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It is right that Ofsted should function entirely independently; that is at the core of its great value for education in this country. There would be no point in having a government-run body to inspect schools and, by implication, the government education policy. Even so the department, which in the words of the Minister in another place has no strategic input into Ofsted, has implemented spending powers to be set by the Secretary of State and introduced new powers to create committees—all of which come with a generous civil servant pay and pension packet.
What the Minister in another place failed to answer was the point concerning the structural reconfiguration and the accountability of levels of remuneration. The regulatory impact assessment quotes the Government's policy on inspection of public services, which states that it,
But nowhere in the regulatory impact assessment is there mention of an advance audit of how effective Ofsted spending will be. The RIA states that at the time of publishing, cost estimates were based on an early assumption that,
I hope the Minister can fill us in on the detail of that policy, how much it is set to cost the taxpayer and, crucially, whether it will affect the independence of Ofsted.
Further to the question of initial finances, there is also little to no incentive in the Bill for the office to
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The proposed inspectorate will incorporate a vast remit and not just in educational terms. It will stretch from nursery schools to adult education—also incorporating the children's services from the Commission for Social Care Inspection—to prison inspection work with juvenile estates. That is planned, I understand, to happen by 2008. That is a tight schedule. I fear that while these various different inspectorates jostle for their new roles under the Ofsted umbrella, roles will become confused and the vital component of our educational system, the head official body for holding schools to account, will suffer, resulting in literally immeasurable damage to standards in schools.
Amendment No. 248ZH injects a duty to promote high standards into the office, which, in its title, stands to represent standards in education, children’s services and skills. I was extremely surprised to note that such a priority was not already included in the Bill, and even more surprised to note the Minister’s rejection of the amendment in another place, stating that the amendment was at odds with the general purpose of Ofsted, although the regulatory impact assessment states:
and—this is the most important thing of all, on which we have touched again and again, although maybe not enough in this Committee—
I should be interested to know which of those statements is true.
Why should not Ofsted focus on high standards? The key to the role of Ofsted must be to ensure that all schools are good. Both the White Paper and the RIA state repeatedly that,
The educational goalposts shift ever upwards. However, that aim, which I read to mean that all children must achieve their best, must be tested.
The Government’s policy is clear. Page 143 of the RIA states unequivocally:
“The Government challenges all schools to provide the best possible standards of education to all their pupils, so all children and young people can achieve their potential”.
Yet in another place the Minister rejected the amendment from my honourable friend, retabled as Amendment No. 248ZH today, which would make it a key statutory aim for the chief inspector to exercise his functions with a view to promoting high standards. That is the essential bridge between the
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Lord Sutherland of Houndwood: I shall speak to the three amendments under my name in this group, Amendments Nos. 248ZAD, 248ZAE and 248ZAF. I have some residual concerns about the process proposed in this part of the Bill. These are probing amendments that I hope will bring clarification of what the consequences and achievements of such a part of the Act would be as it becomes an Act. What is the added value of the office being structured in this way? Is there a potential deficit? I stress also the points made in the previous speech about the importance of independence for Ofsted and clarity of purpose and governance. I suspect that these clauses of the Bill will add to neither independence nor clarity.
This measure could be expensive. Doubtless, as committees and sub-committees multiply, it will become more expensive because they all have to be fuelled and the expenses covered. Ofsted has happily moved ahead in its management arrangementsto include independent members of the senior management group within Ofsted. I think that these independent members have given considerable value and provided what this part of the Bill ideally sets out to provide. They have been a valuable addition and this model of governance has served Ofsted well.
4.15 pm
As for additional value, could it be that weare to use the blessed words “accountable” and “accountability”? Those words usually appear at this stage in such a debate. Her Majesty's chief inspector is accountable. He or she is accountable to Parliament, and is rightly held to account by Parliament through, for example, the annual report, the Secretary of State and the Select Committees.All of those operate well and in a way that teststhe independence and clarity of vision of the inspectorate.
That is happening—accountability is there. If there be any doubt, there are more than 25,000 schools in England, each of which has a complement of teachers who regard it as a sacred duty to keep an eye on Ofsted. So there is an informal form of accountability. I believe that accountability is there and clear and should properly continue to be exercised by Parliament.
Is there then the risk of a deficit in these departures? I believe that there is, and I think that the risk is that the office, constituted as it is in the Bill, will perhaps raise issues about both the professional and independent judgment of the chief inspector and his or her colleagues.
