You are here: Parliament home page > Parliamentary business > Publications and Records > Committee Publications > All Select Committee Publications > Joint Select Committees > National Security Strategy > National Security Strategy
Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2017-19

First Special Report

The Committee published its Fourth Report of Session 2017–19, Revisiting the UK’s national security strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme (HL Paper 406, HC 2072), on 21 July 2019. The Government’s response was received on 25 October 2019 and is appended to this report.

Appendix: Government Response

Covering letter from the Prime Minister, 22 October 2019

The Government was grateful to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) for its fourth report of this session, Revisiting the UK’s National Security Strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme.

I am pleased to attach the Government’s response to the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.

Further to the Committee’s recommendation (at paragraph 73), the Civil Contingencies Secretariat will also share the 2019 National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) document in confidence, subject to an accompanying oral briefing by the appropriate official and on the basis that the NSRA cannot be shared or paraphrased publicly. Officials from the Cabinet Office will be in contact with the Clerks to arrange this.

The Government was grateful to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) for its fourth report of this session, Revisiting the UK’s National Security Strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme. Below is the Government response to the conclusions and recommendations.

A less favourable strategic outlook for the UK.

1.The cornerstones of UK national security are being undermined in four ways:

If the Government is to convince others—at home and abroad—that it is positioning the UK for a more positive and self-assured role in the world after its departure from the European Union, then it needs to be more honest about how it proposes to address these challenges. (Paragraph 20)

In SDSR 2015 and NSCR 2018, we described how the world is changing rapidly, becoming more volatile and uncertain. We continue to see long-term shifts in the balance of global economic and military power, increasing competition between states, as well as the threat from non-state actors. We are clear how these challenges should be addressed.

We are reinforcing our friendships in order to defend both security interests and the values that bind us - democracy, the rule of law and respect for individual civil and political rights. Our partners are not limited to our traditional alliances: we are deepening cooperation with the world’s emerging powers, supported by cross-Whitehall funds and an expansion of our diplomatic network.

We are determined to uphold the rules-based international system to protect our security and wider interests – with no impunity for those who break the rules. We acknowledge this is becoming more challenging in a contested world, but the UK can still mobilise support in the international community to address key challenges – as we did in 2018 to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention in response to flagrant use in Syria, Kuala Lumpur and Salisbury.

The UK has a special and enduring relationship with the United States based on our long history and commitment to shared values. We are natural, resilient and strong partners and allies, and we do more together than any two countries in the world. The State Visit by President Trump in June 2019 underlined just how close and important the relationship is to our security and our prosperity. There are, of course, areas of difference, but our close relationship allows us to be clear where we disagree.

The UK has a strong and historic relationship with Europe; a bond which existed before we entered the EU and will endure long after we leave. The UK is clear that a safe and secure Europe is inextricable from our own safety, security and prosperity. The UK will continue to play a leading role in Europe by strengthening our alliances, including NATO and the EU, while continuing to protect our national interests.

The UK and China have a constructive partnership based on a strong economic relationship and our position as leading nations. The UK’s approach to China is pragmatic, maximising the benefits of cooperation while protecting our national security. We work with China only where doing so is in line with our values and protects our national interests, including the security of our people and businesses. We are clear and direct in communicating where China’s actions are incompatible with our values.

Fixing UK defence

2.The long-term plan for defence set by the Government in 2015 was never affordable. It relied instead on the “alchemy” of unidentified efficiencies and on a misplaced optimism about the financial risks involved. Some of those risks are now materialising, at a cost to the Government of £1.8 billion so far. This is unlikely to be the final price of what we were advised was the “collective self-delusion” that prevailed in 2015. (Paragraph 24)

The MOD is committed to modernising and transforming the way it delivers its outputs, improving military capability and value for money, whilst also driving significant and sustainable improvements in efficiency. The Department continually reviews its programme to ensure the rising defence budget focuses on frontline priorities and emerging threats. The MOD efficiency programme has reduced forecast costs by £9.5bn over ten years – more than 70% of its £13.4bn target, and MOD remains committed to delivering the remainder in full.

