2 Reinforcing the ring-fence |
5. In our First Report, we found convincing evidence
on the benefits of structural reform, not only on grounds of financial
stability but also for its potential to change the culture of
banks for the betteran area not examined by the ICB.
We identified a number of challenges that a new structural framework
for banks would face.
In the light of these challenges, we concluded that the proposals
for the ring-fence as they stood at the time the draft Bill was
published in October 2012 might well not be sufficient to achieve
the Government's policy objectives.
We reflected upon the advice from the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
and Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, not to miss
the opportunity created by a measure of agreement on implementing
a ring-fence. Accordingly,
we set out a series of measures to reinforce the ring-fence in
order to increase the prospect of it proving durable in the long-term.
The Commission's approach was welcomed by Sir John Vickers, who
supported the approach of increasing the durability and permanence
of the ring-fence.
6. In its response the Government has agreed
with our view that "it is essential to ensure that the framework
is robust, and not susceptible to erosion over time".
The Government has also agreed "that further steps should
be taken to ensure that the ring-fencing framework stands the
test of time".
The Commission welcomes the
Government's acceptance of the principle that its proposed framework
for ring-fencing requires reinforcement. In this chapter, we consider
progress in relation to our main suggestions with this aim in
Electrifying the ring-fence
THE RATIONALE FOR ELECTRIFICATION
7. The analysis which we undertook of the approach
of banks towards their regulation, and the likely response of
regulators and of politicians, led us to conclude that there was
a significant risk that the effectiveness of the ring-fence would
be eroded over time. In reaching this view we were influenced
by the evidence of Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the US Federal
Reserve, about the US experience with bank structural reforms
in the past and the possible permeability of the ring-fence.
The US has twice endeavoured to establish a far greater degree
of organisational separation than is envisaged under the ring-fence,
as early as the National Bank Act of 1866,
and againin the aftermath of the Wall Street Crashin
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Both of these attempts were eventually
frustrated, by banks establishing investment affiliates to get
around the prohibition,
and by bank lobbying which led to the repeal of key provisions
of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Drawing on evidence from the Governor of the Bank of England,
we identified a risk that banks would view the new framework and
the rules that flowed from it as basis for negotiation rather
than a line in the sand.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury has observed that "the
history of financial regulation shows that banks have been able
to discover ways of circumventing the rules".
Drawing on a phrase in our Report,
the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills has
the Commission rightly raised concerns about the
banks' future behaviour. There is a risk that, when the banks
regain, as they surely will, their reputation for alchemyfor
turning base metal into goldthey may be tempted to "game"
the ring-fence, perhaps by constructing complex instruments. These
instruments might technically be classed as retail banking products
and - in practice - fail to respect the spirit of ring-fencing.
8. Our intention in our specific proposals for
'electrification' of the ring-fence was to create a significant
new disincentive for banks seeking over time to test the ring-fence
with a view to undermining its effectiveness. This disincentive
was in the form of powers to enforce full institutional separation
at the level of individual banks or the sector as a whole. We
Additional powers are essential to provide adequate
incentives for the banks to comply not just with the rules of
the ring-fence, but also with their spirit. In the absence of
the Commission's legislative proposals to electrify the ring-fence,
the risk that the ring-fence will eventually fail will be much
9. Sir John Vickers did not see it as inevitable
that banks would seek to test the ring-fence, but acknowledged
that "they might well do so" and that it was thus "a
risk that one would want to guard against very seriously and effectively".
He considered that the proposals for electrification would "further
reinforce the chance of ring-fencing working".
He also thought that it would increase the chance of it working
"for longer. It is a question of durability and permanence."
He emphasised that the powers could be a "credible threat"
to influence bank behaviour without needing to be used.
The Chancellor has now accepted the rationale for electrifying
We're not going to repeat the mistakes of the past.
In America and elsewhere, banks found ways to undermine and get
around the rules. Greed overcame good governance. We could see
that again so we are going to arm ourselves in advance.
In the jargon, we will 'electrify the ring-fence'.
THE FIRST RESERVE POWER
10. Our First Report recommended two distinct
reserve powers, the first of which would enable the regulator
to take steps that could lead to a specific banking group affected
by the ring-fence being required to divest itself fully of either
its ring-fenced or its non-ring-fenced bank.
This power could thus be exercised in respect of an individual
bank (or more than one if necessary) while retaining the benefits
across the sector as a whole of diversification, with different
banking models continuing to operate alongside each other, thus
taking account of the case for such diversification made to us
by Sir John Vickers in October.
