Appendix: Government Response to the Committee's
First Report of Session
2010-12
HM GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE FIRST REVIEW OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2010 BY THE PARLIAMENTARY JOINT
COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The National Security Strategy aimed to mobilise
the whole of Government behind the protection of Britain's security
interests and to gear us up for an age of uncertainty. And that
is exactly what it has achieved.
From helping the Government to deliver a balanced
defence budget for the first time in a decade, to hosting the
world's largest gathering of leaders ever to address the threats
of terrorism and piracy coming from Somalia, to strengthening
our relations with emerging powers such that our exports to those
countries have now increased by 26%, the National Security Strategy
has ensured that the Government is focused on the right decisions
to strengthen our ability to protect our national security and
to advance our interests in the world.
The National Security Council has played a vital
role in delivering all of this and more, bringing together the
key decision-makers from across Government on a regular basis
significantly to improve the coherence, pace and impact of decision-making
on UK national security. Since its inception two years ago, the
National Security Council has regularly discussed immediate priorities
such as Afghanistan and Iran, while also considering longer term
issues such as how we tackle cyber defence, prevent threats from
the Sahel increasing and ensure that we remain a competitive player
in Asia.
1. It is significant that the NSS and SDSR were
produced in parallel with the spending review—rather than
guiding or following it—and after a review of just five
months. (para 6)
2. We welcome the Government's decision to produce
the SDSR at the same time as the NSS. In principle, this should
allow us to see, alongside the Strategy, what impact it will have
on policy priorities and resource allocation. (para 10)
3. We also welcome the Government's commitment
to review the NSS and SDSR regularly. A five yearly review cycle,
as is currently proposed, seems to us appropriate. However, producing
a new Strategy shortly after a General Election—as this
timetable suggests—raises the danger of a hurried review
process, particularly if there is a change of Government. (para
11)
4. The order in which the NSS, SDSR, and CSR are
begun is not particularly significant. What is crucial is that
all three are able to influence each other, in a process which
is begun in plenty of time. The timing of the Election led to
the 2010 NSS, SDSR and CSR being completed in a relatively short
timescale with little consultation. We urge the Government to
plan for a much longer lead time for the 2015 review. (para 12)
The Government agrees with the Committee's view that
there is benefit in carrying out the NSS, SDSR and CSR processes
in an interactive way so as to ensure that strategy takes account
of financial realities but is not pre-determined by CSR allocations.
It will be important to start thinking about the work plan for
the 2015 review well in advance of 2015. The cross-Whitehall National
Security Strategy Network is already beginning to consider this.
Activities such as the National Risk Assessment and the National
Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) make significant contributions.
We welcome the Committee's support for HMG's commitment
to quinquennial review of the NSS and SDSR. The commitment to
one review in each Parliament does not, however, require that
all the preparatory work for such reviews would be compressed
into a narrow window shortly after each General Election. Experience
gained from the first NSS and SDSR will contribute to the review.
5. We welcome the decision of this Government
and the last to publish an NSS. We believe that producing and
publishing an NSS can help to play an important role in identifying
likely future threats to, and opportunities for, the UK. This
allows the UK to prepare for them and, in an era of scarce resources,
to prioritise effectively. This is important to maintaining the
security of the country. (para 16)
6. We regret that the Government's unwillingness,
to date, to provide us with all the information we requested about
the NSRA, means that we are not in a position to give the two
Houses any assurance about its adequacy. We urge the Government
to reconsider its position on this. We need this information if
we are to do our job properly as a Joint Committee tasked with
scrutinising the NSS (para 23)
HMG agrees with the Committee's view of the importance
of publishing a National Security Strategy. The Government will
look to provide the Committee with a confidential briefing on
the new National Security Risk Assessment.
7. We remain to be convinced of the Government's
reasoning for not including Afghanistan in the NSRA. The Government
has said that it is not including immediate security issues but
terrorism, accidents, flooding and cyber attack are included,
though they are all current threats. While the date of troop withdrawal
may be a firm policy, we take the view that Afghanistan and the
surrounding region remain an area of risk for the UK's security
and this ought to be reflected in the NSRA. (para 24)
HMG agrees that Afghanistan and our commitment there
will continue to be an area of risk for national security. The
NSRA is intended to give strategic notice about future risks,
enabling HMG to prioritise, and to plan the national response
and capabilities for the longer term. To serve this purpose, the
NSRA considers generic risks rather than scenarios that are tied
to a particular place or set of circumstances. Accordingly, the
NSRA did not set out the risks arising from instability or conflict
in named countries but considered the generic risk to national
security posed by states that are prone to fail or to be subject
to internal conflict.