However, MOD is also managing cost pressures within its budget that have resulted from risks materialising since the 2015 Spending Review. Through active management of costs and the £1.8bn additional funding announced by HM Treasury in Autumn 2018, MOD has managed these pressures and delivered its plans since 2015 without breaching its parliamentary control totals. MOD remains confident that it will deliver its plans within budget in 2019/20.

Work is in hand to develop an affordable plan for delivering against this ambition over the longer term. The £2.2bn additional funding announced by HM Treasury in the 2019 Spending Round will support this.

3.Today’s hi-tech and hybrid threats in areas such as cyberspace and information warfare do not obviate the need for soldiers, sailors, airmen and conventional equipment. These remain essential for deterring more traditional threats. The UK’s armed forces must have the capacity and balance of capability to respond to both types of threat, and to protect conventional equipment from newer threats such as cyber-attack. (Paragraph 35)

We agree that the UK needs to maintain credible forces to deter and defend against a broad spectrum of threats. As we develop new capabilities to address emerging threats we must carefully and objectively balance this with the continued need to protect against conventional attack.

The modern capabilities we are currently operating and will be bringing into service in the years ahead include the F-35B Lightning aircraft, Type 26 Global Combat Ships, Type 31e frigates, Dreadnought and Astute class submarines, the two new Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers, new Offshore Patrol Vessels, the new Ajax multi-purpose armoured vehicles, the P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Protector surveillance and reconnaissance armed remotely piloted aircraft.

We also agree that we must protect conventional capabilities from new threats. The MOD has already invested significantly in cyber defence and security, across a broad range of its capabilities and infrastructure. This includes investing £12m in the Defence Cyber School, and £40m in the Cyber Security Operations Capability. £265m has also been invested in a pioneering approach to root out cyber vulnerabilities within military platforms and wider cyber-dependent systems, helping Defence better understand and mitigate cyber risks.

4.The Modernising Defence Programme was undertaken in the context of significant challenges to UK defence. Having set high expectations at its launch, the MDP provided only a short-term fix for the capability and funding gaps that had emerged since 2015, and ultimately raised more questions than it answered. This has left the Ministry of Defence in a ‘holding pattern’ until the next Spending Review. (Paragraph 36)

The extra £2.2bn pledged to Defence in the 2019 Spending Round will support our world-class Armed Forces as they modernise to meet the intensifying threats and risks we face, including by prioritising investment in key capabilities, such as offensive cyber, anti-submarine warfare and the nuclear deterrent.

We recognise that Defence requires long-term decision making and next year’s multi-year Spending Review presents an opportunity to address this.

5.While we welcome the recognition in the MDP report that UK defence must be able to harness new technology and innovation more effectively, the initiatives it sets out are only the first steps towards a wider change in culture that is urgently needed. This includes the ability to identify disruptive technological change and its implications for the application of military force, as well as the willingness to adapt defence programmes accordingly and often at speed. (Paragraph 37)

We agree that the initiatives set out in the MDP are only the first steps towards modernising our approach to technology and innovation in Defence.

The objective of the Defence Innovation Initiative is to achieve a mindset across the Defence enterprise where being innovative is instinctive, and this is supported by a Defence Innovation Fund that will continue to grow to a total of around £800m by 2025/26. The Fund aims to incentivise behavioural change, providing freedoms to pursue and deliver innovative solutions.

Through MOD’s new Technology-led Modernisation approach, Defence has now positioned technology as a core element of its thinking, strategic processes and capability planning. MOD has recently published its Defence Technology Framework and Defence Innovation Priorities, which explain where Defence is focussing its efforts. The MOD ‘Spearhead’ programmes (part of the Defence Transformation programme) are already piloting accelerated approaches to delivering innovative military capability solutions, pulling through new technology over a seven-year period.

