The Human Rights Implications of UK Extradition Policy - Human Rights Joint Committee Contents

2  Human rights and extradition

28. In this chapter we consider the effectiveness of the requirement for a judge to consider whether extradition of a requested person would be compatible with that person's human rights. Section 21 (category 1 territories) and 87 (category 2 territories) of the Extradition Act 2003 sets out this requirement:

"21 Human rights

(1)If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11 or 20) he must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)."

If a judge decides that surrender would result in a breach of human rights as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998, the extradition request will be refused.

29. The articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that are most often engaged by extradition cases are:

  • Article 3, prohibition of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment.
  • Article 5, right to liberty and security.
  • Article 6, right to a fair trial.
  • Article 8, right to respect for private and family life.
  • Article 14, prohibition of discrimination.

30. Article 3 is an absolute, non-derogable right. Articles 5 and 6 are rights which are qualified only in times of war or a public emergency when they may be subject to limited derogation. Article 8 is a qualified right which allows for some interference where it is in accordance with the law and proportionate to a legitimate aim. Article 14 can only be invoked in conjunction with another Convention right.

Human Rights case law


31. Courts in the United Kingdom are subject to a strong interpretative obligation to construe Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 in a manner that removes the complexity and potential for delay inherent in previous extradition procedures.[20] In Brussels v Cando-Armas, the first Part 1 case to be considered by the House of Lords, Lord Bingham said that:

"Part 1 of the 2003 Act did not effect a simple and straightforward transposition, and it did not on the whole use the language of the Framework Decision. But its interpretation must be approached on the twin assumptions that Parliament did not intend the provisions of Part 1 to be inconsistent with the Framework Decision and that, while Parliament might properly provide for a greater measure of co-operation by the United Kingdom than the Decision required, it did not intend to provide for less."[21]

32. The EAW initiative is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and on mutual trust between the judicial authorities of EU states. Acknowledging the importance of this principle, Lord Bingham in Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain noted that:

"The important underlying assumption of the Framework Decision is that member states, sharing common values and recognising common rights, can and should trust the integrity and fairness of each other's judicial institutions."[22]


33. Although courts are required to consider whether extradition is compatible with human rights, there has been a presumption in many decisions that all EU states will comply with their ECHR obligations. Attempts to resist extradition by reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 have rarely been successful even when supported by evidence. In Jaso, Lopez, Hernandez v Central Criminal Court No 2 Madrid,[23] one of the grounds of appeal related to fear that suspected terrorists would be subjected to ill-treatment in prison in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. The court considered that the substance of this appeal sought:

"[…] to impeach the processes of the Spanish judicial authorities. What is common to all of these grounds is a lack of trust in these authorities. If our courts were to accede to such arguments, they would be defeating the assumption which underpins the Framework Decision that member states should trust the integrity and fairness of each other's judicial institutions."

An evidence-based report which concluded that while ill treatment was not a regular practice in Spain its occurrence was "more than sporadic and incidental" was insufficient to establish a case for non-surrender.[24]

34. The EAW system is intended to provide an effective means of improving the fight against cross-border crime. Facilitating extradition within the EU is an important public interest. Consequently, the courts have set a high threshold test for establishing a breach of human rights. In R (Jan Rot) v Poland [25] Mr Justice Mitting noted that:

"Category 1 States can be taken to have accepted between themselves that conditions of detention and the adequacy of fairness of criminal justice systems in such states will not be required to be examined by other states when considering extradition applications by them. For those reasons, and in my opinion, for the purposes of Articles 2, 3 and if relevant 8, the treatment of a person extradited to a Category 1 State which is a signatory of the Convention is a matter between the individual extradited and that state, and not between the United Kingdom."

35. Further support for this approach can be found in Klimas v Lithuania[26]. The court observed that as a matter of principle:

"[…] when prison conditions in a Convention category 1 state are raised as an obstacle to extradition, the district judge need not, save in wholly extraordinary circumstances in which the constitutional order of the requesting state has been upset—for example by a military coup or violent revolution—examine the question at all."


