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11 Oct 2006 : Column 249

House of Lords

Wednesday, 11 October 2006.

The House met at three of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Coventry): the LORD SPEAKER on the Woolsack.

Sudan: Darfur

Baroness Cox asked Her Majesty’s Government:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Triesman): My Lords, we are extremely concerned about the situation in Darfur. We are making it clear to the Sudanese Government and the armed rebel groups that they must stop fighting immediately. The Government must also accept a UN force for Darfur and the bolstering of the African Union force until the UN can arrive and they must restart the political process with the non-signatories to the Darfur peace agreement. We are urging international partners to take the same line.

Baroness Cox: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Given the continuing, horrifying escalation of death and destruction, with 300,000 to 400,000 people now dead and 90 per cent of villages in Darfur destroyed by the National Islamic Front regime’s genocidal policy, does he agree that the time has now come for the consideration of serious measures, such as targeted sanctions or the refusal of visas to the regime’s representatives, instead of, as at the present moment, giving invitations to the chairman of the Khartoum Stock Exchange, who is in London at the invitation of the Foreign Office? How long are this Government going to continue to do business with a regime that kills while it talks?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, there are already United Nations decisions on sanctions and there is no doubt, as matters stand, that there will be a need for further consideration of further sanctions against a wider group of people. The other critical issue has been to establish a viable African Union force to keep the peace, as far as that is possible, across Darfur. On20 September, that process looked impossible, but it had been achieved, at least in outline, by the end of that week. That force has to be capable of doing the job of protecting the people of Darfur until the United Nations can take over the responsibility, as it must.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, the Minister spoke about making the situation clear to both sides, but is it not obvious, and did not the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, make it even clearer, that this is not a level killing field with two sides locked in

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deadly combat and that the Government in Khartoum do not care anything for their citizens, are bent upon encouraging the most appalling atrocities and are continuing to do so in defiance of world opinion? Is it not indeed time that very much firmer sanctions were mobilised against the Khartoum Government and more were pressed for in the United Nations? What will happen when the African Union mission ends, which is any day now in September and October, when the UN mission will come, at the earliest, in January? How will the killing going on in the mean time be stopped unless we have a really firm grip on the Khartoum Government of the kind that is so far lacking?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, for the sake of clarity, the agreement that was reached with the African Union in New York, to which I was a party, means that its mandate has been extended until the end of December with a significant improvement in United Nations assistance. I can say from overnight discussions that there has been agreement with, at least, President al-Bashir about what the United Nations’ additional assistance should be. That is a small step forward.

I do not dissent at all from the view that there are the most serious crimes and breaches of the agreements that the Government of Sudan voluntarily entered into, but it is also true that rebel groups are killing widely. This is a war between a number of parties, and our task must be to get them all to sign the peace agreement, from which many absented themselves.

Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, do the Government agree with the analysis of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 that the primary responsibility for protecting human rights lies with the Government concerned, that if the Government fail to discharge that responsibility it passes to the Security Council and that if the Security Council fails adequately to act, the question arises of whether the greater harm lies in the damage to international order of bypassing the Security Council or in the slaughter of human beings while the international community looks on? If the third of those situations arises, does my noble friend agree with Mr Kofi Annan that not even the principle of national sovereignty can protect crimes against humanity?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, in the meeting that preceded the United Nations General Assembly last year, the world community agreed that a responsibility to protect should be part of the operating code of the United Nations. That means that the first responsibility is with the Government concerned and then it passes, irrespective of sovereignty, to the international community. In Security Council Resolution 1706, drafted by the United Kingdom, that is explicitly written into the terms of the decision by the Security Council, taken without a vote against and with three abstentions. In the final analysis, the Security Council—and the United Nations—will be tested by whether it takes that responsibility seriously with the full implications that it bears.



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Lord Avebury: My Lords, I am sure the Minister will have seen President Obasanjo’s reference to impending genocide and his offer of additional Nigerian troops for the African Union force. In view of the implacable refusal by Khartoum to allow the United Nations to take over the operation, will the international community do better to concentrate on AMIS Plus, with the possibility that the UN might lend military units to AMIS, and more robust rules of engagement so that it can adequately protect the civilian population?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, our position is that the United Nations needs to take over this operation, but the fact is that there would be an interregnum—and there would have been one from the end of December through to 1 January if AMIS had not been prepared to step in with additional assistance, as I said a few moments ago—from the United Nations. Bolstering that force should be done in a way that is compatible with a transition to UN. I believe that the international community has an obligation to put all pressure on the Government of Sudan to agree to a UN force, and all pressure on the other rebel groups to sign the peace treaty, which they could have signed several months ago and spared many thousands of lives.

