Report
Our work in 2012
1. Our Committee was first established in 2009,
just before the end of the last Parliament, and was not reappointed
after the General Election until December 2010. It was not until
2011 that the Committee got underway. The role given us by the
two Houses is broad: "to consider the National Security Strategy".
We were determined to avoid duplicating the work of other Committees,
and a key consideration from the start has been to focus on where
we think we can best add value.
2. In 2011 we concentrated on the new National
Security Strategy (NSS) published by the Coalition Government
in October 2010[1] and
on the newly formed National Security Council (NSC) — the
Cabinet Committee established to co-ordinate and deliver the Government's
international security agenda. We published our first report,
First review of the National Security Strategy 2010, in
March 2012.[2] The
Government responded, positively in some respects but failing
to engage with many of our arguments. We were particularly concerned
that the Government was not pressing ahead with planning for the
next NSS. We published the response with a short report bringing
those concerns to the attention of the two Houses.[3]
We published the Government's response to that report as a Special
Report in November 2012.[4]
3. Our focus in 2012 was to explore in more detail
the impact of the NSS and the NSC on Government Departments and
on departmental policy-making. We began by taking evidence from
the new National Security Adviser, Sir Kim Darroch, in March 2012.
We then held a series of evidence sessions with the senior Secretaries
of State who serve on the NSC. We took evidence from the Foreign
Secretary, Rt Hon William Hague MP in April; from the then Secretary
of State for International Development, Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell
MP in June; and from the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon
Philip Hammond MP, and from the Home Secretary, Rt Hon Theresa
May MP, both in December 2012. The oral evidence, and the supplementary
written evidence provided, is published on our website.[5]
4. During the year, we also had two in-confidence
briefings, one from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Integrated
Country Strategies, and one from the Cabinet Office, on the National
Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). In our first report we had been
critical of the Government's initial unwillingness to provide
us with the information requested about the NSRA: we welcome the
change of heart.
5. In November, the Government published its
annual update: the Annual report on the National Security Strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review.[6]
We welcomed this as broader and more wide-ranging than last year's
report, but not yet as complete, transparent, and strategic as
it could be.[7] We were
provided in confidence with the internal SDSR Implementation:
Summary Report and have arranged a briefing from the Cabinet
Office to answer our further questions on this.
6. Throughout the year, we were ably assisted
by our specialist advisers: Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Research
Director/Director, UK Defence Policy at the Royal United Services
Institute, and Professor Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor
of the History of War at the University of Oxford.
7. We are grateful to all those who have assisted
us in our work over the past year.
Key concerns
8. The information we have received this year
from the Government has given us some reassurance about the NSRA
process and our evidence from Ministers confirms that the NSC
is valued and an important forum for collective discussion. However
we continue to have a number of significant concerns.
9. First, we are not convinced that the NSC has
maintained its strategic focus since completing the NSS and SDSR
in 2010. It appears to have focused on operational matters and
short-term imperatives. We have continued to look for evidence
of the NSC considering long term and blue skies topics and have
found little.
10. Secondly, we are not yet convinced that the
existence of the NSC is making the contribution that it should:
enabling Government to work as a co-ordinated whole. In other
words, we question how much extra value is derived from having
the NSC as opposed to the preceding systems of Cabinet Committees.
It is clear that Ministers derive benefit from their regular exchanges
around the NSC table but much more could be gained.
11. Thirdly, major strategic policy changes appear
to have been made by individual Government Departments without
discussion at the NSC. Most notably, the big decisions made by
the Ministry of Defence last year — the policy shifts set
out in Future Reserves 2020[8]
and Army 2020[9],
in particular — do not appear to have been steered by
the NSC; nor have we seen any evidence that the NSC has considered
the implications of those decisions for wider security strategy.
12. Fourthly, the NSC appears to have neglected,
or only recently discussed, some very central, and uncomfortable
questions:
- the strategic and security
impact of the Eurozone crisis and of efforts to save the Euro;
- the strategic and security uncertainties posed
by the planned referendums on Scottish independence and EU membership;
- the significance of the US pivot to Asia-Pacific.
13. Finally, we have not yet seen evidence of
the Government pressing ahead with planning for the next NSS or
giving serious consideration to engaging outside experts, politicians
across the political parties and the public in its development.
14. We recommend that the Government address
these five concerns as a matter of urgency. We look forward to
seeing evidence in the next Annual Report on the NSS and SDSR
that the NSC is maintaining focus on long-term strategy, as well
as responding to operational imperatives; and that it has reviewed
the cumulative strategic impact of policy changes and external
events since 2010.
Looking ahead
15. In the next stage of our work we plan to
focus on the future, on the big strategic questions which the
next NSS must address, and to take evidence from outside Government.
We plan to hold a series of evidence sessions on the UK's relationship
with NATO; national security and the EU; the nature of our alliance
with the United States; energy security; and food security: topics
which the Government appears a little unwilling to address, at
least in public. In doing this we are not seeking to do the Government's
work for it: instead, we hope the Government will take forward
work on the issues identified, drawing on expertise from outside
of Government as well as from within.
16. We would welcome views from other members
of the two Houses of Parliament, and from the public, as well
as from the Government, on the issues listed above, and on other
issues which the next NSS should address.
1 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010 Back
2
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First
review of the National Security Strategy 2010 ,First Report
of Session 2010-12, HL Paper 265 HC 1384 Back
3
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Planning
for the next National Security Strategy: comments on the Government
response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2010-12,
First Report of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 27 HC 423 Back
4
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Government
Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2012-13,
First Special Report of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 65 HC 758 Back
5
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/publications/ Back
6
https://update.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/121128-Annual-Report-to-Parliament-on-NSS-and-SDSR.pdf;
and HC Deb, 29 November 2012, col 26WS Back
7
JCNSS Press release 7 December 2012: www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/news/committees-response-to-governments-2012-annual-report/ Back
8
Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation's Security Together,
Cm 8475, November 2012: http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8475/8475.pdf Back
9
HC Deb, 5 July 2012, col 1085; Transforming the British Army,
July 2012: http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/
general/Army2020_brochure.pdf Back
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