4 Anti-Slavery Commissioner
144. The Home Office identified the provisions relating
to the creation of an Anti-Slavery Commissioner (the Commissioner)
as "one of the most important aspects" of the draft
Bill; a role which could galvanise the national response to modern
slavery.[217] Our witnesses,
who included two EU independent national anti-trafficking rapporteurs
and the holders of three domestic posts upon which the proposal
for an Anti-Slavery Commissioner is based, put similar emphasis
on the significance of the role.[218]
Their evidence however, while generally supportive of the proposition
that there be an Anti-Slavery Commissioner, has caused us to have
concerns regarding the Commissioner's status and remit as set
out in the draft Bill: first, the absence of statutory protection
to secure the Home Secretary's stated intention of independence
for the Commissioner; and second, the narrowness with which it
is proposed the role be defined.
Independence
145. The Dutch National Rapporteur, Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen,
illustrated the importance of statutory independence for a UK
Anti-Slavery Commissioner when she told us that the long-standing
effectiveness of her own role lay in its statutory independence
and the trust engendered as a consequence.[219]
The Home Office told us that it intends the Anti-Slavery Commissioner
to be "independent", with "the authority and autonomy
they need to carry out their functions effectively".[220]
We welcome this assurance and have no doubt that the current Home
Secretary would prioritise the Commissioner's independence in
practice. Many of our witnesses, however, pointed out the draft
Bill is not consistent with these assurances. We are sympathetic
to those who cautioned against relying on either the good intentions
of the holder of the office of Home Secretary[221]
or the personal qualities of a particular Commissioner to ensure
long-term independence;[222]
a clear statutory framework of independence is necessary.
APPOINTMENT OF STAFF
146. Under clause 30(4) of the draft Bill, the Secretary
of State would provide the Commissioner with such staff as the
Secretary of State considers necessary. This is not a novel proposition,
mirroring the arrangements put in place for the Surveillance Camera
Commissioner.[223]
The Home Office clarified in written evidence that the intention
is that the Commissioner will "be supported by a small team
of civil servants from within the Home Office".[224]
147. The Independent Police Complaints Commission
stressed the importance of freedom to appoint staff to the Commissioner's
independence:
[...] the perception of that independence, if
not its reality, may be affected by its statutory closeness to
the department. Unlike the Prisons Inspectorate or the IPCC (or
indeed the Victims Commissioner), the Anti Slavery Commissioner
[...] will be unable to engage his or her own staff, or be located
outside the department. He or she will therefore be relying on
negotiating the right number and expertise of departmental civil
servants, whose careers and ultimate accountability lie within
the department. In my view, this is unfortunate, as it does not
provide the Commissioner with any visible separation from the
department.
Other comparable domestic and international Commissioners
have the freedom to appoint their own staff.[225]
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson
QC, told us that he had appointed a specialist adviser and, given
his role, it was "essential that [he] should make that decision".
He added that if the Commissioner was to be a simple "adjunct
to the law enforcement process", such freedom might not be
required.[226] The
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, John Vine,
told us that his staff were largely civil servants from across
the civil service but that he was "able to advertise for
staff in newspapers in order to get a good mix of skills".[227]
We note that, under the UK Borders Act 2007, section 49, "the
Chief Inspector may appoint staff".[228]
REPORTS AND PLANS
148. The draft Bill provides for the Commissioner
to make three distinct types of reports:
· on "permitted matters" (under
clause 31)
· annual plans (under Clause 32), and
· annual reports (also under Clause 32).
149. Clause 31(3) of the draft Bill defines a permitted
matter as one which either the Secretary of State has "authorised
the Commissioner to report on", or one proposed in "the
current annual plan, approved by the Secretary of State".
Regardless of the flexibility the Home Secretary may grant in
practice, the terms of the draft Bill in this subsection give
the Home Secretary the power to exercise operational control over
the choice of topic of the Commissioner's reports and to prevent
the Commissioner responding quickly to an urgent or topical issue.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson
QC, pointed out that he had the right to produce reports on his
own initiative,[229]
while the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
felt "totally free" to choose the topics of his reports
as he was "appointed to bring [his] experience and judgment
to bear on what [he] should look at".[230]
We believe that the Anti-Slavery Commissioner should be able to
exercise the same degree of discretion and judgement.
