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This is really red-top newspaper stuffto publicise young people who are perhaps guilty of disorderly conduct; having their photographs put up in the local pubs or published in the newspaper. Will that reform them? Will it make them better people? Will they be less likely to offend in future? I very much doubt it. I think that the effect of publicity of that sort could be twofold. It could be seen as turning the individual into a local media personality, so that he can bask in the glow of the publicity. Alternatively, it could be seen to be something that damages his future education and career. Whichever it may be, it is wholly undesirable. I respectfully urge on your Lordships that it is appropriate to remove the naming and shaming provisions from the Bill, both on the making of the orderor rather, on conviction following criminal proceedingsand in any other respect. I beg to move.
Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, we had a similar debate only last week in your Lordships House when we discussed the Police and Justice Bill. We did not have the benefit of the historical discourse given by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, which I am sure we all found enlivening and, in its way, entertaining. I am tempted to talk about whipping, although perhaps it is inappropriate. In any case, I got the message from the noble Lords story to us all.
The amendment seeks to reimpose automatic reporting restrictions, in the terms set out by the noble Lord, in proceedings for an order on conviction involving young people and where there is a breach of an order by a young person. As I said, we debated this last week and on several other occasions, and we on the government Benches take a very different view. In the past, I sought to explain that we are not creating a situation in which all cases would be automatically reported. Although we are reversing the presumption, we are not preventing the courts imposing reporting restrictions where appropriate. It is for the courts to make that judgment. The important point here is that communities that become involved in laying the ground for a form of social action, of which drinking banning orders are part, need to be able to see and to understand that action is being taken on their behalf against behaviour that can blight whole neighbourhoods. In addition, we argue that the effectiveness of a drinking banning order and the ability to enforce it will frequently depend on people knowing about the order and its terms.
The noble Lord talked about individuals becoming local anti-heroes and media personalities in their neighbourhood. I doubt that that is likely; it has certainly not occurred greatly where I live as a result of anti-social behaviour orders. The publicity surrounding those orders has, in most instances that I
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Anti-social behaviour orders have certainly had some value. A test case in the London borough of BrentR (on application of Stanley, Marshall and Kelly) v the Metropolitan Police Commissionerupheld the principle that publicity is necessary to help to enforce an order. It recognised that, by informing local people of the prohibitions imposed by the order, they could identify and report breaches to the police. We recognise, however, that any publicity must be necessary and proportionate to the identified aims and impact of the order. In some circumstances, particularly where publicans and local people need to know and understand to whom an order applies, there will be value in publicity.
I come back to the point that we do not want to undermine the effectiveness of drinking banning orders by accepting the amendments. Accepting them would have an adverse impact on our policy objectives. The noble Lord takes a different view, to which he is entitled, but I urge him to reconsider his position for the sake of the effectiveness and completeness of the policy that we are working through in the legislation and to withdraw his amendment. I cannot see that those amendments have merit. Where courts think that it would be inappropriate, they are of course entitled to take the view that publicity given to drinking banning orders for young people is wrong, inappropriate or unnecessary, and are at liberty to follow their own judgments.
disorderly conduct cannot be criminal, as a matter of interpretation. Therefore, you are concerned with a person who has been engaged in conduct which isnot criminal, as a matter of interpretation. Under Clause 7(7), a drinking banning order takes effect on the day on which it is made. But what about the appellate process from a decision of the county court? In my day, it was in the Green Book, or something like that. Has that all gone? Is there no procedure for appeal from the county court? If it takes effect on the day that it is made, does that mean you prescribe the procedure for appeal? I do not know: perhaps the noble Lord will help me.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, as ever, I am very grateful for support from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, on this point. He emphasises the point that I made on Amendment No. 1. Unhappily, he was unable to make it in relation to that amendment. It is a question of balance. The Government have a favourite phrase, We think we have got it just about right. I recall once speaking to Lord Williams of Mostyn, for whom this was a very favourite phrase. He reminded me of a man riding a bicycle on a tightrope in spangled tightsI must say, he was not very impressed with that analogy.
I do not think that the Government have got the balance right in this instance. For 70 years we have had a principle that, except in exceptional cases, there should not be publicitynaming and shamingof people under the age of 18, as it now is. I do not object to publicity for those over the age of 18 who are made subject to drinking banning orders. I do not suggest for a moment that, if necessary, their photographs should not be put up in public houses as being subject to such an order and that the prohibitions which apply to them are known tothe public. That is not my point. My point is that the balance can be properly struck only if some protection remains for juveniles. I feel very strongly on this and I am not able to withdraw the amendment. I propose to test the opinion of the House.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, these minor and technical changes clarify aspects of the Bill. Amendment No. 13 deletes Clause 11(11); the subsection provides that an order made by the Secretary of State under Clause 11 specifying persons who may bring proceedings for breach of a drinking banning order is subject to the negative resolution procedure. It has been deleted because it was considered to be neater for the procedure to be governed by the general order- and regulation-making provisions under Clause 14. Amendment No. 16 to Clause 14 ensures that this is the case. These amendments ensure that an order made under Clause 11 will continue to be subject to the negative resolution procedure.