In parallel, MOD is also pursuing wider changes to its acquisition and commercial processes to enable such initiatives.

6.As we said in our March 2018 report, strong arguments have been advanced that it is not enough to spend 2% of GDP on defence, in light of both the scale and range of threats to the UK and the costs involved in keeping pace with rapid technological change. Yet a recent Defence Committee report found that Ministry of Defence expenditure fell from 2.4% of GDP in 2010/11 to 1.8% in 2017/18, while overall (cross-government) defence spending under the NATO definition fell from 2.5% of GDP in 2010/11 to 2.1% in 2017/18. (Paragraph 42)

We spend more on Defence than any other European country, and are the second highest Defence spender in NATO. In June 2019, NATO reported that we will spend 2.13% of our GDP on Defence in 2019/20, which remains well above the 2% benchmark. NATO determines the definitions for categorising Defence spending and the UK calculates its Defence spending in line with these guidelines. The UK, along with all member states, regularly updates how we categorise our Defence spending so that it fully captures what falls within NATO’s guidelines. This is critical to allow a fair comparison across the alliance.

We are committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on Defence and we also meet the target of spending 20% on major equipment and associated research and development. We have a £39bn Defence budget in 2019/20 and with the additional funding announced at Spending Round 19, this will rise to almost £41.5bn by 2020/21. This is an average growth rate of 2.3% above inflation over the last 5 years, which greatly exceeds the previous commitment of 0.5% above inflation in every year of this Parliament.

7.But spending more on defence is only part of the answer. The NSCR and MDP processes have shown that the funding model for UK defence is broken: the Treasury persists in not funding the Government’s ambitions for defence properly, while the Ministry of Defence has repeatedly struggled to manage its budget efficiently and effectively. The current programme budget is heavily over-committed and dominated by so-called ‘legacy’ capabilities, leaving little opportunity for an effective response by the MoD to changing threats and technology. (Paragraph 43)

The MOD and HM Treasury have a continuous dialogue about the Department’s financial position, which covers all elements of the programme and the steps MOD takes to manage its finances to best effect.

The MOD has flexibility in its planning process and manages the finances of its large and complex projects/programmes through a portfolio approach. One of the aims of the annual budget cycle (ABC) is to ensure that MOD spending plans remain fully up to date, addressing emerging threats and responding to the opportunities that the latest technology can offer. A good example of this is the creation of the Transformation Fund in ABC2019, in which £160m was allocated in the current financial year to support the acquisition of new and innovative military capabilities.

MOD has taken key steps to enable longer term affordability by improving financial management of the Equipment Plan. Efficiency targets have been consolidated to simplify their management, the Submarine Delivery Agency has been established to manage the submarine programme, and Head Office has begun a functional leadership programme to improve financial management. This programme is making good progress with the high-level design of the Finance Operating Model completed and improvements made in the production of management information.

8.We recommend that, as well as increasing the overall defence budget, the Treasury help the MoD move away from its ‘use it or lose it’ mentality towards a more agile approach to planning and procurement. This would enable the MoD to take better advantage of rapid technological change. At the least, some of the MoD’s budget should be ringfenced for the identification and adoption of cutting-edge technologies with potential military application. It should also be possible to roll over this ‘transformation’ funding from one financial year to the next in the event of underspend. The National Security Council should oversee a joint process between the MoD and the Treasury to determine the size of this ring-fenced budget. £500 million should be the minimum for such a Transformation Fund. (Paragraph 44)

The 2019 Spending Round resulted in a positive settlement for Defence. In the next year, as is the case for any Spending Review, MOD and HMT will negotiate to ensure budgets are as flexible as possible. Budgetary arrangements will aim to strengthen Defence’s ability to deliver national priority projects on time while taking advantage of all opportunities to drive taxpayer value for money.

