2 Human rights and extradition
28. In this chapter we consider the effectiveness
of the requirement for a judge to consider whether extradition
of a requested person would be compatible with that person's human
rights. Section 21 (category 1 territories) and 87 (category 2
territories) of the Extradition Act 2003 sets out this requirement:
"21 Human rights
(1)If the judge is required to proceed under this
section (by virtue of section 11 or 20) he must decide whether
the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention
rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)."
If a judge decides that surrender would result in
a breach of human rights as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998,
the extradition request will be refused.
29. The articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) that are most often engaged by extradition cases
- Article 3, prohibition of torture,
or inhuman or degrading treatment.
- Article 5, right to liberty and security.
- Article 6, right to a fair trial.
- Article 8, right to respect for private and family
- Article 14, prohibition of discrimination.
30. Article 3 is an absolute, non-derogable right.
Articles 5 and 6 are rights
which are qualified only in times of war or a public emergency
when they may be subject to limited derogation. Article 8 is a
qualified right which allows for some interference where it is
in accordance with the law and proportionate to a legitimate aim.
Article 14 can only be invoked in conjunction with another Convention
Human Rights case law
31. Courts in the United Kingdom are subject to a
strong interpretative obligation to construe Part 1 of the Extradition
Act 2003 in a manner that removes the complexity and potential
for delay inherent in previous extradition procedures.
In Brussels v Cando-Armas, the first Part 1 case to be
considered by the House of Lords, Lord Bingham said that:
"Part 1 of the 2003 Act did not effect a simple
and straightforward transposition, and it did not on the whole
use the language of the Framework Decision. But its interpretation
must be approached on the twin assumptions that Parliament did
not intend the provisions of Part 1 to be inconsistent with the
Framework Decision and that, while Parliament might properly provide
for a greater measure of co-operation by the United Kingdom than
the Decision required, it did not intend to provide for less."
32. The EAW initiative is based on the principle
of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and on mutual trust
between the judicial authorities of EU states. Acknowledging the
importance of this principle, Lord Bingham in Dabas v High
Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain noted that:
"The important underlying assumption of the
Framework Decision is that member states, sharing common values
and recognising common rights, can and should trust the integrity
and fairness of each other's judicial institutions."
33. Although courts are required to consider whether
extradition is compatible with human rights, there has been a
presumption in many decisions that all EU states will comply with
their ECHR obligations. Attempts to resist extradition by reference
to the Human Rights Act 1998 have rarely been successful even
when supported by evidence. In Jaso, Lopez, Hernandez v Central
Criminal Court No 2 Madrid,
one of the grounds of appeal related to fear that suspected terrorists
would be subjected to ill-treatment in prison in breach of Article
3 of the ECHR. The court considered that the substance of this
] to impeach the processes of the Spanish
judicial authorities. What is common to all of these grounds is
a lack of trust in these authorities. If our courts were to accede
to such arguments, they would be defeating the assumption which
underpins the Framework Decision that member states should trust
the integrity and fairness of each other's judicial institutions."
An evidence-based report which concluded that while
ill treatment was not a regular practice in Spain its occurrence
was "more than sporadic and incidental" was insufficient
to establish a case for non-surrender.
34. The EAW system is intended to provide an effective
means of improving the fight against cross-border crime. Facilitating
extradition within the EU is an important public interest. Consequently,
the courts have set a high threshold test for establishing a breach
of human rights. In R (Jan Rot) v Poland 
Mr Justice Mitting noted that:
"Category 1 States can be taken to have accepted
between themselves that conditions of detention and the adequacy
of fairness of criminal justice systems in such states will not
be required to be examined by other states when considering extradition
applications by them. For those reasons, and in my opinion, for
the purposes of Articles 2, 3 and if relevant 8, the treatment
of a person extradited to a Category 1 State which is a signatory
of the Convention is a matter between the individual extradited
and that state, and not between the United Kingdom."
35. Further support for this approach can be found
in Klimas v Lithuania.