11. The possible impact of this reserve power,
and the issues raised about the circumstances in which it might
be exercised, were raised by both Anthony Browne, Chief Executive
of the BBA, and Martin
Taylor. Sir John
Vickers also stressed the need for checks on the exercise of the
power. In our First
Report we outlined proposals on how the first reserve power might
work, and also several safeguards, which were:
a) A stipulation that the regulator could only
commence the process if it felt there was a significant risk to
the objectives of the ring-fence;
b) A provision that the power would not be exercisable
before the first independent review of the effectiveness of the
ring-fence (an independent review which we discuss in the next
section of this Report);
c) A requirement for the regulator to give a
banking group early notice of any intention to use the reserve
d) The appointment of an external reviewer to
consider the relationship between the banking group concerned
and the regulator;
e) A right of appeal in relation to the exercise
of the power; and
f) A Treasury power to override implementation.
12. In its response, the Government has agreed
with us that "a reserve power to require an individual banking
group to move to full separation of retail and wholesale activities
could be a powerful additional tool for the regulator to ensure
the independence of a ring-fenced bank".
The Chancellor of the Exchequer told us in February that he viewed
this reserve power as probably "the most powerful tool"
the regulator would have.
The Government has agreed to amend the Bill to include provisions
giving the regulator the power to enforce full separation between
retail and wholesale banking in a specified group. It also stated
that it would establish "strict statutory conditions [...]
setting out the circumstances in which this power can be used,
tests that must be met and factors the regulator must take into
account before deciding to require a group to separate".
The Government has also indicated that Treasury approval would
be required for such a requirement. The Government has announced
that it would bring forward an amendment to the Bill to include
the necessary provisions.
The Government has not referred specifically to our proposal relating
to the involvement of an external reviewer to examine the relationship
between the regulator and the bank concerned before the power
is exercised, but the Financial Secretary to the Treasury confirmed
that the amendment would reflect the Commission's recommendations.
13. When our First Report was published in December,
the Chief Executive of the BBA, Anthony Browne, was reported as
saying that "the threat of banks being broken up was causing
uncertainty, and making it harder for them to raise money which
could then be loaned to small firms".
In evidence in January Anthony Browne said that he had been seeking
to make a wider point about regulatory uncertainty, but reiterated
that regulatory uncertainty made it harder for banks to raise
capital. When the
Government's response was published in early February, Anthony
Browne was again reported as expressing almost identical views
as in December: "This will create uncertainty for investors,
making it more difficult for banks to raise capital, which will
ultimately mean that banks will have less money to lend to businesses"
14. In view of the significance of the potential
concern about the impact of the measure on bank capital raising,
we explored it further with witnesses in the New Year. Both Sir
John Vickers and Martin Taylor were unpersuaded by the argument
that electrification increased uncertainty, given that its intention
was to ensure that the ring-fence operated properly.
Sir John said:
The only way I can see it increasing uncertainty
is if banks intend to play around the boundary, flirting with
15. In view of the fact that the BBA purports
to represent banks and to lobby on their behalf and that its principal
source of funding is from the banks directly affected by the ring-fence
proposals, we were keen to seek the views of individual banks.
We asked Antonio Horta-Osório, Group Chief Executive, Lloyds
Banking Group, whether he agreed with the BBA's opposition to
electrification. He replied:
We were not notified about those comments, which
I think were made by the CEO of the BBA in his name. I support
electrification, like I supported ring-fencing. As you know, we
were the only bank publicly to support ring-fencing. The reason
why I support your proposal is that, if we think that for society
as a whole it is better to have ring-fencing, both from a financial
stability point of view and from a cultural point of view, I absolutely
agree that you should have strong enforcement and strong incentives
in order for that to happen.
Both Sir David Walker, Chairman of Barclays and Douglas
Flint, Executive Chairman of HSBC, also indicated that they supported
the proposal for the first reserve power, the latter saying:
In the event that it is judged that participants
are circumventing or frustrating the purpose of the ring-fence,
it seems to me quite reasonable for there to be a sanction.
In evidence to the Treasury Committee, the next Governor
of the Bank of England, Dr Mark Carney, also indicated his support
for the first reserve power.
16. The Commission finds it surprising
that the Chief Executive of the British Bankers' Association should
adopt a policy position which has no public support from the major
banks most directly affected by the ring-fence.
