3 Victims
Background
59. Modern slavery is a heinous abuse of human rights
and the UK has a moral and legal obligation to offer assistance
and support. Victim protection is also fundamental to increasing
the proportion of successful prosecutions for modern slavery offences.
A number of respected individuals and organisations made this
point very powerfully to the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review.
Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe's (OSCE) Special Representative and Co-ordinator for
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, told the Review that:
In order to strengthen the criminal justice response,
we need a multi-faceted range of criminal and social measures,
which should include strengthening victims' access to assistance,
support and compensation".[67]
Luis CdeBaca, United States Ambassador-at-Large to
Combat Trafficking in Persons, was clear on the US experience:
When we started focusing on how to effectively
respond to modern slavery in the United States, we very quickly
realised that prosecution alone is not enough. We can't prosecute
our way out of this crime. Prosecution is a very important part
of the response, but we also need to enact systematic and structural
changes to ensure that victims feel they can come forward and
be made safe.[68]
We also agree with Anti-slavery International that
"victims that are adequately safeguarded and supported are
more likely to be willing to participate in criminal proceedings
and better testify in court".[69]
Yet the draft Bill does not address either the identification
or protection of victims.
Case study: "Mary was born and grew up in Nigeria. After her mother's death, Mary was forced to move to the country's capital in order to make some money. It was there that she met Tony. He told her he could offer her a good job in England. Tony organised her plane ticket, and they both left for the UK. Hours after her arrival, Mary was taken to what appeared to be a house. It was actually a brothel. She was then forced, under threat, to have sex with men who paid money to Tony. Before Mary even realised she had been deceived, she was trapped. For many months she was locked in her room and forced to have sex with as many men as Tony dictatedoften up to ten or 12 men a dayand she was never allowed to say 'no'. After some time Mary fell pregnant. When Tony found out he was furious; he attacked Mary and tried to abort her baby by force. These attempts were not successful. One evening after this ordeal, Tony and his friends had a party at the brothel. Mary took her chance to escape and, with the men too drunk to notice, fled the property".[70]
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Non-criminalisation of victims of modern slavery
60. Avoiding abuse of victims by the State through
prosecutions which are incompatible with their status as victims
is key to improving victim protection.
61. Race in Europe research found at least 142 cases
between January 2011 and December 2013 of Vietnamese nationals
prosecuted for cannabis cultivation where there were strong indicators
of trafficking.[71] This
is a severe indictment of the efficacy of previous CPS guidance.
As the AIRE Centre told us,[72]
and as explained by Peter Willis, by the time that the Court of
Appeal heard the four appeals in R v L[73]
in summer 2013:
The guidance had failed in those 4 cases. The
judgment is all the more striking in that it comes several years
after the Court of Appeal (in R v. O[74])
had already found - in what Laws LJ described as a "shameful
set of circumstances" - that prosecutors had failed to follow
guidance on this issue.[75]
Case study: "In the early hours of the morning of 5 March 2012 police officers attended a house in Mansfield. They had been alerted by a number of local residents who had seen the defendant (HVN) being removed from the house by a group of men. His hands were bound. The police found him nearby, barefoot and apparently frightened. Inside the house a large quantity of cannabis was being grown, as a professional operation. The appellant was arrested. He admitted that he had been in the premises and was looking after the crop. He knew it was cannabis, but initially did not know it was illegal. He worked that out later. In the meantime the finger prints taken from the house in Derby were matched with the finger prints taken from the appellant when he was arrested. The police immediately referred HVN to the social services department of Nottinghamshire County Council. An age assessment interview was conducted. [...] The appellant had provided a date of birth which was accepted by social workers, and it was concluded that he was then just under 17 years old. They also recorded that he "described being locked in a cannabis cultivation house by gang members that recruited him in London. He was driven to Nottinghamshire - an unknown location to him at the time. He was unable to leave the property once he was locked in. [...] On 8 May 2012 at Nottingham Crown Court HVN pleaded guilty to two counts of producing a controlled drug of class B, contrary to s.4(2)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. On 21 May he was sentenced to 8 months detention and training concurrent on each count.[76]
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62. Our evidence revealed mixed opinions on
whether there should be a statutory defence of being a victim
of modern slavery, with those who did not support a statutory
solution, or who favoured the prosecutorial discretion status
quo, raising the following arguments:
a) That the scope of the defence would be difficult
to define;[77]
b) That the temporal link between the commission
of the offence and the enslavement of the victim would be difficult
to define and use in practice;[78]
c) That there is a potential for unintended consequences,
for example, an increase in the use of victims of trafficking
for the commission of serious offences;[79]
d) That the defence could be open to abuse by
perpetrators of modern slavery who are inventive as to the defences
they adopt and the arguments they advance in attempting to avoid
or frustrate prosecution;[80]
e) That persons who are or have been trafficked
can and do commit serious crimes. They may kill their exploiters.
More commonly they may traffick or exploit others;[81]
f) That no such statutory defence is available
for drug mules, or, in relation to terrorism, for those who assist
in terrorist offences through fear, threat or coercion;
g) That the real issue is not statutory protection
from prosecution, but improved identification of victims.[82]
63. In contrast, the evidence we received in favour
of a statutory defence made a moral and practical case for statutory
reform, highlighting the failure of guidance (since the first
guidance was issued in 2004, it has been updated 12 times, mostly
to reflect changes in legislation or updates in case law), while
victims continue to be prosecuted, and the importance of legislation
as an educational tool to create a ripple effect of knowledge
through all levels of law enforcement.
64. The arguments presented by this group of witnesses
suggested problems in relying solely upon an abuse of process
approach, because it has traditionally been seen as a form of
judicial review of a prosecutor's decision-making process, and
not as a consideration of the merits of the substantive decision.
They told us that, while the Court of Appeal in R v L had
suggested that "the court will reach its own decision on
the basis of the material advanced in support of and against the
continuation of the prosecution",[83]
it is not clear whether this statement expands the grounds for
applications beyond the traditional abuse of process review. This
confusion has been reflected in the current CPS Guidance, which
focuses first upon whether there is "clear evidence of credible
common law defence of duress" and if there is not, as a second
stage of whether "the public interest lies in proceeding
to prosecute or not". We note that there is no mention of
R v L in the CPS guidance until the document discusses
age assessment of children. [84]
65. Those in favour of a statutory defence also told
us that the existing defence of duress was insufficiently nuanced
to recognise the complexities of human trafficking.[85]
It also sets a very high threshold, requiring proof that the victim
was compelled to commit the crime: "that the victim
has effectively lost the ability to consent to their actions or
to act with free will".[86]
Few thought that a victim of modern slavery could meet that threshold
and we do not think they should have to.
