5 Is there a rational basis for disenfranchisement?|
The right to vote and the "social
114. In this chapter we consider whether or not voting
is a "right", and, if it is, whether there is a rational
justification for removing the right to vote from prisoners.
115. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government
of 1690, described the state of nature as one of "perfect
freedom" and "equality". In combining to form society,
Locke argued, people gave up this freedom:
"Because no political society can be, nor
subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property,
and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that
society; there, and there only is political society, where every
one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it
up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him
not from appealing for protection to the law established by it."
116. Locke accordingly proposed that an implied contract
underlay all social obligations; the criminal, by breaking the
laws of society and breaching the terms of the social contract,
became in effect an outlaw: he "may be destroyed as a lion
or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can
have no society nor security". William Cobbett, writing more
than a century later in 1829, echoed this argument: while acknowledging
that "The great right
of every man, the right of rights,
is the right of having a share in the making of the laws",
he argued that "Men stained with indelible crimes are excluded,
because they have forfeited their right by violating the laws,
to which their assent has been given."
117. The existence of a "social contract"
has been questioned repeatedly over the centuries, on both philosophical
and empirical grounds. David Hume, for example, while conceding
that there might have been some "original contract"
between rulers and the governed in primitive societies, noted
that its application to more advanced societies was "not
justified by history or experience in any age or country of the
evidence to this Committee, Professor Jeremy Waldron echoed Hume's
scepticism, commenting that "I think it is the case that
the social contract is mainly used these days as a convenient
fiction, with some opinions differing as to how convenient it
118. Nevertheless, to this day the social contract
is cited as a key justification for depriving convicted prisoners
of the vote: as the ECtHR noted, one of the planks of the Government's
defence in the Hirst case was that "Convicted prisoners
had breached the social contract and so could be regarded as (temporarily)
forfeiting the right to take part in the government of the country."
119. In his judgment in Chester and McGeoch,
Lord Sumption criticised lazy assumptions that UK rules about
prisoner voting imposed some form of "civil death" which
is justified solely on the basis of the social contract. Citing
Locke's account of the social contract, he said that "It
is tempting to regard the present British rule about prisoners'
voting rights as a distant reflexion of this view, and plenty
of commentators have succumbed to the temptation. But like most
rhetoric, this is misleading."
120. The "social contract", as described
by Locke, is more easily understood by reference to individual
"freedoms", rather than "rights"he
envisaged the perfect freedom of a state of nature being reined
in, by common consent to the rule of law, in order to promote
the common good. It follows that, in common law countries, citizens
have historically been presumed to enjoy all freedoms which have
not been explicitly removed or limited by law. In the words of
Thomas Hobbes, "A free man
is he that is not hindered
to do what he has a will to do."
As Lord Hoffmann claimed in 2009, even in the eighteenth century
there was a perception across Europe "that England was a
free country; that there was, for example, freedom of speech although
there was no law which expressly said so."
121. This principlethat freedoms are enjoyed
unless and until they are taken away by lawhas deep roots
in the common law and in our shared political and constitutional
history. The founding texts of the UK constitution, such as the
Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right of 1628, the English
Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Scottish Claim of Right of 1689,
were drawn up to prevent unwarranted encroachment by the sovereign
upon the "liberties" of the English or Scottish people.
In each case those concerned by the potential for royal abuse
of power sought to reaffirm ancient liberties, rather than seeking
to identify and formulate an exhaustive list of "rights"
as such. They affirm that the consent of the governed is needed
if the state is to encroach upon individual freedoms. Over the
centuries the courts, by a narrow construction of statute where
necessary, and by developing common law principles of fairness
and reasonableness to constrain executive action, have also played
a key role in defending the liberties of the subject.
122. One effect of this tradition of "negative
liberty" was to make it almost impossible for individuals
to enforce "rights" or "freedoms" in the abstract
(in other words without an established cause of action), with
the result that basic freedoms or rights were on occasion lost
or regained by inadvertence rather than design. Voting rights
for prisoners, as we have outlined in Chapter 2, were a case in
point. For almost a century, the Forfeiture Act 1870 expressly
prevented some prisoners from voting. But the restriction on the
prison franchise outstripped these express provisions for long
periods. For Aidan O'Neill QC, these consequences "happened
accidentally", with little consideration by Parliament: "What
was that voting was tied to residence. If you
were no longer in your place of residence, as a matter of fact
you could not vote."
