12.In 2012, the National Audit Office (NAO) and Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) published reviews of the CSSF’s predecessor, the Conflict Pool. The reviews found that the Conflict Pool was adept at identifying and acting on opportunities to help countries that were unstable or affected by conflict. However, both reports criticised the weak links between the Conflict Pool’s strategic objectives, its activities and the intended outcomes. ICAI also concluded that a clearer strategic framework was needed.
13.The CSSF was established to create a “more strategic approach to [the UK’s] work in conflict-affected states” than was the case under the Conflict Pool. It would do so by:
(1)establishing a new, “direct link between programmes and [the Government’s] policy objectives”. CSSF programmes would be delivered in direct support of the NSC’s regional, country and thematic strategies;
(2)bringing together expertise from all NSC Departments, and not just the FCO, DFID and MOD as was the case under the Conflict Pool. This would allow domestic expertise also to be brought to bear when tackling international and transnational security issues such as counter-terrorism and organised crime;
(3)funding more multi-year programmes in comparison with the Conflict Pool. This would help programmes to achieve sustainable change in these risky environments;
(4)combining ODA and non-ODA funding, thereby continuing Conflict Pool practices in this regard. This would enable a wider range of responses to conflict and instability overseas.
This may add up to a more strategic approach to tackling conflict and stability in countries of strategic importance to the UK. A more pertinent consideration, however, is whether this approach ultimately translates into greater strategic impact.
14.Of course, it is extremely difficult to have a strategic impact in countries that are unstable or affected by violent conflict. Each situation is different and so there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. Operating in such countries is risky. These risks must be identified and mitigated where possible. But if we accept risk we must also accept the possibility of failure. Furthermore, as Dr Stephanie Blair, a senior advisor to the Stabilisation Unit and Director of conflict and stability consultancy Opimian Ltd, explains, “Violent conflict and its resolution are intensely political”. And so there must be “coherence between political engagement [and] technical programming.” Dr Andrew Rathmell, a stabilisation expert and Director of strategic consultancy Aktis Strategy Ltd, agreed with this assessment. Providing oral evidence to the Committee, he said:
… a fund like this … works only when it brings together different instruments of national power in a political way. … the famous Petraeus surge in Iraq in 2006–07 … was not about putting troops on the ground; it was about the fusion of political engagement, political analysis, intelligence, kinetic military activity and development work. It was essentially CSSF on steroids, because special forces were involved as well. At any one moment, the leadership in the US embassy in Baghdad could cut a political deal, do some development and kill someone. That was a great fusion, which led to marvellous effect against the targets we were trying to deal with, and brought a degree of stability to Iraq for a few years. Where you can get that real fusion, it can be effective.
A key question we pursued during our inquiry was whether the CSSF is achieving just such an effect and if so, how the Government is measuring it.
15.The high-level examples of CSSF activity provided by the Government suggest that the Fund is supporting some valuable projects in pursuit of worthy goals. It is not clear, however, how representative these examples are of other CSSF projects. Nor is it clear whether these projects and the overarching programmes do in fact add up to a more meaningful effect—in other words, a strategic impact. During our inquiry we were told about the various challenges involved in identifying and measuring strategic impact.
16.For some CSSF activity, it is simply too soon to tell. Crisis response activity is intended to have an immediate effect. However, we heard that preventing conflict and developing longer-term stability can take 10–20 years. As Dr Blair stated: “In the contexts we are talking about, one year [of CSSF-funded activity] is entirely insufficient to say that we have created conditions of stability or implemented security.” The National Security Adviser told us that “As the fund develops and over the period of the Parliament, I would hope that there would be more and more examples where you can demonstrate actual impact and the achievement of objectives against British national interests.” In other words, it will take time to build up an aggregate picture of the CSSF’s impact in each country and region on the basis of quarterly reports and annual reviews (see Appendix 1, paragraphs 10–12).
17.We observed in paragraph 14 that due to the highly complex, high-risk nature of fragile and conflict-affected states, it is difficult to achieve strategic impact through CSSF activity. These conditions also make it very difficult to prove a direct link between an activity and the outcome, which in turn has implications for attributing any progress made to the CSSF. In addition, a principal aim of the CSSF is to prevent conflict and instability from happening in the first place. It is even harder to prove the link between CSSF-funded activity and something that did not come to pass. On these points, the National Security Adviser said:
Proving impact in this area is not going to be easy. … proving a negative is difficult if you are preventing conflict. We are also working in very high-risk areas, often in high-risk countries. Therefore, one cannot expect fully to achieve the objectives that one sets at the beginning of the strategies. Some of the overall strategies will fail, whereas some of the individual programmes may be relatively successful in their own terms. For wider reasons, you could say that the Syria strategy is not working, but individual programmes within that might be quite successful in their own terms.