36. There is some evidence, however, that the practical application of the EAW is testing the level of judicial support for the principle of mutual trust. Recent case-law indicates a greater willingness to rebut the presumption in favour of surrender. In Targosinski, R (on the application of) v Judicial Authority of Poland[27] the court considered that it is possible to envisage circumstances in which a defendant could rebut the presumption. A finding by the European Court of Human Rights that there had been systemic violations of the Convention rights of prisoners could therefore be considered as clear and cogent evidence.[28]

Article 8

37. It is difficult to challenge extradition on the grounds of a qualified right such as Article 8, which permits interference which is proportionate to the legitimate aim of extradition. In Jaso and others v Central Criminal Court No 2 Madrid,[29] the court considered whether the interference with a person's right to respect for family life would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of honouring an extradition treaty. Lord Justice Dyson stated that:

"in an extradition case there will have to be striking and unusual facts to lead to the conclusion that it is disproportionate to interfere with an extraditee's article 8 rights."

38. Refusing an appeal based on Article 8, the court in Symeou v Greece[30] observed that it would take "a very strong case for the interests which are mutually engaged in the extradition process under the Framework Decision to be set aside." A similar approach has been taken when considering an Article 8 appeal against extradition to a non-EU state. In Norris v Government of the United States of America[31], the court considered that a successful appeal must demonstrate that "the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition."

39. However, in Jansons v Latvia [32] an appeal was allowed on Article 8 grounds because it would be oppressive to order extradition for the theft of two mobile phones where there was evidence of a substantial risk that the appellant would commit suicide. In subsequent cases, appeals based on evidence of mental health problems have been unsuccessful. Similarly, arguments based on triviality and proportionality generally fail. In Sandru v Romania[33] the appellant had been convicted of killing his neighbour's chickens in Romania. Refusing his appeal, Lord Justice Elias considered that refusing extradition on grounds of proportionality would risk undermining the principle of mutual respect. We also note the recent decisions of the High Court in Iwinski v Regional Court in Bydgoszcz, Poland[34] and Gryncewicz v Polish Judicial Authority[35] where the Court examined the proportionality of extradition in relation to the personal circumstances of the extraditee. The Human Rights Bar was designed to enable this sort of assessment.

Effectiveness of the human rights bar to extradition in the Extradition Act 2003

40. We asked witnesses whether the human rights bar set out in Sections 21 and 87 of the Extradition Act 2003 was effective in protecting the rights of those requested for extradition. There was no unanimous view on this or on how the bar could be made more effective.

41. Several witnesses criticised the effectiveness of the bar and argued that courts had, in practice, been unwilling to refuse extradition on human rights grounds.[36] Liberty argued that "in practice the Sections have provided very little protection to a minimal number of persons."[37] Sally Ireland, Director of Criminal Justice Policy at JUSTICE, agreed that courts were "very unwilling to find violations."[38] This was echoed by Catherine Heard, Head of Policy at Fair Trials International, who argued that "in practice English courts seem to be unwilling" to bar extradition on human rights grounds.[39] Fair Trials International argued that its casework had shown that "courts are not proactive enough when alerted to a potential risk of rights infringement."[40]

42. Witnesses gave three reasons for the ineffectiveness of the bar and the unwillingness of judges to refuse extradition on human rights grounds: the high threshold test established by the courts, the difficulty experienced by defence lawyers in obtaining evidence to support a case and the unwillingness of the judiciary to engage in the political process of extradition. The first issue is considered from paragraph 45.

43. On the second issue, Jodie Blackstock, Barrister and Senior Legal Officer, EU Justice and Home Affairs at JUSTICE, told us that "often extradition defence lawyers are given instructions by their clients [...] which engage human rights issues, but they are not given the requisite evidence to prove those to the standards that our courts expect."[41] Charlotte Powell, a practising extradition lawyer, also noted the difficulty "defence lawyers have in trying to locate evidence to put before the court to substantiate the risk of a breach of human rights."[42] We return to this issue and possible solutions in Chapter 3.

