Report
In this report conclusions are presented
in bold, and recommendations in bold italics.
Introduction
1. Our Committee was established with
a broad role: "to consider the National Security Strategy".
In practice we have considered not only the National Security
Strategy (NSS) document[1]
published by the Government in 2010 but also the wider strategy
that underlies, or should underlie, government decision-making
on matters affecting national security. We have considered the
relationship between the NSS and the Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR),[2] which
was published alongside the NSS, since the two are inextricably
linked. We have also considered the way in which the NSS is implemented
and monitored within Government, and particularly the work of
the National Security Council (NSC), the Cabinet Committee which
oversees national security matters.And, as we get nearer to the
end of the Parliament, we have increasingly been focusing on the
next NSS, which the Government is expected to publish after the
General Election in 2015.
2. Our Committee has been referred to
as a "super-committee" because its membership includes
the Chairs of relevant departmental select committees in the House
of Commons, and our approach has been to draw on, rather than
duplicate, the work of other committees. Over the past year, we
have drawn particularly on the reports which the Defence Committee
has published as part of its multi-part inquiry Towards the
next Defence and Security Review.[3]We
have also followed with particular interest the Foreign Affairs
Committee's inquiry into UK Government policy towards the United
States[4] and the work
of the Lords Committee on Soft Power.[5]
3. We published our last report, The
work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
in 2012, in February 2013.[6]That
report described our work in 2012, highlighted five areas of significant
concern and announced our next phase of work.The purpose of this
report is similar:we give an account of our activities over the
past year, highlighting in particular our evidence session with
the Prime Minister in January 2014; draw attention to areas of
continuing concern; and outline our objectives for the remainder
of the Parliament.
4. We would like to record our thanks
to our specialist advisers, Professor Malcolm Chalmers of the
Royal United Services Institute and Professor Sir Hew Strachan,
Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of
Oxford, for their continuing important contributions to our work.
Our work in 2013-14
Evidence from outside Government
5. In our February 2013 report we said
that next we intended to focus on the future, and on the big strategic
questions which the 2015 NSS would need to address, and to take
evidence from outside Government.[7]
One of our concerns has been that the Government has not drawn
sufficiently on external advice in its policy-making, and we wished
to bring in a broader range of expertise, from within the UK and
from further afield. Between April and June 2013, we held three
evidence sessions with different panels of witnesses on the UK's
national security and the European Union, on the role of NATO,
and on the UK's relationship with the United States.[8]
In July 2013 we took evidence on energy security from Dr Fatih
Birol, Chief Economist and Head of the Economic Analysis Division,
International Energy Agency (based in Paris). Other witnesses
also submitted written evidence.[9]
We highlight some key points from this evidence in this report
and will reflect on it in our further work on the next NSS.We
commendto the Government the evidence we have received, both on
its own merits and to underline the value of hearing from outside
experts.
6. In addition to our public evidence
sessions, we held an extremely informative private meeting with
HM King Abdullah II of Jordan in June 2013. The meeting covered
a wide range of issues, and we appreciated his unique insight
into developments in the Middle East and global security issues.
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER
7. We received the Government's response
to our February 2013 report in May 2013. It gave us no confidence
that the Government was taking the concerns we highlighted in
our report seriously, and it reinforced our fears that the Government
was putting very little effort into planning for the next NSS.
Instead of reporting again, we asked our Chair to seek a meeting
with the Prime Minister to make our concerns plain in person.
8. Our Chair met with the Prime Minister
on 3 July 2013.It was a constructive and plain-speaking meeting
and had three positive outcomes.