150. Clause 32 of the draft Bill requires the Commissioner
to submit an annual plan setting out objectives, priorities and
proposed activities for the year which would be subject to approval
by the Secretary of State. This arrangement was criticised by
the United States Ambassador-at-Large, Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, Luis CdeBaca:
One of the things that struck me about the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner was the idea that that person would have to be basically
negotiating the terms of their mandate with the Secretary of State
every year. With regard to
my mandate, it works for the
reporting and the co-ordinating that I do across the United States
because I do not have to renegotiate it with anybody. If, in the
United States, a new Secretary of State or a new Attorney-General
comes in
we don't have to go and convince them that they
need to listen to some guy in the State Department, because the
statute says that it needs to be done. It was something that just
jumped out at me. It seemed like it was going to be a stumbling
blockor a potential stumbling block.[231]
151. The draft Bill gives the Secretary of State
powers to remove (or in the case of reports on permitted matters
direct the Commissioner to omit) material from reports where the
Secretary of State thinks it is "undesirable for reasons
of national security, might jeopardise an individual's safety
or might prejudice the investigation or prosecution of an offence".[232]
Such wide-ranging powers to enforce redaction seem unnecessary
to us and are out of step with international comparators. Both
the Dutch and Finnish national rapporteurs publish reports unredacted.[233]
The Australian Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
is trusted to decide whether there is information in his reports
that might prejudice national security or endanger a person's
safety.[234]
152. The Home Office suggested that the redaction
provisions in the draft Bill broadly mirror those applicable to
the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism, in terms of prejudicing
criminal proceedings, and the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders
and Immigration regarding the safety of individuals and national
security.[235] Yet
the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism himself told us that the
use of the term "undesirable" in the draft Bill seems
"to give the Home Secretary a very broad discretion"
to redact material on grounds of national security and suggested
"necessary" might be more appropriate.[236]
We concur.
153. The draft Bill states that the Secretary of
State should lay the Commissioner's annual reports before Parliament.[237]
The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, to
whom a similar arrangement applies, told that it did not impinge
on his independence.[238]
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism noted that formally his
reports are laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State on
receipt but that in practice this had meant "a struggle"
of up to three weeks and left open the potential for the provision
of information to Parliament and publication to be delayed for
news management purposes.[239]
The draft Bill gives no indication of timescales for laying the
Commissioner's reports before Parliament.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON INDEPENDENCE
154. We welcome the Government's proposal to create
an independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. But we note that the
statutory safeguards intended to ensure independence for the Commissioner
fall short of those applicable to comparable roles, such as the
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism and the Independent Chief Inspector
of Borders and Immigration. The draft Bill does not offer sufficient
protection for the Commissioner's independence in the long term.
Failure to do will undermine the Commissioner's credibility and
capacity to establish relationships based on trust with NGOs and
other stakeholder groups whose role in combating modern slavery
is well-recognised.
155. We do not consider the Surveillance Camera
Commissioner an appropriate model for providing staff and recommend
that the Commissioner be permitted to appoint his or her own staff
on the same terms as the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders
and Immigration. We further recommend that the Commissioner be
given powers to publish both annual and ad hoc reports on his
or her own initiative and without the requirement to secure the
approval of the Home Secretary; and to prepare a business plan
covering more than a single year. The Commissioner's reports should
be redacted on national security grounds only when necessary and
should be laid before Parliament within four weeks of receipt.
Our Bill sets out how these conditions should be achieved in legislation.
Functions
156. The Minister for Modern Slavery, Karen Bradley
MP, explained that the Commissioner was intended to be "the
person who puts the rocket up the law enforcement agencies"[240]
and indeed the functions of the Commissioner, as set out in Clause
31(1) of the draft Bill, encapsulate this ambition. Police representatives
agreed that the national coordination and promotion of best
practice which the Commissioner could bring to this aspect of
his work would improve the fight against modern slavery.[241]
157. We are disappointed however that the functions
envisaged for the Commissioner in the draft Bill are restricted
to law enforcement. As the ATMG told us, the role as drafted is
"significantly weaker than equivalent mechanisms elsewhere
in Europe".[242]
Its narrow remit contrasts, for example, with that of the successful
Dutch national rapporteur, who described "a very broad mandate",
facilitating innovative and creative action.[243]
RESPONSIBILITY FOR VICTIMS
158. Several of our witnesses called for the Commissioner's
role to go beyond simply encouraging the prosecution of specific
offences and for it expressly to be extended to representation
of, and advocacy for, victims of modern slavery. The Modern Slavery
Bill Evidence Review recommended the Commissioner should "represent
and give a voice to the concerns and best interests of victims
and survivors of modern slavery".[244]
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concurred,
arguing that such an extension "would be an important step
in the fight against trafficking".[245]
159. The Home Office told us that a focused Commissioner
role was "crucial" to improving law enforcement and
that this would be "the most effective way to prevent people
from becoming victims in the first place".[246]
Yet our other witnesses emphasised that victim support was fundamental
to achieving more prosecutions and should therefore be a specific
function of the Commissioner. Luis CdeBaca emphasised the indivisibility
of the three Ps of protection, prosecution and prevention. We
agree with the Dutch rapporteur that "protecting victims
and prosecuting criminals are two sides of the same coin".
160. We recommend that the Anti-Slavery Commissioner's
functions clearly include victim protection. It is fundamental
to achieving the Government's aim of improved law enforcement.