66. The crux of their argument was that by legislating
rather than relying upon guidance, the need not to prosecute victims
of modern slavery was made clear and easily found. It would also
ensure that victimhood was considered earlier in the decision-making
process, namely at the evidential stage of the CPS Full Code test
in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, rather than in "addition
to applying the Full Code Test" through a separate three-stage
assessment.[87] This
approach recognises that the question is not whether the victim
of slavery has committed the offence, but whether they should
be prosecuted and, if not, the best way to prevent prosecution.
67. We have borne in mind that the guidance provided
in the case of R v L has only been in place since June
2013, and that the latest CPS guidance was only published in February
2014. We also bore in mind that obligations at international level
are not prescriptive, and are met by the UK's system of prosecutorial
discretion and sentencing practice.[88]
Nonetheless, we note that there are existing statutory defences
for other crimes.[89]
68. In coming to our conclusion we have considered
not only the most obvious cases, one end of the spectrum, where
prosecution should not have commenced, let alone proceeded to
conviction (for example, the child cannabis farmers in R v
L), but also hypothetical cases at the other extreme where,
for example, a victim is forced to commit theft and in doing so
inflicts serious physical injuries on or kills a member of the
public.
69. We conclude that there should be a statutory
defence of being a victim of modern slavery, which should:
a) be clear on the causative link between
the slavery of the victim and the offence committed
b) provide protection that is proportionate
to the offence committed by the victim
c) include consideration of the temporal link
between the slavery and the offence, and
d) make specific provision for murder, namely,
that there is no full defence, but, as with the existing law on
loss of self control, murder is reduced to manslaughter.
70. Our proposed defence would only be considered
by the court where there is evidence (rather than mere assertion)
that the accused was the victim of a Part 1 offence and the offence
charged was committed as a direct and immediate result of the
Part 1 offence - with the words "direct and immediate"
creating a temporal and causative limitation on the circumstances
in which the defence could be raised.
71. Like duress, this defence applies to every offence
except murder, but it involves a more realistic evidential burden
than that which applies to the defence of duress in order to protect
those who really should not be prosecuted for acts committed in
the throes of their slavery or in attempts to escape. Our proposed
defence is proportionate because it would apply only where an
ordinary person in the same circumstances as the accused might
have done the same. This mirrors the wording of the existing defence
of loss of self-control. [90]
72. Where the offence is murder, our clause recognises
the unique nature of that crime and does not provide a complete
defence. Subsection (2) allows a jury to determine whether the
defence should apply, and, if the jury deems it should, the effect
of the defence is not acquittal but to reduce the conviction to
manslaughter. This recognises the effect of mandatory life sentences
and provides for judicial discretion in sentencing; a judge may
still, however, impose a life sentence for the manslaughter conviction.
73. In essence we think that it enacts a test of
sympathetic reasonableness, while providing a simple and clear
guide to the CPS and other prosecutors as to the test they should
apply in deciding whether the evidence justifies prosecution.
A prosecutor would still be able to apply the interests of justice
test where, for example, the defence would not apply but the circumstances
of the accused were such that a merely nominal penalty is likely.
Assistance and support for victims
of modern slavery
74. The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is the
means used to identify victims of human trafficking in UK and
acts as the gateway to victim support services. It is also a source
of data on the extent of trafficking. The NRM was introduced in
2009 to meet the UK's obligations under the Trafficking Convention.
75. The NRM operates a three-stage system for identifying
potential victims. Initially, a first responder (first responders
include law enforcement bodies, local authorities and some NGOs)
makes a referral to a competent authority. Second, the competent
authority determines whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
the person concerned is a victim of trafficking. If the competent
authority finds there are reasonable grounds, the potential victim
is accommodated for a reflection and recovery period of 45 days.
During this period, the competent authority should make a conclusive
decision on whether the person is a victim. The two competent
authorities are the multi-disciplinary UK Human Trafficking Centre
(UKHTC), which is part of the National Crime Agency, and UK Visas
and Immigration (UKVI), which is part of the Home Office.
76. Many of the problems that we have identified
in the provision of care and assistance to victims, and the issues
we have considered as to how to provide that care, focus on the
NRM. Referral to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) remains
a voluntary decision for the individual victim, and we expect
that there will be some victims who do not use the NRM system,
simply because they do not wish to be referred. There may be other
victims too who do not use the NRM but to whom it is appropriate
to provide some care and assistance. It is to this end that we
have included an order-making clause in the Committee Bill that
gives power to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Anti-Slavery Commissioner, to publish and maintain guidance on
the provision of assistance and support to victims of modern slavery.
Reforming the National Referral
Mechanism
77. There are longstanding concerns about the fairness
and effectiveness of the NRM.[91]
In October 2013, the Home Office announced it would review the
NRM's governance and functioning.[92]
Six months on we have seen very little evidence of progress on
this review.[93]
78. We are very disappointed that there has been
so little progress on the review of the NRM. It has made our task
more challenging.
A STATUTORY NRM
79. At present the NRM has no statutory basis. This
has advantages: it provides for flexibility to respond to specific
circumstances. We were also told that victims might perceive a
statutory system as more legalistic and less empathetic than the
current arrangements.[94]
80. We heard, nevertheless, a variety of arguments
in favour of making the NRM statutory. Anti-Slavery International
told us that the current arrangements "led to arbitrariness
of application and access for victims".[95]
Others pointed out that giving victims statutory rights would
make claiming and enforcing those rights more straightforward.[96]
Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX) argued that a statutory footing
was necessary for reasons of transparency and accountability and
that the weaknesses of the current "ad hoc structure is borne
out in the experiences of victims".[97]
The AIRE Centre told us that a statutory NRM was necessary both
for the UK to fulfil its international obligations and to secure
the most effective victim identification process. The latter,
they argued, would result in better protected victims more equipped
to cooperate in prosecutions.[98]
The Head of the UKHTC, Liam Vernon, suggested that legislating
for the NRM could raise awareness of it among front-line agencies.[99]
Case study: "Ms O was referred to the National Referral Mechanism on 27 January 2012. Whilst detained in Yarls Wood Immigration Removal Centre, the Poppy project chased the NRM for a decision repeatedly. In total Ms O spent 336 days in both prison and immigration detention without being properly identified as a trafficked person. Forty-nine of those days were after the referral had been made and three of those days were after the positive reasonable grounds decision had been issued".[100]
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81. Putting the NRM on a statutory basis would also
be an opportunity to establish a clear review and appeals process.[101]
The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group (ATMG) detailed the present
patchy and chaotic system of informal requests for decisions to
be reconsidered. These requests can only come from a first responder
or other support provider directly involved in the case, but some
of these bodies lack the capacity, willingness or remit to challenge
decisions.[102] Judicial
review offers a more formal route but can only be used to challenge
the way in which a conclusion has been reached rather than the
merits of the conclusion itself. Judicial review is also expensive
and potential victims are eligible to apply for legal aid only
if a competent authority has established reasonable grounds to
consider them a victim of trafficking.