17. The Commission sees no merit
in the proposition that the first reserve power will create uncertainty
for banks or put at risk their attempts to raise funds for lending.
That power will be a source of uncertainty only for those minded
to take actions that conflict with the objectives of the ring-fence.
For all other banks, for regulators, for Parliament and the public,
it will be a source of greater certainty about the effectiveness
of the ring-fence. The Commission welcomes the Government's commitment
to amend the Bill to provide for a reserve power to break-up a
bank that seeks to flout the ring-fence.
18. We consider it important that
the regulator's powers to break-up a bank should be exercisable
only after consideration of the regulator's relationship with
the bank by an independent reviewer. It is also important that
the reviewer should be independent of Government. We welcome the
Financial Secretary to the Treasury's commitment to give careful
consideration to our specific proposals on the conditions on the
exercise of this power. Amendments J and K in the Appendix are
intended to provide an early opportunity for the House of Commons
to consider further this reserve power and the appropriate limits
upon its exercise. We would also envisage a specific timetable
relating to the exercise of the powers, to be determined at the
19. We have also considered whether it would
be appropriate in certain circumstances for the reserve power
to create a complete split between a ring-fenced bank and an investment
bank to be supplemented by a specific regulatory power to require
banks to cease certain, specified activities. We note that, under
the prospective EU Recovery and Resolution Directive, the regulators
are expected by the Government to be given "substantial powers
to require reorganisations", but this power is only to be
exercisable in the context of achieving resolvability.
We envisage a power that would be exercised to secure protection
for the cultural position of ring-fenced activities by removing
specified activities from within a particular bank that posed
a cultural threat rather than a threat to resolvability. We
recommend that the Government make explicit provision in the Bill
to enable the regulator to require a bank to divest itself of
a specified division or set of activities which would fall short
of the full divestment required under the first reserve power.
We envisage that this power would be subject to limits on its
exercise similar to those of the first reserve power.
THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW MECHANISM
20. Although the Government has accepted the
principle of the first reserve power, it has not yet been convinced
of the case we set out for a statutory independent review mechanism.
In our First Report we concluded that the review of the ring-fence
envisaged in the draft Bill was too narrow. We recommended both
an annual review of the operation of the ring-fence by the Prudential
Regulation Authority (PRA) and a regular independently-led reviewthe
first after four years, and every five years thereafterof
the ring-fence's effectiveness.
21. The periodic independent reviews represent
a crucial part of the architecture for implementation of the reserve
powers that we recommended. The first reserve power, to which
we referred in the previous section, would not be available to
the regulator until after the completion of the first such review.
The second reserve power for full separation across the banking
sector as a whole, which we consider in the next section, would
only be exercisable following recommendations of such a review.
22. The Government has accepted that the PRA
should be required to conduct annual reviews of the operation
of the ring-fence,
and has made provision for this in the Bill.
The Government has said that it will review the ring-fence and
its effectiveness on a continuing basis,
and the Bill provides for the PRA itself to carry out reviews
of the ring-fence every five years.
In its response to our Report, the Government did not address
the case for an independent and external review of the kind we
recommended, but in oral evidence in February the Chancellor of
the Exchequer told us that he would be "very happy"
to consider an independent review of the overall effectiveness
of the ring-fence.
He said that his concerns had been about a review being tasked
specifically with considering the case for full separation.
23. The case for a statutory, periodic and independent
review was made in evidence rehearsed in our First Report, notably
that from the Governor of the Bank of England.
In subsequent evidence, Sir John Vickers supported the proposal
for a "serious periodic review", suggesting that it
should also consider the allied measures on capital and loss absorbency.
Sir David Walker also emphasised the importance of any review
of the ring-fence before any changes were made being "independent":
"if it is an independent review after a period of time, I
don't see how we could object to that".
Douglas Flint also supported the proposition:
I think it would be remarkable if everybody who has
been involved in this process is able to anticipate everything
that might arise from the operationalising of the ring-fence over
the next three to five years. I actually think that the first
independent review might be earlier than five years, because problems,
if they arise on either side of this application, will probably
arise quickly in its operation, rather than later. So I think
maybe three years afterwards would be a good first time.
