Conclusions and recommendations
1. It
is significant that the NSS and SDSR were produced in parallel
with the Spending Review—rather than guiding or following
it—and after a review of just five months. (Paragraph 6)
2. We
welcome the Government's decision to produce the SDSR at the same
time as the NSS. In principle, this should allow us to see, alongside
the Strategy, what impact it will have on policy priorities and
resource allocation. (Paragraph 10)
3. We
also welcome the Government's commitment to review the NSS and
SDSR regularly. A five yearly review cycle, as is currently proposed,
seems to us appropriate. However, producing a new Strategy shortly
after a General Election—as this timetable suggests—raises
the danger of a hurried review process, particularly if there
is a change of Government. (Paragraph 11)
4. The
order in which the NSS, SDSR, and CSR are begun is not particularly
significant. What is crucial is that all three are able to influence
each other, in a process which is begun in plenty of time. The
timing of the Election led to the 2010 NSS, SDSR and CSR being
completed in a relatively short timescale, with little consultation.
We urge the Government to plan for a much longer lead time for
the 2015 review. (Paragraph 12)
5. We
welcome the decision of this Government and the last to publish
an NSS. We believe that producing and publishing an NSS can help
to play an important role in identifying likely future threats
to, and opportunities for, the UK. This allows the UK to prepare
for them and, in an era of scarce resources, to prioritise effectively.
This is important to maintaining the security of the country.
(Paragraph 16)
6. We
regret that the Government's unwillingness, to date, to provide
us with all the information we requested about the NSRA, means
that we are not in a position to give the two Houses any assurance
about its adequacy. We urge the Government to reconsider its
position on this. We need this information if we are to do our
job properly, as a Joint Committee tasked with scrutinising the
NSS. (Paragraph 23)
7. We
remain to be convinced of the Government's reasoning for not including
Afghanistan in the NSRA. The Government has said that it is not
including "immediate security issues" but terrorism,
accidents, flooding and cyber attack are included, though they
are all current threats. While the date of troop withdrawal may
be a firm policy, we take the view that Afghanistan and the surrounding
region remain an area of risk for the UK's security and this ought
to be reflected in the NSRA. (Paragraph 24)
8. In
principle, we welcome the development of the NSRA but the Government
must ensure that it does not lead to a false sense of security.
Any forecasting tool, however well designed, is imperfect and
speculative, and the results produced should be treated with caution
and used as a support for, not a substitute for, good judgement.
The NSRA will not always predict the next big problem: resources
must be allocated to continual horizon-scanning, and must be available
to deal with unpredicted risks as they emerge. (Paragraph 25)
9. A
key point of the NSS is to set priorities, and to guide choices
in an era of diminished resources. While such a strategy may contain
aspirational elements it must also be realistic. The NSS simultaneously
recognises the rise of new global powers, shifts in the centres
of economic activity, and reduced resources in the UK, while at
the same time asserting "no reduction in influence".
This is wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term and the
UK needs to plan for a changing, and more partnership-dependent,
role in the world. (Paragraph 30)
10. We
are concerned that the Government has not done enough in the NSS
and SDSR to articulate its concept of what influence is, why it
is needed, or what the most cost-effective way is of achieving
it in different circumstances and regions. The NSS mentions many
different forms of "soft power" but could do more to
spell out the different roles of organisations such as the BBC
World Service and British Council. We believe that greater clarity
over exactly what we are seeking, and why, could enable resources
to be better targeted. (Paragraph 35)
11. We
welcome the idea of an "adaptable posture" in principle.
But in a world in which it was deemed right in principle to intervene
militarily in Libya but not, for instance, in Syria, we would
welcome more clarity on how this principle shaped decisions on
the mix of capabilities to be maintained. We call on the Government
to elaborate on the thinking linking the NSS, the "adaptable
approach" and the capabilities decided upon. (Paragraph 40)
12. We
accept that the NSS is not a "recipe book" which dictates
our response to every event, but we would have expected to have
seen some evidence that it had influenced decisions made since
the SDSR, including the Government's responses to the Arab Spring.
We have found no such evidence. As the NSS states, "a strategy
is only useful if it guides choices"; it is about thinking
in the longer term, and not simply doing what is in the UK's short-term
interest. If the current strategy is not guiding choices then
it needs to be revised. (Paragraph 41)
13. In
the NSS, the Government has started to set out crucial statements
which can guide future policy. However it does not yet present
a clear overarching strategy: a common understanding about the
UK's interests and objectives that guides choices on investment
across government departments, including domestic departments,
as well as guiding operational priorities and crisis response.
Such a strategy must be based on a realistic vision of the UK's
future position in the world. This vision will both shape, and
be shaped, by the UK's interests and objectives. (Paragraph 46)
14. We
are concerned that the NSS's focus on bilateral relations with
large emerging powers—and concomitant investments in diplomatic
and capacity-building activities—should not be at the expense
of strengthening relations with the Commonwealth and with key
regional organisations such as ASEAN, the Arab League and African
Union. (Paragraph 51)
15. We
are concerned that the NSS and SDSR have avoided some of the difficult
questions about alliances. There does not appear to have been
a fundamental assessment of the extent to which the UK can rely
on its allies, and the extent to which it needs the capacity to
operate independently. The SDSR states that "we will maintain
our ability to act alone where we cannot expect others to help".
We call on the Government to set out in response to this report
in what situations it thinks the UK may need to operate alone
and what capabilities they would require. (Paragraph 54)
16. We
recognise that there are limits to what can be said in a public
document. However we believe that the USA's publication of Sustaining
US Global Leadership provides an opportunity to open up a
debate on a number of crucial issues. We call on the Government
to reflect deeply on the long term implications of the geographical
and functional shifts in US policy that are now taking place.