44. On the third issue, Liberty argued that "in practice the sections have provided very little protection to a minimal number of persons, mostly due to judicial reluctance to engage in what is seen as the largely diplomatic and political process which is extradition."[43] We return to this issue later in this Chapter and in Chapter 5.

The threshold for refusing extradition on human rights grounds

45. Many witnesses noted the importance of case law in setting the threshold of the human rights bar to extradition. The then Minister told us that "the question of the right level of human rights protections is itself controverted and to some extent that level is moving. Individual cases give rise to changes in law."[44]


46. There was much discussion of this high threshold and some witnesses questioned whether the Act provides sufficient protection for persons subject to extradition.

47. Jodie Blackstock said that "the starting point of our courts is not to go behind their systems. We have to have an element of trust in the way that they work."[45] The Director of Public Prosecutions, Crown Prosecution Service, Keir Starmer QC, explained that "the approach has been that the individual can rebut that presumption by clear and cogent evidence that there will be a breach of his or her human rights."[46] Jodie Blackstock argued that "had they [the courts] been looking at prison conditions in the UK, they would apply a more critical analysis to the evidence that is presented before them."[47]

48. In its submission to the Extradition Review, the Law Society explained that:

"a higher threshold for establishing a breach of rights is applied in extradition proceedings than would otherwise be purely domestic criminal proceedings. UK courts will presume that parties to the ECHR and other international human rights agreements will comply with their obligations; particularly so where the requesting State is an EU Member State."[48]

49. Charlotte Powell noted that the cases of Jan Rot and Klimas had excluded any possibility of a defendant in extradition proceedings rebutting the presumption that signatories of the ECHR would meet their obligations under the Convention. In the case of Klimas, the judgment suggested that "the district judge need not, save in wholly extraordinary circumstances [...] examine the question at all."[49] The Director of Public Prosecutions agreed that "in the case of Klimas, it was suggested that the threshold is quite high. You would have to show that there was some constitutional defect in the country requesting whereby the human rights would not be upheld—possibility revolution or constitutional turmoil." He continued that "I can understand why people would have been anxious about the higher threshold."[50]

50. Both the Director of Public Prosecutions and Charlotte Powell noted that a recent authority challenged the high threshold test established in earlier cases. The DPP explained that in the case of Targosinski, the judge had said that if the Strasbourg court had found evidence of systematic human rights violations in a country, in this case Poland, that "might be sufficient for clear and cogent" evidence of the risk of a human rights breach if extradition proceeded. This meant that "if you can show consistent breaches that have been found by the Strasbourg court, you are getting close to clear and cogent evidence of a breach of human rights."[51] Ms Powell told us that "that is helpful to us as practitioners because it enables us to be aware that it is possible to use Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 to argue that extradition should be barred on human rights grounds."[52]

51. Fair Trials International and JUSTICE referred to MSS v Belgium and Greece where the ECtHR had held that:

"the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment."[53]

The Court concluded that "any complaint that expulsion to another country will expose an individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3 [...] requires close and rigorous scrutiny."[54]

52. Fair Trials International noted a further difficulty in showing the necessary clear and cogent evidence of the risk of a breach of rights. It explained many challenges to extradition on human rights grounds failed as they did not show the risk of rights infringements "with enough cogency or speficity to satisfy the judge that the requested individual risks a rights infringement."[55]

53. As a result, Fair Trials International considered that the human rights test made it "almost impossible" to challenge successfully extradition on Article 6 grounds. They cited the case of Andrew Symeou:

"The mere theoretical availability of a legal remedy in the issuing state should not absolve the executing state of the duty to conduct a proper legal review of the risk of infringement raised by the requested extradition and to provide the protection necessary to safeguard those rights, including where necessary by refusing to extradite."[56]