In some cases, it is relatively easy to draw a direct line between a programme, the funding and the beneficial effect for national security. I will give you one example, of some criminal justice advisers who were funded to go [to] east Africa and whose work led directly to the seizure of £512-million worth of cocaine in UK waters. That is a direct cause and effect that one can draw in that particular programme. We established and helped to fund the Organised Immigration Crime Task Force. That led to the arrest of a smuggling gang that was smuggling 50 people into the UK every month.
There are some specific programmes and projects where you can say that you put money in at the front and you get some effect for national security at the back. But that is not true of all the cases; it is a much more complex situation. Perhaps I may cite one further example, which is in Jordan. We have an extensive series of programmes there, which help to train the military but also work in some of the refugee camps in Syria. Clearly, that work is having important effects in promoting the stability of Jordan. I would argue that it is a good example of a programme successfully supporting a strategy.
18.And of course, it is also important to remember that in those countries and regions where the CSSF is active it is not the only player. UK Government Departments and agencies such as the FCO, DFID, MOD and the security and intelligence agencies are also working bilaterally in the same countries in support of the UK’s national interests. Furthermore, other countries, multilateral organisations and international NGOs are also active in the same countries and regions as the UK, making it difficult to co-ordinate and deconflict their respective activities. The presence of so many other actors makes it all the more difficult to prove the link between CSSF-funded activity and the outcome and therefore to discern the particular impact of the CSSF.
19.We asked the panel of stabilisation experts whether the CSSF adds value in countries at risk of instability or affected by conflict, given that there are so many other international players involved. John Speakman, an Advisor at the World Bank, told us that the CSSF had “played a critical role” in securing a loan for Jordan that would help the country to manage the influx of refugees from neighbouring Syria. He said:
… you [the UK] were engaging with stakeholders and building the necessary consensus to do this operation. You have no idea how hard it is to get a Government to borrow from you to benefit refugees who are not their own citizens. … It was a very constructive conversation and operation, and I thank you for your leadership. It was really appreciated from the World Bank side.
Dr Rathmell agrees that the CSSF certainly does add value, especially where it is used to “help bring together other donors round the table on key security issues (eg in Tunisia), or shape larger interventions (eg by the US or EU).” Nevertheless, he concludes: “it is impossible where there is a crowded donor space for the UK to decide where and whether it adds value and to not act where it does not.”
20.We heard that the Government has not yet found a way to overcome the challenges involved in assessing the strategic impact of CSSF-funded activity. The process for monitoring and evaluating individual programmes has certainly improved under the CSSF in comparison with the Conflict Pool (see Appendix 1, paragraphs 10–12). And it is this information that is used to build an aggregate picture of the CSSF’s impact at the country, regional and Fund levels, using the reports on results and expenditure that are passed up the Cabinet Office chain of command to the NSC. However, Dr Rathmell told us:
… when I was in the Foreign Office [in 2008–09] I tried to commission a study that assessed for a previous Government what the return on investment was for our investment in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. MoD economists were very helpful, but we got no useful answers whatsoever. The state of the art has not moved much further since then. It is hard to quantify this in the way you might quantify the utility of HS2 or something else.
… At the macro level—whether it is better to put funds into this or that country on this or that issue—frankly, I do not think our foreign policy system is set up to make those balanced investment calculations at the moment.
Dr Rathmell argued that this is because there is still too great a focus on short-term deliverables, rather than the overall impact of the CSSF. In addition:
What [the] CSSF is not yet very good at in implementing NSC strategies is … thoroughly analysing the conflict “system”, working out the relationship between project interventions and these conflict dynamics, and then actively appraising and monitoring the interaction of the two. CSSF and posts [Embassies and Consulates] are now starting to do this but this area requires more focus in the next couple of years.
Dr Rathmell nevertheless concluded that such weaknesses in assessing the return on the Government’s investment at the ‘macro level’ does not mean that it should not attempt to assess the strategic impact of its investment in countries at risk of instability or affected by conflict.