9. First, the Government made a modest
revision to its response to our report to clarify the extent to
which work had already begun on the NSS review process. We published
the revised response without comment in October 2013.[10]
10. Secondly, the Prime Minister agreed
to provide us, on an in confidence basis, with the NSC's agendas
so that we could monitor whether it had been sufficiently strategic
in its focus. It is most unusual, if not unprecedented, for
a select committee to be given access to a Cabinet Committee's
agendas, and we welcome the access we have been given to the NSC's
agendas as a signal that the Prime Minister is committed to ensuring
that the NSC is operating to best effect. We present our conclusions
on the focus of the NSC's agendas in paragraphs 20 to 22 below.
11. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly,
the Prime Minister offered to give oral evidence to our Committee
in public, to make clear his views on the National Security Strategy
and to respond to our concerns.This took place on 30 January 2014.[11]
We highlight some of the key issues raised in the evidence in
the second part of this report. The Prime Minister normally
appears only before the Commons Liaison Committee and his agreement
to appear before our Committee demonstrates the personal interest
he takes in national security matters.We found our evidence session
with the Prime Minister helpful and informative: it gave us a
clearer understanding of the Prime Minister's personal vision
and of the rationale for some of the Government's decisions.We
return below to some concerns about the Strategy.
BRIEFINGS FROM OFFICIALS
12. In parallel to our public evidence,
we have been assisted by background briefings from Civil Service
officials.
13. Since October 2012 we have been
provided in confidence with the Government's six-monthly Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) summary reports to the NSS
and SDSR Implementation Board (a body of officials chaired by
the Deputy National Security Adviser, Julian Miller). In March
2013, we received a briefing from Cabinet Office officials on
the methodology behind these summary reports, the role of the
Implementation Board, and the progress made to date in implementing
the SDSR. This was helpful to our understanding of the information
supplied.
14. We have in previous reports expressed
concern about an apparent lack of horizon-scanning or "blue
skies thinking" in Government, at least at NSC level.[12]In
October 2013, we had a very useful briefing from the team at the
Ministry of Defence (MOD) who produce the Global Strategic
Trends publications. These are public documents setting out
likely trends in the world over the next 30 years which are designed
to aid the MOD's medium and long-term planning.[13]
They cover everything from climate and population, to social media
and cultural changes, as well as topics more specific to MOD interests
such as developments in weapons technology. We appreciated being
told of their work, which makes extensive use of outside academic
and industry experts, and is subject to a rigorous peer review
process. We have commended this approach to the Cabinet Office
officials involved in producing the next NSS. We look to
the Government for assurance in the response to this report that
the findings of the Global Strategic Trends work are being well
communicated outside the Ministry of Defence and will be drawn
on in the development of the next NSS.
15. In March 2014, we were briefed by
the Cabinet Office officials tasked with planning for the next
NSS.In advance of this meeting, we shared with the Cabinet Office
an illustrative list of questions which we thought the review
ought to address. Our continuing concerns about the Government's
plans for the NSS review process are set out in paragraphs 48
to 51 below.
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NSS AND SDSR
16. As in previous years, we have awaited
with interest the Government's latest Annual Report on the
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security
Review, published in December 2013.[14]
The report publishes information on the progress of implementation
of commitments made in the SDSR (in much the same form that they
are reported to the Implementation Board in the sixth monthly
summary reports mentioned in paragraph 13 above) but with more
narrative explanation for an external audience. We are pleased
to note that the criticisms of the Annual Report we have made
in previous reports have been acted upon, at least in part. We
criticised the 2011 Annual Report as "unrelentingly positive":[15]
there is now more acknowledgement of things that have not worked
so well, with references to recent flooding, and events in Syria,
for example. There is also a section on lessons learned, which,
though not hugely illuminating, is a welcome addition. However
it is surprising that a number of significant events of strategic
importance (or potential strategic importance) are not mentioned:
the leaks of intelligence data by Edward Snowden, tensions with
the Spanish over Gibraltar, and the continuing problems with the
UK Border Agency / Border Force, for example. Like previous editions
of the Annual Report it contains very little information
on what the NSC has done, or on what it has learned. We commend
the improvements made to the Annual Reporton the NSS and SDSR
in 2013 but suggest there is still more that could be done to
make the Annual Report into a genuinely useful document
for Parliament and the public.