What precisely is the office meant to add and what will it do? According to the Bill, it will “determine strategy”. The Government properly determine policy. If a body such as this determines strategy, what is left for the professionals in the organisation who have served us very well not only in exercising
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There will be a layer of bureaucracy between the inspectorate and the exercise of its judgment in practical ways. Does it have to go back to the body in question—in monthly meetings, six-weekly meetings, three-monthly meetings? Does the chief inspector have to go back to that body before making sometimes very urgent practical decisions to ensure that it is in line with strategy and strategic priorities as set out in the mind of the office?
My view is that this element of the Bill will at best add little to the activities of Ofsted. As it stands, however, it could confuse the lines of accountability and the professional responsibilities of the inspectorate and the chief inspector by adding another line of accountability. I know that the schedule spells out in some detail who does what, but I do not think that it adds up to a clear line of responsibility or a clear line of accountability. For example, the office can make appointments but only through the action of the chief inspector. That seems rather convoluted, and there is a series of similar examples in the Bill.
I would ultimately wish that these clauses be excised, but I suspect that that is too much to hope for. However, if they are to remain, I hope that they can be modified to make plain where independence, professional judgment and accountability lie, which is quite clearly with Parliament rather than, effectively, a quango.
Baroness Sharp of Guildford: I have three amendments standing in my name in this group: Amendments Nos. 248D and 248E, to which I wish to speak, and Amendment No. 251A, which I shall not speak to or move.
We have tabled Amendments Nos. 248D and 248E on behalf of the Local Government Association. They relate to Clause 130, on reviews of local education authorities. The LGA is putting forward these amendments to give the chief inspector a power rather than a duty to review and rate the overall performance of each local authority every year.
The LGA sees the creation of a single inspectorate for children as an important step forward as it reflects the focus on the child rather than the institutions providing services. However, the LGA is concerned about the proposal to require the chief inspector to review the overall performance of each local authority every year and to award a performance rating. Whileit is adamant that inspection of direct services to
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The landscape of children’s services has changed significantly, even in the short time in which children’s services inspections have been formally under way. The LGA and the IDA have proposed that the new local performance framework to replace CPA should be consistent with the way localities are governed and focus on improvement rather than compliance. They would like to see an annual assessment at the heart of a new framework undertaken by local authorities and their partners. This would draw on a robust evidence base, including the inspections carried out by the new inspectorate, so they would expect that inspection and assessment of services for vulnerable children would continue to be important. The results of these inspections would be used by local authorities and their partners in their own annual assessments but they do not want to see the new single inspectorate required to carry out an annual review of the local authority’s performance in isolation or to give authorities a performance rating. This reflects the current CPA framework, and they do not think that the legal basis for the new inspectorate should prescribe existing inspection methodology for the future.
Lord Adonis: Amendment No. 248ZAA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, concerns paragraph 5 to Schedule 11. I stress that these remuneration and salary arrangements for members of the office are common to any public organisation with a non-executive board. They are not unusual and replicate those made in other equivalent cases. It is only right that members of the non-executive board are financially compensated for their services through a remuneration package, the payment of allowances and pensions. Removal of this provision would limit the ability to recruit members of sufficient expertise.
The noble Baroness asked what pressure there would be on the new Ofsted to contain costs. There is a requirement on the office in that regard under Clause 108(1)(c) and Clause 109(1)(c). Clause 109(1)(c ) states:
“The Office is to perform its functions for the general purpose of encouraging...(c) the efficient and effective use of resources in the carrying”,
out of its duties. The savings that we expect to be realised by bringing together all these inspectorates are set out in the regulatory impact assessment, which states in paragraph 20.29 that while there willbe transitional costs of around £13.5 million to£19.7 million, there is an expectation of annual savings of £6.4 million, which means that there is an implied payback period, once cumulative savings have covered any transitional costs, of between two years,
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On Amendment No. 248ZAB, paragraph 7 to Schedule 11 is a standard provision, giving the non-executive board flexibility to establish whatever committees and sub-committees it chooses. There is nothing unusual in that respect. As my honourable friend said in another place, at the moment we do not know what pattern of committees and sub-committees the office will choose to establish and we regard that as beyond our remit to determine. The office should be free to determine those matters itself.