21.The National Security Adviser conceded that measuring the impact of the CSSF is “work in progress”, not least because the CSSF involves multi-year programming and is still less than two years old. However, he also told us that
All the programmes and projects that are funded from the CSSF flow directly from the strategies set by the National Security Council, so ultimately it is the National Security Council that assesses whether the money that is being spent through the CSSF has helped to progress or achieve the objectives set in that overall strategy. In each case, that will depend on what has been achieved on the ground and what the objectives were, so it is difficult to give you a single definition of evaluation.
22.The lack of a clear framework by which to evaluate country-level investment decisions means that the NSC is in effect marking its own homework in relation to the CSSF. There is a risk that the CSSF is being used as a ‘slush fund’ for projects that may be worthy, but which do not collectively meet the needs of UK national security. The transition from the Conflict Pool to the CSSF may well have systematised (or bureaucratised) the process for approving projects but has not necessarily ensured that there is ‘a controlling mind’ in charge of the programme that ensures there is strategic focus.
23.We were unable to verify whether the CSSF’s programmes are delivering the NSC’s strategic objectives, let alone whether they are collectively having a strategic impact and therefore represent value for money for the taxpayer. This is because we do not have access to the classified NSC strategies that guide the use of CSSF funding. Nor do we have information about CSSF programmes beyond that which is in the public domain (see paragraphs 82–88).
24.The CSSF represents a more ambitious approach by the Government to tackling the causes and effects of conflict, instability and insecurity overseas than existed under the Conflict Pool. We commend the Government on creating more coherent procedures to tie spending on stability and security in parts of the world that matter to the UK to our national security goals. A more strategic approach to the activity commissioned under the CSSF is certainly to be welcomed.
25.The Committee also recognises the inherent difficulties involved in measuring the specific strategic impact of CSSF-funded activity, not least in a country or region where other Governments and organisations (including other UK Government Departments and agencies) are also involved.
26.Nevertheless, the Government has failed to provide the Committee with the evidence that we need to assess whether the activity funded by the CSSF is as coherent as it could be or is sufficiently linked to the UK’s core strategic objectives. Significantly more information is required if we are to make a judgment on these points. At present, the Committee does not have access to a breakdown of expenditure beyond the regional level, the content of the NSC strategies, the list of CSSF-funded programmes or relevant summary evaluation reports.
27.The CSSF’s budget for regional and thematic programmes in 2016–17 is £577.8 million. Dr Rathmell described this as “a very small drop in the ocean”. Yet the CSSF is funding 97 programmes in more than 40 countries. We are consequently concerned that the Government is spreading its limited resources too thin. We asked the National Security Adviser whether the programmes budget would have a greater impact if it were spent in fewer countries where the UK’s direct strategic interest is much more clearly identified. The NSA replied:
I think that is a legitimate argument, but I think we have a balance between the two. … Some of the countries in which we operate have substantial allocations. For example, Afghanistan has £90 million, Syria has £60 million and Somalia has £32 million. Those are reasonably substantive sums of money that are being allocated per country. It is not such a large number of countries.
28.The CSSF method of allocating funds appears to involve awarding grants without any strategic assessment of the needs of the country concerned. As funds are limited, it is important to focus resources on fragile states in line with UK national security goals. There is a balance to be struck between funding multi-year programmes in a smaller number of countries and the need to ensure flexibility for small-scale, shorter-term investments where opportunities such as the Colombian peace process arise. Without access to more information about the programmes funded by the CSSF, it is impossible for us to assess whether the Government has struck the right balance in its disbursement of CSSF funding between countries.
29.The use of CSSF funding in support of the more than 40 country, regional and thematic strategies created by the National Security Council dilutes its effect. The UK national interest would be better served by concentrating the bulk of CSSF funding in a smaller number of countries to achieve greater impact.
30.Conflict prevention is a stated priority of the CSSF, along with post-crisis stabilisation, crisis response and early warning of potential instability. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS & SDSR 2015) states:
We will help to address the causes of conflict and instability through increased support for tackling corruption, promoting good governance, developing security and justice, and creating jobs and economic opportunity. These are essential elements of the golden thread of democracy and development, supporting more peaceful and inclusive societies.
Conciliation Resources, an international peacebuilding organisation and CSSF Framework Supplier, agrees that focusing on the “structural drivers” of insecurity (through conflict prevention) rather than its “manifestations” (through crisis response and post-conflict stabilisation) is in the UK’s national security interests. That said, conflict prevention is by far and away the most difficult of the activities funded by the CSSF. It is extremely difficult to identify which actions will make conflict less likely, and therefore which programmes to fund, and it is even more difficult to pinpoint what these actions have ultimately achieved.