Areas of continuing concern
The operation of the National
Security Council
17. In our 2013 report we set out five
key concerns, four of them about the way the NSC operates.We said
that the evidence suggested:
· the NSC had focused on short-term
imperatives and operational matters, and showed little sign of
considering long-term and blue skies topics
· the NSC was not making the
contribution it should, in enabling the Government to work as
a co-ordinated whole
· that major policy decisions
were being made by individual departments (notably MOD) without
discussion at the NSC, and
· the NSC had not discussed
central questions such as the Eurozone crisis, the uncertainties
posed by the planned referendums on Scottish independence and
the EU, and the US pivot to Asia-Pacific.[16]
18. In our evidence session with the
Prime Minister in January, we began by asking how he saw the role
of the NSC. He told us:
What I hope to gain is to make sure
that we analyse better the threats to Britain and the opportunities
for our country, that we plan better across government and that
we make better decisions. I would say that, three and a half years
in, it has been a real success, because you are bringing together
the relevant departments, you are considering national security
from a domestic perspective as well as an overseas perspective,
and you are making sure that the great fiefdoms of WhitehallDefence,
the Foreign Office, DfIDplay together rather than separately.
I think it has proved itself across a number of subjects. I am
hugely enthusiastic about this reform. I think it works very well.
I think it joins up Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor,
Home Secretary and others in a way in which perhaps they have
not been joined up in the past, and I hope it is a reform that
will endure.[17]
19. We accept that the Prime Minister
has found the NSC a useful forum for getting Ministers and Departments
to work together, and believes that it has improved collective
decision-making. It is, of course, for the Prime Minister to arrange
the machinery of government in the way that works best for him.However,we
continue to believe that the NSC could be more effective in helping
the Government achieve its strategic objectives.
20. In previous reports we have recorded
our impression that the NSC tended to focus on operational matters
at the expense of longer-term strategic issues, and on foreign
and defence policy to the neglect of domestic concerns.[18]Access
to the NSC agendas for 2013, on a confidential basis, has been
very helpful in giving us a better understanding of the frequency
of the NSC's meetings, and the range of topics discussed, but
it has, if anything, reinforced our impression that the NSC is
largely foreign policy focused and rarely looks at longer-term
strategic issues. We put this to the Prime Minister who said:
I would argue that it has been a
reasonable mixture. I have the figures with me. In 2011, we had
36 NSCs, we covered 50 foreign policy topics and nine domestic
policy issues but 14 security-related issues, such as counterterrorism
and defence. I think there is an argument that it could do more
domestic subjects, and the Home Secretary is always keen that
we discuss more.[19]
21. At the time of our first report
in 2010 we were told the NSC met weekly when Parliament was in
session.[20] From the
agendas we have seen, the NSC appears to have met only 20 times
in 2013, andwhile the focus of some of the agenda items
is not self-evident from the titledomestic topics appear
to represent only around 15% of the total. We have seen no evidence
that the meetings have become more strategic in focus or that
sufficient time is being provided to consider issues in depth.
22. We are concerned by the decline
in the number of NSC meetings since 2011 and by the extent of
the dominance of foreign affairs topics on the 2013 agendas.We
urge the Prime Minister to increase the number or length of NSC
meetings to allow the NSC time for thorough discussion of domestic
resilience issues and horizon-scanning, as well as immediate foreign
affairs matters.
23. In our earlier reports we have also
questioned whether the NSC makes sufficient use of expertise from
outside Government.[21]
Outside experts can challenge the assumptions or work of departments,
and bring new ideas or perspectives to issues. We raised this
with the Prime Minister who said:
On outside advice, we have on occasion
brought outsiders in, but we have also occasionally had seminars
that NSC members attend in order to hear from outside experts.