82. We recommend that the draft Modern Slavery
Bill is amended to give statutory authority for the NRM to ensure
greater consistency in its operation, decision-making and provision
of victim support services. This statutory basis should also provide
for a mechanism for potential victims to trigger an internal review
and to appeal against decisions taken by competent authorities.
COVERAGE OF THE NRM
83. The scope of operation of the NRM is at present
limited to victims of human trafficking. The recent Connors cases
demonstrate that those subjected to forced labour require similar
support and assistance.[103]
We recommend that the NRM should cover all victims of modern
slavery as defined in Part 1 of the Committee's Bill.
UK VISAS AND IMMIGRATION'S COMPETENT
AUTHORITY STATUS
84. UKVI came into being in April 2013, following
the abolition of the UK Border Authority (UKBA) and the earlier
splitting out of immigration enforcement functions to the Border
Force. UKVI caseworkers take decisions in respect of potential
victims from non-EEA countries identified as part of the immigration
process. UKVI is also responsible for taking immigration-related
decisions. Several witnesses identified this dual role as a potential
source of conflict of interest.[104]
85. Statistics provided by the ATMG show that the
UKHTC granted positive conclusive grounds decisions in 80 per
cent of cases in 2012. UKBA (now UKVI) reached a similar conclusion
in just 20 per cent of cases in the same period.[105]
The Director General of UKVI, Sarah Rapson, told us that she thought
her organisation was now granting positive conclusive grounds
decisions in "about half" of cases, though she conceded
that the data was "not very good".[106]
Commenting on the same statistic, the Minister noted the added
confusion caused by the high number of pending cases at UKVI.[107]
86. The Director of Asylum at UKVI, Glyn Williams,
argued that the different nature of cases handled by UKHTC and
UKVI should be considered in assessing their relative rates of
granting positive conclusive grounds decisions. The EEA cases
considered by UKHTC, he argued, often followed police investigations,
and therefore were taken with the benefit of access to corroborating
evidence. Police investigations were less common in the non-EEA
cases handled by UKVI.[108]
87. The ATMG posited that the statistical discrepancy
was not solely attributable to differences in the ways the respective
individuals had been referred to the NRM. It claimed that UKVI's
decision-making was characterised by a "culture of disbelief",
a "disproportionate focus on [victim] credibility" and
an adversarial or dismissive approach to dealing with the professional
representatives of victims. It also noted a "conflation of
NRM and asylum decisions" when the processes should be entirely
separate. The ATMG also told us that the treatment of children
in NRM decision-making was particularly inappropriate.[109]
88. In rebuttal, the Director-General of UKVI told
us that the organisation aspired to cultural change and was able
to focus on victims and vulnerable people in a way that its predecessor,
UKBA, had been unable to do. [110]
UKVI's Director of Asylum assured us that caseworkers were trained
in the separate processes involved in handling trafficking and
asylum cases.[111]
The Minister emphasised the merits of having asylum expertise
applied to trafficking cases at UKVI.[112]
89. Notwithstanding those points, the evidence provided
by UKVI concerned us in a number of ways:
a) There were repeated references to a lack of
"corroboration" of victims' stories from the police
in non-EEA cases preventing UKVI making positive conclusive grounds
decisions.[113] As
the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association (ILPA), told us
"since corroboration is not required at all, it should not
be making a difference".[114]
b) UKVI seemed to imply that police evidence
was given particular weight in conclusive grounds decision-making.
The official competent authority guidance states that "due
weight should also be given to reports submitted by recognised
support providers and children's services".[115]
The ATMG told us "treating cases where no police evidence
is available differentially [...] compromises the fairness of
the whole NRM process".[116]
c) UKVI referred to the "independent verification"
of the stories of potential victims of trafficking.[117]
Yet there is no requirement for such verification.
d) Despite asserting that the NRM and asylum
decision-making were separate processes, UKVI repeatedly conflated
them in evidence.[118]
In response to a question about the absence of a formal appeal
process in the NRM, we were referred to a statistic that "78%
of trafficking claims are linked with an asylum claim, and there
is appeal against an asylum decision";[119]
such conflation of NRM and asylum considerations was underlined
by UKVI providing its Director of Asylum as a witness on human
trafficking issues.[120]
e) UKVI's evidence revealed a worrying lack of
understanding of the victim support services provided by NGOs
as part of the NRM.[121]
90. Officials with responsibility for determining
immigration claims should not take decisions on modern slavery
victimhood. There is an inherent conflict of interest in such
an arrangement. The UK Human Trafficking Centre's (UKHTC) multi-disciplinary
staffing model is far more appropriate.
91. The current NRM subjects victims of trafficking
to a support and assistance lottery dependent on their nationality
and the region where support is offered. We recommend that competent
authority status be removed from UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI).
MATTERS FOR THE NRM REVIEW
92. The quality of victim support and assistance
provided under the NRM varies greatly. We have privately heard
from victims some harrowing stories of poor medical treatment,
no access to legal advice and wholly unsuitable accommodation.
FLEX told us that it was "at best patchy and at worst seriously
inadequate".[122]
93. We also heard evidence that the 45 day period
was insufficient for a victim properly to reflect and recover.
Though the UK is more generous than the minimum of 30 days stipulated
in the Trafficking Convention, the United Nations Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women has noted several states
have longer reflection periods including Chile with six months,
Canada and Norway with 180 days, Germany three months, Czech Republic
60 days and Denmark a 30 to 100 day period.[123]
The Minister assured us that questioning the duration of the reflection
and recovery period would form part of the Home Office's review
of the NRM.[124]
94. UKVI's Director-General acknowledged that it
was "unacceptable",[125]
but not surprising,[126]
that a victim had waited 8 months for a reasonable grounds decision
that was supposed to take five days. We were told that following
reforms at UKVI, such decisions were now being taken within five
days.[127] But the
Director-General acknowledged also that subsequent conclusive
grounds decisions were still not being made within 45 days and
that she did not have access to statistics to tell her how long
cases had been in their system.[128]
A representative of ILPA told us of a client who had been waiting
four months for a conclusive grounds decision.[129]
The Salvation Army suggested that the quality and timeliness of
NRM decisions would be improved by independent case review and
audit mechanisms.[130]
95. Conclusive grounds decisions in the NRM have
a different standard of proof to asylum decisions. A conclusive
grounds NRM decision is subject to the "balance of probabilities"
while in asylum cases the standard is "a reasonable degree
of likelihood" of future harm, a lower threshold. The UKVI
Director of Asylum was unable to explain why different standards
are used or what impact this has in practice.[131]
96. Witnesses were also critical of the apparently
haphazard way in which decisions had been made on who was and
was not a first responder: there are no written criteria and some
of those, including medical professionals and prison staff, who
may come into contact with potential victims are excluded.[132]
It was also suggested that first responders should be permitted
to take reasonable grounds decisions,[133]
and that public authorities should have a statutory duty to identify
potential victims of human trafficking.[134]
97. It was suggested to us that the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner might be given responsibility for overseeing the
NRM. René Cassin thought these powers might be extended
to overturning negative decisions.[135]
98. The NRM is overdue major reform. The Home
Office's review should be ambitious and have a wide remit. We
recommend that the Secretary of State should, by Order, and in
light of the conclusions of the review, set out: the stages of
the identification process; the criteria for assessing whether
organisations are suitable for carrying out those stages; the
timescales by which each stage should occur; the tests to be applied,
including standards of proof; provisions for an independent internal
review or appeal; and the minimum standards of assistance and
services which shall be provided for victims and potential victims
of modern slavery in the framework.