£160m has been set aside from the Defence budget in 2019/20 to create a Transformation Fund. This fund aims to support the acquisition of new innovative military capabilities by pursuing promising new technologies and equipment at the pace required to counter emerging threats. The Transformation Fund is in addition to the Innovation Fund, which was established in 2016 and worth around £800m over 10 years. It aims to incentivise changes in behaviours, providing freedoms to pursue and deliver innovative solutions. More than 160 projects have received funding from the Innovation Fund. Decisions on continuing these funds will be a matter for the next Spending Review.

Time for a re-set on UK national security?

9.It is time for the Government to go back to first principles on the national security strategy. The UK will have to chart a more nuanced course in the coming years as the direction and influence of key countries such as the US and China change unpredictably, and following its departure from the European Union. It will also have to respond to fast-changing and increasingly complex security threats, as described in our March 2018 report on the NSCR. (Paragraph 51)

We agree that we must keep our approach to National Security strategy under review and have done so since SDSR15 was published, including through commissioning the 2018 NSCR which refreshed our analysis and reaffirmed the vision and values in the SDSR. No decisions have yet been taken on the nature and timing of the next review.

10.Yet the Government has become accustomed to talking a better game than it plays on national security, despite efforts to improve how it makes and delivers strategy since the National Security Council was established. The ‘Global Britain’ concept is meaningless against the current background of reduced diplomatic spending and under-powered defence. If the Government wants to turn ‘Global Britain’ into a meaningful strategy, it must re-build the UK’s hard power while reinvesting in and unifying the various instruments of soft power, including aid and diplomacy. This will require a combination of increased funding and rebalancing funding between defence, diplomacy and aid. National security strategy-making is about making choices, and the Government must now steel itself to make the difficult choices that it has sidestepped for too long. (Paragraph 52)

The Global Britain vision looks beyond Brexit to a Britain that is a world class economy; a free, fair and tolerant society; an active and responsible country; and a global power. We are pursuing this through three key objectives: to uphold, modernise and strengthen the rules-based international system; to maximise UK influence and soft power; and to project the UK as a global economy and an open and attractive place to visit, work and study. This requires us to use our full array of world-leading assets and capabilities to maximise our global presence, influence and impact to deliver UK interests.

Additional resource is being committed to support our international ambition, including the largest expansion of our diplomatic network for a generation with over 1000 new positions, 12 new posts and two upgraded missions in Africa. We are investing in our key relationships across the world to deliver greater political engagement and influencing capacity with G20 members and other rising powers. And we are increasing our representation to multilateral organisations and our links with key regional organisations, to ensure we can play a leading role in updating the international rulebook so it is fit for today and tackling the global challenges that will affect the next generation – including climate change.

Through Defence’s policy approaches and capability investments we want to ensure that the UK remains the strongest defence player in Europe, with a full spectrum of hard power capabilities. We are driving a concerted effort to mainstream soft power across our international work and deliver the best possible benefits for Britain from our soft power assets. We are aware though that the cost of doing business internationally is rising. As we raise our ambition so too will we need to raise our investment in delivering our international work and making sure that the Global Britain vision is successful. This Government will continue to look for ways to do that.

11.We recommend that the Government, under the new Prime Minister, immediately set about addressing policy and budgetary decisions that have been left hanging by the National Security Capability Review and especially by the Modernising Defence Programme—with its implicit requirement for greater defence expenditure. The next Spending Review would provide the best opportunity to do so. The Government should describe in its response to this report what action it is taking to ensure that the Spending Review is based on thorough consideration of the issues raised. (Paragraph 53)

The 2019 Spending Round resulted in a strong settlement for Defence, but we agree that the next multi-year Spending Review is the right moment to address longer term policy issues and budgetary decisions.

The analysis conducted as part of the MDP means that Defence now has a better understanding of its strengths and where it needs to take steps to improve. Our approach to the next Spending Review will be to build on that work to ensure that Defence has adequate funding to deliver its plans and Government priorities.

