20.The Prevent Strategy has a long history. Relevant initiatives can be traced back as far as 2002, when it was recognised that a long-term effort would be needed to prevent another generation falling prey to violent extremism of the (then Al-Qa’ida) ideology.
21.The question became more pressing after the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, and this resulted in “a more explicit acknowledgment of ‘neighbour terrorism’—that the terrorist threat was internal rather than external and required engagement with, and the energising of, affected communities at levels other than security and policing.” A formal Prevent Strategy was initiated by the Labour Government, following the London bombings of 2005. It forms part of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy and has seen several iterations since.
22.Following a review by the Coalition Government in 2011 and a separate independent review by the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile QC, a new Prevent Strategy was published in June 2011. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 then effectively put the Prevent Strategy (and in particular a ‘Prevent Duty’) on a statutory footing. The Prevent Duty requires that certain bodies (including schools, local authorities, prisons, police and health bodies) have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”
23.The Duty commenced on 1 July 2015 for authorities specified in schedule 6 to the Act (save in respect of specified authorities in the further and higher education sectors). The duty commenced for the latter authorities on 18 September 2015.
24.In addition to these initiatives to counter extremism, the Government’s new Counter-Extremism Strategy was launched by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary on 19 October 2015. The Counter-Extremism agenda emerged out of the establishment of the ‘Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism Taskforce’ in 2013 in response to the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich.
25.The Task Force, which reported in 2013, said that “[w]e will not tolerate extremist activity of any sort, which creates an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them on a pathway towards terrorism”. The report suggested:
26.As David Anderson QC has noted, “ideas were further developed by a speech given by the Home Secretary in September 2014, and found a place in the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the 2015 general election.”
27.The Counter-Extremism Strategy states that the greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism (e.g. Al Qa’ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)). However, it is also designed to tackle “all forms of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi.”
28.While the bulk of the evidence we have taken focused on religiously inspired extremism, the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy stated that Islamist extremism is not the only threat, noting “the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups.”
29.Following the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, a series of racist and xenophobic attacks were reported. The National Police Chiefs Council has said that complaints filed to the police online hate-crime reporting site ‘True Vision’ increased fivefold in the week immediately after the referendum, with 331 hate crime incidents reported to the site compared with a weekly average of 63.
30.These attacks led the Polish Embassy to say that it was “shocked and deeply concerned by the recent incidents of xenophobic abuse directed against the Polish community and other UK residents of migrant heritage.” The Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, David Isaac, said:
Reports that some individuals are hijacking the referendum result to promote racism, hate and division are extremely worrying and should be widely condemned.
31.These incidents included a graffiti attack on the Polish Social and Cultural Association in Hammersmith and reports of hate crimes in Cambridgeshire where leaflets were posted which read “Leave the EU. No more Polish vermin.”
32.In an oral statement to the House of Commons on 29 June 2016, the Minister, Karen Bradley MP, said that the Government would:
Take steps to boost reporting of hate crime and to support victims, issue new Crown Prosecution Service guidance to prosecutors on racially aggravated crime, provide a new fund for protective security measures at potentially vulnerable institutions, and offer additional funding to community organisations so that they can tackle hate crime.
33.She also noted “despicable hate speech posted online following the shocking death of our colleague Jo Cox” and announced that the Government would be publishing a new Hate Crime Action Plan covering all forms of hate crime, including xenophobic attacks.
34. Following the EU referendum there appears to have been a deeply worrying rise in the expression of xenophobia and racism. We note that the Government is drawing up a Hate Crime Action Plan. Given that the Counter-Extremism Strategy refers to right-wing, as well as religious, extremism these issues should be seen as part of that strategy and will have to be considered if any legislation is forthcoming.
35.Unfortunate and deplorable incidents involving racism and xenophobia persist. The criminal law already contains offences which make such expressions of hatred unlawful. The Government and police should monitor the situation carefully and ensure that these incidents are dealt with vigorously and swiftly under the existing law so that no further harm is done to community relations. It must also seek to repair the harm that has undoubtedly already been sustained.