Duty to notify
99. Clause 35 of the draft Bill places a duty on
specified public authorities to notify the National Crime Agency
if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual
may be a victim of human trafficking. This measure is designed
to improve data collection without requiring potential victims
to be referred to the NRM. There is no similar duty proposed regarding
victims of other forms of modern slavery.
100. The White Paper accompanying the draft Bill
makes clear that a notification could be made without identifying
the victim if the victim wished to remain anonymous.[136]
But, as Human Rights Watch pointed out, the explanatory notes[137]
accompanying the Bill indicate that "the nationality of the
victim, type of exploitation experienced and the location and
dates it took place" would be included in notifications,
thus revealing "a significant amount of data on the victim
and the perpetrator".[138]
We also heard concern that notification could occur without the
informed consent of adult victims.[139]
This risks undermining the trust of victims in NGOs and public
services.[140] The
Impact Assessment accompanying the draft Bill implies that the
"specified public authorities" for the purposes of the
duty to notify would be NRM first responders, which include NGOs
such as Kalayaan, the Medaille Trust and the Poppy Project.[141]
Victims of exploitation might avoid using victim support or public
services for fear of the consequences of being reported: it would
be understandable for someone wary of authorities to think of
a notification to the National Crime Agency as ominous,
and exploiters could use this fear to exert further control over
their victims.[142]
101. The varying descriptions of the scope and
effect of clause 35 of the draft Bill in Home Office documentation
suggest that it is ill thought-through. While we very much support
the Government's desire to improve statistics on modern slavery,
it is not clear that imposing a duty on NRM first responders to
notify the National Crime Agency to potential victims of human
trafficking would achieve that aim. At the same time, it risks
undermining trust in, and use of, vital victim services. We recommend
that the duty to notify clause is removed from the draft Bill
and is reconsidered as part of the NRM review. The NRM review
should also consider the merits of the Anti-Slavery Commissioner
rather than the National Crime Agency receiving and collating
victim notifications.
Advocates for child victims
Trafficked children
102. Trafficked children from outside the EEA have
the same legal rights in the UK as those from the UK and EEA countries.[143]
There are statutory duties on public bodies, including local authorities,
police, youth agencies[144]
and UKVI,[145] to safeguard
and promote the welfare of all children. Children trafficked into
the UK may be particularly vulnerable as a result of their experiences.
[146] Add to
this cultural and language barriers,[147]
an unawareness of their rights,[148]
a general suspicion of public authorities, or that victims may
have been groomed to give a false account of themselves by their
exploiters and it is not hard to understand why, despite efforts
on the part of public authorities, it remains difficult to establish
a connection between trafficked children and those with a duty
to protect and provide for them.[149]
Nevertheless the existing processes require trafficked children
to go "from agency to agency, to meet different people, to
retell their story again and again" in order to access welfare
and legal assistance.[150]
Other witnesses added that inadequate treatment of trafficked
children was a consequence of existing services being improperly
implemented and cautioned against recommending new measures.[151]
103. Trafficked children are "very vulnerable
to being re-trafficked".[152]
Dan Boucher of Christian Action Research and Education (CARE)
told us that "between 2005 and 2010, 32% of rescued trafficked
children were lost while in local authority care."[153]
It is hard to be certain about the reasons for this. In part it
may be because the children continue to have the same vulnerabilities
that made them susceptible to trafficking in the first place,
or because those who originally trafficked them continue to exert
influence. But we are concerned that the barriers we have identified
to trafficked children securing safe welfare services and legal
assistance may force some, through desperation, to turn to their
former traffickers, or another adult who offers assistance with
a view to exploiting them, and thus be a contributory factor to
the high proportion of children re-trafficked.
CARE ORDERS AND CAFCASS GUARDIANS
104. A child who is the subject of an application
for a Care Order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 will
have an independent guardian appointed by Cafcass and may have
an Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO). While this can provide
some valuable remedy for trafficked children, the remit and expertise
of Cafcass guardians, restricted as it is to welfare and the family
courts, is too narrow to meet the particular and cross-agency
needs of trafficked children.[154]
Equally, IROs do not provide a sufficient service.[155]
We also noted that children aged 17, or 16 if they are married,
are not eligible for section 31 care orders.[156]
105. Local authority Care Orders and Cafcass guardians
are an insufficient response to the particular needs of trafficked
children.
OPTIONS FOR ADVOCATES
106. There was widespread agreement among our witnesses
that the specific support required by a trafficked child would
most appropriately be provided by an individual representative
with the following characteristics:
· expertise, knowledge and training across
a wide range of public services [157]
· an ability to act as a focal point for
issues regarding the child
· independence, to give unbiased advice
to the child and engender trust that someone is "on their
side" [158]
· an ability to ensure that "the child's
voice is heard",[159]
and
· the right to have access to information
and appropriate documents from police, social services, the NHS
and other agencies.
107. 'Guardian' is the most common description of
this type of role and is used in the EU Directive.[160]
We prefer the term 'advocate'. It does not carry any implication
of parental responsibility for the child, and best expresses the
key purposes of the roleto ensure that the child's voice
is heard and that decisions are taken in the child's best interest.
We considered three different models for creating an advocate
scheme: a Government policy initiative, an agreement among stakeholders,
and a statutory scheme.
Advocates by policy
108. The Home Office announced a trial involving
'personal advocates' in January 2014.[161]
The Minister for Modern Slavery and Organised Crime, Karen Bradley
MP, told us that a personal advocate would be:
both an expert in trafficking and also someone
who is completely independent of the local authority- somebody
who is just there for the victim, not part of the local authority,
who knows what the processes are, what the offences are, how to
help the victim...it is a one-stop shop for the victim.[162]
Twenty-two local authorities are expected to be involved
in the trials which are planned to commence by the summer of 2014.[163]
109. While our witnesses generally welcomed the Home
Office's commitment to developing an advocate scheme, we heard
concerns that a solely policy-based approach would not fully meet
the needs of trafficked children. Barnardo's described the Home
Office's announcement as a "step in the right direction"
but cautioned that personal advocates would not have "legal
responsibility for the child in order to make decisions in their
best interest" and would not be equipped to "hold agencies
to account if they fail to support child victims of trafficking".