8. In principle we welcome the development of
the NSRA but the Government must ensure that it does not lead
to a false sense of security. Any forecasting tool, however well
designed, is imperfect and speculative, and the results produced
should be treated with caution and used as a support for, not
a substitute for, good judgement. The NSRA will not always predict
the next big problem: resources must be allocated to continual
horizon-scanning, and must be available to deal with unpredicted
risks as they emerge. (para 25)
The Government agrees and its National Security Strategy
warns of the intrinsic uncertainty in human events and of the
need to be alert to change. HMG will continue to assess and re-assess
the risks, including this year and every two years through a review
of the NSRA itself; will allocate resources to analysing early
warning signs of emerging issues with implications for UK interests;
and has strengthened its machinery for managing crises as they
emerge. The NSRA will continue to be developed, not as a predictive
tool, but as a risk assessment designed to assist in prioritising
and planning for future risks. The Government also has an established
process for identifying countries at risk of instability. This
analysis informs both the Building Stability Overseas Strategy
and the NSRA.
9. A key point of the NSS is to set priorities,
and to guide choices in an era of diminished resources. While
such a strategy may contain aspirational elements it must also
be realistic. The NSS simultaneously recognises the rise of new
global powers, shifts in the centres of economic activity, and
reduced resources in the UK, while at the same time asserting
"no reduction in influence". This is wholly unrealistic
in the medium to long term and the UK needs to plan for a changing,
and more partnership-dependent, role in the world. (para 30)
The NSS and SDSR between them set out the Government's
national security interests and objectives, identify the risks
to them, and seek to co-ordinate the instruments of national power
to find ways of delivering them. The NSS and SDSR between them
made a number of strategic choices: to maintain the UK's international
profile; to honour our operational commitments; and to plan for
an adaptable force as a hedge against uncertainty. In so doing,
we set a path to protect and promote British national security
interests over the next 20 years; but we have done so in a way
that recognises the propensity for rapid changes in the strategic
environment. The NSS and SDSR focused on the 'ends' and the 'means'
elements of strategy; they were less prescriptive about the 'ways'
in which we will deliver our objectives over time because we recognise
that, in an increasingly competitive global environment, the UK
will need to remain agile. Hence, adaptability is at the heart
of the NSS and SDSR. That, in itself, is a strategic choice.
In the lead-up to the NSS and SDSR, the NSC considered
a range of potential strategic postures that the UK could adopt.
Amongst them was the possibility of a more insular, protectionist
approach. The NSC rejected this posture as inconsistent with the
UK's enduring global interests. This is what the NSS meant by
the rejection of any notion of the shrinkage of our influence.
Of course the Government recognises the increasing multi-polarity
of global influence as new powers emerge on the global stage,
fuelled by strong economic growth in areas such as South and East
Asia and Latin America. However, in absolute terms, the
UK remains one of the most powerful, wealthy and influential countries
in the world. In a changing world, the NSS and SDSR make clear
that the Government is determined to use all our national capabilities
to optimise and, where possible, to extend the UK's influence
in the world in order to build Britain's prosperity and strengthen
our security. The emerging powers offer significant opportunities
as well as risks for the UK's influence; and we are already moving
decisively—for example, through the shift of the FCO's diplomatic
network and the development of the Defence Engagement Strategy—to
enhance our political and economic relationships with many of
these countries.
10. We are concerned that the Government has not
done enough in the NSS and SDSR to articulate its concept of what
influence is, why it is needed, or what the most cost-effective
way is of achieving it in different circumstances and regions.
The NSS mentions many different forms of "soft power"
but could do more to spell out the different roles of organisations
such as the BBC World Service and British Council. We believe
that greater clarity over exactly what we are seeking, and why,
could enable resources to be better targeted. (para 35)
The Government is clear that influence is "our
ability to have an effect on the beliefs and actions of others,
which in turn leads to action in support of our interests or greater
acceptance of our own actions." We agree that influence
can take many forms—from military and economic ("hard
power"), through to the influence of our culture and values
("soft power"). Our aim is to use "smart power",
by using an appropriate combination of different sorts of influence
in each specific policy context.