24. The Government's proposal for
the periodic review to be conducted by the regulator is wholly
inadequate. Such a review conducted by the regulator would be
little different in character from the regulator's annual report
and could amount to no more than a case of the regulator marking
its own examination paper. The creation of a periodic independent
review arrangement is crucial to the balance that we sought to
strike between giving regulators the tools they need to do their
job effectively and giving Parliament, the public and the banks
affected confidence that there will be independent constraints
upon the exercise of those regulatory powers. One of the strengths
of the banking industry (as well as one of its weaknesses) is
its capacity for innovation. The new framework must be subject
to regular periodic, independent review to ensure that that framework
keeps pace with innovation in the banking sector as well as the
experience of the operation of the ring-fence. We welcome the
Chancellor of the Exchequer's indication that he is happy to consider
the case for an independent review. We urge the two Houses of
Parliament to support our proposal for an independent review;
Amendment N in the Appendix enables the two Houses to debate and
reach a decision in principle on this proposition.
THE SECOND RESERVE POWER
25. Alongside our proposal for a group-specific
regulatory power to enforce full structural separation, we recommended
that the independent review should be required to assess the case
for a move to full separation across the banking sector as a whole.
To strengthen the hand of the review in considering this issue,
we recommended that legislation to give effect to any such recommendation
should be included in the Bill now before Parliament.
26. The Government has rejected the case for
a reserve power at this stage for full structural separation.
The Government advances several grounds for that rejection. First,
it contends that passing such legislation would entail the Government
pursuing a "different policy" from that contained in
the Bill, a policy which in the Government's view would be based
on the assumption that the ring-fence might fail, when the Government
does not itself believe that the ring-fence will fail.
Second, the Government argues that "it is not necessary to
legislate now for a reserve power to abandon ring-fencing at some
point in the future", because this is a decision best made
by Government and Parliament at the time.
Third, it contends that it would be wrong for the final decision
on whether to bring in such a radical change to be in the hands
of the regulator rather than for Government and Parliament.
27. The Government has been at
pains to make the case against the provision for full separation
being implemented on the say so of the regulator. The Government
has erected a straw man which it has then successfully demolished,
because we made no such recommendation in our First Report. Instead,
we envisaged that the legislative provisions would be brought
into force only in the light of the recommendations of the independent
28. The Commission continues to
believe that statutory provision for full separation should be
included in the Bill now before Parliament. Amendments L and M
in the Appendix facilitate debate and decision in principle on
this proposition. The power would not be available to be implemented
until after the case for full separation across the sector had
been considered by an independent periodic review of the effectiveness
of the ring-fencing framework which had come to a recommendation
to that effect. The view of the regulator would be of great importance
in such consideration, but we would expect the decision to implement
full separation across the sector to be a matter for Government
and Parliament. We have therefore made provision for the amendments
which give effect to full separation across the sector as a whole
to come into force only after an affirmative resolution in both
Objectives in primary legislation
29. The draft Bill set out a proposed 'continuity
objective' for the regulatorin almost all cases the new
PRAin discharging its functions in relation to the ring-fence.
This objective was defined as "protecting the continuity
of the provision of core services", a term itself defined
by reference to the management of retail deposits and associated
payments and overdraft facilities. Drawing on evidence from regulators
and others, we concluded that the proposed objective did not adequately
reflect the stated objectives of the underlying policy, relating
to absorbing losses, reducing the costs and difficulties of resolution
and curbing incentives for excessive risk-taking. We recommended
that these underlying objectives be reflected in the relevant
statutory provisions and that the relationship between the continuity
objective and other regulatory objectives should be clarified.
30. The Government has now agreed that "the
objectives of ring-fencing should be fully reflected on the face
of the Bill and that the relationship between the PRA's continuity
objective and the regulator's other objective should be clarified".
To achieve the latter end, the Government has amended the Bill
to make the continuity objective part of the PRA's general objectivepromoting
the safety and soundness of the institutions that it regulatesso
that it is one means by which the PRA advances that general objective.
According to the Government, "as a result of this change,
it should be clear that ensuring continuity of (ring-fenced) core
services is a central pillar of the PRA's general objective, and
not an additional obligation".
The Government has revised its formulation of the continuity objective
in an endeavour to reflect the ICB's three objectives for ring-fencing
and set out its reasons for its approach.
The Commission welcomes the
Government's clarification of the relationship between the continuity
objective and the PRA's general objective, and the steps it has
taken with regard to the formulation of the continuity objective.
We invite the two Houses of Parliament to examine the Government's
changes alongside Amendments A to D in the Appendix, which we
consider adhere more fully to the ICB's objectives for ring-fencing.
