3 Does the Order remove the incompatibility?
Introduction
46. If Parliament is satisfied that the Government
has demonstrated both the need for a counter-terrorism power to
stop and search without reasonable suspicion and the need for
such a power to be introduced with immediate effect, the next
question is whether the Order, as introduced, removes the incompatibility
identified by the European Court of Human Rights in Gillan.
47. The incompatibility found by the Court, it will
be recalled, was that the current counter-terrorism powers to
stop and search without reasonable suspicion were in breach of
the right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR because
they are "neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject
to adequate legal safeguards against abuse."
48. The Remedial Order introduces a replacement power
to stop and search which is still exercisable without reasonable
suspicion, but is only available in more circumscribed circumstances
and subject to stronger safeguards.
(1) Is a power to stop and search
without suspicion inherently incompatible with Article 8 ECHR?
49. The first compatibility issue raised by the Remedial
Order is whether a power to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion is inherently incompatible with the Convention, because
the lack of any requirement for reasonable suspicion renders selection
for stop and search arbitrary and invites discrimination in the
exercise of the power.
50. The EHRC included with its submission a legal
opinion it has obtained from Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Aileen
McColgan as to the human rights compatibility of the replacement
stop and search power contained in the equivalent provisions of
the Protection of Freedoms Bill. Singh and McColgan advise that,
although the replacement power is an improvement on the current
law, the inherently arbitrary nature of stop and search without
the need for reasonable suspicion is irredeemably incompatible
with Article 8. In their view, nothing short of a requirement
of reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer selecting for
stop and search can provide a sufficient legal basis for interferences
with the right to respect for private life in Article 8. The absence
of such a requirement renders selection for stop and search arbitrary.
As well as failing to remedy the incompatibility identified in
Gillan, it is also, in Singh and McColgan's view, inherently
incompatible with the right to liberty in Article 5 ECHR (since
stopping and searching involves a deprivation of liberty for the
duration of the stop and search); is likely to give rise to breaches
in practice of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful
protest in Articles 10 and 11 ECHR where the power is used against
protestors, as it was in Gillan itself; and is likely to
lead to discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights in
breach of Article 14 ECHR because by authorising arbitrary stop
and search it invites discrimination in the selection of individuals
against whom to use the power.
51. Human Rights Watch, in its submission, also takes
the view that a power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion
is "fundamentally flawed" and, even with the best guidance
to officers as to how to exercise the power, cannot be rendered
compatible with Convention rights because of the irreducible arbitrariness
of the selection of individuals to subject to the power. In Human
Rights Watch's view, the only human rights compatible power to
stop and search is one which requires reasonable suspicion. On
this view, the Order fails to remove the incompatibility identified
in Gillan and either should not be approved or should be
modified to include a requirement of reasonable suspicion.
52. The EHRC itself, however, does not appear to
share this view that a power to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion is inherently incompatible with Article 8 and other
Convention rights. In its submission, it "recognises that
there may be very exceptional circumstances in which it is necessary
for there to be a power to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion [...] for instance to prevent a real and immediate act
of terrorism or to search for perpetrators or weapons following
a serious incident." The question for the EHRC, rather, is
whether the restrictions on the scope of the power are sufficiently
tightly defined and the safeguards against its misuse robust enough
to ensure that the power is only used in those very exceptional
circumstances when it is absolutely necessary.
53. The NIHRC, the IPCC, JUSTICE and Liberty all
appear to take a similar position to the EHRC, accepting in principle
that a power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion may
be necessary in exceptional circumstances and focusing on the
definition of the power in the Order and the adequacy of the safeguards
provided in order to make sure that it is exercised compatibly
with Convention rights.
54. We do not consider that a power to stop and search
without reasonable suspicion is inherently incompatible with Article
8 ECHR, as well as Articles 5, 10, 11 and 14, because of its inherent
arbitrariness. Although we see considerable force in the argument
that the lack of a requirement of reasonable suspicion gives rise
to a serious risk that the power will be exercised in breach of
those rights, because there is an irreducible element of arbitrariness
in the exercise of the power, in our view it is not clear from
the Gillan judgment that the European Court of Human Rights
goes this far. In particular, if the Court in that case had considered
that the lack of a requirement of reasonable suspicion was of
itself fatal to the compatibility of the power, it would not have
been necessary to conduct the detailed analysis of the practical
effectiveness of the limitations on the scope of the power and
the adequacy of the safeguards against its misuse.