We recognise that the UK has a large number of soft
power assets, ranging from those over which we have a high degree
of control, such as our overseas budget, to those inherited assets
which are beyond the control of the Government, such as the English
language and our historical legacy. The FCO has led cross-Whitehall
analysis of how the UK's soft power works, and will be publishing
a document later this year.
Soft power is not an end in itself, but a capability
to be used in pursuit of a wide range of foreign policy objectives. Different
regions or policies will require the Government to work with different
partners. Much of the value of some of our partners comes from
their independence or distance from Government; and we need to
be careful not to damage this.
The BBC World Service and the British Council both
play a crucial role in the UK's soft power. Although they receive
funding from Government, their independence allows them to engage
with people who might be unwilling to deal directly with HMG.
Both organisations help show the world the values of the UK that
we wish to promote; and we would not want to compromise this independence.
The UK's development programme also makes an important
contribution to our global influence. UK influence is strengthened
by the promotion of our values, including through the work of
the Department for International Development and the continued
commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income on Official
Development Assistance from 2013.
11. We welcome the idea of an "adaptable
posture" in principle. But in a world in which it was deemed
right in principle to intervene militarily in Libya but not, for
instance, in Syria, we would welcome more clarity on how this
principle shaped decisions on the mix of capabilities to be maintained.
We call on the Government to elaborate on the thinking linking
the NSS, the "adaptable approach" and the capabilities
decided upon. (para 40)
The National Security Strategy sets out the Government's
national security interests and objectives, and identifies the
principal risks to them. A central conclusion of the National
Security Strategy was to recognise the increasing uncertainty
of a future world in which the pace of change—political,
economic, military and technological—is increasing. This
recognition underpinned the Government's judgement that it needs
an adaptable posture to allow it to respond to those changes.
In turn, this implies a balanced and flexible set of national
capabilities to underpin that adaptability.
The adaptable posture, and its implications, were
important factors in the Strategic Defence and Security Review
decisions on future defence capabilities (less heavy armour and
fewer fast jets, more helicopters, more investment in cyber, and
more intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
(ISTAR) etc.), and in guiding the prioritisation of the defence
equipment programme that underpinned the Defence Secretary's announcement
on balancing the defence programme.
The prioritisation of risks through the National
Security Risk Assessment helped to underpin strategic choices
about the balance of investment in future capabilities. Those
choices were reflected both in the allocation of Departmental
funding through the Comprehensive Spending Review and, through
the Strategic Defence and Security Review, in those capability
areas identified for increased, continued or reduced investment.
In all these choices, a premium was placed on those
capabilities which were flexible and adaptable enough to make
a contribution across a number of the National Security Tasks,
or to mitigate a range of risks identified in the National Security
Risk Assessment. The Government believes that these capability
choices will allow the UK to remain agile in the pursuit of its
national interests in a fast-changing world, in a manner that
is both affordable and sustainable.
12. We accept that the NSS is not a "recipe
book" which dictates our response to every event, but we
would have expected to have seen some evidence that it had influenced
decisions made since the SDSR, including the Government's responses
to the Arab Spring. We have found no such evidence. As the NSS
states, "a strategy is only useful if it guides choices";
it is about thinking in the longer term, and not simply doing
what is in the UK's short-term interest. If the current strategy
is not guiding choices then it needs to be revised. (para 41)
13. In the NSS the Government has started to set
out crucial statements which can guide future policy. However
it does not yet present a clear over-arching strategy: a common
understanding about the UK's interests and objectives that guides
choices on investment across government departments, including
domestic departments, as well as guiding operational priorities
and crisis response. Such a strategy must be based on a realistic
vision of the UK's future position in the world. This vision will
both shape, and be shaped by, the UK's interests and objectives.
(para 46)
The clear and over-arching vision and strategy set
out in the National Security Strategy have been at the heart of
all national security decisions taken by this government. They
are shown in the major thematic priorities for delivering a safe
and secure UK and for shaping a stable world set out in the SDSR
and have been delivered in a number of ways including: progress
to implement the 2010 Anglo-French Defence and Security Cooperation
Treaty, the review and implementation of CONTEST and security
preparations for the London Olympics, the 2011 London Cyber Conference
and the 2012 London Somalia Conference.