36.Despite the one-off independent review of the Prevent Strategy by Lord Carlile QC in 2011, the Prevent Strategy, unlike many aspects of counter-terrorism law, is not subject to continued review or oversight by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. On 2 February 2016, David Anderson QC sent a supplementary submission to the Home Affairs Select Committee in respect of its inquiry into countering extremism. In his submission he argued that there was a case for independent review of the Prevent Strategy (in particular on the operation of the Prevent Duty in schools). He concluded that the Prevent programme was “clearly suffering from a widespread problem of perception, particularly in relation to the statutory duty on schools and in relation to non-violent extremism.” Accordingly, he observed that:
[I]t seems to me that Prevent could benefit from independent review. It is perverse that Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial powers […] that are exercised under the Pursue strand of the CONTEST strategy. The lack of transparency in the operation of Prevent encourages rumour and mistrust to spread and fester.
37.David Anderson had previously made a similar recommendation to our predecessor Committee when it considered the Bill that became the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. We picked this subject up in oral evidence. Lord Carlile QC argued that “reviewers can help the Government by challenging them and by giving reasons for changes in the law being required. I cannot see anything being lost by reviewing the Prevent policy.” Bharath Ganesh (Tell MAMA and Faith Matters) went further, contending that:
It is of paramount importance that the Home Office moves to having some type of independent review and evaluation of the Prevent strategy. Another Bill is being proposed before we even know how well the Prevent Duty has worked in the last year. Such policymaking is a bit too fast. We need to take a step back and evaluate how the Prevent duty is operating.
38.The current position is that the Prevent Strategy is kept under review by a Government appointed oversight board, which is supposed to monitor the effectiveness of the programme. However, little information about the board or its work is placed in the public domain. In answer to a Parliamentary Question in May 2016, the Security Minister, John Hayes MP, said that there were “no plans to publish the terms of reference or the membership of the board.” Lord Carlile QC (who is a member of the board) was critical of its historic performance, although he acknowledged that there had recently been a renewed interest by ministers.
39.In oral evidence, the Minister, Karen Bradley MP, sought to draw a clear distinction between the Prevent Strategy, which she argued related solely to counter-terrorism, and the Counter-Extremism Strategy. She said:
The Prevent strategy is part of our counter-terrorism strategy. That is not the same as the counter-extremism strategy, because extremism is wider than terrorism. It is hate crime and the other harms that can be caused to society by the promotion of ideology that leads to harm.
Clearly, we need to look at the evidence for all sorts of strategies and work that go on across government, but I want to be clear that they are separate matters. [...] We are looking at a different form of activity; there is cross-over, but it is a different form of activity. It is the promotion of an ideology that could lead to hateful activity.
41.Yet the Prevent Strategy (and the related Duty) are explicitly designed to counter extremism, not just terrorism, and are used in schools and universities as well as other institutions. Moreover, the use of these policies can be subject to evidence-based review. The Minister conceded that this might happen as part of a wider review of the CONTEST strategy, such a review was announced in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) published in November 2015). It is worth noting that the SDSR clearly linked the counter-extremism and counter-terrorism agendas.
42.Any new Bill on countering extremism should draw on all the available evidence. Those preparing the Bill should consider the experience of the Prevent Strategy and the operation of the Prevent Duty. An independent review of the Prevent Strategy and Duty should be published as part of the consultation on the Bill. The current oversight arrangements for Prevent are too opaque and do not engender confidence. It is not clear to us why the Government does not currently regard the Prevent Strategy as being part of the background to its proposed Bill.
43.The Prevent Strategy identifies education as a “priority area” with regards to tackling radicalism. During the last Parliament, the alleged ‘Trojan Horse’ affair in Birmingham schools raised concerns that extremist ideology could be spread through the school system, which prompted a series of inquiries and subsequently action by the then Coalition Government, including the move to promote ‘British values’ in schools.
44.The Government published an overview of the duties on schools in its policy paper ‘Preventing extremism in the education and children’s services sectors’ on 1 September 2015.