55. In our view,
a very tightly circumscribed power with sufficiently robust safeguards
against abuse is not inherently incompatible with Convention rights,
provided its definition and safeguards ensure that it is confined
to the exceptional circumstances in which such a power is shown
to be needed in order to prevent a real and immediate risk of
terrorist attack.
56. The main questions for our consideration are
therefore whether in the Order as currently drafted the replacement
power is sufficiently tightly defined and the safeguards sufficiently
robust to prevent the abuse or arbitrary use of the power in practice.
(2) The Definition of the Replacement
Power
57. We have considered whether the replacement power
to stop and search without reasonable suspicion is sufficiently
tightly circumscribed as defined in the Order, or whether the
Order should be modified to constrain further the discretion left
both to authorising officers and to those exercising the power
to stop and search.
58. The Government argues that the definition of
the replacement power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion
addresses the criticisms made in the Gillan judgment about
the breadth of the discretion given by the current law to both
the authorising officer and the individual officer exercising
the power to stop and search. It points in particular to the following
features of the replacement power which, it argues, ensure that
the discretion conferred by the Order is "appropriately constrained":
- An authorisation may only be
given when a senior officer reasonably suspects that an act of
terrorism will take place and the senior officer considers that
it is necessary to prevent such an act (this is considerably higher
than the "expediency" test in section 44);
- An authorisation may last for a period no longer
than the senior officer considers necessary and for a maximum
of 14 days (as opposed to a 28-day maximum under section 46(2)
of the 2000 Act);
- An authorisation may cover an area or place no
greater than the senior officer considers necessary;
- The Secretary of State may substitute an earlier
date or time for the expiry of an authorisation when confirming
an authorisation;
- The Secretary of State may substitute the area
or place authorised for a more restricted area or place when confirming
an authorisation;
- A senior police officer may substitute an earlier
time or date or a more restricted area or place, or may cancel
an authorisation;
- An officer exercising the stop and search powers
may only do so for the purpose of searching for evidence that
the person concerned is a terrorist (within the meaning of section
40(1)(b) of the 2000 Act) or that the vehicle concerned is being
use for the purposes of terrorism (as opposed to the purpose under
section 45(1) of searching for articles of a kind which could
be used in connection with terrorism);
- Officers (in both authorising and using the powers)
must have regard to a statutory Code of Practice which further
constrains the use of those powers.
59. The replacement power is defined in a way which
does meet a number of the criticisms made by the Court in Gillan
concerning the breadth of the discretion left to both the authorising
officer and the individual officer exercising the power. This
is acknowledged in the representations of the EHRC, the NIHRC,
the IPCC, JUSTICE, Liberty and Human Rights Watch, as well as
in the Legal Opinion of Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Aileen
McColgan. Many of these representations, however, argue that there
is scope to define the power more tightly and that this ought
to be done in order to make it more likely that the power will
be exercised compatibly with the right to respect for private
life and other Convention rights.
60. We have considered four main ways in which the
scope of the power could be more tightly defined.
(a) Objective grounds for authorising officer's
view of necessity
61. The European Court of Human Rights was critical
of the fact that the statutory test for the giving of authorisations
by the senior police officer was one of "expediency"
rather than "necessity".[38]
This meant that there is no requirement of any assessment of the
proportionality of the measure. The Order provides that an authorisation
can be given if the authorising officer "reasonably suspects
that an act of terrorism will take place"[39]
and "considers" that the authorisation is necessary
to prevent such an act, the specified area or place is no greater
than is necessary to prevent such an act and the duration of the
authorisation is no longer than is necessary to prevent such an
act.[40]
62. We welcome the definition of the first part of
the test for authorisations: reasonable suspicion that an act
of terrorism will take place is, as the Metropolitan Police point
out in their evidence, "a fundamental increase in the threshold."