54. Fair Trials International also cited the case of Da An Chen who was tried in absentia in Romania without his knowledge. During his extradition hearing the High Court held that "as Romania was bound by the ECHR, the provisions of its domestic law giving its courts a merely discretionary power to grant a retrial, should be interpreted so as to grant a right to a retrial" even though expert evidence was provided to show that Romanian law only granted the right to apply for retrial. Since his extradition, Da An Chen has been refused a retrial.[57] Liberty agreed that there was a concerning "tendency for a judge to assume that an adverse judgment from the ECtHR will have been rectified by the Member State in question."[58]

55. The recent European Commission report on the operation of the European Arrest Warrant similarly noted that "while an individual can have recourse to the European Court of Human Rights to assert rights [...] this can only be done after an alleged breach has occurred." It concluded that "this has not proved to be an effective means of ensuring that signatories comply with the Convention's standards."[59]


56. Although category 2 territories are not necessarily signatories to the ECHR, witnesses suggested that there was still a presumption that territories with which the UK had extradition arrangements would respect fundamental rights.

57. Mr David Bermingham told us about his experience of being extradited to the United States under Part 2 of the Act (commonly known as the "NatWest Three" case). He said that "with Article 6 [right to a fair trial], we knew we were always going to lose because it has long been European jurisprudence that the standard test that you must meet in order to demonstrate that your chances of a fair trial are slim is flagrant breach." His case relied on Article 8 [right to private and family life]:

"what we argued [...] was it was neither necessary nor proportionate to extradite us because the case not only could but should have been heard in the UK because all of the facts, all of the evidence and substantially all of the witnesses were here."

He concluded that "if we stick with the current framework of the Extradition Act there are basically no protections [of human rights]".[60]

58. Mr Bermingham said that the case of Babar Ahmad demonstrated implicit trust that extradition arrangements with the US would respect fundamental rights. The judge had found in this case that:

"the fundamental assumption of good faith on behalf of the requesting state where the requesting state is one in which the UK has for many years reposed the confidence not only of general good relations but also of successive bilateral treaties consistently honoured, the evidence required to displace good faith must possess special force."[61]

59. On the other hand, John Hardy QC, an extradition lawyer, argued in his submission that Part 2 of the Act had worked well in terms of protection of the rights of requested persons: "the fact that this Part of the Act works tolerably well is attested to by the relatively high number of cases, often of media prominence, which have resulted in the discharge of the person sought."[62]


60. Several witnesses suggested methods for making the human rights bar to extradition more effective in protecting the rights of those subject to extradition.

61. Although Ms Powell welcomed the Targosinki decision, she considered that this judgment did not go far enough. She argued that practitioners may wish to point to a wide range of sources when looking to show the possibility of a breach of rights. These might include, "other experts in foreign jurisdictions such as lawyers from the requesting state who may be party to appeals that are being brought against requesting states that have not yet got to the European Court of Human Rights."[63]

62. We asked Ms Powell to clarify how she felt the human rights threshold should be revised. She explained that it should be amended so that "a person's extradition could be barred if evidence were to lead the judge to conclude reasonably that it would give rise to a real risk that that person would be subject to treatment which is contrary to or unlawful according to the Human Rights Act 1998."[64]

63. Fair Trials International have proposed an amendment to the human rights bar in relation to Category 1 states to make it more effective in protecting rights:

"(6) The person's extradition would not be compatible with the Convention rights if—

(a) there is a real risk that the person, if surrendered, would be subject to treatment in the category 1 territory that, if taking place in the United Kingdom, would be an act or omission made unlawful by section 6 of the 1998 Act;

(b) in relation to the matters giving rise to the Part 1 warrant, the person has been subject to such treatment in that territory; or

(c) the person's removal from the United Kingdom would be incompatible with the Convention rights.

(7) The judge shall not treat a matter set out in subsection (6) (a) or (b) as established unless there is material before him on which a court might reasonably so conclude; but if there is such material before him, he shall treat that matter as established unless satisfied to the contrary."[65]

64. Fair Trials International considered that this amendment would ensure that the threshold was not set too high (as suggested by Ms Powell) and would place the burden of providing evidential proof of the risk on the requested person. Once the requested person had shown the risk of interference with a Convention right, it would be up to the requesting country to justify this interference.