Amendment No. 9 amends Clause 9(5) to replace clerk with proper officer. Permission of the proper officer is therefore required if an application for an interim drinking banning order against an individual is to be made without notice being given to that individual and heard in the absence of that individual. Under Clause 14, proper officer means the justices clerk in relation to a magistrates court, and the clerk of the court in relation to any other court.
Amendment No. 14 seeks to clarify when a course provider must issue a certificate or notice on being asked to by the individual. The course provider must give a certificate unless the individual who undertakes the course fails to pay the course fees, attend the course as instructed or comply with any other reasonable requirement of the course provider. If the course provider does not issue a certificate, they must give the individual written notice of that decision and their reasons. The amendment makes it clear that the course provider must issue a certificate or notice before the end of the 14th day beginning with the day on which any request to do so is made by the individual.
Under Clause 13(6), the Bill already provides that where an individual is given a notice or his request for a notice or certificate has not been complied with, he may apply within a certain period to the court for a declaration that a certificate has been incorrectly withheld in contravention of Clause 13(3). Ifthat is found to be the case, the court can, under Clause 13(7), decide that the individual has satisfactorily completed the approved course and may therefore receive a reduction to the length of the drinking banning order. I beg to move.
( ) The Secretary of State must issue guidance setting out factors that the court should have regard to in determining whether applications for the renewal of orders under this section should be granted.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, it is open to the court to continue to renew interim drinking banning orders without a final hearing ever taking place. When we debated this in Committee on26 April, at col. 197a long while agothe Minister agreed that if this were to occur, it would be an abuse of process and a cloak for inefficiency. He said that getting this matter addressed through guidance would be on his to do list. It is now October, and I have moved this amendment to ask the Government what progress they have made in producing draft guidance on this matter and whether the House will be able to see it before Third Reading.
In an idle moment in August, I went through Hansard trying to add up the number of times the Minister told the House that guidance would be produced. There were not enough idle moments, even in August, for me to list all the occasions on which he said that. However, we should be given an indication of the guidance with regard to interim drinking banning orders, and I hope that we will be able to see it before the Bill finally leaves this House. I beg to move.
Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness found plenty of other things to do in August; she probably had a much happier time not using all her downtime to seek out all the references to guidance that have been made during the Bills proceedings.
Amendment No. 10 seeks to ensure that guidance will be issued to set out the factors that the court should have regard to in respect of whether applications for renewal of an interim order should be granted. I understand that the concern arises that courts could continue to renew interim drinking banning orders without a final hearing ever taking place. The noble Baroness has rightly encapsulated my own concerns about this matter at an earlier stage.
The maximum duration of an interim drinking banning order is limited to four weeks. An interim drinking banning order may be renewed once or more but not for longer than four weeks from the time when it would otherwise have expired. It must in any event cease to have effect on the courts decision on whether to make a drinking banning order. While it is technically possible for an interim drinking banning order to continue to be renewed, this should not happen in practice. It hardly seems the best use of the courts timeor, indeed, the police or a local authoritys timeand it seems extremely unlikely that the courts would continue to renew interim drinking banning orders.
It is right that the interim process should be exactly that and that authorities are obliged fully to satisfy the court by making a proper application for a permanent drinking banning order. Drinking
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There are also several safeguards in place. An interim order will not take effect until it is served personally on the subject. Court rules will make this clear. Applications can be made to vary or discharge an interim drinking banning order if an individual believes that it has been wrongly imposed, at which point the court would have to hold a hearing to consider whether to vary or discharge the interim drinking banning order. As I sought to explain in Committee, the detail for such orders will be set out in the magistrates courts rules and in guidance, so coverage of this issue is very much on our to do list.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns: My Lords, the to do list keeps getting longer but with this Bill it never actually gets donethat is the difficulty. The only crumb of comforta very small oneis that the Minister says that a commitment has been given to the Lord Chief Justice that the judiciary will be consulted on the draft drinking banning order guidance.
The Minister says that it would be bad practice and wrong to take up the courts time continually to repeat the process and to have the four-week drinking banning order renewed. My problem is that inertia could be built in. I would not wish to see court time wasted in that way. As the Minister knows, my concern with several unconnected measures in this Bill is that there could be inertia when penalties simply get built into the system and continue without the proper review, and that the final hearing is the right way to deal with those matters. But this is not a matter that I would press further. I hope that the to do list does not grow but gets done. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Page 13, line 20, at end insert , provided that no charges shall be payable by any persons or clubs unless the local authority is satisfied on the basis of evidence that it is reasonable to impose charges on those particular persons or clubs
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