As a result, they concluded that Home Office-appointed personal
advocates would "not address the most significant issues
these children face".[164]
Advocates by agreement among stakeholders
110. The Scottish Guardianship Scheme, which was
extended by three years in February 2013 following a 30 month
pilot, is underpinned not by legislation but by a protocol agreed
between stakeholders. The Scheme's Service Manager, Catriona MacSween,
described guardians as:
assertive, committed watchdogswe make
sure that we defend the rights of the child, that decisions are
taken in their best interests and that young people's wishes and
views are heard and involved in all the decisions that are made
about them.[165]
We heard evidence of the success of the Scheme,[166]
including that "less than 10%" of children involved
had gone missing.[167]
111. We were told that there were some initial difficulties
both in assuring other professionals over the functions and motives
of the guardians and in ensuring that guardians were included
in discussions about social services and immigration issues.[168]
We were also cautioned that the Scottish model would not necessarily
translate well to England, as in Scotland both trafficked children
and expertise in dealing with them are heavily concentrated in
Glasgow, where partnership working is particularly well established,[169]
whereas the pattern of offending in England arises in both urban
and rural areas, and is the responsibility of many different police
forces and local agencies.
Advocates in legislation
112. The majority of the children charities we heard
from supported a statutory advocacy scheme. Legislation, they
argued, would grant advocates legally enforceable powers to "take
any action that is in the best interests of the child",[170]
even when it went against the child's expressed desires. The Immigration
Law Practitioners' Association (ILPA) told us that child victims
may, often as a result of grooming by traffickers, give instructions
to their lawyers that are against their own best interests which
the lawyer is then required to follow. An advocate with the appropriate
legal powers would be able to give instructions to a lawyer on
the child's behalf even where the child's expressed wishes are
against his or her best interests.[171]
113. The power to represent a child would provide
advocates with a legal basis to hold agencies accountable both
through complaints mechanisms and, ultimately, through legal action.
This would make advocates better equipped to compel action and
ensure decisions are made both accurately and in a timely fashion.[172]
114. We recommend that in the Modern Slavery Bill
the Government provides for the introduction of advocates for
all trafficked children. Their extreme vulnerability justifies
bespoke support. Such a scheme would also further support the
Bill's primary objectives by protecting children from those who
would exploit them and by giving those who have been victims the
support and confidence required to give evidence against their
abusers in court. The introduction of advocates should not prevent
local authorities taking trafficked children into care where appropriate.
115. We welcome the Home Office announcement of
pilot schemes for personal advocates for trafficked children.
It is not, however, a substitute for a statutory advocate scheme.
The nature of the exploitation suffered by children, together
with their youth and isolation, means they are frequently unable
to make decisions in their own best interests. Coordinated
and timely action on the part of public agencies is more likely
to occur if those agencies know they will be held to account and
that the advocate has a right to access information and appropriate
documents. Both of these functions require an advocacy scheme
underpinned by statute providing a legal basis for the advocate
to represent the child.
When should an advocate be appointed and when
should the appointment cease?
116. Chloe Setter of ECPAT told us that an advocate
should be appointed "as soon as any relevant agency or NGO
first identifies the child as a potential victim of trafficking".[173]
Dr Dan Boucher of CARE agreed, noting that "children are
most at risk of being re-trafficked in the early days".[174]
117. CARE suggested the advocate's role should come
to an end when "the child reaches the age of 18; or...a durable
solution for the child has been found".[175]
Philip Ishola, of the Counter Human Trafficking Bureau, told us
that an abrupt removal of support at 18 could be counter-productive
and a transition period would be required, in line with the approach
taken by social services to looked-after children.[176]
Such a transitionary approach may reduce the risk of a child being
re-trafficked at the point at which they reach adulthood and child-specific
support and services are withdrawn.
118. We recommend that an advocate is appointed
at the point at which a child is identified as a potential trafficking
victim and that the advocate continues to represent the child
until a durable solution based on the best interests of the child
is found, or the child reaches the age of 21, whichever is the
earlier.
Cost
119. We have commented elsewhere in this report on
the shortage of reliable data about trafficking and modern slavery
generally. Child trafficking is no exception and thus any estimates
over the number of advocates required must by treated with caution.
From the information there is, however, it would not be unreasonable
to assume that more than 500, but fewer than 1,000, children would
require advocates at any one time.[177]
Both Cafcass and Scottish Guardianship Scheme guardians typically
work with around 25 children.[178]
Extrapolating from the cost of the Scottish scheme, the annual
cost of our proposed scheme might be somewhere between £1.5
and £3 million.[179]
120. The Children's Society and UNICEF UK suggested
that the cost of advocates would be offset by savings realised
through the better decision-making and more effective legal representation
they would bring, therefore reducing the number of costly appeals.
They told us, for example, that the cost of an age assessment
appeal "ranges from £15,000 to £75,000 per case."
Similarly, substantial damages have been awarded to children wrongly
detained as adults in detention centres.[180]
121. In recommending the creation of an advocate
scheme for trafficked children we have been mindful of the effect
on the public purse. On the basis of the evidence we have received,
we do not believe the cost of an advocate scheme for the small
number of highly traumatised children involved would be disproportionate.
Children and presumption of age
122. Article 13 of the EU Directive requires Member
States to ensure that where the age of a trafficked person is
uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the person is
a child, that person is presumed to be a child in order to receive
immediate access to assistance, support and protection in accordance
with Articles 14 (Assistance and support to child victims) and
15 (Protection of child victims of trafficking in human beings
in criminal investigations and proceedings). The Trafficking Convention
contains a similar provision.[181]
However, the Children's Society pointed us to a study of 17 trafficked
children that suggested that the presumption of childhood was
not being applied in practice:
ten of the 17 children had their ages disputed
by the authorities, and some had undergone multiple age assessments
before it was agreed by the authorities that they were children.
Sometimes children's ages were questioned on the basis of the
false documents traffickers had provided them. While their age
was disputed some children were placed in adult accommodation
or detention centres, did not have access to education or an independent
advocate which would otherwise be provided to a looked-after child.[182]
123. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its
report on unaccompanied migrant children, made detailed recommendations
on the recording of statistics on age disputes, and the development
of a clear set of statutory guidelines for age assessment, making
clear that young people should be given the benefit of the doubt
unless there are compelling grounds to discount their claim.[183]
The Government's response noted existing pilot schemes on collecting
age dispute statistics, and work to develop a multi-disciplinary
approach to age assessment. It did not believe that statutory
guidance was likely to be needed, or that the age assessment process
is a matter of young people being given the benefit of the doubt.[184]
124. Chloe Setter of Ecpat told us that local authorities
face "a conflict of interest" in making age assessments
in that if "they find that person to be a child, they have
to support and accommodate them. If they find them to be an adult,
they send them to London, and they have to be put through the
asylum system".[185]
UNICEF UK said that the appropriate response to this issue was
a statutory presumption that, where age is uncertain or disputed,
but there is reason to believe the victim may be a child, the
victim is presumed to be under 18.[186]
We recommend that a presumption of age clause be added to the
draft Bill to give clear effect to the UK's international obligations.