Stronger direction from the centre of Government: Fusion Doctrine

12.At the same time, the Government should begin an honest conversation at the national level about the extent of its ambition for the UK as a significant global player, the risks it is willing to take in relation to national security, and the resources it is willing to commit to these ends. In 2009–10, the then Government produced a Green Paper that facilitated such a discussion. A similar Cabinet Office-led exercise in advance of the next National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review would leave the UK better prepared than it was in 2015 to deliver on its national interests in the face of unpredictable strategic change and evolving threats. This next full review should take place alongside a Spending Review. (Paragraph 54)

We appreciate the need to communicate and engage with a variety of stakeholders when developing the content and our approach to the next review. No decision has yet been made on the timing and nature of the next strategic review for defence and national security, therefore the precise vehicle for doing this has yet to be agreed. Good practice from previous reviews and strategies will be used to inform the right approach for any further review.

13.The Fusion Doctrine was one of the stand-out announcements of the National Security Capability Review. We welcome this attempt to strengthen the National Security Council’s authority across Government—both in pursuing its strategic priorities and in responding flexibly to national security threats. However, it is unclear how, under the Fusion Doctrine, the Government is engaging with the private sector and the UK’s allies and partners, all of whom are central to our national security. (Paragraph 61)

See Response to Paragraph 63

14.We also remain concerned that efforts to integrate the assessment and use of defence and security capabilities across Government will continue to be hindered by the fundamental challenges facing UK defence. It is no solution to ‘fuse’ reviews of security with reviews of defence, as the NSCR attempted to do, if every extra pound spent on the one comes at the expense of the other. (Paragraph 62)

As set out in the NSCR, the Fusion Doctrine strengthens our collective approach to national security and allows for strategic prioritisation across National Security, including Defence. We recognise the need for Defence to be able to invest in priority capabilities, as demonstrated by the extra £2.2bn pledged to them in the 2019 Spending Round. However, we do recognise that there is more to do in optimising the Armed Forces and MOD to deliver the Government’s wider national security ambitions and will continue to identify how it can do so as we approach the next Spending Review.

15.We recommend that the Government publish the list of National Security Strategy and Implementation Groups, the ‘home’ department of the Senior Responsible Official for each NSC policy priority, and the frequency with which each NSSIG meets. In its response to this report, the Government should also set out:

We have no plans to make public the list of current National Strategy Implementation Groups (NSIGs) or Senior Responsible Officials (SROs), or to detail the frequency of NSIG officials’ meetings.

National Security Council priorities change over time and SROs will be appointed and stood down accordingly. SROs and their NSIGs work on the highest priority thematic and geographic challenges relating to UK national security. While some of these are obvious and likely to be enduring, such as Counter-Terrorism or Russia, it would not be appropriate to provide a running public commentary on the changing priorities of the NSC, some of which could be sensitive at the time.

Each NSIG is led by an SRO who is accountable to the NSC for the development of options and the implementation of the Government’s strategy. The focus is on impact rather than prescriptive processes, and it is therefore for these SROs to determine how their NSIG operates in order to implement the direction of the NSC.

This is a fundamental part of a successful Fusion approach: the SRO-led strategy making process is informed throughout by engagement with and input from the private sector, international allies and others. This continues throughout the implementation of our priority national strategies, where we work in partnership with those outside Government in order to harness the full range of available national capabilities. Mutually beneficial partnerships enable us to fully utilise our comparative advantages in support of UK interests. Our strengths are unique but they are much stronger when combined with those of our allies.

In Africa, for example, the UK is working in partnership with governments, investors, entrepreneurs and the wider private sector to create jobs, boost investment and further develop infrastructure across the continent. The Fusion approach is driving a significant increase in UK investment into Africa – aiming to invest up to £3.5bn in businesses over four years through the CDC Group (the UK’s Development Finance Institution). Working closely with the City of London, we are also mobilising £4bn of private sector investment into the continent. These investments will help generate hundreds of thousands of jobs, build stability and trigger growth in some of the poorest and most fragile countries. We will host the Africa Investment Summit in 2020 and aim to be the largest G7 foreign direct investor in Africa by 2022.