We accept the Home Office's explanation for preferring "reasonable
suspicion" to "reasonable belief": to ensure that
the right balance is struck between the powers being significantly
circumscribed and the powers still being useful.[41]
The threshold of reasonable suspicion, rather than belief, reflects
the reality that authorising officers will usually be acting on
the basis of intelligence information which cannot necessarily
be immediately corroborated but may need to be acted upon. On
the other hand, the powers can only be authorised where there
is reasonable suspicion that an act of terrorism "will"
take place, rather than "may" take place, which is designed
to ensure that the powers are only authorised in response to an
immediate threat. We also welcome the fact that the Code of Practice
makes clear that the authorising officer's reasonable suspicion
must relate to a particular act of terrorism rather than be based
on a generic assessment that an act of terrorism is likely. We
also note with interest the fact that as of 13 May 2011 the Metropolitan
Police had not considered it appropriate to use the replacement
power to stop and search "as the MPS have not been presented
with sufficient intelligence to reach the threshold necessary
to support the use of an authority."[42]
The fact that this period included the Royal Wedding confirms
to us that the threshold in the Order is indeed significantly
higher than in the previous legislation that it replaces.
63. However, there is no express requirement in the
Order that the authorising officer's views as to necessity be
"reasonable" and therefore have an objective basis:
on the face of the Order, the authorising officer's subjective
view as to necessity (however unreasonable) would therefore be
sufficient.
64. The Code of Practice provides authorising officers
with detailed guidance as to how to apply the new statutory test
for making an authorisation, including, for example, guidance
that the consideration of necessity by the authorising officer
must involve an assessment of why other measures, such as reasonable
suspicion stop and search powers, are not sufficient to address
the threat.[43] The Code
of Practice also gives guidance on the information which should
be provided by the authorising officer to the Secretary of State,
including an explanation of why the use of the authorisation powers
is considered an appropriate and necessary response to the circumstances
and why other measures are regarded as inadequate.[44]
However, while the Order contains an express requirement that
a constable must have regard to the Code when exercising any powers
to which the Code relates,[45]
and that a failure to do so can be taken into account by a court
or tribunal, there is no equivalent provision requiring authorising
officers to have regard to the Code when issuing authorisations.
65. The EHRC welcomes the introduction of the reasonable
suspicion requirement on the authorising officer and the provisions
in the Code of Practice requiring an explanation as to why the
powers are felt appropriate and necessary and why other measures
are regarded as inadequate. However, they argue that there would
be better checks on the use of the power if the Code of Practice
provision were on the face of the Order and if there were also
an express requirement that the authorising officer have a reasonable
belief as to the necessity of the authorisation to prevent an
act of terrorism and the necessity of its geographical scope and
duration. Singh and McColgan similarly argue that a requirement
for objective reasonableness as regards the senior police officer's
view as to the necessity for the authorisation (its geographical
and temporal extent, etc.) would facilitate subsequent legal challenge:
"in the absence of such a requirement it is difficult to
see what judicial control could apply after the fact."
66. JUSTICE, however, disagree, considering it unnecessary
to introduce an additional requirement of reasonable belief, because
"the courts would likely read in such a requirement in any
event, as a matter of public law reasonableness if not compatibility
with Article 8 ECHR."
67. We consider
that expressly requiring that the authorising officer's view of
necessity be reasonable, and that those reasons be given, will
both concentrate minds and facilitate effective judicial control
of the authorisation process. We therefore recommend that the
Order should be modified so as to include express requirements
on the face of the Order that the authorising officer:
(i) have a "reasonable belief"
as to the necessity of the three matters specified in new s. 47A(1)(b)(i)-(iii)
Terrorism Act 2000; and
(ii) provide an explanation to the
Secretary of State (or to the court if the Order is amended to
provide for prior judicial authorisation[46])
as to why the powers are necessary and appropriate and why other
measures are regarded as inadequate.
(b) Geographical area
68. The Court in Gillan was critical of the
potential geographical width of authorisations to stop and search
without reasonable suspicion. Under the replacement power the
geographical area of an authorisation must be no greater than
the authorising officer considers necessary to prevent an act
of terrorism.
69. The Code of Practice makes clear that any authorisations
must be "as limited as possible" and the area authorised
should be "no wider than necessary". It also makes clear
that Force-wide authorisations are not justifiable (other than
in respect of the City of London Police force, which covers the
square mile of the City of London).
70. A number of representations received argued that
absolute geographical limitations on the face of the Order would
reduce the risk of the power being used arbitrarily. JUSTICE,
for example, suggested that it may be desirable to include a maximum
limit of no more than five square kilometres. The EHRC suggested
a limit of no more than one square mile.