Special measures and protection
of victims
125. Special measures, such as providing screens
to shield witnesses and enabling witnesses to give evidence via
a video link or in private, are designed to help vulnerable and
intimidated witnesses give evidence in court to the best of their
ability.[187] Child
witnesses are eligible for special measures under section 16 of
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Adult victims
of sexual or trafficking (but not all modern slavery) offences[188]
appearing as a witness in relation to those proceedings are eligible
for special measures under Section 17(4) of that Act. The CPS
acknowledges that it needs to use special measures more effectively
to protect victims of modern slavery.[189]
126. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act 1999 restricts evidence or questions about a complainant's
sexual history when the accused is charged with a sexual offence.
There is no analogous provision in respect of modern slavery offences,
leaving victims unprotected from questioning of their personal
history when giving evidence.[190]
We were told that victims of exploitation were often targeted
because of particular vulnerabilities: "alcoholism, drug
abuse, mental health problems, poverty", information which
could be used by the defence to focus unfairly on the victim's
background and "obfuscate the real issues in the case".[191]
It was also suggested to us that "the crimes a victim commits
at the behest of the trafficker should only be admissible in the
trafficking trial by leave of the judge".[192]
127. A further possibility is for modern slavery
offences to attract a "ticket" for Judges, whereby only
specially-trained Judges would be able to sit on modern slavery
trials. A similar system is in place in respect of judges hearing
cases involving sexual offences.
128. We recommend that the Government
a) extends the existing special measures under
section 17(4) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999
to include all modern slavery offences;
b) extends the scope of section 41 of the
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to include victims
of modern slavery;
c) considers, in collaboration with the Lord
Chief Justice and the President of the Queen's Bench Division,
the merits of a Modern Slavery Act "ticket" for judges,
or similar arrangements.
Legal assistance
129. Many of the victims we met had been located,
identified and assisted by lawyers working pro bono for victims'
charities. The importance of legal assistance is recognised in
Article 15(2) of the Trafficking Convention, which requires a
signatory state to provide a "right to legal assistance and
to free legal aid for victims under the conditions provided by
its internal law".[193]
130. Access to and eligibility for legal aid for
civil legal services is determined by the Legal Aid, Sentencing
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 ("LASPO 2012").
Only those civil legal services expressly included within Schedule
1 of LASPO 2012 may be funded by the Legal Aid Agency, unless
the case meets the strict requirements of the exceptional funding
scheme, which has been heavily criticised and has made only a
very small number of grants of funding to date.[194]
All civil funding is also subject to a means (of the applicant)
and merits (of the case) test. At present, victims of trafficking
can receive legal aid for certain specified civil legal services
under paragraph 32 of Schedule 1, but in order to do so they must
have received a positive NRM reasonable grounds decision.
131. If a victim has received a negative NRM decision,
they may seek to redress an erroneous decision by way of judicial
review, which challenges the way in which a decision has been
made, rather than the rights and wrongs of the conclusion reached.
NRM judicial reviews currently attract legal aid funding but the
Ministry of Justice's proposed residence test will mean that unless
a person has accrued 12 months' lawful residence in the UK, they
will be ineligible for legal aid. There is a proposed exemption
from the residence test for trafficked persons but this does not
extend to judicial review.[195]
As the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association ("ILPA")
told us:
By definition, a trafficking case involves a
person being brought to the UK for the purposes of their exploitation.[196]
Many will have been taken to the UK through irregular means and
thus will be unable to meet the requirement for 12 months lawful
residence in the UK.[197]
132. ILPA suggested that the current legal aid system
leaves gaps in assistance. First, the threshold requirement, which
means that only those who have received a positive NRM reasonable
grounds decision receive funding, automatically excludes funding
for legal assistance to help a victim increase their chance of
receiving that positive NRM decision.[198]
Without a positive NRM decision, the victim has no access to funded
civil legal services. Second, the structure of legal aid contracts
restricts the number of cases taken on and therefore the number
of victims who can be provided with assistance.[199]
133. We recommend the establishment of a fund
for provision of legal services to victims of modern slavery consistent
with our international obligations but also to meet the practical
need for timely legal advice. Regardless, we recommend that the
definition of victims in paragraph 32 of Schedule 1 of the Legal
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is expanded
to cover victims of all modern slavery offences and that funding
is retained for judicial review challenges to negative NRM decisions.
We also recommend that legal aid is available to defendants for
Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Orders or Risk Orders as with
other civil prevention orders.
Compensation
134. Luis CdeBaca, the United States Ambassador-at-Large
to Combat Trafficking in Persons, told us that compensation
payments to victims, whether as part of the exploiter's sentence,
by way of civil action or through a recognised scheme or similar
process, are one of the "characteristics of successful victim
support legislation".[200]
All of the methods Mr CdeBaca mentioned are theoretically available
in the UK, though the extent to which they are used varies.
COMPENSATION ORDERS IN FAVOUR OF
VICTIMS
135. Section 130 of the Powers of Criminal Courts
(Sentencing) Act 2000 gives a court the power to require a person
convicted of an offence to pay compensation for personal injury,
loss, damage, funeral expenses or bereavement resulting from the
offence. Since 2012, a court has been required to "consider
making a compensation order in any case where" section 130
empowers it to do so.[201]
The effect of section 130(12) of the 2000 Act and of section 13(5)
and (6) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is that compensation
is protected from erosion by fines or confiscation orders where
the offender's means are insufficient to pay both.