123. Such accidents worked both ways: the effective
re-enfranchisement of many prisoners following enactment of the
Representation of the People Act 1948 was also inadvertent, a
by-product of the introduction of postal voting.
The emergence of "human
124. The emergence of the modern concept of "human
rights" can be traced to the late 1940s, after the events
of the Second World War exposed the fragility of the notion that
the legitimacy of the state rests upon an unspoken contract between
rulers and those they governed. In the late 1940s the fundamental
and inalienable quality of individual human rights was affirmed
not just in the European Convention on Human Rights, but in a
range of other international declarations and instruments,
which used a new language of universalism. Mr Jagland pointed
out that the UK was at the forefront of developing these new international
"During the war and after the war the United
Kingdom stood up, took the responsibility after the war and said
clearly, 'We have to have a human rights protection system in
Europe, because one of the reasons why the Second World War came
was a total breakdown of rule of law and human rights on this
continent.' There was clear leadership coming from London."
125. The ECHR is unique among these international
declarations in being more than just a Convention, or paper document.
It is the foundation stone of what Mr Jagland described as the
"Convention system", which permits individuals to petition
the ECtHR on the basis of their Convention rights. The key issue
for this Committee has been whether the UK's adherence to the
Convention signifies an irreversible shift away from its long-standing
tradition of negative civil liberties, which may be limited as
part of an implicit "social contract", and towards a
more prescriptive system of rights, enforced through the courts.
Is there a right to vote?
126. Within the ECHR certain rights are expressed
without qualification, while others are explicitly subject to
the requirements of public safety, public order, and so on. For
instance, Article 3 states simply that "No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
On the other hand, paragraph 2 of Article 9 (which guarantees
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) states
"Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
127. Some witnesses, drawing on the different ways
rights are described within the Convention, sought to distinguish
between those rights that are "fundamental"that
is, inalienable under any circumstancesand those that are
of a lesser status. David Davis MP, for instance, said that "The
Chairman started out by asking whether [the right to vote] is
a fundamental right, and we said that it is a civic right. It
is part of a contract";
Jack Straw MP also described the vote as a "civic right which
is part of the contract for citizenship."
Lord Mackay of Clashfern, on the other hand, found formal distinctions
between "fundamental" and "civic" rights unhelpful:
"I do not know that I understand exactly what is meant by
'fundamental'. A human right is a human right, and some may be
more important than others."
128. In Chapter 3 we have traced the process whereby
the ECtHR determined that voting was a human right under the Convention.
But we have also asked ourselves whether, regardless of the meaning
of the Convention, voting should be considered a "right";
and, if so, how important a right it is, and how far it may legitimately
be limited or qualified.
129. Jonathan Fisher QC argued that the "right
to vote" was not properly to be considered a "human
right". His argument was based upon the principle that if
a right is not found in positive law, it is not a right at all,
and his reading of Article 3, Protocol 1 accordingly distinguished
between "the guarantee to hold free elections on the one
hand, and the manner in which free elections are to be held on
the other." Underlying this analysis was a more fundamental
challenge to the philosophical basis for recognising "rights":
"Theories based on John Locke's social contract
and/or the existence of natural law rights have given way in modern
times to a positivist approach, by which human rights are recognised
in circumstances where a broad section of society acknowledges
this to be the case. Applying the positivist and self-sustaining
approach to the recognition of legal norms, I believe it is clear
that the right to free elections which guarantee the democratic
process is protected as a fundamental freedom whereas an individual's
ability to participate in the process is not."
130. It is clear that Mr Fisher's argument is not
accepted by the ECtHR, which, as we have described in chapter
3, has since 1987 consistently interpreted Article 3, Protocol
1 as establishing an individual right to vote. At the other end
of the spectrum, Dr Daniel Viehoff and Dr Christopher Bennett,
of Sheffield University, posited a three-fold rationale as to
why the right to vote deserves its place in human rights instruments:
"First, universal enfranchisement improves
the quality of our political decision-making, by protecting individual
interests from unjust violations, by holding accountable office
holders, and by fostering discussion and deliberation that yield
better solutions to the complex political problems we face. As
such, it benefits all citizens. Second, the right to vote benefits
the person whose right it is in particular, mainly because it
symbolically asserts that she is someone who counts, someone to
whom equal concern and respect is owed. Third, under circumstances
where the state's legitimate authority cannot rest on the actual
consent of its subjects, the opportunity for equal political participation
in the democratic process provides an alternative basis for the
moral legitimacy of our political institutions."