Fusion is also at the heart of the UK’s efforts to promote peace and security in the Sahel, through diplomacy and targeted support. We work closely with the UN and France through contributions to the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the deployment of three RAF Chinook helicopters to Operation Barkhane in 2018. As the third largest humanitarian donor to the region and an active member of the Sahel Envoys network and the Sahel Alliance, the UK is reaching those vulnerable to conflict, climate change and malnutrition. Our efforts have already provided life-saving humanitarian aid to 2.3m people across the region since 2015.

SROs and NSIGs played a central part in the first Annual Posture Review (APR). Feedback received from SROs, NSIGs and Departments noted that Fusion is bedding in well and has been used to challenge traditional mind-sets; help convene and direct work in new and positive ways; and make greater use of a broader range of UK levers and expertise. SROs also told us that using the Fusion model gave them greater authority and reach across the system, encouraged collaborative behaviours and increased access to a broader range of capabilities they could use to deliver their objectives. The intention is that SROs will continue to be consulted, in particular on how existing capabilities are best used and to identify future capability requirements.

We are now using Fusion mechanisms to help shape departmental prioritisation for a future spending review or SDSR and to gather improved cross-cutting data on expenditure against national security priorities. This is contributing to a better understanding of how defence and security capabilities are – and could be – used to deliver national security objectives and ways in which we can be more impactful in our use of capabilities and drive greater efficiencies. NSIGs play a key role in establishing the strategic outlook, which in turn informs how threat agnostic capabilities are developed and used.

16.The value of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund comes from the way in which it brings together multiple departments and agencies—as well as both Official Development Assistance and non-ODA funding—to deliver programmes which provide significant national security benefits but might ordinarily be beyond the remit and/or risk appetite of individual departments. The Committee recognises the value of this approach. However, it is precisely this combination of complexity and greater risk that necessitates strong direction from the centre of Government, and especially proactive ministerial oversight. We will therefore monitor the work of the new National Security Council sub-committee closely as part of our ongoing scrutiny of the CSSF. (Paragraph 66)

We recognise the need for clear Ministerial oversight of the Funds. The Funds will continue to report directly into the NSC which provides direction on the use of the CSSF. There remains a Minister clearly responsible for the Funds (Minister for the Cabinet Office, the Rt. Hon. Oliver Dowden MP). Detailed Ministerial arrangements under the newly constituted NSC are currently being re-confirmed.

17.We recommend that the Government share the agenda for the NSC sub-committee on cross-government funds with us, in confidence and on a regular basis, as it does for the NSC and its other sub-committees. (Paragraph 67)

We agree, subject to confirmation of detailed Ministerial oversight arrangements under the ambit of the NSC as mentioned above.

A more agile approach to national security between SDSRs: ‘posture reviews’

18.The national security landscape is changing more quickly than the current cycle of five-yearly reviews of UK national security can accommodate, suggesting that a form of interim review is needed. The way in which the National Security Capability Review and then the Modernising Defence Programme unfolded in 2017 and 2018 demonstrated the importance of a more deliberate, considered process. Such reviews of national security should be led, as far as possible, by policy need rather than politics. (Paragraph 70)

19.We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to hold regular, limited ‘posture reviews’ in between the publication of the National Security Strategy every five years, although we caution against holding them too frequently. This formalised approach would allow the Government incrementally to adjust the UK’s course and capabilities. It would have the advantage of providing:

This dynamic review of national security should be a key function of the National Security Council. (Paragraph 71)

20.We recommend that when the Government publishes its first posture review, it should set out: how it was conducted; by whom (including which Ministers were involved and at what stage); whether it was “fiscally neutral”; and how it relates to the National Security Risk Assessment (which is also conducted on a regular basis between the five-yearly reviews of national security). In addition, the Government should weigh up the benefits of conducting this first posture review against the costs to departments, with a view to making a more informed decision about when to hold the next one. (Paragraph 72)

The original timing of the reviews was linked to the five-year Parliamentary cycle. This cycle shifted with the 2017 election. The content of the reviews is driven by a hard-headed appraisal of our national security and foreign policy objectives, and the complex risks we face in a changing world.