The court observed that as a matter of principle:
] when prison conditions in a Convention
category 1 state are raised as an obstacle to extradition, the
district judge need not, save in wholly extraordinary circumstances
in which the constitutional order of the requesting state has
been upsetfor example by a military coup or violent revolutionexamine
the question at all."
36. There is some evidence, however, that the practical
application of the EAW is testing the level of judicial support
for the principle of mutual trust. Recent case-law indicates a
greater willingness to rebut the presumption in favour of surrender.
In Targosinski, R (on the application of) v Judicial Authority
the court considered that it is possible to envisage circumstances
in which a defendant could rebut the presumption. A finding by
the European Court of Human Rights that there had been systemic
violations of the Convention rights of prisoners could therefore
be considered as clear and cogent evidence.
37. It is difficult to challenge extradition on the
grounds of a qualified right such as Article 8, which permits
interference which is proportionate to the legitimate aim of extradition.
In Jaso and others v Central Criminal Court No 2 Madrid,
the court considered whether the interference with a person's
right to respect for family life would be proportionate to the
legitimate aim of honouring an extradition treaty. Lord Justice
Dyson stated that:
"in an extradition case there will have to be
striking and unusual facts to lead to the conclusion that it is
disproportionate to interfere with an extraditee's article 8 rights."
38. Refusing an appeal based on Article 8, the court
in Symeou v Greece
observed that it would take "a very strong case for the interests
which are mutually engaged in the extradition process under the
Framework Decision to be set aside." A similar approach has
been taken when considering an Article 8 appeal against extradition
to a non-EU state. In Norris v Government of the United States
the court considered that a successful appeal must demonstrate
that "the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights
must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance
39. However, in Jansons v Latvia 
an appeal was allowed on Article 8 grounds because it would be
oppressive to order extradition for the theft of two mobile phones
where there was evidence of a substantial risk that the appellant
would commit suicide. In subsequent cases, appeals based on evidence
of mental health problems have been unsuccessful. Similarly, arguments
based on triviality and proportionality generally fail. In Sandru
the appellant had been convicted of killing his neighbour's
chickens in Romania. Refusing his appeal, Lord Justice Elias considered
that refusing extradition on grounds of proportionality would
risk undermining the principle of mutual respect. We also note
the recent decisions of the High Court in Iwinski v Regional
Court in Bydgoszcz, Poland
and Gryncewicz v Polish Judicial Authority
where the Court examined the proportionality of extradition in
relation to the personal circumstances of the extraditee. The
Human Rights Bar was designed to enable this sort of assessment.
Effectiveness of the human rights
bar to extradition in the Extradition Act 2003
40. We asked witnesses whether the human rights bar
set out in Sections 21 and 87 of the Extradition Act 2003 was
effective in protecting the rights of those requested for extradition.
There was no unanimous view on this or on how the bar could be
made more effective.
41. Several witnesses criticised the effectiveness
of the bar and argued that courts had, in practice, been unwilling
to refuse extradition on human rights grounds.
Liberty argued that "in practice the Sections have provided
very little protection to a minimal number of persons."
Sally Ireland, Director of Criminal Justice Policy at JUSTICE,
agreed that courts were "very unwilling to find violations."
This was echoed by Catherine Heard, Head of Policy at Fair Trials
International, who argued that "in practice English courts
seem to be unwilling" to bar extradition on human rights
grounds. Fair Trials
International argued that its casework had shown that "courts
are not proactive enough when alerted to a potential risk of rights
42. Witnesses gave three reasons for the ineffectiveness
of the bar and the unwillingness of judges to refuse extradition
on human rights grounds: the high threshold test established by
the courts, the difficulty experienced by defence lawyers in obtaining
evidence to support a case and the unwillingness of the judiciary
to engage in the political process of extradition. The first issue
is considered from paragraph 45.
43. On the second issue, Jodie Blackstock, Barrister
and Senior Legal Officer, EU Justice and Home Affairs at JUSTICE,
told us that "often extradition defence lawyers are given
instructions by their clients [...] which engage human rights
issues, but they are not given the requisite evidence to prove
those to the standards that our courts expect."