45.As noted above, Part 5 of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 contains provisions to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and in effect puts the Prevent strategy on a statutory footing via the Prevent Duty. The Act provides that the Secretary of State may publish guidance on how specified authorities should fulfil this duty. Statutory guidance on the Prevent duties in the Act, across all policy areas, has been published for England and Wales, and Scotland. The relevant provisions came into force in Scotland on 25 March 2015. In England and Wales, the provisions relevant to schools came into force on 1 July 2015.
46.On 21 June 2016, The Times reported that “in schools 1,041 children were referred last year to Channel, the deradicalisation programme; in 2012, the year it was extended nationally, only nine children were referred.” Evidence on the proportionality of such referrals is almost entirely anecdotal at this stage. Yet it is far from clear that it was envisaged that so many children would be referred. Tell MAMA has stated that it has “received a number of cases involving schools and where Muslim young people have been interviewed on the back of alleged comments that they have made within the school environment.” They argue that some of these individuals “believe that they have been targeted because of their faith.”
47.In oral evidence, David Anderson QC talked of what he perceived as an “acute crisis of confidence” in the Prevent Duty in schools. He stated that, as a result of informal conversations, he believed that discussions about extremism in the educational context had to some extent been choked off, and that teachers could feel inhibited about discussing these matters. Another complaint Anderson cited was from Muslim parents who were effectively discouraged from talking about these issues in the home due to worries that if the subject came up and the child went into school the next day and perhaps gave an inaccurate or colourful account of what was said then some “half-trained teacher” might misrepresent that and, thinking that “they had better be safe”, make a Prevent referral.
48.Karon McCarthy (Prevent Officer and Assistant Principal at Chobham Academy) addressed the question of the referral rate. She said that people might be “being a bit too enthusiastic and feeling very scared that if they do not report something, which is now a duty, they will somehow fall foul of the law.” She suggested that “for a lot of staff, that is very concerning.”
49.During the course of our inquiry, there were several stories of what appeared to be heavy-handed referrals under the Prevent Duty. Perhaps the most widely reported was the story of the four-year old nursery pupil who was referred to Luton Council after he had drawn a picture of what was initially described by the nursery as a “cooker bomb” but which turned out to be a cucumber. However, we also recognise that some of these stories are down to inaccurate reporting and these can create dangerous myths. David Anderson QC told us about a “number of rumours” which are “swirling around about Prevent.” He said:
I am sure that most of them are not true and some are the consequences of sloppy journalism. For example, every Muslim group I have seen over the last month has talked to me about the “terrorist house” incident, where the eight year-old boy wrote in his homework “I live in a terrorist house” and the police went round to his house. They searched the house and looked into his parents’ laptop, so everywhere you get: “Aren’t the police stupid? Don’t we live in a police state?” What no one tells you, because they probably do not know, is that two days after that story went right around the world the police woke up and went to the Lancashire Telegraph. They gave it a copy of the boy’s homework and he had indeed written “I live in a terrorist house”, but in the paragraph above he had written “I don’t like it when my uncle beats me”. This had been a safeguarding intervention that, through sloppy journalism or otherwise, had been made into something it was not.
50.It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions on the success of the Prevent Duty in schools. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be some cause for concern about the impact of the Duty and the Government would be well-advised to ensure that referrals are made in a sensible and proportionate fashion. However, we also accept that it is very easy for dangerous myths to be spread about Prevent. The only way for these to be dispelled is for there to be rigorous and transparent reporting about the operation of the Prevent Duty.
51.In the university sphere, the issues that is often raised is whether individuals who espouse what are deemed to be extremist views should be excluded from speaking to students, or whether they should be challenged by opposing ‘mainstream’ points of view. The Quilliam Foundation has described this latter approach as the paradigm of “legal tolerance – civil intolerance.” Some university vice-chancellors have expressed the view that excluding speakers is a potential interference with free speech (potentially raising issues under Article 10 of the ECHR).