Delegated powers and scrutiny
of secondary legislation
THE APPROACH OF THE DRAFT BILL AND
THE ASSOCIATED RISKS
31. The draft Bill was primarily an enabling
Bill, seeking the powers that would enable the Treasury to implement
its proposed policy through secondary legislation.
Although some of the key concepts to give effect to the ring-fence
were included in the proposed primary legislation, these were
to be subject to qualification and adaptation through the exercise
of delegated powers. We pointed out that this enabled very different
policy outcomes, some of which might be quite distinct from the
Government's stated policy, to be delivered through the same statutory
vehicle. We concluded
that the heavy reliance on secondary legislation left open too
many questions of significant policy importance, creating uncertainty
for the regulators charged with making the framework operational
and for the banks required to operate within it. In consequence,
the jury was still out on whether the Government would implement
the letter and the spirit of the ring-fence as then proposed.
We recommended a number of specific steps to redress the imbalance
that might flow from the Government's proposed approach, the main
ones of which we consider in this section.
CONSIDERATION OF INITIAL PROPOSED
SECONDARY LEGISLATION IN DRAFT
32. During the initial phase of our inquiry the
Government committed itself to producing the principal draft secondary
legislation before the House of Commons Committee stage and to
publish all draft secondary legislation later in 2013.
We recommended that the principal draft secondary legislation
should be published at the same time as the Bill, and that there
should be a pause of three sitting months between the publication
of the Bill and the commencement of Committee stage.
In its response to our First Report, the Government has restated
its previous commitment in slightly more specific form:
To assist Parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill, the
Government will by the Bill's Commons Committee stage publish
drafts of the principal statutory instruments, including those
establishing the scope of the ring-fence, the de minimis exemption
from ring-fencing, the specific prohibitions on ring-fenced banks,
and the precise conditions for exemptions.
In answer to an urgent question the same day, the
Financial Secretary to the Treasury went slightly further, stating
that "Drafts of the principal statutory instruments to be
made will be made available to the House before Second Reading".
notes with disappointment that even the 'principal' secondary
legislation was not available at the time of publication of the
Bill as we had recommended, but welcomes the commitment to publish
it before Second Reading.
CONDITIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF CERTAIN
33. We expressed particular concern about the
delegated powers to exempt a class of institutions from the requirements
of the ring-fence and to change the definition of an 'excluded
activity'one that ring-fenced banks cannot conduct. The
proposed condition was framed as a negative testrelating
to the likelihood of a significant adverse effect on the provision
of core serviceswhereas we recommended that exemptions
be permitted only if they did not pose a risk to the continuity
objective and provided a significant economic or financial stability
benefit. In response
the Government has agreed that the tests should be "tough"
and indicated that it "will consider further amendments to
ensure that the tests deliver the policy intention".
welcomes in the Government's commitment in principle to consider
toughening the tests for the exercise of delegated powers for
exemptions from the ring-fence. We believe that the specific tougher
tests we proposed in our First Report are the right ones. We commend
Amendments E and F to assist in parliamentary consideration of
34. One way in which concerns about the extent
of delegated powers can be allayed is by making provision for
effective parliamentary scrutiny. In November, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer accepted the need for proper scrutiny.
However, under the draft Bill, almost all of the powers to determine
and then amend the location of the ring-fence were proposed to
be subject to the weakest form of scrutinythe negative
resolution procedure. We supported the assessment of the Delegated
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the Government's justification
for its proposed approach was unsatisfactory, and recommended
that the key delegated powers should be subject to the affirmative
In order to reduce the risk of the ring-fence being undermined
over time, we devised a set of measures to ensure that subsequent
proposals to amend the secondary legislation governing the ring-fence
were subject to full consultation and parliamentary scrutiny by
an ad hoc committee of the two Houses of Parliament before they
took final form, except in urgent cases.
35. In its response, the Government has again
accepted the need for proper scrutiny of secondary legislation,
and the Bill has been amended to provide for the affirmative resolution
procedure in respect of the powers we identified.
In November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us that, "if
this Commission recommends further ways of scrutinising that secondary
legislation, of course I will be very willing to listen to it".
The Government has made clear its intention to "publish all
secondary legislation for consultation where possible".
However, the recommendations we devised to ensure greater transparency
for secondary legislation which could move the ring-fence have
been rejected by the Government in a single sentence: "The
Government does not consider that an additional Parliamentary
scrutiny process is necessary".