Charlotte Powell, a practising extradition lawyer, also noted
the difficulty "defence lawyers have in trying to locate
evidence to put before the court to substantiate the risk of a
breach of human rights."
We return to this issue and possible solutions in Chapter 3.
44. On the third issue, Liberty argued that "in
practice the sections have provided very little protection to
a minimal number of persons, mostly due to judicial reluctance
to engage in what is seen as the largely diplomatic and political
process which is extradition."
We return to this issue later in this Chapter and in Chapter 5.
The threshold for refusing extradition
on human rights grounds
45. Many witnesses noted the importance of case law
in setting the threshold of the human rights bar to extradition.
The then Minister told us that "the question of the right
level of human rights protections is itself controverted and to
some extent that level is moving. Individual cases give rise to
changes in law."
EXTRADITION WITHIN THE EU
46. There was much discussion of this high threshold
and some witnesses questioned whether the Act provides sufficient
protection for persons subject to extradition.
47. Jodie Blackstock said that "the starting
point of our courts is not to go behind their systems. We have
to have an element of trust in the way that they work."
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Crown Prosecution Service,
Keir Starmer QC, explained that "the approach has been that
the individual can rebut that presumption by clear and cogent
evidence that there will be a breach of his or her human rights."
Jodie Blackstock argued that "had they [the courts] been
looking at prison conditions in the UK, they would apply a more
critical analysis to the evidence that is presented before them."
48. In its submission to the Extradition Review,
the Law Society explained that:
"a higher threshold for establishing a breach
of rights is applied in extradition proceedings than would otherwise
be purely domestic criminal proceedings. UK courts will presume
that parties to the ECHR and other international human rights
agreements will comply with their obligations; particularly so
where the requesting State is an EU Member State."
49. Charlotte Powell noted that the cases of Jan
Rot and Klimas had excluded any possibility of a defendant
in extradition proceedings rebutting the presumption that signatories
of the ECHR would meet their obligations under the Convention.
In the case of Klimas, the judgment suggested that "the
district judge need not, save in wholly extraordinary circumstances
[...] examine the question at all."
The Director of Public Prosecutions agreed that "in the case
of Klimas, it was suggested that the threshold is quite
high. You would have to show that there was some constitutional
defect in the country requesting whereby the human rights would
not be upheldpossibility revolution or constitutional turmoil."
He continued that "I can understand why people would have
been anxious about the higher threshold."
50. Both the Director of Public Prosecutions and
Charlotte Powell noted that a recent authority challenged the
high threshold test established in earlier cases. The DPP explained
that in the case of Targosinski, the judge had said that
if the Strasbourg court had found evidence of systematic human
rights violations in a country, in this case Poland, that "might
be sufficient for clear and cogent" evidence of the risk
of a human rights breach if extradition proceeded. This meant
that "if you can show consistent breaches that have been
found by the Strasbourg court, you are getting close to clear
and cogent evidence of a breach of human rights."
Ms Powell told us that "that is helpful to us as practitioners
because it enables us to be aware that it is possible to use Section
21 of the Extradition Act 2003 to argue that extradition should
be barred on human rights grounds."
51. Fair Trials International and JUSTICE referred
to MSS v Belgium and Greece where the ECtHR had held that:
"the existence of domestic laws and accession
to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental
rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment."
The Court concluded that "any complaint that
expulsion to another country will expose an individual to treatment
prohibited by Article 3 [...] requires close and rigorous scrutiny."
52. Fair Trials International noted a further difficulty
in showing the necessary clear and cogent evidence of the risk
of a breach of rights. It explained many challenges to extradition
on human rights grounds failed as they did not show the risk of
rights infringements "with enough cogency or speficity to
satisfy the judge that the requested individual risks a rights
53. As a result, Fair Trials International considered
that the human rights test made it "almost impossible"
to challenge successfully extradition on Article 6 grounds. They
cited the case of Andrew Symeou:
"The mere theoretical availability of a legal
remedy in the issuing state should not absolve the executing state
of the duty to conduct a proper legal review of the risk of infringement
raised by the requested extradition and to provide the protection
necessary to safeguard those rights, including where necessary
by refusing to extradite."