31.In oral evidence to the Committee, Dr Rathmell gave a financial reason for trying to prevent, rather than waiting to react to, conflict and instability:
All the theory and case studies tell us that, if you can find a way of investing more upstream in conflict prevention, you will get more bang for your buck. Fairly obviously, if you prevent a conflict it is much cheaper than having to do something afterwards.
Robert Chatterton Dickson, Director of Foreign Policy in the National Security Secretariat, told us how much has been committed via the Procurement Framework alone in 2016–17 so far:
Melinda Simmons, Head of the National Security Secretariat Joint Programme Hub, also explained that these figures may be somewhat misleading because in many cases, activity classed as primarily promoting security and justice, for example, will also help to prevent conflict.
32.We heard from other witnesses, however, that the CSSF does not currently spend enough on conflict prevention. Saferworld, a conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation and CSSF Framework Supplier, infers an emphasis on quick fixes and attempts to manage conflict “from the top down” from the pipeline of CSSF programmes. Providing oral evidence to the Committee, Dr Blair stated: “the CSSF has moved slightly towards conflict, security and stability, and I am not quite sure where conflict prevention is. I think we have lost it. I am deeply afraid that [the Government has] lost conflict prevention.” Dr Rathmell agreed, saying:
Most of it [CSSF programmes] is now about stabilisation and post-conflict/crisis response, so some rebalancing within Whitehall structures and CSSF is really important.
He explained that this ‘rebalancing’ may be difficult to achieve, however:
… the political cycle encourages us to invest in active conflicts, because that is what is in the headlines at the moment, and it is far easier to spend money on training the Iraqi army than preventing Iraq falling to pieces in the first place. In principle, spending on conflict prevention will be more effective, but encouraging the system to do that is really hard, for obvious political reasons.
33.In short, there is significant pressure on the Government to demonstrate tangible results quickly in return for its investment, something that does not easily fit with the long-term and often less tangible nature of conflict prevention activities (see paragraph 17). Nevertheless, it is important that the Government strikes the right balance between prevention and reaction. As Saferworld concludes:
If the UK national security interest is too narrowly defined, it could miss opportunities to address core conflict drivers preventatively, and neglect a critical focus on securing just, lasting peace overseas through support to non-violent change.
34.The CSSF covers conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilisation and crisis response. Conflict prevention is extremely difficult. But successful conflict prevention provides more desirable outcomes and better value for money than reacting to instability after it has occurred. However, given both the inherent difficulty in measuring the success of pre-crisis intervention and pressure from Parliament, the public and the media on the Government to respond to events as they develop, we have heard that such preventive activity is a ‘tough sell’ for civil servants who must point to results and value for money. There should be ministerial support for enabling sufficient funds to be reserved for conflict prevention even if immediate results are not achievable.
35.Melinda Simmons told us that about two-thirds of CSSF programming in 2016–17 is multi-year. The introduction of multi-year programming under the CSSF is to be welcomed. The continuity this provides helps CSSF-funded activity to achieve a bigger impact and a longer-lasting effect. However, we have taken conflicting evidence about the duration of projects that do not run for more than a year. Rebecca Crozier, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at International Alert, an international peacebuilding organisation and CSSF Framework Supplier, said that her organisation’s projects had typically lasted for between six and nine months. She explained that this was often because delays in signing the contracts had eaten into the time available for delivering the projects. Ruairi Nolan, Head of Research Engagement at Peace Direct, another international peacebuilding organisation and CSSF Framework Supplier, said that Peace Direct’s contracts had ranged between three and 12 months in length. He added that his organisation had not yet succeeded in getting grant extensions across financial years.
36.We put this evidence to Melinda Simmons who runs the CSSF. She said:
The six months is news to me … those projects were not programmed to run for less than a year, even before the Treasury stipulated [that the CSSF was allowed to undertake multi-year programming] in our spending review settlement. … Boards and programme deliverers were assigning annual one-year contracts and then having to start the process again. This is not activity that started and finished within the year.
The exception may be where there is new unforeseen in-year activity in response to a crisis. A good example was after the massacre in Sousse [in Tunisia in June 2015]. The Middle East [Regional] board decided to make an in-year allocation for Tunisia, and the initial activity, which would have been short-term, was transferred into a bigger programme that was bid for in the next allocation round. That is an exception, but even then it would be built into a bigger programme for following years.