71. We have
given careful consideration to whether the geographical area or
place to which an authorization applies should be more specifically
defined on the face of the Order and, if so, what that limit should
be. We have concluded that the combination of the tighter definitions
and stronger safeguards that we are recommending, together with
the clear guidance in the Code of Practice, makes it unnecessary
to define a geographical limit on the face of the Order.
(c) Duration
72. The Order provides that authorisations may last
for no longer than the authorising officer considers necessary
to prevent an act of terrorism and for a maximum of 14 days (compared
to 28 days under the current law).
73. Some representations we received also argued
that stricter temporal limitations on the face of the Order would
make it more likely that the power to stop and search without
reasonable suspicion would in practice be exercised compatibly
with the right to respect for private life and other Convention
rights. The EHRC, for example, argued that authorisations should
be subject to a maximum duration of 48 hours, with any longer
period requiring judicial authorisation. JUSTICE, on the other
hand, considered the 14 day limit to be sufficient, but only on
the basis that authorisations are made by courts (see below).
74. We welcome
the stricter limit on the duration of an authorisation under the
Order. We think that the power to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion should be a wholly exceptional power which is only available
where there is an imminent threat of terrorist attack, and this
requires the duration of an authorisation to be as short as possible.
We have therefore considered whether the duration of an authorization
should be even more strictly defined in the Order, but we do not
consider this to be necessary if our recommendation below concerning
the renewal of authorisations is accepted.
(d) Renewal of authorizations
75. The Court in Gillan was critical of the
fact that "rolling authorisations" were possible under
the 2000 Act, and that such a rolling authorisation had been in
place in respect of the Metropolitan Police area since the powers
had come into force.
76. The provisions in the Remedial Order permit the
renewal of authorisations.[47]
The Code of Practice states that rolling authorisations are not
permitted under the new powers, but that a new authorisation covering
the same or substantially the same area or place "may be
given if the intelligence which informed the initial authorisation
has been subject to fresh assessment and the officer giving the
authorisation is satisfied that the test for authorisation is
still met on the basis of that assessment."[48]
Human Rights Watch argue that these provisions in the Code are
not sufficient to avoid rolling authorisations. The EHRC suggest
that the Order should specify a limit as to the number of authorisations
that can be made consecutively in relation to the same place without
new evidence, and JUSTICE favour the Order expressly preventing
the giving of a new authorisation other than on the basis of new
or additional information.
77. The Home Office points out that the Code of Practice
makes clear that rolling authorisations of the kind made by some
forces under the old s. 44 powers, where some geographical areas
are repeatedly covered by authorisations based on the same information,
are not permitted. It opposes a prohibition on renewal of authorisations,
because this would mean that it would not be possible to authorise
the powers in an area previously covered, even where the existing
intelligence had been reassessed and remained current and credible.
78. We accept that a total prohibition on the renewal
of an authorisation would not be desirable, but we note that there
is nothing on the face of the Order to prevent rolling renewals
and the mere assertion that these are not permitted by the Code
of Practice cannot have that effect in the absence of some statutory
words to that effect.
79. We recommend that the Order should be modified
so as expressly to prevent the giving of a new authorization other
than on the basis of new or additional information or a reassessment
of existing intelligence that the threat remains immediate and
credible.
(3) Adequacy of the Safeguards
against Abuse
80. We received a number of representations in favour
of increasing the legal safeguards against possible abuse or arbitrary
use of the replacement power to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion.
(a) Prior judicial authorisation
81. The Court in Gillan was concerned about
the adequacy of the provision in the legal framework for review
of authorisations. It was particularly concerned by the limited
review powers of the Secretary of State and lack of opportunity
for effective judicial scrutiny of the powers.
82. In their written evidence, JUSTICE and the EHRC
argued forcefully for prior judicial authorisation of the availability
of the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion.
In the EHRC's view, this would increase the likelihood of robust
and independent scrutiny of the necessity for authorisations and
so make it more likely that authorisations would only be made
when strictly necessary. In JUSTICE's view, the power is unlikely
to be compatible with Article 8 in the absence of such prior judicial
authorisation. Although it welcomes the additional safeguards
in the Order as genuine improvements on the present position,
it considers that they are not in themselves enough to ensure
compatibility with Article 8 ECHR. It considers that the case
for confirmation being made by a judge rather than a government
minister is overwhelming, and recommends that the authorisation
power in the Order be amended to require police authorisations
to be approved by a High Court judge.