54. Fair Trials International also cited the case
of Da An Chen who was tried in absentia in Romania without
his knowledge. During his extradition hearing the High Court held
that "as Romania was bound by the ECHR, the provisions of
its domestic law giving its courts a merely discretionary power
to grant a retrial, should be interpreted so as to grant a right
to a retrial" even though expert evidence was provided to
show that Romanian law only granted the right to apply for retrial.
Since his extradition, Da An Chen has been refused a retrial.
Liberty agreed that there was a concerning "tendency for
a judge to assume that an adverse judgment from the ECtHR will
have been rectified by the Member State in question."
55. The recent European Commission report on the
operation of the European Arrest Warrant similarly noted that
"while an individual can have recourse to the European Court
of Human Rights to assert rights [...] this can only be done after
an alleged breach has occurred." It concluded that "this
has not proved to be an effective means of ensuring that signatories
comply with the Convention's standards."
EXTRADITION TO NON-EU TERRITORIES
56. Although category 2 territories are not necessarily
signatories to the ECHR, witnesses suggested that there was still
a presumption that territories with which the UK had extradition
arrangements would respect fundamental rights.
57. Mr David Bermingham told us about his experience
of being extradited to the United States under Part 2 of the Act
(commonly known as the "NatWest Three" case). He said
that "with Article 6 [right to a fair trial], we knew we
were always going to lose because it has long been European jurisprudence
that the standard test that you must meet in order to demonstrate
that your chances of a fair trial are slim is flagrant breach."
His case relied on Article 8 [right to private and family life]:
"what we argued [...] was it was neither necessary
nor proportionate to extradite us because the case not only could
but should have been heard in the UK because all of the facts,
all of the evidence and substantially all of the witnesses were
He concluded that "if we stick with the current
framework of the Extradition Act there are basically no protections
[of human rights]".
58. Mr Bermingham said that the case of Babar Ahmad
demonstrated implicit trust that extradition arrangements with
the US would respect fundamental rights. The judge had found in
this case that:
"the fundamental assumption of good faith on
behalf of the requesting state where the requesting state is one
in which the UK has for many years reposed the confidence not
only of general good relations but also of successive bilateral
treaties consistently honoured, the evidence required to displace
good faith must possess special force."
59. On the other hand, John Hardy QC, an extradition
lawyer, argued in his submission that Part 2 of the Act had worked
well in terms of protection of the rights of requested persons:
"the fact that this Part of the Act works tolerably well
is attested to by the relatively high number of cases, often of
media prominence, which have resulted in the discharge of the
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BAR
60. Several witnesses suggested methods for making
the human rights bar to extradition more effective in protecting
the rights of those subject to extradition.
61. Although Ms Powell welcomed the Targosinki
decision, she considered that this judgment did not go far enough.
She argued that practitioners may wish to point to a wide range
of sources when looking to show the possibility of a breach of
rights. These might include, "other experts in foreign jurisdictions
such as lawyers from the requesting state who may be party to
appeals that are being brought against requesting states that
have not yet got to the European Court of Human Rights."
62. We asked Ms Powell to clarify how she felt the
human rights threshold should be revised. She explained that it
should be amended so that "a person's extradition could be
barred if evidence were to lead the judge to conclude reasonably
that it would give rise to a real risk that that person would
be subject to treatment which is contrary to or unlawful according
to the Human Rights Act 1998."
63. Fair Trials International have proposed an amendment
to the human rights bar in relation to Category 1 states to make
it more effective in protecting rights:
"(6) The person's extradition would not be
compatible with the Convention rights if
(a) there is a real risk that the person, if surrendered,
would be subject to treatment in the category 1 territory that,
if taking place in the United Kingdom, would be an act or omission
made unlawful by section 6 of the 1998 Act;
(b) in relation to the matters giving rise to
the Part 1 warrant, the person has been subject to such treatment
in that territory; or
(c) the person's removal from the United Kingdom
would be incompatible with the Convention rights.