We had a particularly good session on Pakistan and Afghanistan
for which some experts came. We had a special NSC in August last
year on Syria. For our G8 agenda on tax and transparency and all
of that, we had a whole series of experts in to address those
issues[22]
24. We welcome the Prime Minister's
assurance that outside experts had been brought in by the NSC,
and we would encourage this to happen more regularly in future.We
recommend that in future this Committee should be provided, together
with the NSC agendas, with details of outside experts attending
the NSC.
LESSONS FROM RECENT EVENTS
25. Recent events have underlined the
importance of long term and strategic thinking, both domestically
and on foreign policy matters.
26. Recent events in Ukraine may not
have been precisely predictable but the fact that Ukraine was
unstable and Russia might react to that instability was widely
recognised. The impact of EU policy towards Ukraine on stability
in the region appears to have been overlooked, perhaps in part
because EU matters are considered not in the National Security
Council but in another Cabinet Committee. The crisis in Ukraine
is the type of event we had in mind when calling on the NSC to
give time to horizon-scanning and longer-term, strategic issues.
27. The impact of recent severe weather
in the UK provides a second example.At the time of our evidence
session with the Prime Minister in January 2014, the Christmas
floods and power cuts were fresh in everyone's mind, though the
further flooding in February on the Somerset levels and elsewhere
was still to come.The Prime Minister told us that the NSC had
discussed flooding in the context of the national risk register
and threats to critical national infrastructure, and had a sub-committee
that looked at resilience, threats and hazards.[23]
However, discussion of the risk does not appear to have led to
more investment in flood protection.The Prime Minister told us
that the NSC did look at resource choices notably the intelligence
budgetbut did not directly measure up the arguments for
investment on flooding, as opposed to, say, terrorism.[24]
28. The lessons from the recent severe
weather are being considered by other committees, and we await
their conclusions with interest.[25]
However,the indications are that there was a lack of joined-up
working between Government Departments both in planning for flood
prevention and in the response once problemsarose. The NSC
should examine the risks to the UK's resilience from the likely
longer-term impacts of climate change, and consider whether the
Government should be allocating more resources to this area.
29. The recent experience of flooding
and the Prime Minister's comments about resource choices lead
us to question whether enough is being done to ensure that the
National Security Risk Assessment steers decisions on Government
expenditure. We recommend that, as part of its planning
for the next NSS, the National Security Secretariat should develop
a methodology which enables the impact and likelihood of risks
to be considered alongside the amount of government effort and
resources that are being deployed to mitigate it.This
would enable the Government to take a view on whether the resources
deployed to cope with, say, a cyber threat were proportionate
to the risks when compared with the resources deployed to mitigate
the risk of, say, a pandemic or volcanic eruption.
THE US "PIVOT TO ASIA"
30. We took evidence on the UK's relations
with the US in June 2013 and with NATO in May 2013. There have
been a number of key events since then, with recent changes to
plans on EU defence, and the crisis in Ukraine. However, much
of what we heard is still pertinent, particularly on the issue
of the US Government's so-called pivot to Asia or Asia-Pacific.
31. The Defence Committee concluded
earlier this year that "there can be few developments more
fundamental to the UK's strategic position than the US pivot to
the Pacific."[26]
The Government's response to our 2013 report assured us that "the
Government, of course, continues to examine the impact of any
adjustments to US strategic focus" and added that the UK
was also "re-balancing" towards Asia, by moving diplomatic
resources to the region.[27]
In his evidence to us in January, the Prime Minister made a similar
point:
The first thing I would say is that
we are doing our own pivot. If you look at the amount of Foreign
Office activity in south-east AsiaI mentioned the ASEAN
countriesand what we are doing in China and India, there
is real evidence that William is changing that department and
focusing it on high-growth emerging powers and all the rest of
it. [...] So I think we are doing our own pivoting.[28]
It may well be in the UK's interests
to increase its diplomatic presence in South East Asia, but this
rather misses the point of our concern about the US pivot. The
key question is whether the pivot will lead the US to decrease
its commitment, military and diplomatic, to the security of Europe
and in Europe's "near abroad", the Middle East and North
Africa, in particular. Recent indications from Washington are
that this may be a less significant shift that it initially appeared.[29]In
response to this report the Government should set out how significant
it thinks the US pivot to be and what this means for the UK's
longer-term strategy and capability requirement.