83. The Metropolitan Police, on the other hand, "cannot
see a case for [prior judicial authorisation] as the current process
has a significant level of oversight already as the application
passes from the Assistant Commissioner to the Home Secretary and
is scrutinised at each level."[49]
The police regard prior judicial oversight as "adding an
additional level of bureaucracy" and "an additional
administrative phase." They point out that this is likely
to be "in the midst of what may be a testing scenario"
and suggest that the person exercising the judicial oversight
would have to be vetted to the highest level and have access to
the full intelligence picture, "in addition to a background
of operational experience to make what, in effect, is an operational
decision." The police do not however, rule out the possibility
of prior independent oversight, but say any proposal for it would
need to be looked at very closely, and suggest as a possible alternative
model independent oversight by a commissioner, similar to the
role performed by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners.
84. The Home Office says that the review of counter-terrorism
and security powers considered judicial authorisation of the use
of the new stop and search powers and decided that it was not
appropriate, because it blurs the lines between the executive
and judiciary. The Government should be responsible for national
security decisions, and the judiciary for reviewing such decisions.
85. We understand why, from the police's perspective,
having to obtain prior authorisation of the availability of certain
counter-terrorism powers from an external, independent decision-maker
will seem like, at best, the addition of an unnecessary layer
of bureaucracy and, at worst, a distraction from dealing with
urgent operational demands. We also understand concerns about
the capacity of the independent overseer to understand and appreciate
those operational demands. In our view, however, it is important
not to lose sight of the fact that a power to stop and search
without reasonable suspicion is a wholly exceptional power, the
exercise of which can only be justified in the narrowest of circumstances.
As Lord Bingham observed in the House of Lords in Gillan,[50]
"It is an old and cherished tradition of our
country that everyone should be free to go about their business
in the streets of the land, confident that they will not be stopped
and searched by the police unless reasonably suspected of having
committed a criminal offence. So jealously has this tradition
been guarded that it has almost become a constitutional principle.
[...] [A]ny departure from the ordinary rule calls for careful
scrutiny".
86. We think it is right that the legal regime which
makes this power available to be exercised in such exceptional
circumstances should include a requirement of prior judicial authorisation.
We do not regard this as blurring the lines between the executive
and the judiciary as the Home Office suggests. Rather, it would
guarantee independent scrutiny of the justification for making
such an exceptional power available, and as such would be a crucial
safeguard against the power being used in practice in wider circumstances
that Parliament intended. Given the history of the operation in
practice of the previous power in s. 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000,
we regard prior judicial authorisation as an indispensible safeguard.
We are pleased to see that the Metropolitan Police is not in principle
opposed to some system of prior independent scrutiny of authorisations.
We are confident that High Court judges can perform this important
role, and that an urgent procedure can be devised to deal with
genuine emergencies, whereby a police authorisation can have immediate
effect, subject to judicial confirmation within 48 hours.
87. We recommend
that the Order should be modified so as to provide for prior judicial
(as opposed to executive) authorization of the availability of
the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion, with
an urgent procedure for police authorization subject to judicial
authorization within 48 hours.
(b) Strengthening the Code of Practice
88. We welcome the fact that the Code of Practice
accompanying the replacement power does expressly prohibit the
selection of people for stop and search on grounds of ethnicity,
except where the characteristic forms part of the description
of a particular suspect.[51]
89. However, we note that while the IPCC welcomed
many of the safeguards in the Code of Practice, it was concerned
about the absence of a requirement to record a person's name and
description of the person or vehicle being searched, because this
may make it harder to monitor effectively the use of stop and
search powers and thereby safeguard against their misuse. We also
note that while constables exercising the power to stop and search
without reasonable suspicion are obliged to comply with the Code
of Practice, authorising officers are not.
90. We recommend
that the Code of Practice should contain stronger recording requirements
in order to facilitate monitoring and supervision of the use of
the replacement power to stop and search without suspicion. We
also recommend that the authorising officer should be obliged
to comply with the Code of Practice, as well as the individual
officers exercising the power to stop and search.