(7) The judge shall not treat a matter set out
in subsection (6) (a) or (b) as established unless there is material
before him on which a court might reasonably so conclude; but
if there is such material before him, he shall treat that matter
as established unless satisfied to the contrary."
64. Fair Trials International considered that this
amendment would ensure that the threshold was not set too high
(as suggested by Ms Powell) and would place the burden of providing
evidential proof of the risk on the requested person. Once the
requested person had shown the risk of interference with a Convention
right, it would be up to the requesting country to justify this
65. JUSTICE agreed that UK courts should consider
reports from organisations such as the Committee for the Prevention
of Torture (CPT): "they should not require evidence (often
impossible to obtain) that, in a state where conditions frequently
breach Article 3, that the person will be sent to a facility where
conditions are similarly poor."
66. Jodie Blackstock was not convinced that it would
be possible to amend the test itself to make it more effective.
Instead she suggested an amendment to Section 21 of the Act, which
requires the courts to look at human right issues from the perspective
of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union. She
suggested that looking at these issues from the perspective of
the Charter instead would lower the threshold required to prove
a violation. In its
submission to the Extradition Review, JUSTICE argued that "the
Charter is a more contemporary and extensive human rights instrument,
which explicitly provides that the ECHR standards should not prevent
the Union providing more extensive protection." It concluded
that by including the Charter within the human rights bar to extradition
"certain standards could be raised within the EU."
67. Liberty suggested that the greater protection
for the human rights of requested persons would not come from
amending the threshold, but from adding further procedural safeguards
into the Act which the judge would be required to consider in
each case: "the technique of having a generalised bar on
human rights grounds is not an adequate substitute for other procedural
We consider the safeguards suggested by witnesses, including particularly
a most appropriate forum and prima facie case requirement,
in Chapter 3 of this Report.
68. Other groups have suggested that there is no
need to amend the threshold. The Director of Public Prosecutions
told us that the threshold had at first been set very high but,
as noted above, recent cases had lowered it. In its submission
to the Extradition Review, the Law Society similarly concluded
that it did not believe that the court's powers need to be strengthened
although the submission called upon courts to "exercise their
inherent abuse jurisdiction where appropriate."
69. John Hardy QC noted that when the Extradition
Bill was before Parliament the prevailing view was that the human
rights "provisions constituted some sort of universal panacea
against injustice and/or unfairness in the scheme and processes
of extradition. In the view of many, they have proved to be anything
but." He continued, however, that in his view:
"the courts have set the bar at the right level
[...] there is a strong presumption that the requesting judicial
authority will honour its Convention rights obligations, and that
presumption can only be displaced by cogent and powerful evidence.
Any student of the jurisprudence of the courts of the United Kingdom
will see this test appropriately applied in the vast majority
He noted that "any extradition scheme will inevitably
produce cases which expose its innate imperfections."
70. As the Extradition Review was in progress when
the then Minister gave oral evidence, she did not comment on the
operation of the threshold beyond noting the importance of case
law in setting the level of the threshold of the human rights
bar and the problems that had been raised by commentators.
71. We have
heard evidence that Sections 21 and 87 of the Extradition Act
2003 do not, in practice, offer adequate human rights protection
for those subject to proceedings and that the courts have set
their interpretation of the threshold too high. We welcome recent
developments that have seen UK courts apply an apparently lower
threshold, as demonstrated in the case of Targosinski v Judicial
Authority of Poland. The defendant should have a realistic opportunity
to rebut the presumption that their human rights will be respected
if extradited to a country which is a signatory to the ECHR or
with which the UK has good relations.
witnesses have suggested that defence lawyers should be able to
call upon a wider range of evidence, including reports of the
Committee on the Prevention of Torture, to illustrate human rights
concerns in the requesting country. The human rights bar would
be more effective if material such as reports of the Committee
on the Prevention of Torture were regarded as relevant evidence.
We find the concerns about the effectiveness of the bar persuasive.