65. JUSTICE agreed that UK courts should consider reports from organisations such as the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT): "they should not require evidence (often impossible to obtain) that, in a state where conditions frequently breach Article 3, that the person will be sent to a facility where conditions are similarly poor."[66]

66. Jodie Blackstock was not convinced that it would be possible to amend the test itself to make it more effective. Instead she suggested an amendment to Section 21 of the Act, which requires the courts to look at human right issues from the perspective of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union. She suggested that looking at these issues from the perspective of the Charter instead would lower the threshold required to prove a violation.[67] In its submission to the Extradition Review, JUSTICE argued that "the Charter is a more contemporary and extensive human rights instrument, which explicitly provides that the ECHR standards should not prevent the Union providing more extensive protection." It concluded that by including the Charter within the human rights bar to extradition "certain standards could be raised within the EU."[68]

67. Liberty suggested that the greater protection for the human rights of requested persons would not come from amending the threshold, but from adding further procedural safeguards into the Act which the judge would be required to consider in each case: "the technique of having a generalised bar on human rights grounds is not an adequate substitute for other procedural legislative protections."[69] We consider the safeguards suggested by witnesses, including particularly a most appropriate forum and prima facie case requirement, in Chapter 3 of this Report.

68. Other groups have suggested that there is no need to amend the threshold. The Director of Public Prosecutions told us that the threshold had at first been set very high but, as noted above, recent cases had lowered it. In its submission to the Extradition Review, the Law Society similarly concluded that it did not believe that the court's powers need to be strengthened although the submission called upon courts to "exercise their inherent abuse jurisdiction where appropriate."[70]

69. John Hardy QC noted that when the Extradition Bill was before Parliament the prevailing view was that the human rights "provisions constituted some sort of universal panacea against injustice and/or unfairness in the scheme and processes of extradition. In the view of many, they have proved to be anything but." He continued, however, that in his view:

"the courts have set the bar at the right level [...] there is a strong presumption that the requesting judicial authority will honour its Convention rights obligations, and that presumption can only be displaced by cogent and powerful evidence. Any student of the jurisprudence of the courts of the United Kingdom will see this test appropriately applied in the vast majority of cases."

He noted that "any extradition scheme will inevitably produce cases which expose its innate imperfections."[71]

70. As the Extradition Review was in progress when the then Minister gave oral evidence, she did not comment on the operation of the threshold beyond noting the importance of case law in setting the level of the threshold of the human rights bar and the problems that had been raised by commentators.[72]

71. We have heard evidence that Sections 21 and 87 of the Extradition Act 2003 do not, in practice, offer adequate human rights protection for those subject to proceedings and that the courts have set their interpretation of the threshold too high. We welcome recent developments that have seen UK courts apply an apparently lower threshold, as demonstrated in the case of Targosinski v Judicial Authority of Poland. The defendant should have a realistic opportunity to rebut the presumption that their human rights will be respected if extradited to a country which is a signatory to the ECHR or with which the UK has good relations.

72. Several witnesses have suggested that defence lawyers should be able to call upon a wider range of evidence, including reports of the Committee on the Prevention of Torture, to illustrate human rights concerns in the requesting country. The human rights bar would be more effective if material such as reports of the Committee on the Prevention of Torture were regarded as relevant evidence. We find the concerns about the effectiveness of the bar persuasive. Below we examine the suggested safeguards and specific amendments to UK extradition policy with a view to improving human rights protection.

Increased judicial involvement in extradition process

73. Several witnesses commented on the importance of the role of the judiciary in the extradition process and were critical of the automatic nature of the extradition process. The courts were criticised for insufficient scrutiny of extradition requests.