131. Of these three propositions, the third, that
the right to vote underpins democratic legitimacy and thus what
Dr Viehoff and Dr Bennett called the state's "moral right
to exercise power over its subjects", carries particular
weight: the presumption, in any democracy, must be that all citizens
have a right to vote. To put it another way, universal suffrage
underpins any democracy and cannot be guaranteed unless each citizen
possesses a presumptive right to vote. But that right is presumptive,
not absolute. In the words of Angela Patrick, of JUSTICE:
"In a democratic society, the starting point
is universal suffrage. The right to vote exists and it is not
absolute. But, if you are going to shift away from the notion
of absolute suffrage, that shift requires serious thought and
Limitations on the right to vote
132. Given the presumption in favour of universal
suffrage, it follows that if any group of citizens (including
prisoners) is to be disenfranchised, there needs to be a robust
and principled justification for that disenfranchisement. In the
language of ECtHR case-law, this means that the right to vote
may be only be limited in pursuit of the "legitimate aims"
of democratic states. These aims encompass various limitations
on the right to vote that are deemed necessary to protect the
integrity of the electoral process, including age limits, since
children and younger adolescents "lack the intellectual and
emotional maturity necessary to make good use of the power over
our fellow citizens each of us exercises by voting;"
nationality and residence requirements;
and restrictions based on mental incapacity.
In the latter regard, long-standing common law restrictions upon
voting relating to mental state were abolished in the UK by means
of section 73 of the Electoral Registration Act 2006. In the UK
one further restriction remains, the peculiar product of our constitutional
history: peers who sit in the House of Lords, being members of
the legislature for life as of right, are disqualified from voting
in elections to the House of Commons.
133. The question for this Committee, therefore,
has been whether a case can be made for maintaining a ban on voting
by some or all convicted prisoners. In particular we have considered
whether the current ban is justified and necessary, as part of
penal policy (i.e. as part of the punishment imposed on those
receiving custodial sentences). Finally we consider the symbolic
value of the ban in promoting civic responsibility.
Prisoner voting and penal policy
134. The loss of certain rights is a necessary consequence
of imprisonment. Most obviously, loss of liberty is the key element
of any custodial sentence. This is acknowledged in Article 5 of
the Convention, which states that "Everyone has the right
to liberty and security of person", before listing six cases
in which persons may be deprived of liberty "in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law", including "the
lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court."
The argument that loss of the right to vote is part and parcel
of the loss of liberty was summarised by the Archbishops' Council
of the Church of England in the following terms: "imprisonment
constitutes a loss of liberty and, as a corollary of that, a range
of opportunities to participate in civil society, as well as in
normal social patterns of activity, are forfeited, including the
right to vote."
135. The ECtHR has held that liberty is the only
Convention right to be automatically forfeited as a consequence
of lawful detention,
though the exercise of other rights may be curtailed where the
Convention so specifies. For example, interference by public authorities
in the right to "respect for
private and family life"
contained in Article 8 ECHR is permitted to the extent that is
"necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
[or] for the prevention of disorder or crime." Prisoners
may therefore be subject to inspection regimes and restrictions
on their ability to associate, which are necessary to the running
of a prison but would not be generally acceptable outside the
136. Similar principles exist in domestic case law.
In 1983 the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords affirmed
that "under English law, a convicted prisoner, in spite of
his imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken
away expressly or by necessary implication."
The vote is, at present, expressly removed from all prisoners
under section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983.
137. The Government's defence of section 3, as summarised
in the judgment in Hirst, is that loss of voting rights
pursues the twin aims of "preventing crime by sanctioning
the conduct of convicted prisoners and also of enhancing civic
responsibility and respect for the rule of law."