Below we examine the suggested safeguards and specific amendments
to UK extradition policy with a view to improving human rights
Increased judicial involvement
in extradition process
73. Several witnesses commented on the importance
of the role of the judiciary in the extradition process and were
critical of the automatic nature of the extradition process. The
courts were criticised for insufficient scrutiny of extradition
74. Liberty argued that "the flaws of the extradition
system have also been highlighted by numerous judges whose role
in relation to extradition has, in many cases, been confined to
a rubber stamp by the 2003 Act."
The Freedom Association agreed that "the national judiciary's
role in the process is just to rubber stamp the extradition of
a UK citizen, even if it has grave concerns about the case and
about the treatment the citizen will receive."
75. Witnesses were not in favour of involving the
Executive in Part 1 cases or increasing its role in Part 2 and
instead favoured increasing the effectiveness of the role of the
judiciary. We return to the role of the Executive in Chapter 5.
76. Catherine Heard argued that it was important
"to build in sufficient discretion for judges who are dealing
with extradition requests to make sure that certain flexibility
remains in the system to avoid miscarriages of justice in extradition
safeguards and clarification of the human rights bar could ensure
that the judiciary played a role beyond "rubber-stamping"
of requests. Others, including the Law Society as noted above,
have called for the courts to make use of the powers available
77. John Hardy QC agreed that "the virtual extinction
of judicial discretion, and the paring down of the function of
judicial evaluation are inherently unsatisfactory from a common
law perspective." He continued that "in Part 1 cases
[...] the judicial control theoretically envisaged by the Framework
Decision must depend on the capacity of the Act to permit the
proper exercise of judicial decision-making."
78. Witnesses argued that the increasing automaticity
of extradition under both Parts 1 and 2 of the Extradition Act
2003 and the diminished role of the judiciary had reduced human
rights protection when discussing safeguards or the human rights
threshold, but the role of the judiciary is inextricably linked
to both these areas. The human rights threshold and safeguards
are the tools by which the judiciary can ensure that the rights
of those requested for extradition are protected. The
effectiveness of human rights protection would be improved if
judges in extradition cases took a more active role in the extradition
process, through the implementation of safeguards and the use
of the human rights bar to ensure that the role of a judge in
an extradition case is more than only "rubber stamping"
Human rights in deportation cases
compared to extradition cases
79. During the course of our inquiry, we asked witnesses
to compare the human rights protections available in deportation
cases. Charlotte Powell noted that "in an immigration or
a deportation case, I have to concede that the person who is being
sent back is not necessarily wanted for the commission of an offence.
Therefore, there might be a different balancing exercise in the
threshold test which is set."
80. The Director of Public Prosecutions told us that
in deportation cases "there is obviously very extensive scrutiny,
because you are talking about a situation where somebody might
lose their life or be subjected to torture." In extradition
cases "more often you would be dealing with Article 5 on
the right to liberty, Article 6 on fair trials and Article 8.
They are by their nature different rights." He concluded
that you would deal with a deportation case in more detail as
their life is more likely to be at risk than in an extradition
81. The effect of both extradition and deportation
process are the same in that they can both lead to removal from
the UK. However, witnesses have noted fundamental differences:
deportation may be for breach of a condition of entry and unlike
extradition it is not part of the criminal process. We note a
further difference. In many deportation cases, the individual
has been convicted of a criminal offence, whereas in extradition
cases the presumption of innocence still applies (except in cases
where a person is extradited to serve a sentence). The discrepancies
between the standards of human rights protection in extradition
and deportation cases are likely to become more evident, given
the increasing number of successful challenges to deportation
orders under Article 8.