74. Liberty argued that "the flaws of the extradition system have also been highlighted by numerous judges whose role in relation to extradition has, in many cases, been confined to a rubber stamp by the 2003 Act."[73] The Freedom Association agreed that "the national judiciary's role in the process is just to rubber stamp the extradition of a UK citizen, even if it has grave concerns about the case and about the treatment the citizen will receive."[74]

75. Witnesses were not in favour of involving the Executive in Part 1 cases or increasing its role in Part 2 and instead favoured increasing the effectiveness of the role of the judiciary. We return to the role of the Executive in Chapter 5.

76. Catherine Heard argued that it was important "to build in sufficient discretion for judges who are dealing with extradition requests to make sure that certain flexibility remains in the system to avoid miscarriages of justice in extradition cases."[75] Further safeguards and clarification of the human rights bar could ensure that the judiciary played a role beyond "rubber-stamping" of requests. Others, including the Law Society as noted above, have called for the courts to make use of the powers available to them.

77. John Hardy QC agreed that "the virtual extinction of judicial discretion, and the paring down of the function of judicial evaluation are inherently unsatisfactory from a common law perspective." He continued that "in Part 1 cases [...] the judicial control theoretically envisaged by the Framework Decision must depend on the capacity of the Act to permit the proper exercise of judicial decision-making."[76]

78. Witnesses argued that the increasing automaticity of extradition under both Parts 1 and 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and the diminished role of the judiciary had reduced human rights protection when discussing safeguards or the human rights threshold, but the role of the judiciary is inextricably linked to both these areas. The human rights threshold and safeguards are the tools by which the judiciary can ensure that the rights of those requested for extradition are protected. The effectiveness of human rights protection would be improved if judges in extradition cases took a more active role in the extradition process, through the implementation of safeguards and the use of the human rights bar to ensure that the role of a judge in an extradition case is more than only "rubber stamping" extradition requests.

Human rights in deportation cases compared to extradition cases

79. During the course of our inquiry, we asked witnesses to compare the human rights protections available in deportation cases. Charlotte Powell noted that "in an immigration or a deportation case, I have to concede that the person who is being sent back is not necessarily wanted for the commission of an offence. Therefore, there might be a different balancing exercise in the threshold test which is set."[77]

80. The Director of Public Prosecutions told us that in deportation cases "there is obviously very extensive scrutiny, because you are talking about a situation where somebody might lose their life or be subjected to torture." In extradition cases "more often you would be dealing with Article 5 on the right to liberty, Article 6 on fair trials and Article 8. They are by their nature different rights." He concluded that you would deal with a deportation case in more detail as their life is more likely to be at risk than in an extradition case.[78]

81. The effect of both extradition and deportation process are the same in that they can both lead to removal from the UK. However, witnesses have noted fundamental differences: deportation may be for breach of a condition of entry and unlike extradition it is not part of the criminal process. We note a further difference. In many deportation cases, the individual has been convicted of a criminal offence, whereas in extradition cases the presumption of innocence still applies (except in cases where a person is extradited to serve a sentence). The discrepancies between the standards of human rights protection in extradition and deportation cases are likely to become more evident, given the increasing number of successful challenges to deportation orders under Article 8.

The rights of victims in the extradition process

82. A number of different groups of people are affected by extradition. In this Report, we consider the rights of UK citizens or residents in the United Kingdom who are accused of crimes overseas and are requested for extradition. Victims of crime are also affected by the UK's extradition policy: both those UK citizens or residents who have been the victim of a crime and the accused is either resident in, or has absconded to, a foreign jurisdiction and the victims of crimes in foreign jurisdictions where the accused is resident in the United Kingdom. We consider the rights of all victims, in particular those resident in the UK, as well as the rights of requested persons in the extradition process in this Report.

83. When we discussed this issue with the then Minister she agreed that "it is not always just the suspect who has cause for anxiety; it is also the victim." She also noted that "the interests of justice are certainly served by both extraditing and facilitating the process under the rules."[79] Through extradition, the accused can be returned to the country where the crime allegedly took place in order to facilitate the process of justice, which is in the interests of the victims of crime. The extradition process has to be effective in order to ensure that alleged offenders can be returned to the United Kingdom, as well as protecting the rights of persons requested for extradition abroad.