THE UK'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU
32. Our external witnesses stressed
to us that whether the UK was in the European Union was of central
importance to the UK's place in the world, wider strategic posture
and alliances.[30]The
Prime Minister told us:
My strategy, which is linked in
with the national security strategy, is that we secure for Britain
a reform in the European Union and a referendum. I want to recommend
that we remain part of a reformed European Union, and I plan on
the basis of success rather than on the basis of anything else.
This goes to the broader point that we have not dealt with European
issues in the National Security Council; we have dealt with them
elsewhere in government. I accept that this has important implications
for the UK, but, as I say, I think we should plan on the basis
of what we want to achieve.[31]
The 2015 National Security Strategy
will need to take account of the continuing uncertainty about
the UK's role in Europe.
33. In 2012, the Foreign Secretary William
Hague told us that the Cabinet Committee which dealt with the
EU did not look at the national security aspects of the Eurozone
collapse because "the questions here are so overwhelmingly
economic that the national security implications are not the prime
considerations".[32]
As noted in respect of the Ukraine crisis, EU matters are dealt
with by the European Affairs Committee, and not by the NSC, with
the risks that their security implications are neglected. The
UK's future relationship with the EU is vital to the UK's national
security.It worries us that the NSC does not consider EU matters
as this risks crucial connections being missed.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
34. We were struck by the Prime Minister's
statement that he believes in "planning on the basis of what
you want to achieve".[33]
Clearly it is sometimes necessary or advisable not to contemplate
failure publicly and to assert that you have "no Plan B".
However, in our work we have become concerned that in some areas
the Government seems genuinely not to have any contingency plans.
This is dangerous and unwise.
35. We reject the Prime Minister's
assertion that we should "plan on the basis of what we want
to achieve". The Government plans for many things it does
not want to happen: pandemics, flooding, and terrorism, for example.
An attitude of "no Plan B" is dangerous when national
security is at stake. The last NSS should have included the
impacts of possible Scottish Independence and the next one should
include, either in the published version or in private, the impact
were the UK's relationship with the EU to change.
ENERGY SECURITY, RESILIENCE AND
CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
36. In our evidence session on energy
security in July 2013,Dr Fatih Birol, Chief Economist and Head
of the Economic Analysis Division, International Energy Agency,
was asked about the resilience of UK energy infrastructure. He
told us that "I think the UK is definitely one of the countries
that need to look at adaptation to climate change and increasing
the resilience of the infrastructure very carefully."[34]He
went on to say that the World Energy Outlook publication[35]
identified the UK's North Sea as one of the three energy producing
areas in the world most vulnerable to climate change; in the case
of the North Sea from cyclones and storms.[36]
37. While the Government has an Energy
Security Strategy[37]
it is a Department of Energy and Climate Change document, and
does not address issues outside that department's remit such as
planning consent, or the numerous foreign policy implications
of energy security. The strategy itself is focused on "keeping
the lights on" in the short term. Virtually nothing is said
about improving the resilience of the energy system to electromagnetic
pulses (EMP), severe weather, flooding, or (surprisingly) climate
change. It is crucially important that energy security and
domestic resilience are fully addressed in the next NSS.