Adaptability is at the heart of the UK's National
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The
National Security Strategy provides enduring principles to guide
subsequent choices rather than being prescriptive about the ways
in which we will deliver our objectives over time. It does not
replace the need for more "granular" decisions. The
SDSR focuses on developing the tools to underpin that adaptability.
The Arab uprisings are a good example of the inherent
uncertainty of global risks. The UK's response to them has underlined
the effectiveness of the National Security Council in examining
national security issues as they emerge and deriving sensible
and balanced judgements on how to respond case-by-case consistently
with National Security Strategy principles.
14. We are concerned that the NSS's focus on bilateral
relations with large emerging powers—and concomitant investments
in diplomatic and capacity-building activities—should not
be at the expense of strengthening relations with the Commonwealth
and with key regional organisations such as ASEAN, the Arab League
and African Union. (para 51)
The Foreign Secretary noted in Australia in January
2011 that it is a striking fact that while the world is becoming
more multilateral, bilateral relations between states remain as
important as ever.
Multilateral bodies enable agreements which have
the legitimacy and credibility of broad international agreement,
and are a vital part of British policy. Multilaterals also enable
UK funds, such as those of our international aid programme, to
be used in a wider set of countries than we focus on bilaterally.
For example, the UN and EU both work in over 150 countries; but
the decisions these bodies reach are the product of a myriad of
bilateral relations between them, and require effective bilateral
diplomacy as well.
Our enhanced bilateral relationships with the Emerging
Powers have been accompanied by, and have not been at the expense
of, strengthening our relations with international organisations
to which these powers belong.
The UK has been instrumental in working with key
partners in the Commonwealth to ensure that Heads agreed a process
for modernising the organisation—the most significant reforms
in recent Commonwealth history—which will make the organisation
more relevant and resilient for the future. The UK is contributing
£50 million to The Queen Elizabeth Diamond Jubilee Trust
Fund in support of charitable projects and organisations across
the Commonwealth.
We have worked closely with the members of the League
of Arab States in responding to the momentous changes of the Arab
Spring, and particularly in shaping the international community's
response to the crises in Libya and Syria.
The UK has an excellent relationship with the African
Union, which has been built through constructive policy dialogues
over crises in Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and above all Somalia. We
are helping the AU develop stronger capabilities to manage and
prevent conflict through substantial donations from the Conflict
Pool, from DFID, and via the EU's Africa Peace Facility.
The Government is planning to sign the ASEAN Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation. We have created an annual ASEAN Programme
Fund of £200,000, and have increased the number of staff
working on the organisation.
15. We are concerned that the NSS and SDSR have
avoided some of the difficult questions about alliances. There
does not appear to have been a fundamental assessment of the extent
to which the UK can rely on its allies, and the extent to which
it needs the capacity to operate independently. The SDSR states
that "we will maintain our ability to act alone where we
cannot expect others to help". We call on the Government
to set out in response to this report in what situations it thinks
the UK may need to operate alone and what capabilities they would
require. (para 54)
We expect to work in alliances and partnerships and
have done so very successfully in recent operations such as those
in Libya. We do have interests where we should be prepared to
act alone; but specifying these could give an advantage to any
potential adversary. We want to prevent conflict. Identifying
where we might act could unnecessarily escalate tension or be
perceived as a signal of aggression.
We are committed to sustaining a range of alliances
and partnerships, which remain a fundamental part of our approach
to defence and security; but we acknowledge that there may be
occasions when constraints imposed by geographic treaty obligations,
national sensitivities or operational timeliness will require
the ability to act alone. To this end, the Armed Forces' Future
Force 2020 has been designed to provide a balanced and broad spectrum
of integrated and sophisticated capabilities across all environments.
16. We recognise that there are limits to what
can be said in a public document. However we believe that the
USA's publication of Sustaining US Global Leadership
provides an opportunity to open up a debate on a number of crucial
issues. We call on the Government to reflect deeply on the long
term implications of the geographical and functional shifts in
US policy that are now taking place. It raises fundamental questions
if our pre-eminent defence and security relationship is with an
ally who has interests which are increasingly divergent from our
own. The Government needs to decide if the UK will continue to
be as involved in US military action as we have been in the past
if the US focuses on Asia Pacific. If the US is moving towards
viewing Europe as a producer rather than a consumer of security,
and reducing its capability to mount long term stabilisation missions,
it raises more questions as to what we can except from the US
and what the US expects from the UK. (para 60)
The analysis, diagnosis and prescription for dealing
with future security challenges in the United States Department
of Defense's new Strategic Guidance, issued in January 2012, aligns
closely with the NSS and SDSR. They reached many common conclusions.