52.Universities became subject to the new Prevent duty on 18 September 2015, with the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) given responsibility for assessing how they meet the requirements under the new duty. In November 2015, the HEFCE published guidance which included a Monitoring Framework for the Higher Education Sector. All “relevant higher education bodies” are required to submit to the HEFCE detailed information to show that they have established appropriate arrangements to implement the Prevent duty in line with the statutory guidance by 1 August 2016. HEFCE indicate that they will also ask (on a voluntary basis) for data on Channel referrals, events and speakers, and staff training.
53.The detailed information required by the HEFCE includes:
Policies and procedures for managing and mitigating the risks around external speakers and events on campus and institution-branded events taking place off campus. Such policies should reflect the institution’s duty to ensure freedom of speech on campus and its arrangements to protect the importance of academic freedom.
54.In the previous Parliament, the then Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concerns about the implications for both freedom of expression and academic freedom at universities of the new Prevent Duty contained in the Bill which became the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. It noted the lack of legal certainty over the definitions of terms such as “extremism” (then referred to in the draft guidance on the use of the power) stating that universities would not know with sufficient certainty whether they risked being found to be in breach of the new duty.
55.In response to concerns expressed during the Bill’s progress through the House of Lords, at report stage, the Government moved an amendment which required that any guidance issued to specified authorities on the Prevent duty had to be laid before Parliament to be approved under the affirmative procedure. Section 31 of the 2015 Act also made clear that when issuing such guidance to universities, the Secretary of State should have particular regard to their duty to ensure freedom of speech.
56.Higher education institutions have a duty of care for the welfare of their staff and students, which the Government argues includes the responsibility to protect vulnerable members of their institution from radicalisation. The role of the higher education sector in preventing extremism on its campuses and its other premises has come under scrutiny following the involvement of a number of ex-students of UK universities in incidents of terrorist activity.
57.As noted in Chapter 2, there are additional legal considerations in play when considering the university sector: section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 contains a duty to ensure freedom of speech. Furthermore, Section 202 of the Education Reform Act 1988 also contains provisions on academic freedom and provides that University Commissioners should have regard to the need to “ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.”
58.The bulk of the evidence we received supported the proposition that, unlike school children, university students were adults and that extremist views were best combated via debate, rather than prohibitions on speakers. Christine Abbot observed that “there is a fundamental difference in that university students are adults and you have to treat them as adults and to discuss the issues in a more sophisticated way than one, rightly, does at school.”
59.Professor Louise Richardson said:
My position on this is that any effort to infringe freedom of expression should be opposed, whether it comes from what I take to be the well-intentioned but misguided Prevent counter-terrorism policy or from student unions that do not want to hear views that they find objectionable. A university has to be a place where the right to express objectionable views is protected.
60.The evidence we received suggested that, unless an individual or group is advocating violence, they should not be excluded from speaking in a university context. It was argued that extremist views are best countered by vigorous debate. However, it was also important for universities to ensure that such a debate is possible and that students are not too intimidated to challenge visiting speakers on their views.
61.Reports suggest that freedom of speech issues do arise in the university setting. Often, these appear to be associated with actions of students’ unions or affiliated organisations (rather than directly with the universities themselves). These incidents have included the “no-platforming” of speakers, alleged intimidation, and attempts to segregate audiences by gender. This final concern around gender segregation in secular spaces appears to persist despite criticism of the practice from the Prime Minister in 2013.
62.Any proposed legislation will have to tread carefully in an area where there is already considerable uncertainty. For example, in the university context, it is arguable whether the expression of certain views constitutes putting forward new ideas in the form of controversial and unpopular opinions, or whether it amounts to vocal and active opposition to the UK’s fundamental values. The potentially conflicting duties on universities to promote free speech, whilst precluding the expression of extremist views, is likely to continue to cause confusion.
65.The Committee also took evidence on the suggested extension of regulation to all ‘intensive education settings’. This was proposed by a Department for Education (DfE) Consultation document, ‘Out-of-school education settings (November 2015)’. The consultation document indicated that intensive education “could be considered anything which entails an individual child attending a setting for more than between 6 to 8 hours a week” and noted that “any setting meeting the threshold would be required to register with their local authority and would be eligible for investigation, and if appropriate, intervention where concerns were reported.”