The first of these arguments (that the loss of voting rights is
a part of the punishment handed down to convicted prisoners) echoed
statements made in the domestic case that preceded John Hirst's
application to the ECtHR. Lord Justice Kennedy quoted the following
defence of the Government's policy, made in February 2001 by the
then Home Secretary, Mr Jack Straw MP:
"By committing offences which by themselves
or taken with any aggravating circumstances including the offender's
character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence,
such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way
the country is governed for that period."
138. Any punishment, to be justified, must serve
one or more purposes. These purposes are conventionally grouped
under the four headings: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation
and public protection.
Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which sets out the
"purposes of sentencing", adds a fifth, reparation:
142(1) Any court dealing with an offender in
respect of his offence must have regard to the following purposes
(a) the punishment of offenders,
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
(d) the protection of the public, and
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to
persons affected by their offences.
139. The Government's reference in the Hirst
case to "sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners"
suggests that deprivation of the right to vote is essentially
an act of retribution, part of "the punishment of offenders".
Indeed, retribution was described by Dr Viehoff and Dr Bennett
as the only purpose of punishment which could offer "a plausible
philosophical basis for disenfranchising a significant portion
of the prison population."
140. The interpretation of disenfranchisement as
an act of retribution is open to a number of objections, chief
among which is the lack of an obvious "fit" between
the crime and the punishment: the same punishment is applied (albeit
for a different length of time) to someone imprisoned for dangerous
driving and to someone imprisoned for rape, and in neither case
is it self-evident that loss of voting rights (as opposed to loss
of liberty) is fitting retribution.
141. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest disenfranchisement
is perceived by prisoners themselves as a significant component
of retributive punishment. As Paul McDowell, of NACRO, said, "The
idea that, somehow, removing the right to vote or not providing
the right to vote for prisoners would be perceived by those prisoners
as a punishment is not reality."
We see no reason to question this statement.
142. While some prisoners may not perceive the loss
of the vote as punishment, many of our witnesses commented on
the negative impact of disenfranchisement on the prisoner. Dr
Susan Easton told us that disenfranchisement was a "degrading
punishment" that reinforced offenders' social exclusion.
Sorcha Daly, Specialist Contracts Manager for Women in
Prison, told us that women found the experience of prison "incredibly
dehumanising" and that the continued ban on voting would
cause further damage "by saying that they are not citizens
or persons within society."
Juliet Lyon, Director of the Prisoner Reform Trust, argued that
enfranchisement was important in affirming "that you remain
a person even if you are serving time behind bars."
She also argued that that a punishment of "civic death"
was "completely out of step with a modern prison system",
devaluing prisoners and reinforcing the societal view that prisoners
143. The other principle purposes of punishment are
still harder to relate to prisoner disenfranchisement. No argument
was advanced to us that disenfranchisement acts either as a deterrent,
that it protects the public, or that it contributes to the rehabilitation
of prisoners. The Caritas Social Action Network, in a joint submission
with the Catholic Bishops' Conference, went even further:
"Three separate Freedom of Information requests
were made to the Ministry of Justice, the Cabinet Office, and
the Department of Communities and Local Government, after which
it transpired that no assessment had been made, and no evidence
base had been developed, for the current policy that deprives
all prisoners of the vote. None of these bodies were able to produce
evidence to prove that the current disenfranchisement of prisoners
furthers any aim of punishment whatsoever."
Prisoner voting and rehabilitation
144. While no witnesses suggested that depriving
prisoners of the vote contributes to rehabilitation, several argued
that reinstating prisoners' right to vote could be a powerful
tool for rehabilitation. Mark Johnson, of User Voice, a charity
which works with prisoners in establishing prison councils, described
time in prison as "a tremendous opportunity to teach the
benefits of entering a democratic process". He also noted
that where prisoners had been engaged in democratic systems, such
as prison council elections, research had shown an increased interest
on the part of prisoners in exercising their right to vote on
at HMP High Down and HMP Downview were also overwhelmingly of
the view that the exercise of voting rights could play a useful
part in rehabilitation. They noted that while many prisoners were
alienated from society before their conviction, prison gave them
time to sort out their lives, and that in the process they became
politically engaged for the first time.
Caritas Social Action Network argued that "we must not turn
our backs on prisoners and forget about them; instead we should
put them on the path to reform by showing them that they have
a continuing stake in, and duty towards, the community into which
they will return."
Such arguments would apply equally were prisoners to retain the
right to vote, or were they to lose that right upon sentencing
while being given the chance to apply for its reinstatement at
some point during their sentence.