The United States will continue to view the UK and European allies
as partners of choice. NATO will remain of vital interest to both
continents. We do not believe, therefore, that the United States'
interests are increasingly divergent from our own.
President Obama made clear during the Prime Minister's
visit to Washington in March that strengthening the United States'
alliance with the UK, and alliances around the world, was one
of the United States' highest foreign policy priorities. The UK-US
joint factsheet on defence cooperation,[1]
issued during the visit, sets out how the United States and the
UK will collaborate for the future, including through NATO. This
echoes the statement by Leon Panetta, United States Secretary
of Defense, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2012:
"For Europe, the US defence strategy reaffirms the lasting
strategic importance of the transatlantic partnership with the
United States. Although it will evolve in light of strategic guidance
and the resulting budget decisions, our military footprint in
Europe will remain larger than in any other region in the world.
That's not only because the peace and prosperity of Europe is
critically important to the United States, but because Europe
remains our security partner, our security partner of choice for
military operations and diplomacy around the world. We saw that
in Libya last year and we see it in Afghanistan every day. Drawing
on the lessons of a decade of war, a robust and effective network
of alliances and partnerships is absolutely an essential element
of this strategy's vision for the future US military. As part
of the strategy, we are therefore deeply committed to strengthening
transatlantic security partnerships and institutions, including
NATO."
17. We are not convinced that the Government gave
sufficient attention in the NSS to the potential risks that future
international economic instability might pose for the UK security.
These go beyond the UK being unable to afford to defend itself.
International economic problems could lead to our allies having
to make considerable cuts to their defence spending, and to an
increase in economic migrants between EU member states and to
domestic social or political unrest. The NSC needs to take all
of this into account. (para 67)
18. We hope that the problems within the Eurozone
can be resolved. However we believe that, even in 2010, the potential
threat to UK security from full, or partial, collapse of the Eurozone
was one of the plausible scenarios which a prudent NSRA should
have examined. We call on the NSC to address the potential impacts
on the UK and NATO (and how the Government would respond) were
this to happen, as a matter of urgency. It also needs to examine
the long term strategic impact for the UK of any measures to save
the Euro, such as further Eurozone political integration or the
exit of some states from EU membership. (para 68)
The NSRA did not specifically identify, and the NSS
does not consider, economic instability as a direct risk to UK
national security in its own right; but it did consider financial
instability as a factor contributing to developments that would
themselves pose a risk to national security. These included economic
factors contributing to the risk of state failure of countries
important to UK national security, and to the risk of systemic
failure in international organisations that are important to UK
national security such as the UN, NATO, or the EU.
As more direct economic risks to UK national security,
the NSRA weighed the risks to national security of disruptions
in capital flows, and disruption of other resources that are essential
to the economy (e.g. oil or gas supplies, food, and minerals—all
of which feature as tier 3 risks). These judgements on risk, and
the part that economic factors play in them, underpin in part
the emphasis placed in the National Security Strategy on the mutually
reinforcing relationship between economic security and national
security, and the need for strong alliances and partnerships as
a fundamental element in our approach to defence and security.
All these risks, and the contribution to them made
by macro-economic factors including the risk of a continuation
of the problems within the Eurozone, are currently under review
as part of NSRA 2012. We recognise that Alliance members are facing
a period of austerity with impact on defence budgets and resources.
The UK supports the NATO Secretary General's 'Smart Defence' initiative
to better prioritise and co-ordinate capabilities between nations.
As the NSS said, the purpose of the National Strategic
Risk Assessment is to give strategic notice about future threats
to enable us to plan our national response and capabilities in
advance. Early warning of the risks of global conditions is provided
by the FCO's economic analysis network and FCO's Economics Unit,
working closely with HM Treasury and colleagues across Whitehall,
as well as a host of non-government sources. These strengthen
our understanding of the potential risks to the UK of global economic
instability, and feed into policy to mitigate the risks.
The FCO network systematically feeds economic intelligence back
to London, engages overseas with influential policy makers and
analysts across the Prosperity agenda, and helps to secure EU,
G8 and G20 policy outcomes that help mitigate the risks.