BROADER RESPONSIBILITIES
161. We note that the draft Bill includes no clear
or specific mention of data collection. Our evidence suggests
that this is a weakness: we heard of how the long-run statistical
reports produced by the office of the Dutch national rapporteur
had enabled authorities to make an informed assessment of the
changing nature of modern slavery.[247]
The AIRE Centre emphasised the potential importance of improved
data in shaping measures to prevent modern slavery.[248]
We were also told that an independent Commissioner was more likely
to be trusted than government and therefore could be a more effective
collector and collator of statistics from victims and NGOs.[249]
The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern
Day Slavery has argued that the creation of the Commissioner would
be key to improving statistics on modern slavery.[250]
We agree.
162. We also heard evidence of the importance of
the Commissioner promoting trust, cooperation and partnerships
between law enforcement bodies, national and local government,
agencies, other commissioners and NGOs. Partnership was a key
feature of the Commissioner role as envisaged by the Centre for
Social Justice and set out in its report, It Happens Here:
This position should work independently from
but in partnership with government departments, encourage engagement
and the sharing of information with NGOs and communicate the UK's
stance on fighting modern slavery at a European and international
level.[251]
The Dutch and Finnish national rapporteurs and Luis
CdeBaca all gave examples of the ways in which they, with their
broader mandates, facilitated effective multi-agency and cross-sector
collaboration.[252]
163. The Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review recommended
that the "The Anti-Slavery Commissioner should be mandated
to work closely with international equivalents [...] and international
partners to increase bi-lateral law enforcement agreements and
more effective prevention measures". The Dutch national rapporteur
emphasised the importance of such international cooperation
in preventing trafficking.[253]
The lack of a defined international role was identified by the
ATMG as a weakness of the Commissioner role as set out in the
draft Bill.[254]
164. Accurate and comprehensive data is an essential
element in the prevention of modern slavery. It can also play
an important role in prosecution by identifying trends in modern
slavery crime. An independent Commissioner is ideally placed to
act as a focal point for the collection, compilation, analysis
and dissemination of information and statistics. The Commissioner's
functions should reflect this.
- Just as the three Ps of combating of modern
slaveryprevention, protection and prosecution, are indivisible,
so too should a fourth P be added to the list: partnership. The
Anti-Slavery Commissioner will not be sufficiently empowered to
adopt a galvanising role if their remit is limited simply to filling
in gaps between other preexisting roles. It is essential
that the Commissioner is empowered to work with national and international
partners and to promote and facilitate domestic and international
collaboration on the part of others. The Commissioner needs to
have an overarching remit to enable the necessary holistic approach.
Clause 33 of the Committee Bill would achieve this.
217 Written evidence from the Home Office, Role of
the Anti-Slavery Commissioner Back
218
Ibid. Back
219
QQ 916-917 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen) Back
220
Written evidence from the Home Office, Role of the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner Back
221
Written evidence from Lord Morrow Back
222
Q 1057 (John Vine) Back
223
Written evidence from the Home Office, Role of the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner Back
224
Ibid. Back
225
Q39 (Dr Maggie Atkinson), Q918 and Q924 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen),
Q 1040 (Eva Biaudet), Q1061 (John Vine), Q1062 (David Anderson
QC) Back
226
Q1062 (David Anderson QC) Back
227
Q 1061 (John Vine) Back
228
UK Borders Act 2007 s.49 Back
229
Q 1063 (David Anderson QC) Back
230
Q 1063 (John Vine) Back
231
Q 706 (Luis CdeBaca) Back
232
Clauses and 31(5) and 32(7) Back
233
Q 921, Q 1040 Back
234
Australia Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act
2010 c.29. Back
235
Written evidence from the Home Office, Role of the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner Back
236
Q 1067 (David Anderson QC) Back
237
Clause 32(6) Back
238
Q 1070 (John Vine) Back
239
Q 1070 (David Anderson QC) Back
240
Q 1340 (Karen Bradley MP) Back
241
Q 585 (Detective Inspector Roberts) Back
242
Written evidence from the ATMG, Anti-Slavery Commissioner Back
243
Q 918 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen) Back
244
Report of the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review, p41. Back
245
Written evidence from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Back
246
Written evidence from the Home Office, Role of the Anti-Slavery
Commissioner Back
247
Q 841 (Klara Skrivankova) Back
248
Written evidence from the Aire Centre Back
249
Q843 (Klara Skrivankova) and Q847 (Klara Skrivankova and Professor
Bales) Back
250
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern
Day Slavery, Inquiry into the collection, exchange and use
of data about human trafficking and modern slavery, January
2014, p7. Back
251
Centre for Social Justice, It Happens Here, March 2013,
p59. Back
252
Q 696 (Luis CdeBaca), Q 925 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen),Q 1045
(Eva Biaudet) Back
253
Q936 (Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen) Back
254
Written evidence from the ATMG, Anti-Slavery Commissioner Back
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