66.The consultation provided a number of examples of potential issues that might need to be addressed, for example “safeguarding and health and safety concerns, such as overcrowded, cramped and dirty conditions; exposed gas pipes; no fire escape; no access to drinking water.” However, the principal focus appeared to be on extremism and the consultation document noted that the Prevent Strategy had made clear that “over the lifetime of the strategy, the government would work to reduce the risk that children and young people are exposed to harm and extremist views in out-of-school education settings.”
67.These concerns, raised in the DfE consultation, were reinforced by the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy which suggested that “some supplementary schools may be teaching children views which run contrary to our shared values, encouraging hatred of other religions.”
68.The Department for Education consultation document set out the basic elements of the proposed new system. It featured, amongst other things, proposals for compulsory registration, inspection by Ofsted to ensure compliance with certain standards, and sanctions to prevent individuals who have failed to register or who have breached the standards from working with children, and to prevent the use of inadequate premises.
69.The Government briefing on the proposed new Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, at the time of the 2016 Queen’s Speech, noted that the Bill was expected to introduce new “powers to intervene in intensive unregulated education settings which teach hate and drive communities apart.”
70.The evidence we received on this issue was mixed. Professor Julian Rivers noted that any new laws would have to avoid having the appearance of requiring religions to register, or risk being in breach of Article 9 of the ECHR. In a separate briefing note that he sent to the Committee, he said:
The consultation document suggests that sanctions could cover any work with children in out-of-school settings (not just ‘intensive’ out-of-school settings), so a group which failed to register as required could find itself barred from any work with children or using its property for any ‘educational’ purpose.
The scope of activities intended to be covered by the new obligation to register is not entirely clear, but seems extremely broad. The paper refers to ‘tuition, training or instruction’, and also ‘activities and education for children in many subjects including arts, language, music, sport and religion.’
71.David Anderson QC expressed some doubts about any proposal for universal compulsory inspection, particularly if this were done by secular inspectors from, for example, Ofsted, visiting religious schools or institutions. He stated that this could cause “considerable ill feeling.” It is far from clear that Ofsted would be best placed to do this work and in oral evidence the Minister did not make clear whether Ofsted had been consulted on its suitability for this task.
72.Karon McCarthy also expressed some doubts and took issue with the suggestion that those who run out-of-school activities should have to register with the State if they teach children for more than, say, six hours in any one week. She said:
Six hours is a very arbitrary figure, and it is very hard to know why five hours would not cause harm whereas six hours would. That is the first issue. How will it be overseen and policed? How is that going to happen? We are already struggling for volunteers because of the scrutiny already put on you and the suggestion that, if you are working with children, you have to jump through a lot of hoops.
73.By contrast, Lord Carlile took the view that this should be seen as a safeguarding issue (rather than being labelled as part of a broader counter-extremism programme). In this way, he suggested that the focus should be on large group activity which occurred frequently, to avoid accusations of discrimination. He observed that: “I believe there are child protection issues that need to be addressed […]. In my view some type of light-touch regulation or inspection would be justified.”
74.The need to safeguard children from neglect, physical harm and sexual abuse is well understood. But it is rather less clear how one can draw a line between religious freedom and requirements for safeguarding that genuinely protect children. While there may be some argument for safeguarding measures to be introduced in out-of-school settings, these should not be specifically aimed at religious activities, nor are we convinced that existing safeguarding measures are inadequate in this regard. Any new measures should be proportionate, focused, and should only apply where identifiable concerns about the safety or wellbeing of children and young persons have been raised within a particular institution. We do not support a regime of routine inspections of out-of-school settings. We are aware of the very grave concerns around Government proposals for a regime of compulsory registration. We reserve the right to return to this issue if and when we see detailed proposals from the Government.
75.Moreover, the Government should listen with particular attention to those who would be expected to apply for and enforce these orders, such as the police, educational establishments and councils, and Muslim or other faith communities.