Deficit reduction in general, and sorting out the
imbalances in the defence budget in particular, are the best means
of ensuring that the UK's national security structures are resilient
to such economic shocks.
Specifically in relation to the Eurozone crisis,
HMG has contingency plans in place to cover a range of eventualities
and varied risks, and the UK is well prepared for potential eventualities.
19. The fact that the potential impact of Scottish
independence was not brought to the NSC's attention strengthens
our concern that the horizon-scanning carried out on the NSC's
behalf is inadequate and that the NSC's oversight of security
issues is not sufficiently broad and strategic. (para 71)
We do not believe this concern is well-founded. There
is considerable discussion about Scottish issues at the highest
level of Government and the Prime Minister has made clear his
and the Government's commitment to keeping the United Kingdom
together.
However, as yet there is no date or timetable for
a referendum on Scottish independence. The Government believes
the referendum should be held as soon as possible to end the damaging
uncertainty surrounding this question, and the Government is currently
in the process of facilitating a referendum, in recognition of
the SNP's win at the 2011 elections to the Scottish Parliament
and their manifesto commitment to hold a referendum.
20. The 2011 progress report is a relatively uninformative
implementation report on the SDSR. Next year we expect a rounded
and insightful update on both NSS and the SDSR. It should include
a summary of the main events of the year that were of relevance
to national security, how the UK responded to them, and the longer
term, strategic implications. For example this year's report could
have included the problems at the UK Border Agency, the Eurozone
crisis (and the strategic implication of measures to resolve it),
an update on the US-UK joint strategy board, on the Anglo-French
alliance, on Iran, and on commitments in Afghanistan and the adjacent
area after 2015. It should also include a summary of the work
of the NSC that year. The Libya Crisis report, with its identification
of problems faced and lessons learned, provides a good model.
(para 75)
HMG notes the Committee's suggestions for the next
annual report on SDSR.
21. We welcome the introduction of an NSC to give
strategic direction to the Government's national security agenda,
but we are not convinced that the NSC has successfully maintained
its strategic focus. We are left with the distinct impression
that it has been deeply involved in operations and this may have
reduced its ability to think strategically. (para 83)
22. We are concerned that the Cabinet Office was
unable to provide us, either in public or in confidence, with
concrete examples of "blue skies" discussions by the
NSC. Coupled with its failure to discuss the national security
implications of either the Eurozone crisis or the possibility
of Scottish independence, it is apparent that there are major
problems in the way that the NSC selects topics for discussion.
(para 86)
Much of the Council's time has been spent in discussion
of longer-term strategic issues. The Council has considered
a broad range of issues relevant to national security. The National
Security Strategy provides a good guide to the risks which we
would regard as falling within the scope of the NSC. The NSC gave
a lot of time to the Strategic Defence and Security Review between
July and October 2010. In terms of process, this involved regular
Ministerial debate through departmental officials and the NSC
so as to provide strategic direction to the development of both
documents. NSC saw drafts on five occasions for substantive discussions
which led to strategic decision-making. It remains important to
retain the flexibility to consider other issues if necessary.
The NSC Forward Work Programme is shaped by proposals
or advice from Government Departments, Number 10 and the Deputy
Prime Minister's Office. The National Security Adviser puts this
to the PM for approval. Agenda proposals look across the range
of departmental, domestic, foreign policy, defence and other priorities.
This is a quarterly, cross-Whitehall consultative process. It
enables NSC to give strategic direction on a range of priorities
but it is sufficiently flexible to respond to urgent priorities
and to react to real world events through shorter term direction
where required.
The NSC has no formal decision-making role in relation
to the initiation of military operations, but as the Cabinet Committee
with responsibility for national security and foreign policy strategy
its views would be taken into account by Cabinet. The NSC regularly
discusses strategic matters in relation to on-going conflicts.
For both Libya and Afghanistan, we have established separate Ministerial
meetings to cover operational issues, leaving the NSC itself to
concentrate on more strategic questions. We do not believe the
Committee's concern about a lack of strategic focus is well-founded.
23. We welcome the appointment of a National Security
Adviser, though we still have questions about the nature of the
role, and its status. We have concerns too that the current and
former NSA both have a FCO background. The Government has assured
us that this has not led to a lack of focus on domestic issues,
but this was not a view that all our witnesses shared. In addition
we noted a lack of military focus in the NSA's Libya Crisis report.