The rights of victims in the
82. A number of different groups of people are affected
by extradition. In this Report, we consider the rights of UK citizens
or residents in the United Kingdom who are accused of crimes overseas
and are requested for extradition. Victims of crime are also affected
by the UK's extradition policy: both those UK citizens or residents
who have been the victim of a crime and the accused is either
resident in, or has absconded to, a foreign jurisdiction and the
victims of crimes in foreign jurisdictions where the accused is
resident in the United Kingdom. We consider the rights of all
victims, in particular those resident in the UK, as well as the
rights of requested persons in the extradition process in this
83. When we discussed this issue with the then Minister
she agreed that "it is not always just the suspect who has
cause for anxiety; it is also the victim." She also
noted that "the interests of justice are certainly
served by both extraditing and facilitating the process under
Through extradition, the accused can be returned to the country
where the crime allegedly took place in order to facilitate the
process of justice, which is in the interests of the victims of
crime. The extradition process has to be effective in order to
ensure that alleged offenders can be returned to the United Kingdom,
as well as protecting the rights of persons requested for extradition
84. We received evidence from an individual who asked
us not to print his name. This individual set out his experience
of the extradition process from the perspective of a victim of
a crime, the alleged perpetrator of which had absconded to another
country. They criticised our inquiry and particularly the Call
for Evidence for not including the rights of victims of crime
or the extradition of persons to the UK to be tried: "there
is a high probability that evidence will be biased heavily towards
issues surrounding export extradition of suspects with little
balance for import extradition of suspects or victims of crime
in both import and export extradition cases."
In response to these comments, Committee staff contacted victims'
organisations in an attempt to receive evidence representing this
point of view but without success. This Report intends to address
these issues as well as the rights of those requested for extradition.
85. We urge
the Government and the Extradition Review Panel, when considering
changes to the extradition process, to take into account the rights
of victims of crime, both in the UK and other countries, as well
as the rights of those subject to extradition. The process of
extradition is important in ensuring that criminals are brought
to justice and there is a need to ensure balance between this
and protecting rights of those subject to extradition.
20 Office of the Kings Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando
Armas  3 WLR 1079; Dabas v High Court of Justice
in Madrid, Spain  UKHR 6 and The Governor of HMP
Wandsworth v Antanas Kinderis  EWHC 998 (Admin); Pulpino
Office of the Kings Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas 
3 WLR 1079. Back
 UKHL 6,  2 AC 31, para 4 Back
 EWHC 2983 (Admin) Back
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the question of torture, 6 February 2004, para 58 Back
 EWHC 1820 (Admin) Back
 EWHC 2076 (Admin) Back
 EWHC 312 (Admin) Back
In Orchowski v Poland application 17885/04, 22 January
2010 the ECtHR concluded that there had been systemic violations
of the Convention rights of prisoners in Polish prisons from 2000
until May 2008. Back
 EWHC 2983 (Admin) Back
 EWHC 897 (Admin) Back
 UKHL 16 Back
 EWHC 1845 (Admin) Back
 EWHC 2879 (Admin) Back
 All DR 116 Back
 All ER 70 Back
Fair Trials International, Liberty, JUSTICE, David Bermingham
and Charlotte Powell all made the point to the Committee that
the human rights bar was ineffective in practice. Back
EXT 6 Back
Q 3 Back
Q 3 Back
EXT 25 Back
Q 3 Back
Q 138 Back
EXT 6 Back
Q 218 Back
Q 3 Back
Q 175 Back
Q 3 Back
Law Society response to the Home Office Extradition Review, March
2011, p.4, available at on the Committee website (www.parliament.uk/jchr) Back
Q 138 Back
Q 175 Back
Q 175 Back
Q 139 Back
EXT 20, EXT 25 Back
EXT 25 Back
EXT 25 Back
EXT 24 Back
COM (2011) 175 Back
Qq 62-3. Back
Q 71 Back
EXT 28 Back
Q 142 Back
Q 143 Back
Fair Trials International submission to the Extradition Review
Panel, 21 December 2010, available at: http://www.fairtrials.net/publications/article/submission_to_the_extradition_review_panel Back
EXT 20 Back
Q 4 Back
JUSTICE Response to the Home Office Extradition Review, January
2011, p. 13, available at: http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/163/Home_Office_Extradition_Review_-JUSTICE_response_jan11.pdf Back
EXT 6 Back
Law Society response to the Home Office Extradition Review, March
2011, p 5 Back
EXT 28 Back
Q 218 Back
EXT 6 Back
EXT 2 Back
Q 15 Back
EXT 28 Back
Qq 144-5 Back
Q 176 Back
Qq 215-6 Back
EXT 3 Back