145. Mr Nick Hardwick, the Chief Inspector of Prisons,
confirmed that giving prisoners the vote could help promote rehabilitation,
but told us that its importance should not be overstated: "In
terms of the things that might cause a prisoner not to offend,
being able to vote would be pretty low down the list
do not think you would give the right to vote because it encouraged
rehabilitation but, if you were going to extend the right to vote,
I would use it as an opportunity to work on citizenship-type issues."
146. The Government, while acknowledging that there
might be a rationale for allowing prisoners to "earn back"
the right to vote, drew attention to various practical issues,
including cost and the administrative burden upon the National
Offender Management Service, the accessibility of any courses
offered to prisoners, establishing criteria for re-enfranchisement,
and "the implications of providing citizenship education
or training for detained prisoners that was not also available
to the wider public."
Prisoner voting: symbolism
147. The Government, in its submissions to the ECtHR,
supplemented arguments based on punishment with the wider proposition
that disenfranchisement "enhances civic responsibility and
respect for the rule of law". The ECtHR, in assessing this
argument, drew on the minority judgment in the Canadian case of
Sauvé v the Attorney General of Canada (no. 2):
"The social rejection of serious crime reflected
a moral line which safeguarded the social contract and the rule
of law and bolstered the importance of the nexus between individuals
and the community. The 'promotion of civic responsibility' might
be abstract or symbolic, but symbolic or abstract purposes could
be valid of their own accord and should not be downplayed simply
for being symbolic."
The Court accordingly accepted that the "symbolic"
objective of safeguarding the "social contract" might
in principle constitute a "legitimate aim."
148. The "social contract", as we have
already noted, is widely regarded as a convenient fiction. But
the cultural and constitutional history of the United Kingdom
is very different from that of most other European states. The
UK constitution remains uncodified, and thus mutual trust between
government and the governed, between Parliament and the people,
though subject to many challenges, continues to be a key component
in political life, and is arguably the moral foundation for the
constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
149. Another possible explanation for the particular
symbolic power of the ban on prisoner voting was advanced by Professor
Jeremy Waldron, who noted that the vote was not just a right or
liberty, but a power which every voter enjoys, over his or her
fellow citizens: "If you thought of the vote as a power
you might want to give some thought to whether people who have
shown disregard for the rights and interests of others should,
for the time being, be entrusted by their fellow citizens with
that minuscule power over them
It seems to me that that
hook up with the idea that serious offending should
be what you are looking at."
150. Admittedly the power that each individual voter
exercises is, in Professor Waldron's words, "minuscule".
But there remains an intuitive connection between exercising the
vote and having power over how society is governed. In private
discussion with Professor Nicola Lacey we explored the analogy
of a self-governing association, in which, if a member had grossly
violated the basic rules, it would seem self-evidently appropriate
to take away that member's partial control of the affairs of the
151. The individual voter is just one among an electorate
which in 2011 amounted to more than 46 million; but experience
demonstrates that there will always be particular constituencies,
and occasionally even whole elections, where a handful of votes
tip the balance one way or another. We cannot conceive of the
UK people or Parliament accepting that such power should be vested
in the most serious offenders, whose crimes fundamentally damage
the fabric of society. As Baroness Hale of Richmond commented,
in respect of the two convicted murderers whose case was recently
considered by the Supreme Court: "I cannot envisage any law
which the United Kingdom Parliament might eventually pass on this
subject which would grant either of them the right to vote."
152. So the symbolic and emotive force for the UK
electorate of the current ban on prisoner voting is clear. While
there is little detailed evidence on public opinion on the issue
of prisoner voting, such polling data as exist confirm that, as
David Davis MP told us, around two thirds of the British public
oppose any change to the existing ban on prisoner voting.
But the weight of public opinion is not of itself sufficient to
justify a complete ban; indeed, the EctHR specifically addressed
this point: "Nor is there any place under the Convention
system, where tolerance and broadmindedness are the acknowledged
hallmarks of democratic society, for automatic disenfranchisement
based purely on what might offend public opinion."