We welcome the Government's commitment that future appointments
could be drawn from a range of Departments and Agencies. We shall
be monitoring this. (para 92)
HMG notes the Committee's view. Future NSA appointments
could be drawn from a range of Departments. The NSA has acknowledged
that the National Security Council will need to increase its focus
on domestic security issues in the months ahead, including looking
at counter-terrorism, organised crime, cyber-security and other
domestic security issues.
24. It is important that the Heads of the Security
and Intelligence Agencies have access to, and are directly accountable
to Ministers, and we have been told that this remains the case.
We think it wrong that the performance of the three Agency Heads
should be reported on by anyone other than the relevant Minister.
(para 95)
Each agency head has a statutory right of access
to the Prime Minister. They are accountable for policy to their
Secretaries of State. Every Permanent Secretary has a Civil Service
line manager: the Cabinet Secretary in most cases; and the NSA
in the case of Agency Heads. Such dual accountabilities have been
in place for many years in this respect.
25. The current Prime Minister takes a keen interest
in national security and regularly chairs the NSC. The Government
does not see the need for a National Security Minister at present,
and we can see the clear advantages to the NSA being an official.
However, the Prime Minister's active involvement is a key element
of the current arrangements. Were this to change, and were the
right person available, the question of appointing a National
Security Minister would need to be reconsidered. (para 99)
HMG notes the Committee's view. National security
cuts across a number of Departments. It is entirely appropriate,
therefore, that Ministers of national security Departments consider
the issues in the round and that the NSA should be an official.
26. We are not convinced that all involved in
Government are clear on which Minister is accountable for which
elements of the NSS and NSC. It is even harder for those outside
Government, including Select Committees, to identify who is accountable.
This confusion over responsibility is not indicative of a well
functioning organisation and the Government needs to address this.
(para 102)
There is no confusion of responsibility. The NSS
applies the well-established principle of the Lead Government
Department which takes primary responsibility for a policy area
and leads cross-government work where other Departmental interests
are involved. In the field of security, many Departments are involved
in different strands of strategy implementation. The leadership
of implementation in specific thematic areas unambiguously lies
with the Lead Departments which convene and chair the relevant
cross-Government boards.
27. We accept that the NSC should primarily draw
on, and synthesise, the work of other departments, rather than
seek to duplicate the analytical capabilities of other departments
and agencies. However, the NSC was set up to ensure that things
do not fall into the gap between departments, and in this context
we recommend that the NSC should have some resources to undertake
its own analytical studies and to commission research from outside
Government. It may need to provide alternative viewpoints to those
of departments. (para 109)
28. Given the timescale of the 2010 NSS, it is
perhaps not surprising that the involvement of outside experts
was limited. However, given the much longer lead time for the
next NSS, we would expect more detailed input throughout the process.
(para 115)
29. We have concerns about the limited extent
to which the NSC has in practice drawn on non-government advice.
Clearly some good work has been done but we are not convinced
it is varied or frequent enough. Given the decision to abolish
the National Security Forum, measures must be put in place to
ensure that Ministers have regular exposure to advice from outside
experts. (para 116)
HMG notes the Committee's views. The National Security
Council draws on advice from across Government and from external
sources of expertise including a wide range of strategic assessments
and analytical studies. The National Security Secretariat performs
significant functions in both challenging and coordinating Departmental
points of view.
NSC receives advice and assessments from Departments,
the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Joint Intelligence
Committee. Certainly in the case of Departments this draws on
work conducted in partnership with organisations outside Government
such as the private sector, think tanks, academia and wider
international organisations. NSC is also exposed to non-governmental
experts through seminars; for example, the Afghanistan seminar
held in December 2011 which brought together government and non-government
experts alongside the NSC itself in a lively discussion. As a
matter of course, Ministers consult varied experts in preparation
for NSC.
30. We believe that the next NSS should be the
product of much wider public debate and attempt at a political
consensus. If (as we have suggested) the next NSS addresses more
fundamental questions about the UK's role in the world, and its
relationship with the USA; as well as developments in the Eurozone
and the potential impact of Scottish independence, then these
are questions that the wider public will engage with. The Government
will need to start planning for this now. (para 118)
HMG notes the Committee's view and agrees that it
will be important to start thinking about the work plan for the
next NSS well in advance of 2015.
1 See http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/us-and-uk-defence-cooperation/ Back
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