38. We pressed the Prime Minister on
the acceptability of foreign ownership of critical national infrastructure.He
told us that:
there is going to be a proper NSC
consideration of this because we have slightly different procedures
for some slightly different parts of our infrastructure, and it
would be good to have a proper collective discussion about whether
we are happy when it comes to telecoms, electricity networks,
gas networks and what have you that we have all the rules that
we need in place.[38]
We welcome the fact that the NSC
will look at foreign ownership of critical national infrastructure
and urge the Government to err on the side of caution.
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
39. We asked the Prime Minister about
his views on the 2010 NSS and his ideas for the next NSS, due
in 2015. When asked what he meant by strategy, he said:
To me, strategy is about setting
out a very clear series of goals that you want to meet and then
making sure that you have sensible means for achieving those goals.
I do not have to look at a bit of paper to tell us what our strategy
is: it is to restore Britain's economic strength, it is to tie
us to the fast growing parts of the world, it is to refresh and
enhance the great alliances that we have, it is to tackle the
threats that could threaten our countryand it is to make
sure that we do this right across government and it is not just
the Foreign Office fighting for us abroad but every single bit
of government working together. That is the strategy.[39]
But he also made clear that his interest,
once the NSS had been agreed, was to focus on its implementation:
Of course in the NSC we discuss
strategy, but I want us to determine policy, I want us to agree
action, and I want us to check that we have done what we said
we were going to do.
I find that the problem all too often
is that people love sitting around talking about strategy. Getting
people to do things and act and complete on the strategy is often
the challenge.
40. In our view, there is a balance
to be struck between implementing the old strategy and keeping
up to date with a fast changing world. We think that the Government
is too worried about being distracted and needs to try and balance
both. By now the strategy is nearly four years old and has in
some areas been made less relevant by events, or events have revealed
gaps (such as on flooding). It is therefore necessary to balance
implementing and updating the strategy, especially as the strategy
gets older.
41. We pressed the Prime Minister on
how he would define his strategy for the UK's national security.
He told us:
I would say that the strategy is
about Britain engaging in the world in order to protect its interests
but also to promote British values such as democracy, freedom
of speech and human rights.[40]
He strongly emphasised the importance
of trade and prosperity.[41]
While we welcome that the Prime Minister was able to give a clear
and impassioned vision for how he saw the UK's place in the world
we did not recognise much of what he was saying from the 2010
NSS. This was a document which we have previously described as
"lacking an overarching strategy, a common understanding
about the UK's interests and objectives that guides choices".[42]
42. A clear vision of the UK's goals
and role in the world is essential for a good NSS. The Prime Minister
expressed a clear vision for the UK and its place in the world
in his oral evidence, but it is not one we recognised from the
2010 NSS.It is important that the vision of the Government of
the day is more clearly reflected in the next NSS.
43. When asked about the next NSS, the
Prime Minister told us:
The national security strategy needs
a refresh. I do not think it will be a complete overhaul.
if I am responsible for its eventual outcome I think it will have
that trade/prosperity agenda perhaps even more strongly at its
heart, but I would not expect a huge change in either the national
security strategy or, indeed, the SDSR.[43]
We are concerned that by the Prime Minister's
statement that the NSS only "needs a refresh". The document
definitely needs a significant rethink even if he believes the
strategy underlying it does not. An NSS addressing everything
that needs to be addressed would be a much longer document, but
more importantly it would take a very different approach, tackling
the difficult questions with honesty, rather than assuming that
everything the Government wishes to happen will occur.And it would
convey the Prime Minister's priorities more effectively. We
stand by our recommendation from our first report that the UK
needs an overarching strategy, clearly expressed, that the public
can engage with.As we said in 2012, the next NSS should be "a
very different document".
A REALISTIC NSSNO SHRINKAGE
IN INFLUENCE?