153. At the same time, democratically elected representatives
cannot ignore the views of the electorate, and the vote in the
House of Commons in February 2011 demonstrated that a large majority
of MPs are sensitive to these strong views. The Attorney General
accepted this, while suggesting that MPs could do more to explain
the issues around prisoner voting:
"I have had quite a few letters from constituents
who are concerned about this issue, a few one way and probably
many more the other. It is also right to say that, when I have
had discussions with constituents about the options and explained
some of the background, you can often get a different response.
It all depends on how you frame the question."
Views of the Committee
154. We do not believe the distinction between
fundamental and civic rights to be helpful in considering the
issue of prisoner voting. In a democracy all citizens possess
a presumptive right to vote, thereby having a say in the making
of the laws that govern them. The existence of such a right is
the necessary corollary of universal suffrage. This conclusion
holds good regardless of the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2).
155. It follows that the vote is a right, not
a privilege: it does not have to be earned, and its removal without
good reason undermines democratic legitimacy. The right to vote
is a presumptive right, not an absolute right: democratic states
may restrict the right to vote in order to achieve clearly defined,
156. We consider that the case for depriving prisoners
of the vote as a part of their punishment is weak. It is possible
that disenfranchisement could fulfil a retributive function, but
no assessment of the effectiveness of disenfranchisement in this
regard appears to have been undertaken.
157. A case has been made that reinstating prisoner
voting rights, in whole or in part, could contribute to rehabilitation,
though this is not in itself a strong enough argument to justify
a change in the law.
158. The justification of the disenfranchisement
of convicted prisoners as a symbolic act, which enhances civic
responsibility and reflects the consequences of failure to respect
the laws made by the community as a whole, is, in our view, the
strongest that has been advanced in the course of our inquiry.
We consider in Chapter 7 whether the current prohibition is a
proportionate means to achieve this legitimate aim.
131 This chapter uses the term "rights" broadly,
without seeking to create a distinction between "rights"
and "human rights". For an alternative approach see
the written evidence from Jonathan Fisher QC. Back
William Cobbett, Advice to Young Men (1829), Letter VI;
Cobbett also excluded women, minors and the insane. Back
David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1748) Back
Q 119 Back
Hirst, paragraph 50 Back
Chester and McGeogh, paragraph 126 Back
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), chapter 2, quoted in Isaiah
Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty' (1958) Back
Lord Hoffmann, 'The Universality of Human Rights', Judicial Studies
Board Annual Lecture 2009 Back
See the report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights (December
2012), volume 1, pp 54 ff. Back
Q 34 Back
Notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948. Back
Q 178 Back
Q 99 Back
Q 96 Back
Q 112 Back
Written evidence from Daniel Viehoff and Christopher Bennett Back
Q 35 Back
Written evidence from Daniel Viehoff and Christopher Bennett Back
Written evidence from Her Majesty's Government Back
See the guidelines on Electoral Law endorsed by the Venice Commission
in July 2013, 1.1.d. Back
This rule derives from a resolution passed by the House of Commons
in 1699. Back
Written evidence from the Archbishops' Council, Church of England Back
See also Hirst, paragraph 75 Back
Raymond v Honey (1983) 1 AC 1, paragraph 10 Back
Hirst, paragraph 74 Back
Quoted in R (on the applications of Pearson and Martinez) v
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) EWHC
Admin 239, paragraph 9. Back
The terminology and order may vary: some witnesses referred to
"incapacitation" rather than "public protection"
(written evidence from Daniel Viehoff and Christopher Bennett,
the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England). Back
Written evidence from Daniel Viehoff and Christopher Bennett Back
Q 130 Back
Written evidence from Dr Susan Easton Back
Q 13 Back
Q 13 Back
Q 2 Back
Written evidence from Caritas Social Action Network Back
Q 5 Back
See Appendix 5 Back
Written evidence from the Caritas Social Action Network; see also
written evidence from Howard League Scotland and HM Inspectorate
of Prisons Back
QQ 120-1 21 Back
Written evidence from Her Majesty's Government Back
Hirst, paragraph 37 Back
Hirst, paragraph 75 Back
Q 119 Back
Chester and McGeogh, paragraph 99 Back
Q 99; relevant polling data were summarised by Lady Hale in her
judgment on Chester and McGeogh, paragraph 86. Back
Hirst, paragraph 70, quoted in written evidence from the
Equality and Human Rights Commission. Back
Q 201 Back