37.It is difficult to reconcile the contradictory information provided by our witnesses about the duration of those projects that are not multi-year. And it is difficult for us to get to the bottom of the issue without access to the details about individual programmes and projects, which we do not currently have. More evidence is required. Nevertheless, we welcome the CSSF’s move towards more multi-year programming. We do so on the principle that continuity of support helps to create the right conditions for long-lasting change in fragile countries. It is essential that the CSSF offers enduring support where it is needed, while still preserving the flexibility to respond to crises and changing circumstances. It is also important that where there are shorter-term projects operating over a period of less than a year they are not arbitrarily constrained by the end of the financial year and can span two financial years depending on their start dates.
38.Multi-year programming provides the continuity that is essential to the stabilisation of countries that are at risk of becoming unstable or are affected by conflict. As such, it should be the norm for most of the activity funded by the CSSF, while some funding is held in reserve for responding to opportunities and crises as they arise.
39.The direct link between the strategic objectives set by the NSC and the delivery of CSSF programmes is a central feature of the “more strategic approach to [the UK’s] work in conflict-affected states”. However, the Government may not yet be reaping the full benefit of the link between the NSC strategies and CSSF programmes.
40.Two of the 14 Framework Suppliers that submitted evidence to the inquiry assert that there is greater clarity about Government priorities under the CSSF than under the Conflict Pool. But several other Framework Suppliers state that their ability to understand and respond to the Government’s priorities is hampered by the fact that the NSC strategies are classified in their entirety. There are good reasons why this is the case. As the National Security Adviser told us:
Some projects and programmes are clearly secret and we would not want it known, or the country involved might not want it known, that we are doing them. Even with publishing country strategies, some countries might feel aggrieved that there was a strategy towards them and some countries might feel aggrieved that there was no strategy towards them.
41.Nevertheless, when we asked Rebecca Crozier of International Alert what would improve Framework Suppliers’ ability to deliver the Government’s strategic objectives, she said that it would “help enormously if there were an external version of the strategy”. She explained:
The strategy that you hear about is a conversation with somebody in an embassy who says, “I want to do peace education work in Syria. I want to see whether we can use that to increase young people’s resilience to recruitment by violent extremist groups”. You understand that that is the priority and what they want to do, but you do not understand how it fits into a wider strategic approach—how it connects to priorities on defence, on the diplomatic side and on the humanitarian aid side.
This, she said, “makes it a bit difficult for us [as Framework Suppliers] to engage effectively—to put forward the right ideas and to engage in the right way with [the Government] on their priorities.”
42.The NSC strategies guiding the use of the CSSF are inherently sensitive. Nevertheless, the Government should ensure the best possible service from its external suppliers by sharing summaries of its strategic objectives with the CSSF Framework Suppliers. This would enable them to tailor their programme and project bids to the Government’s wider goals in relation to the country or region in question.
43.We heard from a range of informed witnesses that the UK is looked to as a “thought leader” in relation to policy on building stability overseas, and to security and justice policy in particular. However, according to Dr Blair, “With the exception of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, the policy direction and guidance for [the] CSSF is either out-dated or insufficient.”
44.Before its demise in 2015, the Conflict Pool was guided by the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). Dr Blair asserts that this strategy now needs to be updated. The National Security Adviser, however, informed us that there are no plans to do so. Instead, it has been “subsumed” into the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR 2015). We are not convinced, however, of the merits of condensing the comprehensive, 40-page explanation of UK policy provided by BSOS into four pages in the SDSR 2015. We were also surprised to learn that DFID is eschewing the whole-of-government approach enshrined in the CSSF, and therefore the principle of harnessing the expertise of different Departments, by producing its own policy document for building stability overseas that is for internal use only.
45.In addition, it is unclear where future policy innovation is going to come from. Following the establishment of the CSSF, DFID’s thematic policy teams, covering areas such as security and justice, were replaced by teams with a regional focus. Responsibility for these thematic policy areas does not appear to have been picked up elsewhere in Whitehall. Dr Blair says:
… at present there is no clear Security and Justice policy holder within Whitehall. S and J [Security and Justice] is a major area of programming that requires further support. The absence of a security and justice policy limits understandings and direction to support security and justice interventions and programming.
Our concern about the loss of focused hubs of expertise within Government does not stop with DFID. Dr Blair and Dr Rathmell also raised similar concern that the FCO has “atrophied” in its ability to understand the political, ethnic and tribal tensions that can fuel instability and conflict.
46.In the absence of a dedicated Whitehall policy team and a central, up-to-date articulation of policy, we are concerned that policy innovation and the ongoing development of a truly cross-government approach to building stability overseas will falter under the CSSF. This risks the UK’s international reputation for intellectual leadership in this policy area.