It raises fundamental questions if our pre-eminent defence and
security relationship is with an ally who has interests which
are increasingly divergent from our own. The Government needs
to decide if the UK will continue to be as involved in US military
action as we have been in the past if the US focuses on Asia-Pacific.
If the US is moving towards viewing Europe as a producer rather
than a consumer of security, and reducing its capability to mount
long term stabilisation missions, it raises more questions as
to what we can expect from the US and what the US expects from
the UK. (Paragraph 60)
17. We
are not convinced that the Government gave sufficient attention
in the NSS to the potential risks that future international economic
instability might pose for UK security. These go beyond the UK
being unable to afford to defend itself. International economic
problems could lead to our allies having to make considerable
cuts to their defence spending, and to an increase in economic
migrants between EU member states, and to domestic social or political
unrest. The NSC needs to take all of this into account. (Paragraph
67)
18. We
hope that the problems within the Eurozone can be resolved. However
we believe that, even in 2010, the potential threat to UK security
from a full, or partial, collapse of the Eurozone was one of the
plausible scenarios which a prudent NSRA should have examined.
We call on the NSC to address the potential impacts on the UK
and NATO (and how the Government would respond) were this to happen,
as a matter of urgency. It also needs to examine the long term
strategic impact for the UK of any measures to save the Euro,
such as further Eurozone political integration or the exit of
some states from EU membership. (Paragraph 68)
19. The
fact that the potential impact of Scottish independence was not
brought to the NSC's attention strengthens our concern that the
horizon-scanning carried out on the NSC's behalf is inadequate
and that the NSC's oversight of security issues is not sufficiently
broad and strategic. (Paragraph 71)
20. The
2011 progress report is a relatively uninformative implementation
report on the SDSR. Next year we expect a rounded and insightful
update on both the NSS and the SDSR. It should include a summary
of the main events of the year that were of relevance to national
security, how the UK responded to them, and the longer term strategic
implications. For example this year's report could have included
the problems at the UK Border Agency, the Eurozone crisis (and
the strategic implication of measures to resolve it), an update
on the US-UK joint strategy board, on the Anglo-French alliance,
on Iran, and on commitments in Afghanistan and the adjacent area
after 2015. It should also include a summary of the work of the
NSC that year. The Libya Crisis report, with its identification
of problems faced and lessons learned, provides a good model.
(Paragraph 75)
21. We
welcome the introduction of an NSC to give strategic direction
to the Government's national security agenda, but we are not convinced
that the NSC has successfully maintained its strategic focus.
We are left with the distinct impression that is has been deeply
involved in operations and this may have reduced its ability to
think strategically. (Paragraph 83)
22. We
are concerned that the Cabinet Office was unable to provide us,
either in public or in confidence, with concrete examples of "blue
skies" discussions by the NSC. Coupled with its failure
to discuss the national security implications of either the Eurozone
crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence, it is apparent
that there are major problems in the way that the NSC selects
topics for discussion. (Paragraph 86)
23. We
welcome the appointment of a National Security Adviser, though
we still have questions about the nature of the role, and its
status. We have concerns too that the current and former NSA both
have a FCO background. The Government has assured us that this
has not led to a lack of focus on domestic issues, but this was
not a view that all our witnesses shared. In addition we noted
a lack of military focus in the NSA's Libya Crisis report. We
welcome the Government's commitment that future appointments could
be drawn from a range of Departments and Agencies. We shall be
monitoring this. (Paragraph 92)
24. It
is important that the Heads of the Security and Intelligence Agencies
have access to, and are directly accountable to Ministers, and
we have been told that this remains the case. We think it wrong
that the performance of the three Agency Heads should be reported
on by anyone other than the relevant Minister. (Paragraph 95)
25. The
current Prime Minister takes a keen interest in national security
and regularly chairs the NSC. The Government does not see the
need for a National Security Minister at present, and we can see
the clear advantages to the NSA being an official. However, the
Prime Minister's active involvement is a key element of the current
arrangements. Were this to change, and were the right person available,
the question of appointing a National Security Minister would
need to be reconsidered. (Paragraph 99)
26. We
are not convinced that all involved in Government are clear on
which Minister is accountable for which elements of the NSS and
NSC. It is even harder for those outside Government, including
Select Committees, to identify who is accountable. This confusion
over responsibility is not indicative of a well functioning organisation
and the Government needs to address this. (Paragraph 102)
27. We
accept that the NSC should primarily draw on, and synthesise,
the work of other departments, rather than seek to duplicate the
analytical capabilities of other departments and agencies. However,
the NSC was set up to ensure that things do not fall into the
gaps between departments, and in this context we recommend that
the NSC should have some resources to undertake its own analytical
studies and to commission research from outside Government. It
may need to provide alternative viewpoints to those of departments.
(Paragraph 109)
28. Given
the timescale of the 2010 NSS, it is perhaps not surprising that
the involvement of outside experts was limited. However, given
the much longer lead time for the next NSS, we would expect more
detailed input throughout the process. (Paragraph 115)
29. We
have concerns about the limited extent to which the NSC has in
practice drawn on non-governmental advice. Clearly some good work
has been done but we are not convinced it is varied or frequent
enough. Given the decision to abolish the National Security Forum,
measures must be put in place to ensure that Ministers have regular
exposure to advice from outside experts. (Paragraph 116)
30. We
believe that the next NSS should be the product of much wider
public debate and an attempt at a political consensus. If (as
we have suggested) the next NSS addresses more fundamental questions
about the UK's role in the world, and its relationship with the
USA, as well as developments in the Eurozone and the potential
impact of Scottish independence, then these are questions that
the wider public will engage with. The Government will need to
start planning for this now. (Paragraph 118)
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