The Lord Bishop of Coventry: My Lords, is the Minister aware that there appears to be a concerted campaign by the Khartoum Government to muzzle the freedom of the press in northern Sudan? Does he agree that this is a violation of the terms of the interim constitution and that it also seriously undermines any attempt at democratic transformation?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I completely agree. It is one of a catalogue of areas in which the Government in Khartoum disregard any form of international pressure. They are in breach of the peace agreement they signed just a couple of months ago in every military action that they have embarked on in these past few months.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, can we be sure—

The Minister of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Rooker): My Lords, I am sorry. We are well into the ninth minute now.

Iraq

3.08 pm

Lord Garden asked Her Majesty’s Government:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Drayson): My Lords, the Government have already published two reports on lessons from Iraq. These were Operations in Iraq: First

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Reflections, published in July 2003, and Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, published in December 2003. Internal analysis continues, but the Government do not currently have any plans to publish further reports on this matter.

Lord Garden: My Lords, I trust that the Minister has read the Wall Street Journal this morning, which reports that a new US medical academic survey estimates that there have been around 600,000 Iraqi deaths from violence since March 2003. We have had no updated lessons-learnt report in the last three years, as he has just told us, but we need to learn the lessons if we are not to make the same failures in the future. When will there be an update?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I have not read the Wall Street Journal report to which the noble Lord refers; I will read it when I return to the department. As I said in my original Answer, there is an ongoing process of analysis within the Ministry of Defence. There are no current plans to publish the outcomes of that analysis. However, if that situation changes, I will inform the House.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, can the Minister confirm that lessons learnt from the operations have been applied in practice?

Lord Drayson: Yes I can, my Lords, and I will give some examples from both an operational and an equipment standpoint. What we are doing operationally today in Baghdad and Basra—Operation Sinbad—is a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood clearance of the sectarian killers, with reconstruction on a neighbourhood basis, which is having real success. The chair of the Basra security council, Hammadi, has been out on the streets with the local press, pointing out what has been done to develop local schools. On equipment—just to give one example—improvements in the accuracy of our munitions to reduce collateral damage and investment that we have put into communications have had a big impact on the effectiveness of our operations, which has been reflected on the ground.

Lord Soley: My Lords, I am not sure that the Minister can answer this, but I shall ask it nevertheless. Is it not common sense and common knowledge to most of us now that Iraq will go down in history as an example of how to win a war and lose the subsequent peace? That happened because when Colin Powell was talking about the post-conflict situation, he was increasingly marginalised and power went to Donald Rumsfeld, with the result that there was no post-conflict plan in operation, which left us very exposed in the south of Iraq. We have all paid a very high price for that. That is the lesson, and it is a very important one, not least because there will be other times when we have to intervene, as the previous Question exemplified.

Lord Drayson: My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point. Those points have been reflected in the lessons-learnt documents published by the department.

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It is fair to say that we are very concerned about the situation that we face in Iraq today. Concern is mainly focused on the difficulties that we have in the cities, primarily Baghdad but also Basra. It is correct to say that we had a successful operational campaign in March 2003, which we expected more rapidly to become a peacekeeping operation; we did not expect to have an extended counter-insurgency operation such as we have been faced with. However, we are responding to that from the lessons that we have learnt on the ground and we are seeing progress in the reconstruction effort. A million people in Basra now have electricity and water 24 hours a day. That was not the case a year ago, or five years ago.

Lord Marsh: My Lords, but do the Government, the United States or anyone yet have any evidence of a clear exit strategy from one of the biggest tragedies that mankind has faced for many long years?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, we absolutely have a clear exit strategy. Our strategy is to support the Iraqi security operations—the police and the army—in creating an environment where governance and reconstruction can take place. We have seen that that has worked. This summer, two provinces have been successfully handed over to the Iraqi security forces. We hope that the situation will allow us to hand over a third province. However, the key is the progress that we are able to make in Basra and Baghdad. That is where the main challenge is and that is where we are focusing our attention, but our strategy has not changed. We are following a clear process that is shown to work.

