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Earl Howe: My Lords, the Zaireans have indicated their broad agreement to an operation of the kind that I described. However, it is clear that their grip on power in the eastern part of Zaire is tenuous, if indeed it exists at all. I do not believe that the Zaireans are in a position to guarantee us anything. However, I know that President Mobutu is engaged actively with a number of world leaders in an effort to ensure that the crisis can be addressed in rapid order. Obviously, it is unfortunate that President Mobutu has recently undergone an operation and is therefore not at the peak of physical fitness. But I understand that he is actively engaged in this matter and we shall continue with our own dialogue through the appropriate embassies and other agencies.

Lord Howell: My Lords, most noble Lords will express their appreciation of the way in which the Government are dealing with this matter and the proposals they have put before the House today. However, we are anxious that all the qualifications stated by the Minister, which clearly have to be dealt with, should be dealt with as a matter of the greatest urgency, for the reasons set out in the second part of the Statement; namely, the fact that thousands of people are dying. In a sense, it is regrettable that it has taken even such time to reach this situation. Can the Minister give any indication about the reconnaissance team and how long it might require before it can report back, enabling our forces to be present in Africa to deal with the tasks designed for them?

Secondly, I regard the issue of disarming combatants as a matter of major importance. We have to prevent troops being unnecessarily at risk. On the ground, however, it seems from what we can read that that will be almost inevitable. To protect our troops and the innocent people whom we are designing the operations to assist, it will be necessary to disarm the combatants. So, may we be assured that, if that proves to be the case, there will be no inhibitions so far as our troops are concerned?

Earl Howe: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is impossible for me to tell him precisely the

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timescale before troops go in, assuming that they do. The United Kingdom has the ability to deploy initial forces within 24 hours and, as I indicated, elements of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force are likely to be the troops that we choose to send in.

The assessment team will, I believe, be able to deliver a reasonable over-view of the situation on the ground within a matter of three or four days. I envisage that, if the United Nations further resolution emerges as we expect it to emerge, authorising sending a multinational force, and assuming that the plans now being drawn up in New York take concrete form in the way that we hope and expect, then the multinational force should be able to leave within six or seven days. But I stress that that is a very tentative estimate at this stage and it could turn out to be over-optimistic.

However, we must press on and I am sure the noble Lord will agree that the overriding aim, particularly in view of the alarming reports that we have received on the danger to civilians from starvation, is a worthy one.

Lord Elton: My Lords, does my noble friend recognise that the rather subdued mood in which the House received his Statement is due to the fact that it is under conflicting emotions at this moment? I think we are all extremely glad and would not wish it otherwise than that we should recognise our duties as members of NATO and, even more, as members of the human race. We could not possibly have stood aside.

Moreover, the situation is necessarily obscure, and a commitment, if it is to be made, has to be made at once for it to be effective; otherwise, it will arrive too late. So it is quite clear that it had to be made before the situation became clear and the provision for a reconnaissance force to be sent out in advance is entirely right and very reassuring. A decision will only be made in the light of that; but it will also be made in the light of the reservations expressed by the United States Government (to which, I understand, other members of the force subscribe) as to the non-intervention in order to disarm combatants or to secure control of the camps.

The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, rightly pointed out that Chapter 7 suggests that the force is there to do precisely that. I take it that it has been put there under Chapter 7 in case the force becomes trapped into a situation which develops into a war. That is something we are all anxious should not develop. Yet how, if the only intervention is to introduce food and medicine, is a more stable situation to be brought about? Will the presence of those resources attract large numbers of people to one place rather than several? If that is not the effect of the intervention in political terms, what is intended?

I understand from what my noble friend said that the absence of the president of the state is not as crucial as might have been thought because the state is not in control of the area in which we are interested. That again reflects on the exit plan. I wonder if I am alone in remembering the days of the League of Nations and the United Nations' mandates that were inherited from the League of Nations and whether, in order to bring this sorry and ghastly chapter to an end, we will have to

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go further in our duties as members of the human race--not on our own but through the United Nations--and establish some kind of civil authority with military backup in that area that actually works.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I can readily agree with a lot of what my noble friend said. As he will know, we are looking at a part of the world with a long history of ethnic tension between Zairean tribes and various groups who have traditionally fought each other. It is a complex situation aggravated by an influx of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. The Tutsis have reacted to a campaign against them by Zaireans and Hutu refugees. It is not a situation that will be solved in a hurry. We must be conscious that there are acute risks; that once troops go in, there will be a continuing military requirement for a number of months. I trust that in relation to our own troops we are clear that the exit strategy must involve a rapid withdrawal, once a follow-on force has been assembled.

The mission of the United Nations Special Envoy to the region, Raymond Chretien, is to try to defuse tensions. We wish him well in his task. I do not underestimate his difficulties. In the meantime, the difficulties of separating the warring factions and disarming the militia should not be underestimated. It may or may not be a task that our troops are called upon to perform; I do not know. At this stage the overriding objective is to facilitate the supply of aid and supplies and it will be a case of first things first.

Lord Monkswell: My Lords, we are all glad that something is being done. But there is a great deal of anxiety as to what is being done and how it is being done. The Government advise us that this exercise is to be based on Chapter 7. There will be a multinational force led by one country with rules dictated by another. The force is not even going to wear the United Nations uniform. Furthermore, the operation of that force is designed to carry on providing aid to refugees and do nothing about the underlying problem that has been exacerbated over the past couple of years. Given that scenario, we have every justified reason for being cautious about accepting what the Government are putting in front of us.

Perhaps I can ask two specific questions. First, why will the force not be wearing the United Nations uniform? Secondly, does this unfolding fiasco help to change the Government's mind and attitude to there being a military committee of the United Nations that can do some forward planning and exert command and control in a sensible way over these exercises in the future?

Earl Howe: My Lords, I understand the caution of the noble Lord, Lord Monkswell, in these circumstances. I have not tried to hide the uncertainties that exist. It is undeniably true that we are talking about a short-term solution to a problem with long-standing causes. However, a multinational force is an appropriate first response to the immediate humanitarian crisis in the region.

It cannot be a blue-helmeted force because there is no peace on the ground; there is no agreement between the warring factions to cease fighting. In those

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circumstances it has to be a multinational force under a United Nations mandate; a force that has the means at its disposal to meet not simply the humanitarian objective, but also be able to meet the military objective, if that emerges, of defending itself appropriately in the circumstances and ensuring that the mission is accomplished. However, the response we make to this situation will have to be co-ordinated closely with the humanitarian aid agencies. Once the mission is under way and the situation has stabilised, we would look to a follow-on force to take forward that work. It is far too soon to say how long this situation will take to resolve itself.

Lord St. John of Bletso: My Lords, does not the Minister agree that invariably in crises like these there are no short-term solutions to Africa's problems? Does he agree also that earlier this year there was an initiative by the Americans for an African 10,000-strong reaction force? One of the greatest inhibiting factors to the effectiveness of that force was the lack of training. Can the Minister comment on whether or not Her Majesty's Government have any proposals as to how to assist in the training of such an African reaction force?

At the start of the Statement the Minister commented that

"The current crisis was precipitated by Zaire's decision to withdraw citizenship from the Banyamulenge".

Can he say what initiatives are being taken in order to try to ensure a political resolution to what clearly must be the long-term solution to this crisis?

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