15 J Blackbourn and C Walker, Interdiction and indoctrination: The Counter-Extremism and Security Act, Modern Law Review (forthcoming).
16 J Blackbourn and C Walker, Interdiction and indoctrination: The Counter-Extremism and Security Act, Modern Law Review (forthcoming).
17 For further details, see for example, Counter-Extremism policy: an overview, Commons Briefing Paper , House of Commons Library, May 2016
18 Home Office, , 12 March 2015
19 HM Government, , Cm 9148, October 2015
20 HM Government, , December 2013
21 See, Theresa May:
22 HM Government, , Cm 9148, October 2015, p10
23 , The Guardian online, 30 June 2016
24 , The Guardian online, 27 June 2016
25 Equality and Human Rights Commission, , 27 June 2016
26 HC Deb, [Hate Crime]
27 HC Deb, [Hate Crime]
28 Supplementary written evidence submitted by David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into Countering Extremism,
29 Supplementary written evidence submitted by David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into Countering Extremism,
30 Oral evidence taken on 26 November 2014, HC (2014-15) 836, [David Anderson QC]
31 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [Lord Carlile of Berriew QC CBE]
32 Oral evidence taken on 16 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [Mr Barath Ganesh, Research Officer, Faith Matters]
33 PQ 3887,
34 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [Lord Carlile of Berriew QC CBE]
38 HM Government, , Cm 9161, November 2015. Paragraph 4.85 specifically includes reference to the Counter-Extremism Strategy under a section entitled Preventing people from being radicalised (which also details the statutory Prevent Duty).
39 Department for Education, , 23 December 2015. For more information on Government policy in this area, see for example, Counter-extremism policy in English schools, Commons Briefing Paper , House of Commons Library, June 2016 and see also: Home Office, , 12 July 2016
40 See HM Government , originally issued on 12 March 2015 and revised on 16 July 2015, and HM Government, , originally issued on 12 March 2015 and revised on 16 July 2015
41 , The Times online, June 2016
42 TELLMAMA, 29 January 2016
43 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [David Anderson QC]
44 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [David Anderson QC]
45 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [David Anderson QC]
46 Oral evidence taken on 4 May 2016, HC (2015-16) 647, [Karon McCarthy (Prevent Officer and Assistant Principal at Chobham Academy]
47 The Guardian online, 11 March 2016. See also Right Watch UK, , July 2016
48 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [David Anderson QC]
49 Quilliam argue that heavy handed legal reactions “could serve to perpetuate a rise in extremisms and extremist narratives” and suggest that “a counter extremism strategy which is underpinned by British notions of civil liberties and is able to uphold the British values of freedom of speech, human rights and democracy will be far more powerful.” See: Quillam Policy Document, , June 2013
50 See for example, , Daily Telegraph online, 16 January 2016, and , The Guardian online, 23 February 2016
52 HM Government, Cm 8092, June 2011, p71. For further background see:
53 Oral evidence taken on 4 May 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [Christine Abbott, University Secretary and Director of Operations, Birmingham City University], for further background see: Freedom of Speech in Higher Education Institutions, House of Lords Library Note, , November 2015
54 Oral evidence taken on 4 May 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [Professor Louise Richardson, Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford]
55 , Independent online, April 2016
56 See for example, , Independent online, December 2015
57 See for example: Equality and Human Rights Commission, , 17 July 2014, and , The Telegraph, 19 January 2016
58 , The Guardian online, December 2013
59 Department for Education, , 26 November 2015
60 Private briefing note from Professor Julian Rivers on the constitutional and international human rights implications of ‘Out-of-School Education Settings: call for evidence’ as it affects religious groups and individuals, 7 January 2016.
61 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [David Anderson QC]
63 Oral evidence taken on 4 May 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [Karon McCarthy (Prevent Officer and Assistant Principal at Chobham Academy)]
64 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2016, HC (2015–16) 647, [Lord Carlile of Berriew QC CBE]
21 July 2016