Union. (Paragraph 51)

15.  We are concerned that the NSS and SDSR have avoided some of the difficult questions about alliances. There does not appear to have been a fundamental assessment of the extent to which the UK can rely on its allies, and the extent to which it needs the capacity to operate independently. The SDSR states that "we will maintain our ability to act alone where we cannot expect others to help". We call on the Government to set out in response to this report in what situations it thinks the UK may need to operate alone and what capabilities they would require. (Paragraph 54)

16.  We recognise that there are limits to what can be said in a public document. However we believe that the USA's publication of Sustaining US Global Leadership provides an opportunity to open up a debate on a number of crucial issues. We call on the Government to reflect deeply on the long term implications of the geographical and functional shifts in US policy that are now taking place. It raises fundamental questions if our pre-eminent defence and security relationship is with an ally who has interests which are increasingly divergent from our own. The Government needs to decide if the UK will continue to be as involved in US military action as we have been in the past if the US focuses on Asia-Pacific. If the US is moving towards viewing Europe as a producer rather than a consumer of security, and reducing its capability to mount long term stabilisation missions, it raises more questions as to what we can expect from the US and what the US expects from the UK. (Paragraph 60)

17.  We are not convinced that the Government gave sufficient attention in the NSS to the potential risks that future international economic instability might pose for UK security. These go beyond the UK being unable to afford to defend itself. International economic problems could lead to our allies having to make considerable cuts to their defence spending, and to an increase in economic migrants between EU member states, and to domestic social or political unrest. The NSC needs to take all of this into account. (Paragraph 67)

18.  We hope that the problems within the Eurozone can be resolved. However we believe that, even in 2010, the potential threat to UK security from a full, or partial, collapse of the Eurozone was one of the plausible scenarios which a prudent NSRA should have examined. We call on the NSC to address the potential impacts on the UK and NATO (and how the Government would respond) were this to happen, as a matter of urgency. It also needs to examine the long term strategic impact for the UK of any measures to save the Euro, such as further Eurozone political integration or the exit of some states from EU membership. (Paragraph 68)

19.  The fact that the potential impact of Scottish independence was not brought to the NSC's attention strengthens our concern that the horizon-scanning carried out on the NSC's behalf is inadequate and that the NSC's oversight of security issues is not sufficiently broad and strategic. (Paragraph 71)

20.  The 2011 progress report is a relatively uninformative implementation report on the SDSR. Next year we expect a rounded and insightful update on both the NSS and the SDSR. It should include a summary of the main events of the year that were of relevance to national security, how the UK responded to them, and the longer term strategic implications. For example this year's report could have included the problems at the UK Border Agency, the Eurozone crisis (and the strategic implication of measures to resolve it), an update on the US-UK joint strategy board, on the Anglo-French alliance, on Iran, and on commitments in Afghanistan and the adjacent area after 2015. It should also include a summary of the work of the NSC that year. The Libya Crisis report, with its identification of problems faced and lessons learned, provides a good model. (Paragraph 75)

21.  We welcome the introduction of an NSC to give strategic direction to the Government's national security agenda, but we are not convinced that the NSC has successfully maintained its strategic focus. We are left with the distinct impression that is has been deeply involved in operations and this may have reduced its ability to think strategically. (Paragraph 83)

22.  We are concerned that the Cabinet Office was unable to provide us, either in public or in confidence, with concrete examples of "blue skies" discussions by the NSC. Coupled with its failure to discuss the national security implications of either the Eurozone crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence, it is apparent that there are major problems in the way that the NSC selects topics for discussion. (Paragraph 86)

23.  We welcome the appointment of a National Security Adviser, though we still have questions about the nature of the role, and its status. We have concerns too that the current and former NSA both have a FCO background. The Government has assured us that this has not led to a lack of focus on domestic issues, but this was not a view that all our witnesses shared. In addition we noted a lack of military focus in the NSA's Libya Crisis report. We welcome the Government's commitment that future appointments could be drawn from a range of Departments and Agencies. We shall be monitoring this. (Paragraph 92)

24.  It is important that the Heads of the Security and Intelligence Agencies have access to, and are directly accountable to Ministers, and we have been told that this remains the case. We think it wrong that the performance of the three Agency Heads should be reported on by anyone other than the relevant Minister. (Paragraph 95)

25.  The current Prime Minister takes a keen interest in national security and regularly chairs the NSC. The Government does not see the need for a National Security Minister at present, and we can see the clear advantages to the NSA being an official. However, the Prime Minister's active involvement is a key element of the current arrangements. Were this to change, and were the right person available, the question of appointing a National Security Minister would need to be reconsidered. (Paragraph 99)

26.  We are not convinced that all involved in Government are clear on which Minister is accountable for which elements of the NSS and NSC. It is even harder for those outside Government, including Select Committees, to identify who is accountable. This confusion over responsibility is not indicative of a well functioning organisation and the Government needs to address this. (Paragraph 102)

27.  We accept that the NSC should primarily draw on, and synthesise, the work of other departments, rather than seek to duplicate the analytical capabilities of other departments and agencies. However, the NSC was set up to ensure that things do not fall into the gaps between departments, and in this context we recommend that the NSC should have some resources to undertake its own analytical studies and to commission research from outside Government. It may need to provide alternative viewpoints to those of departments. (Paragraph 109)

28.  Given the timescale of the 2010 NSS, it is perhaps not surprising that the involvement of outside experts was limited. However, given the much longer lead time for the next NSS, we would expect more detailed input throughout the process. (Paragraph 115)

29.  We have concerns about the limited extent to which the NSC has in practice drawn on non-governmental advice. Clearly some good work has been done but we are not convinced it is varied or frequent enough. Given the decision to abolish the National Security Forum, measures must be put in place to ensure that Ministers have regular exposure to advice from outside experts. (Paragraph 116)

30.  We believe that the next NSS should be the product of much wider public debate and an attempt at a political consensus. If (as we have suggested) the next NSS addresses more fundamental questions about the UK's role in the world, and its relationship with the USA, as well as developments in the Eurozone and the potential impact of Scottish independence, then these are questions that the wider public will engage with. The Government will need to start planning for this now. (Paragraph 118)



 
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Prepared 8 March 2012