84. We received evidence from an individual who asked us not to print his name. This individual set out his experience of the extradition process from the perspective of a victim of a crime, the alleged perpetrator of which had absconded to another country. They criticised our inquiry and particularly the Call for Evidence for not including the rights of victims of crime or the extradition of persons to the UK to be tried: "there is a high probability that evidence will be biased heavily towards issues surrounding export extradition of suspects with little balance for import extradition of suspects or victims of crime in both import and export extradition cases."[80] In response to these comments, Committee staff contacted victims' organisations in an attempt to receive evidence representing this point of view but without success. This Report intends to address these issues as well as the rights of those requested for extradition.

85. We urge the Government and the Extradition Review Panel, when considering changes to the extradition process, to take into account the rights of victims of crime, both in the UK and other countries, as well as the rights of those subject to extradition. The process of extradition is important in ensuring that criminals are brought to justice and there is a need to ensure balance between this and protecting rights of those subject to extradition.

20   Office of the Kings Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2005] 3 WLR 1079; Dabas v High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [2007] UKHR 6 and The Governor of HMP Wandsworth v Antanas Kinderis [2007] EWHC 998 (Admin); Pulpino  Back

21   Office of the Kings Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2005] 3 WLR 1079. Back

22   [2007] UKHL 6, [2007] 2 AC 31, para 4 Back

23   [2007] EWHC 2983 (Admin) Back

24   UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, 6 February 2004, para 58 Back

25   [2010] EWHC 1820 (Admin) Back

26   [2010] EWHC 2076 (Admin) Back

27   [2011] EWHC 312 (Admin) Back

28   In Orchowski v Poland application 17885/04, 22 January 2010 the ECtHR concluded that there had been systemic violations of the Convention rights of prisoners in Polish prisons from 2000 until May 2008.  Back

29   [2007] EWHC 2983 (Admin) Back

30   [2009] EWHC 897 (Admin) Back

31   [2008] UKHL 16 Back

32   [2009] EWHC 1845 (Admin) Back

33   [2009] EWHC 2879 (Admin) Back

34   [2011] All DR 116 Back

35   [2011] All ER 70 Back

36   Fair Trials International, Liberty, JUSTICE, David Bermingham and Charlotte Powell all made the point to the Committee that the human rights bar was ineffective in practice.  Back

37   EXT 6 Back

38   Q 3 Back

39   Q 3 Back

40   EXT 25 Back

41   Q 3 Back

42   Q 138 Back

43   EXT 6 Back

44   Q 218 Back

45   Q 3 Back

46   Q 175 Back

47   Q 3 Back

48   Law Society response to the Home Office Extradition Review, March 2011, p.4, available at on the Committee website ( Back

49   Q 138 Back

50   Q 175 Back

51   Q 175 Back

52   Q 139 Back

53   EXT 20, EXT 25 Back

54   EXT 25 Back

55   Ibid. Back

56   EXT 25 Back

57   Ibid. Back

58   EXT 24 Back

59   COM (2011) 175 Back

60   Qq 62-3. Back

61   Q 71 Back

62   EXT 28 Back

63   Q 142 Back

64   Q 143 Back

65   Fair Trials International submission to the Extradition Review Panel, 21 December 2010, available at: Back

66   EXT 20 Back

67   Q 4 Back

68   JUSTICE Response to the Home Office Extradition Review, January 2011, p. 13, available at: Back

69   EXT 6 Back

70   Law Society response to the Home Office Extradition Review, March 2011, p 5 Back

71   EXT 28 Back

72   Q 218 Back

73   EXT 6 Back

74   EXT 2 Back

75   Q 15 Back

76   EXT 28 Back

77   Qq 144-5 Back

78   Q 176 Back

79   Qq 215-6 Back

80   EXT 3 Back

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Prepared 22 June 2011