44. The 2010 NSS stated "the National
Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain's
national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage
of our influence".[44]In
our first report in March 2012 we concluded that with the rise
of new powers and the shift in centres of economic activity eastwards
this was "wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term".[45]
The Defence Committee has also pointed to the unrealism of expecting
no reduction in influence if defence and other capabilities are
significantly reduced, concluding that "a period of strategic
shrinkage is inevitable".[46]
We were therefore surprised that the December 2013 Annual Report
on the NSS and SDSRused an even more bullish phrase:the Government's
objective is now said to be to "ensure that Britain's influence
in the world is expanding".[47]The
Prime Minister did not accept that this aspiration was unrealistic
and told us that:
I also reject the idea that you
can only measure how engaged you are and how successful you are
in projecting influence by how much money you spend. No business
goes about its life like that.[48]
45. We agree with the Prime Minister
that influence is not just about money spent, influence is a complex
mixture of capabilities (both hard and soft), diplomacy, relationships,
and reputation. As in any area of government it is possible to
spend less money more effectively, but there is also a limit to
what can be cut without impacting on the end result. Willingness
to use capabilities, particularly military ones, is also a key
part of influence.
46. More importantly however, influence
is about the overall global picture. The 2010 NSS admits the global
balance of power is shifting. It notes that America will not remain
the only global power, and Asia is rising both economically and
in terms of influence while Europe is in relative decline.[49]
It is clear to us that no amount of spending money more effectively
and/or improving our relations with emerging powers will change
this underlying picture.
47. We repeat that expecting there
to be no shrinkage in the UK's influenceis wholly unrealistic.
Any national security strategy based on this is wishful thinking
rather than credible strategy. While the Government should seek
to maximise its influence, no amount of spending money carefully
can change the overall picture; in the long term, the UK and its
allies are in relative decline on the global stage.
PLANNING FOR THE NEXT NSS
48. The fifth concern we raised in our
2013 report was the fact that the Government was showing no sign
of pressing ahead with planning for the next NSS, or of giving
serious consideration to consulting outside Government in its
development.[50] It had
been the central conclusion of our first report in 2012 that the
next NSS should be the product of a much wider public debate and
an attempt at a political consensus, and that planning for this
should start immediately.[51]
The Government has shown no sign of wanting to engage in this
wider debate. The Government's response to our last report, in
August 2013, said merely that "initial preparatory work is
underway": the MOD was carrying out a programme of studies
for the next SDSR, but the review of the NSS would not be conducted
until after the 2015 Election.[52]
The Prime Minister was quite open with us in saying that his focus
was now on implementing the 2010 strategy and he did not want
work on the next NSS to distract his officials from getting on
and delivering their current objectives.[53]
49. After our meeting with the Prime
Minister we arranged a briefing with Cabinet Office officials
to discuss plans for the 2015 NSS in more detail. This confirmed
what we feared:very little work is being done at the centre to
steer a review of the NSS. In the absence of a clear steer from
above, a bottom-up process seems to be developing with departments
being asked for suggestions.There appears to be no intention to
publish any proposals in draft for consultation before the Election.
50. We understand the Prime Minister's
desire to ensure that the Government maintains focus on implementing
the 2010 NSS.But we believe he is missing an opportunity to build
a broader consensus for his vision for the UK's future, and to
make decision-making more coherent across Government. We have
given the Cabinet Office some idea of the issues that we think
need to be addressed in the review of the NSS and aim to provide
further suggestions before the election.
51. We urge the Prime Minister to
reconsider his approach to the next NSS and to give a clear steer
to his officials that they are expected to produce a radically
different NSS in 2015, tackling the big (and politically difficult)
questions and which will guide decisions going forward. The current
'bottom-up' process will not deliver a document with a clear vision,
and suggestions from departments are likely to result in important
issues falling in the gaps between departmental responsibilities.
Our next phase of work
52. Meanwhile,in order to stimulate
public debate and in the hope of provoking Government into action,
we have decided that in our next phase of work we will focus on
what we believe the next NSS should contain. Clearly we do not
have the resource at our disposal that is available to the Government,
so we anticipate that it will be a high level document, focusing
on the big issues, and perhaps posing questions as well as offering
answers. We will be seeking views on the development of our proposals
later this Summer.