The Commission remains firmly
of the view that the considerable scope for moving the location
of the ring-fence through the exercise of delegated powers necessitates
enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. We invite the two Houses of Parliament
to consider Amendment I in the Appendix which seeks to give effect
to our proposals and which additionally provides that the Chair
of the Treasury Committee should be the chair of the ad hoc joint
8 First Report, para 45 Back
First Report, paras 63-78 Back
Ibid., para 94 Back
Ibid., paras 79, 91 Back
Ibid., para 126 Back
Qq 2562, 2571 Back
Banking reform, para 2.12 Back
First Report, para 84 Back
The 1864 National Bank Act, which created the OCC and the federal
bank charter, from the beginning had limitations on banks' abilities
to engage in non-banking activities, which in effect limited them
and ring fenced them prior to US deposit insurance. Prior to that
various States that had organized banking charters (such as New
York) had similar provisions. Back
Most banks created affiliates. Two examples were National City
Bank in 1911 and Chase National Bank in 1917 who both created
affiliates able to transact securities business their 'parent'
banks were precluded from.(National City was a New York state
chartered bank and Chase was a National Bank (and accordingly
subject to the National Bank Act): Stock Exchange Practices, Report
of the Committee on Banking and Currency 1934, pp 156, 159. Back
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, was enacted on 12 November 12
1999. It repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, removing
barriers in the market among banking, securities and insurance
companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any
combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank and an insurance
company. With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial
banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies
were allowed to consolidate. Back
First Report, paras 132 - 133 Back
HC Deb., 4 February 2013, col 33 Back
First Report, para 78 Back
Speech by Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills
on 6 February Back
First Report, para 163 Back
Q 2563 Back
Q 2562. See also Q 2566. Back
Q 2567 Back
Qq 2564, 2566 Back
Chancellor's Banking Reform speech Back
First Report, para 165 Back
Ibid., para 157 Back
Q 2460 Back
Q 2885 Back
Q 2564 Back
First Report, paras 165-168 Back
Banking reform, para 2.22 Back
Q 4309 Back
First Report, para 167; HC Deb, 4 February 2013, cols 26 - 27 Back
"Bank reform plan 'could hit homeowners'", Evening
Standard, 21 December 2012,standard.co.uk Back
Q 2458 Back
"Chancellor warns banks over-ring-fencing", ITN News
online, 4 February 2013, itn.co.uk Back
Qq 2570, 2882 Back
Q 2570 Back
Q 3421 Back
Qq 3518, 3766 Back
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Treasury
Committee on 7 February 2013, HC (2012-13) 944, (hereafter cited
as HC (2012-13) 944), Q 135 Back
Banking reform, para 2.25 Back
First Report, paras 164, 171-172 Back
Ibid., para 166 Back
Ibid., para 171 Back
Banking Reform, para 2.24 Back
Bill 130, cl. 6 (amending Schedule 1ZB to FSMA) Back
Banking Reform, para 2.24 Back
Bill 130, cl. 4 (new section 142J) Back
Q 4312 Back
Q 4311 Back
First Report, para 170 Back
Q 2568 Back
Q 3519 Back
Q 3767 Back
First Report, para 171 Back
Ibid., paras 164, 171 Back
HC Deb, 4 February 2013, col 27; Banking Reform, para 2.23 Back
Banking Reform, para 2.23 Back
Ibid., para 2.23 Back
First Report, paras 127-130 Back
Banking reform, para 2.14 Back
Banking reform, para 2.14; Bill 130, Clause 1; FSMA, section
Banking reform, para 2.14 Back
Banking reform, para 2.15; Bill 130, Clause 1 (inserted
subsection (3)(c) of section 2B of FSMA) Back
First Report, para 117 Back
Ibid., paras 57-58 Back
Ibid., paras 122-123 Back
Ibid., para 115 Back
Ibid., 124-125. We accepted that the pause could be two
months in the event that the Bill was published after the February
recess, an eventuality which has not materialised. Back
Banking reform, para 2.10 Back
HC Deb, 4 February 2013, col 24 Back
First Report, paras 134-135 Back
Banking reform, para 2.16 Back
First Report, para 115 Back
Ibid., paras 141-146 Back
Ibid., paras 150-152 Back
Banking reform, para 2.18 Back
First Report, para 115 Back
Banking reform, para 2.32 Back
Ibid., para 2.20 Back