136. Article 15(4) of the Trafficking Convention
suggests the establishment of a fund for victim compensation or
other forms of assistance to victims, funded by assets confiscated
from traffickers. Professor Tsachi Keren-Paz of Keele University
School of Law noted that Israel had established such a fund and,
while such schemes have problems, in his opinion the absence of
such a fund is worse.[202]
For Professor Keren-Paz, the point is that the proceeds of fines
and confiscation should be used only to compensate victims, and
not for funding law enforcement or prevention. He commented that
to do otherwise means that "victims, as a group, subsidise
law enforcement activities".[203]
The Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review recommended
that a significant element of the proceeds of the confiscation
order should be allocated to a special victims compensation fund
within the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.[204]
Similarly, the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association suggested
that if cash seizure and forfeiture is pursued, "the police
should have in mind the 'victim' provisions in section 301 of
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that allow a person who has been
deprived of their cash by unlawful means to make an application
for the seized money to be released to them".[205]
137. We questioned whether all victims of the exploiter
or only those who appear as witnesses at the exploiter's trial
should receive compensation from a compensation order. Luis CdeBaca
explained that the United States has a mandatory restitution scheme
where a sum ordered by a judge is paid to victims by the Government
from confiscated assets. It is not a pre-condition that the victim
has to give evidence in order to benefit. As Mr CdeBaca explained,
this can mean that in cases with a large number of victims there
may not be much paid to each victim; in the case he described
there were 300 victims, not all of whom testified, but "everybody
got victim services; everybody got family unification; everybody
got the full panoply of victim protections".[206]
RING-FENCING
138. The Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence
Review recommended that some of the proceeds of confiscation orders
enforced in modern slavery cases should be ring-fenced for both
victim compensation and to support policing efforts in combating
modern slavery.[207]
We asked Mark Sedwill, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office,
for his views on ring-fencing for victims and for policing. He
cautioned that ring-fencing for victims would not necessarily
increase the funding available, in part because it tends to displace
other sources of funding, even if the original intention was to
supplement them. In his opinion, the "key thing is to identify
the amount of funding that is required for victims and then work
on whatever funding sources might be necessary for that".[208]
In relation to policing, he said that the Home Office was reviewing
how to fund modern slavery investigations and would consider ring-fencing,
but cautioned that the range of training and capabilities which
police forces need to build are not specific to modern slavery.[209]
CIVIL CLAIMS AND THE COMPENSATION
SCHEME
139. Victims of trafficking can bring claims for
breach of contract, protection from harassment and false imprisonment
in the County Court or High Court; and for discrimination, unpaid
wages, breach of working time and unfair dismissal in the Employment
Tribunal. ATLEU suggest that "the ability of victims to take
such claims is severely constrained by the lack of availability
of legal aid".[210]
140. In addition to claims brought in the civil courts
and tribunals, the UK meets its international obligations to provide
compensation to victims[211]
through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 ("the
2012 Scheme"). However, as our evidence from Hogan Lovells
International LLP makes clear, the 2012 Scheme has not been drafted
or adapted to meet the needs of victims of modern slavery.[212]
To be eligible, a victim of crime must have sustained "a
criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being
a direct victim of a crime of violence committed in a relevant
place." The existing modern slavery offences are not included
within the Scheme's definition of a "crime of violence",
in contrast to crimes such as arson, which are listed as part
of the definition.[213]
As a result, only certain victims of modern slavery receive compensation
from this source, specifically those victims for whom the facts
of their enslavement means that they were subject to "a threat
against a person, causing fear of immediate violence in circumstances
which would cause a person of reasonable firmness to be put in
such fear".[214]
Hogan Lovells say that this is often very difficult to prove in
the absence of detailed records to evidence specific attacks or
threats. Some victims' claims have been accepted under the 2012
Scheme, due to the control and exploitation involved in their
enslavement, but not all and this has created a patchwork of coverage,
contrary to the UK's international obligations.
141. Compensation under the 2012 Scheme is calculated
according to the injury sustained and the severity of that injury.
For sexual and physical abuse cases the 2012 Scheme provides a
specific tariff. Hogan Lovells argue that "Having a simple
award for human trafficking would take into account the psychological
damage often attributable and would take into account the loss
of liberty and other injuries that victims of trafficking or slavery
suffer."[215]
CONCLUSIONS ON COMPENSATION
142. We recommend that paragraph 2(1) of Annex
B of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 is amended
to make specific reference to crimes of modern slavery, and that
the Scheme should be funded accordingly. Victims should be compensated
not for a loss of earnings for what is illegal employment, but
for the loss of opportunity to earn money freely. We also recommend
that the Government considers creating a specific tariff for victims
of modern slavery, and uses some of the proceeds of confiscated
assets to boost the money available for victim compensation through
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.
Child Rights Impact Assessment
143. Cabinet Office guidance on how the Government
should consider the articles of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child when making new policy and legislation includes the
suggestion that it "would be helpful... if explanatory notes
included a summary of the anticipated effects of legislation on
children and on the compatibility of draft legislation with the
UNCRC". No such assessment has been made for the draft Modern
Slavery Bill.[216]
We recommend that the Home Office complies with Cabinet Office
guidance when publishing the Modern Slavery Bill and includes
a summary in the explanatory notes of the anticipated effects
of the Bill on children.
67 Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review,
p33. Back
68
Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review, p34. Back
69
Written evidence from Anti-Slavery International Back
70
Case study submitted by the William Wilberforce Trust, quoted
in the Centre for Social Justice, It Happens Here, March
2013, p7. Back
71
RACE in Europe Partners, Victim or Criminal? Trafficking for
Forced Criminal Exploitation in Europe, UK chapter, January
2014, p18. Back
72
Written evidence from the AIRE Centre Back
73
[2013] EWCA Crim 991; [2014] 1 All E.R. 113 (hereafter R v
L) Back
74
[2008] EWCA Crim 2835 (hereafter R v O) Back
75
Written evidence from Peter Willis Back
76
R v L Ibid. Back
77
Q 641 (Lord Judge) and written evidence from Dr Anne Gallagher Back
78
Written evidence from Dr Anne Gallagher Back
79
Written evidence from Dr Anne Gallagher Back
80
Written evidence from Rt Hon Frank Mulholland QC, Lord Advocate
for Scotland Back
81
Written evidence from Dr Anne Gallagher Back
82
Written evidence from Rt Hon Frank Mulholland QC, Lord Advocate
for Scotland and Q 632 (Nick Hunt) Back
83
R v L, para 17 Back
84
CPS Guidance on Human Trafficking, Smuggling and Slavery, February
2014. Back
85
Written evidence from the AIRE Centre. Back
86
CPS Guidance on Human Trafficking, Smuggling and Slavery, February
2014. Back
87
Ibid. Back
88
For example Article 26 of the Trafficking Convention, and see
also, R v L at para 9. Back
89
For example, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 section 31 creates
a series of defences described as "Defences based on Article
31(1) of the Refugee Convention", or the law on self defence
which arises both under the common law defence of self-defence
and the defences provided by section 3(1) of the Criminal Law
Act 1967 (use of force in the prevention of crime or making arrest).