18 NAO, , March 2012; ICAI, , Report 12, July 2012
19 NAO, , March 2012, pp 8–9; ICAI, , Report 12, July 2012, p 1
20 ICAI, , Report 12, July 2012, Executive Summary
21 [on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund settlement for 2015–16], 12 March 2015
22 HM Government () para 49
23 HM Government () para 49
24 Cranfield University () para 5; Opimian Ltd () para 3.4
25 HM Government () paras 30, 42
26 The Government’s submission cites the UK’s work in Somalia as an example of “complementary programming” that combines ODA and non-ODA spending. See HM Government () para 30
27 Opimian Ltd () para 3.3
28 Opimian Ltd () para 3.3
29 Opimian Ltd () para 3.3
30 Aktis Strategy Ltd is a CSSF Framework Supplier.
31 Q4 [Dr Andrew Rathmell]
32 HM Government (); Qq24–41; [on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 2015–16 and settlement for 2016–17], 21 July 2016
33 Q3 [Dr Stephanie Blair]
34 Q7 [Dr Stephanie Blair]
36 Q25 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]
37 Dr Stephanie Blair () para 3; Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 3
38 Q3 [John Speakman]
39 Q3 [John Speakman]
40 Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 3
41 Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 3
42 Cranfield University () para 2; Adam Smith International () para 3.4; Coffey International Development, Ltd. () para 3; Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 1
43 Q25 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]
44 Q7 [Dr Andrew Rathmell]
45 Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 1
46 Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 1
47 Q7 [Dr Andrew Rathmell]
50 [on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 2015–16 and settlement for 2016–17], 21 July 2016
51 Q4 [Dr Andrew Rathmell]
53 Q25 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]
54 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, , November 2015, para 5.121
55 Conciliation Resources () para 27
57 As of January 2017. HM Government (). This is not a complete picture of the money spent under each of these categories so far in 2016–17. This is because the Procurement Framework is not the only mechanism by which CSSF money is spent. Some Embassies are authorised to commission CSSF-funded programmes directly below an agreed financial threshold. Government teams might also have carried out CSSF activity within these three categories. See Appendix 1, paragraphs 8–9.
58 Q29 [Melinda Simmons]
59 Saferworld () para 7. Other Framework Suppliers also raised concerns about an imbalance between conflict prevention and crisis response under the CSSF. International Crisis Group () para 22; Conciliation Resources () para 27
60 Q5 [Dr Stephanie Blair]
61 Q5 [Dr Andrew Rathmell]
63 Saferworld () para 7
64 Q29 [Melinda Simmons]
65 Q13 [Rebecca Crozier]
66 Q13 [Rebecca Crozier]
67 Q16 [Ruairi Nolan]. International Alert and Peace Direct were not alone in their experiences. Conciliation Resources said that it had been invited to bid for funding with a delivery timeframe of seven months. International Crisis Group also reported “prohibitively short” timeframes for project delivery. Conciliation Resources () para 15; International Crisis Group () para 19
68 Q16 [Ruairi Nolan]
69 Q29 [Melinda Simmons]
70 [on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund settlement for 2015–16], 12 March 2015
71 Agencia Consulting Ltd () para 5; Adam Smith International () para 2.1
72 Qq14, 15 [Rebecca Crozier, Ruairi Nolan]; Conciliation Resources () para 18; Mercy Corps () para 11; Saferworld () para 9. Conciliation Resources said that it had previously decided not to bid for some CSSF contracts because it could not access the criteria against which its proposals would be assessed. Conciliation Resources () para 20
73 Q35 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]
74 Q15 [Rebecca Crozier]
75 Q15 [Rebecca Crozier]
76 Q14 [Rebecca Crozier]; Saferworld reports that capacity constraints have so far prevented the Government from releasing declassified summaries of the NSC strategies. Saferworld () para 9
77 Opimian Ltd () paras 4.4, 6.1; Dr Stephanie Blair () para 3; Dr Andrew Rathmell () para 4
78 Opimian Ltd () para 4.4
79 DFID, FCO and MOD, , 2011
80 Opimian Ltd () para 4.4
81 Q33 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]. The National Security Adviser told us that the SDSR 2015 is one of “three defining documents” for the CSSF, the other two being the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Aid Strategy. Q33 [Sir Mark Lyall Grant]; HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, , November 2015; HM Treasury and DFID, UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest, , November 2015
82 Q33 [Melinda Simmons]
83 Opimian Ltd. () para 4.4
6 February 2017