1 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953, October 2010 Back
2
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010 Back
3
See Seventh Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197;
Eleventh Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2013-14, Deterrence in the twenty-first century, HC 1066. Back
4
See Eighth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2013-14, Government foreign policy towards the United States, HC 695. Back
5
See Report of the Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence, Session 2013-14, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, HL Paper 150. Back
6
Second Report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Session 2012-13, The work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012, HL Paper 115 / HC 984 Back
7
HL Paper 115 / HC 984 (2012-13),
paragraph 15 Back
8
A list of witnesses is printed on page 20. For evidence see National Security Strategy (Third Review) - Evidence Volume Back
9
A list of written evidence is printed on page 21. For evidence
see National Security Strategy (Third Review) - Evidence Volume Back
10
First Special Report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Session 2013-14, The Work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 58 / HC179 Back
11
Oral evidence from the Prime Minister, 30 January 2014 Back
12
First Report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Session 2010-12, First review of the National Security Strategy 2010, HL Paper 265 / HC 1384,
paragraphs 84-86 Back
13
Global Strategic Trends out to 2040, 4th edition, 17
October 2013, Ministry of Defence. For information on the work
of the MOD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, see https://www.gov.uk/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre Back
14
HC Deb, 19 December 2013, columns 130-133WS, and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2012-to-2013-report. Back
15
First Report of Session 2010-12, First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010, HL Paper 265 / HC 1384,
para 74; HL Paper 115 / HC 984 (Session 2012-13), paragraph 5 Back
16
HL Paper 115 / HC 984 (2012-13),
paragraphs 9-12 Back
17
Q1 Back
18
HL Paper 115 / HC 984 (2012-13), paragraph 9. Also HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (2010-12),
paragraphs 71, 83 and 86. Back
19
Q2 Back
20
HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (Session 2010-12), paragraph 77. Cabinet Office 01, paragraph 4 i.See
also https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/national-security-council Back
21
HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (2010-12), paragraph 116; HL Paper 115 / HC 984,
paragraph 13 Back
22
Q12 Back
23
Q20 Back
24
Q20 Back
25
Inquiry of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee into winter floods
and inquiry of the Energy and Climate Change Committee into power disruption due to severe weather. Back
26
Seventh Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2013-14, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, HC 197,
paragraph 43 Back
27
HL Paper 58 / HC 179 (Session 2013-14), page 4 Back
28
Q28 Back
29
See Eighth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2013-14, Government foreign policy towards the United States, HC 695,
paragraphs 41 to 48. Back
30
Eg Niblett Q17, Dormandy Q32 Back
31
Q31 Back
32
National Security Strategy (Second Review) - Evidence Volume:
Hague Q76 Back
33
Q31 Back
34
Birol Q63 Back
35
A lengthy analysis published annually by the International Energy
Agency: www.worldenergyoutlook.org Back
36
Birol Q63 Back
37
Energy Security Strategy, CM 8466, November 2012 Back
38
Q36 Back
39
Q7 Back
40
Q14 Back
41
Q30 Back
42
HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (Session 2010-12), paragraph 46 Back
43
Q30 Back
44
Cm 7953, paragraph 0.8 Back
45
HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (Session 2010-12), paragraph 30. Back
46
Sixth Report of the Defence Committee, Session 2010-12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, HC 761 Back
47
Annual Report on the National Security and Strategic Defence and Security Review,
December 2013, paragraph 32. Back
48
Q5 Back
49
Cm 7953, paragraphs 1.13 to 1.20 Back
50
HL Paper 115 / HC 984 (Session 2012-13), paragraph 13 Back
51
HL Paper 265 / HC1384 (Session 2010-12), paragraph 118 Back
52
HL Paper 58 / HC179 (Session 2013-14), page 4 Back
53
Q7; Q29 Back
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