It has been refined by the introduction and amendment of section
76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 in relation
to householders and use of force. Back
90
Section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 Back
91
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group on
the National Referral Mechanism Back
92
Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review, p57. Back
93
QQ1320-1323 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
94
Q 1243 (Glyn Williams) Back
95
Written evidence from Anti-Slavery International Back
96
Written evidence from Hope for Justice Back
97
Written evidence from Focus On Labour Exploitation (FLEX) Back
98
Written evidence from the AIRE Centre Back
99
Q 1242 (Liam Vernon) Back
100
Example provided by the Poppy project within the written evidence
from ILPA Back
101
Written evidence from Anti-Slavery International; and the AIRE
Centre Back
102
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group on
the National Referral Mechanism Back
103
Written evidence from Anti-Slavery International Back
104
For example, Q 65 (Saadiya Chaudary) Back
105
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group on
the National Referral Mechanism Back
106
Q 1234 (Sarah Rapson) Back
107
Q 1324 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
108
Q1225 (Glyn Williams) Back
109
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group on
the National Referral Mechanism Back
110
Q 1227 (Sarah Rapson) Back
111
Q 1223 (Glyn Williams) Back
112
Q 1326 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
113
Q 1225 and Q 1274 (Glyn Williams) Back
114
Q 1302 (Shauna Gillan) Back
115
Home Office, Guidance for the Competent Authorities,p14. Back
116
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group (further
submission on the National Referral Mechanism) Back
117
Q 1251 (Glyn Williams) Back
118
Q 1243, Q 1244, Q 1247 (all Glyn Williams) and Q 1270 (Sarah Rapson) Back
119
Q 1243 (Glyn Williams) Back
120
Q 1224 (Glyn Williams) Back
121
Q 1277 (Glyn Williams) Back
122
Written evidence from Focus On Labour Exploitation (FLEX) Back
123
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women, http://www.endvawnow.org/ Back
124
Q 1319 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
125
Q 1228 (Sarah Rapson) Back
126
Q 1254 (Sarah Rapson) Back
127
Q 1228 (Sarah Rapson) Back
128
Q 1253 (Sarah Rapson) Back
129
Q 1291 (Zofia Duszynska) Back
130
Written evidence from the Salvation Army Back
131
QQ1247-51 (Glyn Williams) Back
132
HC Deb, 23 January 2014, col 282W Back
133
QQ 915-6 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen); recommended by the Anti-Trafficking
Monitoring Group in Wrong kind of victim?, June 2010. Back
134
Written evidence from the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group on
the National Referral Mechanism Back
135
Written evidence from René Cassin Back
136
Cm 8770, p8. Back
137
Explanatory Notes to the draft Modern Slavery Bill, para100. Back
138
Written evidence from Human Rights Watch Back
139
Written evidence from the Prison Reform Trust Back
140
Written evidence from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation
Unit (ATLEU); and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) Back
141
Draft Modern Slavery Bill: impact assessment, p3. Back
142
Written evidence from Doctors of the World UK Back
143
For example, those contained in the Children Act 1989 and the
Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000. Back
144
Section 11 of the Children Act 2004. Back
145
Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 Back
146
Written evidence from Cafcass Back
147
Written evidence from the Refugee Children's Consortium Back
148
Ibid. Back
149
Q 513 (Ilona Pinter) Back
150
Q 513 (Dan Boucher) Back
151
Written evidence from Love146 Back
152
Q 513 (Dan Boucher) Back
153
Ibid. Back
154
QQ 897-902 Back
155
Q 1105 (Nadine Finch) Back
156
Section 31(3) of the Children Act 1989. Back
157
See, for example, written evidence from CARE. See also Home Office
press release 008/14, Child victims of slavery to be given
personal support; and Heaven Crawley and Ravi KS Kohli, She
Endures with Me: An evaluation of the Scottish Guardianship Service
Pilot, April 2013. Back
158
Written evidence from Barnardo's; Home Office press release 008/14. Back
159
Q 892 (Philip Ishola); the Refugee Council and Children's Society,
Still at Risk, A review of support for trafficked children,
September 2013Home Office press release 008/14. Back
160
EU Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking
in human beings and protecting its victims, articles 14 and 16. Back
161
Home Office press release 008/14. Back
162
Q 1348 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
163
Ibid. Back
164
Written evidence from Barnardo's Back
165
Q 535 (Catriona MacSween) Back
166
Q 892 (Philip Ishola) Back
167
Q 537 (Catriona MacSween) Back
168
Q 538 (Graham O'Neill) Back
169
Ibid. Back
170
Written evidence from UNICEF UK Back
171
Written evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association Back
172
Q 883 (Chloe Setter) Back
173
Q 886 (Chloe Setter) Back
174
Q 595 (Dan Boucher) Back
175
Written evidence from CARE Back
176
Q 895 (Philip Ishola) Back
177
Q 887 (Chloe Setter) Back
178
Q 540 (Catriona MacSween), Q 1153 (Anthony Douglas) Back
179
Based on data provided in written evidence by The Children's Society
and UNICEF UK. Back
180
Written evidence by The Children's Society and UNICEF UK Back
181
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings, Article 10(3). Back
182
Written evidence by the Children's Society Back
183
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights of unaccompanied
migrant children and young people in the UK, First Report
of Session 2013-14, HL Paper 9 and HC 196, paras 88-89 and 103. Back
184
The Government Response to the First Report from the Joint Committee
on Human Rights of Session 2013-14, HL Paper 9 and HC196, Cm 8778. Back
185
Q 23 (Chloe Setter) Back
186
Written evidence by UNICEF UK. Back
187
Crown Prosecution Service, www.cps.gov.uk Back
188
Defined by section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment
of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. Back
189
Q 612 (Nick Hunt) Back
190
Q 673 (Caroline Haughey) Back
191
Ibid. Back
192
Q 174 (Riel Karmy-Jones) Back
193
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings, Article 15(2). Back
194
Joint Committee on Human Rights, The implications for
access to justice of the Government's proposals to reform legal
aid, Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, HL Paper 100 and HC
766, paras 132-144. Back
195
The Government Response to the Seventh Report from the Joint Committee
on Human Rights of Session 2013-14, HL Paper100 and HC766, Cm
8821. Back
196
As defined in the Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings, Article 4(a). Back
197
Q 1288 (Shauna Gillan) Back
198
Q 1824 (Zofia Duszynska) and written evidence by Human Rights
Watch Back
199
Q 1294 (Shauna Gillan) Back
200
Q 694 (Luis CdeBaca) Back
201
Section 130(2A) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing)
Act 2000. Back
202
Written evidence from Professor Tsachi Keren-Paz Back
203
Penal Law 5737-1977 SH 5737; SH 5766 §377E (Isr.). Back
204
Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review, p18. Back
205
Written evidence by the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association Back
206
QQ 704-705 (Luis CdeBaca) Back
207
Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review, p18. Back
208
Q 743 (Mark Sedwill) Back
209
QQ 745-746 (Mark Sedwill) Back
210
Written evidence from Anti Trafficking And Labour Exploitation
Unit (ATLEU) Back
211
Trafficking Convention Article 15(4) and EU Directive Article
17. Back
212
Written evidence from Hogan Lovells International LLP Back
213
Definition 2(1)(e) of Annex B to the 2012 Scheme. Back
214
Ibid. Back
215
Written evidence from Hogan Lovells International LLP Back
216
Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation, July 2013,
para 11.30 states "The Government has also made a commitment
to give due consideration to the articles of the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) when making new policy and
legislation. In doing so, the Government has stated that it will
always consider the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child's
recommendations but recognise that...[it] may at times disagree
on what compliance with certain articles entails. It would be
helpful...if explanatory notes included a summary of the anticipated
effects of legislation on children and on the compatibility of
draft legislation with the UNCRC.
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