For the review to be truly strategic, the UK’s long as well as short-term interests must be considered, including what capabilities are required and how they can be developed. Shorter scale reviews such as the NSCR and MDP should be conducted as required, rather than built rigidly into the process. This is in order to balance flexibility for changing circumstances and ensure time for capabilities or changes in policy to be implemented and the effect of them to be felt.

We agree that our national security strategy should be kept under review as the policy landscape changes and the Committee acknowledges the importance of the NSCR and MDP, which refreshed our analysis and reaffirmed the key principles of SDSR 15.

The first, official-level, APR was fiscally-neutral. It provided insight into how the new Fusion structures were bedding in, the experience of SROs and practitioners, and identified areas for continued implementation of Fusion. A summary of the findings of the first APR was published within the Third Annual Report on the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 on 22 July 2019, which was approved by Ministers prior to publication.

The purpose of the APR is to take stock of the UK’s positioning on national security in terms of resilience, threats and opportunities, and to take decisions about strategic prioritisation. The NSC reviews these priorities on an ongoing basis, informed by a range of sources, including the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA).

The NSRA highlights the common consequences arising from a range of national security risks, stimulating cross-Government contingency planning at both the local and national scale. It informs NSC priorities by articulating and prioritising the risks and thematic drivers which the wider resilience community is currently concerned about and improves our assurance of local and national response capabilities.

21.The Government should use these posture reviews to establish a regular dialogue with our Committee on national security threats and wider challenges, on the understanding that some of this discussion will need to take place in private. A good first step would be for the Government to share the 2018 National Security Risk Assessment with us, in confidence, so that we can better understand its current assessment and prioritisation of risk. (Paragraph 73)

We value the ongoing dialogue to date with the Committee on national security strategy and priorities. We look forward to continuing this dialogue, and are particularly interested in hearing the Committee’s views on national security threats and wider challenges.

The NSRA is an objective and statistically rigorous document that assesses the impact and likelihood of a subset of both domestic and international risks believed to have the greatest national security implications over the next two years. This holistic approach to risk assessment means that the NSRA helps to proactively identify the risks and thematic trends which might be of significant interest to the NSC.

The future of five-yearly national security reviews

22.If security and defence reviews are held with no Spending Review in sight, the likely result will be a rupture in the Fusion Doctrine, such as that which happened when the Modernising Defence Programme was divorced from the National Security Capability Review. (Paragraph 76)

The NSC commissioned a focused NSCR to support the ongoing implementation of the 2015 SDSR. It aimed to identify how we develop, deliver and deploy our considerable national security capabilities to maximum collective effect. The NSCR was conducted within the existing national security funds envelope, with Spending Review 2015 budgets remaining the basis of the Government’s spending plans. Funding for new NSCR recommendations was found through reprioritisation of existing budgets.

The NSCR recommended that the MOD undertake the Modernising Defence Programme. It was launched because the NSCR found that further work was required to make sure that Defence was sustainable, affordable and configured to address the threats we face. The MDP built on the conclusions of the NSCR, and throughout the programme, MOD worked with colleagues across Government, in line with the Fusion approach.

23.The new Government should set out in its response to this report when it intends to hold the next full review of UK national security, and how in the longer term it intends to reconcile the divergent timelines of the NSS & SDSR, the Spending Review and the start of a new Parliament (Paragraph 77)

No decision has yet been made on the timing of a strategic review of National Security. Once a decision has been taken, we will inform the Committee.



Published: 4 November 2019