Lord Dykes: My Lords—

Lord Blaker: My Lords, is not the lesson of the Iraq war that when Her Majesty's Government differ with the United States on an important issue of policy, they should press their case more vigorously than they did this time?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government's policy on Iraq is clearly to work with our coalition partners to support the development of the country as a democratic state. We have seen how the Iraqi people have responded to that in two general elections and the establishment of a constitution. There is no doubt that the Iraqi people want the country to progress but, as has been said, there is tremendous sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shia. We have to stick with this. We have seen progress in a number of provinces. The main area of difficulty is within the cities. We have a tactical plan which, in the early days, is working. We need to stick with that through the coming months.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that any publication about any shortcomings must be consistent with the safety of our troops on the ground at the moment? The idea of publishing something that feeds a media frenzy

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rather than serving the real purposes of our troops serving on the ground in Iraq would, for many of us, be a tragedy.

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. She is absolutely right; there is obviously a real limitation to the detail into which we can go. Having spoken to operational commanders and troops on the ground, I must say that they find it difficult that the emphasis is on the difficulties and that no real recognition is given to the progress that has been made. The feeling, which is shared by people in DfID, is that the progress that has been made on the reconstruction effort in very difficult circumstances is not properly reflected in the discussion.

Somalia: Peacekeeping

3.15 pm

Lord Avebury asked Her Majesty’s Government:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Triesman): My Lords, the African Union has approved a proposal by members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—IGAD—to deploy a peace-support mission to Somalia. On 13 July 2006, the UN Security Council confirmed its willingness to consider whether a peace-support mission would contribute to peace and stability in Somalia on receipt of a detailed plan from IGAD. We will participate actively in this consideration. I have had discussions with the transitional federal government representatives on this subject and the subject of trying to sustain current peace negotiations.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, has not the situation changed since the Islamic Courts Union declared a jihad against any foreign forces entering Somalian territory, including the deployment of IGADSOM, as has been decided by the African Union Peace and Security Council? Does the Minister consider there to be any scope for a discussion between the AU and the Islamic Courts Union on a variation of the proposal that would be acceptable to them, either in terms of the states that are providing forces or in the terms of reference of the mission? Will it be explained clearly to the Islamic Courts Union that if it does not agree to such a mission, the likelihood is that President Abdullahi Yusuf will call on the Ethiopian forces to help to protect him?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, the peace discussions in Khartoum are about to enter a third phase, and there have also been useful contacts in the past couple of weeks in Nairobi. The aim of the peace discussions is to provide the conditions under which a peace-support operation would work successfully with the agreement of all parties in Somalia. It remains quite

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clear to me that if the Islamic Courts Union cannot accept peace proposals, the Security Council will have to consider very urgently the decisions taken by the front-line states on security in the region.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, are the Americans supporting the warlords in Somalia? If so, will Her Majesty’s Government make representations to them to stop? The trouble in Somalia was caused by gangs of warlords shooting people up and engaging in total mayhem. Even a strongly Muslim Government would be more peaceful and more preferable to what has gone before.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I think the noble Earl is referring to an allegation some while ago that the United States had supported several warlords and their armed militias. Whether or not people think that this is the best outcome for Somalia, the move of the Islamic Courts Union against the warlords has more or less taken them out of any part of the equation, as matters stand. The problems now lie principally between the transitional federal Government of President Yusuf—the only Government who are supported by the United Nations as the legitimate Government—and the Islamic Courts Union.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, what is the Minister’s assessment of the Islamic Courts Union and its medium-term aims? It has been suggested that it wants to create an Islamic state, and that it has links with various fundamentalist extremist groups, including al-Qaeda. Is that a danger? Are we seeing the emergence of yet another failed state and source of terrorism, or could the Islamic Courts Union provide the stability that my noble friends have suggested?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I do not think that the Islamic Courts Union is a homogenous body in any sense. It contains some elements which are moderate and plainly disposed towards the peace negotiations that I have described. It contains some elements—they may be in the ascendancy at the moment—which I would describe as being on the end of the politics of al-Qaeda and very dangerous. The reality is that we must make sure that moderate parties on both sides—the transitional Government and the Islamic Courts Union—engage in discussions and try to get to a new balance between the different forces. It would be of no benefit to this country to see the kind of takeover of Somalia which would create a further serious international security problem.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, is the mandate of the African Union in such a situation solely to observe, as it has been in Darfur where it has not been able to protect the people at all? Is it in any way likely that either it or any subsequent force would have any power of intervention? Is it only to observe and report what we are constantly hearing?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, there are two important questions in the noble Baroness’s supplementary question. First, the precise purpose of an IGAD force, were it to be introduced in Somalia, would have

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to be agreed with the Security Council. Its mandate could include anything that the Security Council deemed appropriate. If it is introduced, I would hope that it would be sufficiently robust to do the job properly. On the second question, which requires some comment, the mandate that the AMIS force has in Darfur could and should have been used far more extensively than just for observation. At the beginning it was.

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