The noble Lord, Lord Sutherland, spoke to Amendments Nos. 248ZAD, 248ZAE and 248ZAF with all the authority of a former chief inspector. I appreciate the points that he made. He was the first head of Ofsted and established it as one of our most successful inspectorates over the past 15 years, if one looks at the results in terms of higher school standards and the increased accountability in the schools system. However, I think that the noble Lord would accept that our proposed model of a non-executive board is not unusual. Indeed, it is much more common for organisations of this kind than that which has been in place for Ofsted.
The present chief inspector, Maurice Smith, and his predecessor, David Bell, who is now Permanent Secretary in my department, met noble Lords a fortnight ago to look at these provisions. Both expressed satisfaction with the current provisions and they believed that the demarcation of responsibilities between the proposed non-executive board and the chief inspector are appropriate to the task and did not raise concerns.
I should emphasise that the Bill provides the board with no powers to overrule the chief inspector on any matter concerning his inspection and regulatory functions. It places those powers and duties firmly and unambiguously on the chief inspector. So, the independence of the chief inspector to report onthe findings from any inspection and to advise the Secretary of State as he or she sees fit are firmly enshrined in Clause 110. As in the time of the noble Lord, Lord Sutherland, as chief inspector, the new Ofsted will be a non-ministerial government department, emphasising that it will continue to have the same status and independence as today. Her Majesty’s chief inspector will continue to be appointed by Her Majesty in Council, which is a further significant guarantee of the inspectorate’s independence.
The noble Lord raised issues relating to the relationship and accountability between the chief inspector and the board. I believe that they are fairly set out. But one of the pertinent points raised by Maurice Smith and David Bell in their meeting with noble Lords was that, at the moment, Her Majesty’s chief inspector’s accountability for his performance is to the Secretary of State in my department, with whom the chief inspector has an annual meeting that
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Amendment No. 248ZH, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, seeks to ensure that the chief inspector exercises his functions with a view to promoting higher standards. I am pleased to tell her that the inspection remits under which the chief inspector works will continue to be agreed with the Secretary of State, as now, and they will give primacy to the promotion of higher standards—so there will be no change in that regard.
Amendments Nos. 248D and 248E were spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Sharp, and tabled at the instigation of the Local Government Association. At present, a local authority’s performance rating for its children’s services functions is arrived at by Ofsted and CSCI discussing and agreeing a rating constructed of two parts: for education and for children’s social care. Clause 130 provides for a single performance rating to be awarded by the chief inspector following the transfer of functions.
The Government believe, first, that tracking year-on-year progress is a key element in driving up performance and, secondly, that providing an overall rating enhances local accountability by providing local communities with a simple measure of their council’s performance. Those provisions are in the Bill but I should be very happy to discuss the matter further with the noble Baroness if that would be helpful.
4.30 pm
Baroness Buscombe: I thank the Minister for his response to my amendments. I was content with his replies to both my Amendments Nos. 248ZAA and 248ZAB. I am much reassured by what he said on the need to prioritise the promotion of higher standards in all our schools and that that will receive primacy under my Amendment No. 248ZH. On that note, I have pleasure in begging leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 248ZAB not moved.]
Clauses 105 and 106 agreed to.
[Amendment No. 248ZAC not moved.]
Clause 108 [Functions of the Office]:
[Amendments Nos. 248ZAD to 248ZAF not moved.]
Baroness Walmsley moved Amendment No. 248ZB:
( ) to safeguard and promote the best interests of the child”The noble Baroness said: We are reaching the home straight. I shall speak also to the rest of the
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Amendment No. 248ZB would add to the functions of the office of the chief inspector the duty to safeguard and promote the best interests of the child. Of course, any organisation providing services to, or inspecting services for, children should have such a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Although we welcome the provisions in the Bill which state that in performing its functions the office has to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the rights and welfare of children, we feel that this should be included in the functions of the office rather than in the performance of the office’s functions. Perhaps we can hear angels dancing on the heads of pins at the moment but that is where we would prefer to see that provision.
Amendment No. 248ZC is another “voice of the child” amendment. It would ensure that the office—I cannot get used to calling it “the office”; I have a picture in my mind of television soap operas—in performing its functions, took account of the views expressed by children. That is an honourable duty. The Minister has been kind enough to accept it in other respects and I hope that he will also look kindly on the idea in this regard.
Amendment No. 248ZD would insert definitions of “rights” and “well-being”. We welcome the office’s functions with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the rights and welfare of children. However, for the sake of clarity, we would hope that the definition of rights as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Human Rights Act 1998, and the definition of “well-being” in the Children Act 2004, could be added to Clause 109(4), as no one would then be in any doubt about what we mean by those things.
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