(c) Public notification of authorisations
91. Authorisations made under the replacement power
will not be public. The EHRC argues that there should be public
notification when authorisations are made, in order to enable
better public scrutiny of the operation of the powers when they
are made available, and also to facilitate judicial scrutiny.
The Commission also considers that such notification may have
a practical deterrent effect in relation to the risk of terrorist
activities. JUSTICE, on the other hand, consider that advance
public notification would be likely to reduce the operational
effectiveness of authorisations, but sees no reason why they should
not be publicised once the authorisation has ended.
92. We note the importance attached by the police
to this power as a tactic to "disrupt, deter and prevent
terrorism", and its belief that "high visibility, overt
policing tactics have changed behaviour and interfered with the
activity of terrorist subjects."[52]
Use of the power for deterrence purposes would militate in favour
of public notification of authorisations. We also note the comments
of the Metropolitan Police that "the police have already
moved towards a widely publicised version of any authorities,
stops and searches."
93. We see the force of the argument that public
notification of authorisations would facilitate accountability
for the exercise of the power, including ex-post legal accountability
through the courts. In our view, however, the case for public
notification of authorisations is less pressing if authorisations
require prior judicial approval, as we have recommended above.
The case for retrospective publication of an authorisation, however,
following its expiry, remains strong and would facilitate political
accountability for the exercise of the power, including transparent
review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
We recommend that the Order
should be amended to include a requirement that authorisations
be publicly notified when they have expired, so far as consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources.
(d) Role of the Independent Reviewer
94. The Independent Reviewer of terrorism legislation
will have an important role to play in ensuring political accountability
for the exercise of these exceptional powers. Given the history
of the operation of powers to stop and search without reasonable
suspicion, and in particular the impact of such powers on minority
communities, we think it is important that the Independent Reviewer
keep a very close eye on the exercise of the replacement power
in practice, and be free to report to Parliament as and when problems
arise in practice.
95. We recommend
that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation should
have the power to report to Parliament on the exercise of this
power on an ad hoc basis, and not be confined to reporting annually
as part of his report on counter-terrorism powers generally.
(4) Defective drafting
96. The Home Office has pointed out that there is
a defect in the drafting which requires modification of the Order.
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Order (consequential amendments)
provides that "the Code of Practice issued under section
66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 known as Code
A is to have effect as if paragraphs 2.18 to 2.26 of the code
were revoked".
97. This should have read that PACE Code A is to
have effect as if paragraphs 2.18A-2.26 were revoked. Those
paragraphs relate to section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Paragraph
2.18 is the last paragraph in a section of Code A on the stop
and search powers in section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act 1994 and should not have been included.
98. The Secretary of State did not have the vires
to make provision to the effect that Code A is to have effect
as if paragraph 2.18 were revoked as paragraph 2.18 is not incidental,
supplemental or consequential on the substantive provisions in
the remedial order (as it relates to a different stop and search
power).
99. We draw
this defective drafting to the attention of each House and anticipate
that it will be corrected by the Secretary of State modifying
the Order.
38 Gillan, above n. 2, para 80. Back
39
New s. 47A(1)(a) Terrorism Act 2000 as inserted by para 3(1) of
the Remedial Order. Back
40
New s. 47A(1)(b) Terrorism Act 2000. Back
41
Home Office answers to JCHR questions on the Remedial Order repealing
and replacing stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000,
appended to letter from James Brokenshire MP, Parliamentary Under
Secretary for Crime and Security, 19 May 2011, Ev 40-43. Back
42
Letter from Assistant Commissioner Yates, 13 May 2011, Ev 37-40. Back
43
Code of Practice, paras 3.1.1-3.1.12. Back
44
Code of Practice, paras 3.2.1-3.2.7. Back
45
New s. 47C Terrorism Act 2000 as inserted by para. 4 of the Remedial
Order. Back
46
See further below, paras 81-87. Back
47
New Schedule 6B to the Terrorism Act 2000, para 11, as inserted
by Schedule 1 to the Remedial Order. Back
48
Code of Practice, para 3.3.2. Back
49
Letter from Assistant Commissioner Yates, 13 May 2011, Ev 37-40. Back
50
[2006] UKHL 12 at para 1. Back
51
Code of Practice, paras 4.3.1-4.3.7. Back
52
Letter to the Chair from Assistant Commissioner Yates, 13 May
2011, Ev 37-40. Back
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