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Lord Kennet: My Lords, I did not mean to imply that the alliance was just an adjunct to US foreign policy, only that we wanted to keep an eye on US foreign policy to see whether it is something which NATO can continue to live by. We should be very careful that it never does become merely an adjunct.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I take the noble Lord's point and apologise if I read into what he said more than he meant. One important aspect of adaptation of the alliance to the new security environment is the work that has been undertaken to address the response to the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. That theme was picked up by noble Lords opposite. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Judd, that the work is a good example of how political leaders of the alliance have been keen to inject new thinking to address new problems. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, reminded us, he has in the past questioned how the alliance would respond to the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Indeed, there was a debate in your Lordships' House last year when my predecessor responded for the Government on that very subject.

At that time, the noble Lord was concerned that the alliance would be forced by the United States to adopt what had been termed in Washington "the counter proliferation initiative". In responding to the debate, my noble friend Lord Henley drew attention to the important work in this field that had been initiated following the NATO summit. He made clear that, far from accepting any single nation's views of the appropriate military response to the problem posed by proliferation, the alliance was undertaking a fundamental analysis of the response to the problem of proliferation with no pre-determined outcome.

I am pleased to inform your Lordships that the important work set in hand by the summit was concluded and the conclusions were endorsed by NATO foreign and defence ministers in June this year. Some of those conclusions will come as no surprise. While the primary aim will continue to be the prevention of proliferation through diplomatic means, we need to take account of the risk which such weapons pose to any operational missions which the alliance may be required to undertake.

We believe that some 10 countries of concern to the alliance now possess either biological or chemical weapons and that a number are also pursuing a nuclear

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weapons programme. Some already have ballistic missiles capable of reaching the southern periphery of the alliance. As the NATO summit in 1994 recognised, such proliferation constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO.

Based on the military capabilities and common defence developed over the course of five decades of allied co-operation, NATO's forces remain robust. At the same time, those proliferant countries which are seeking nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery may in many cases be less predictable than the patterns established by the old Warsaw Pact. And they are less likely to have effective command and control and operational doctrines. These considerations and others have led the alliance to identify a number of actions which need to be taken by the alliance to respond to the risks posed by proliferation. In particular, greater emphasis should be placed on the need for the protection of alliance forces which may be deployed out of the NATO area where the military risks posed by proliferation are greatest.

Some, but not all of the actions identified involve some improvement in existing alliance military capabilities. The important outcome of the work, however, was the overall programme of follow-on work and the mix of capabilities put forward. It would be quite wrong to believe that the work undertaken was preoccupied with a single equipment or capability. In addition--I hope that this will answer in part some of the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet--the notable feature of the work was that it was not based on individual national equipment plans. It derived its conclusions on the basis of the functional military capabilities required. It was therefore a policy framework for subsequent detailed decisions as necessary.

As I shall endeavour to explain in a moment, the alliance is now in a process of relating those capabilities to individual nations' equipment plans. The alliance has developed a well established defence planning process which operates on a two-year cycle. This involves individual force goals being placed on nations which balance the military requirements and what it is realistic to expect nations to provide, taking into account resources and any political factors. Not only does this process seek to ensure that individual nations meet their NATO obligations, it also allows for a relative importance of particular military requirements to be tested. In order to allay what may be a concern of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, I should stress that the alliance force planning process is a means of establishing whether individual capability enhancements are included in a nation's plans. It does not represent a financial commitment either by the alliance or by the nations concerned.

Once the alliance had reached conclusions about the actions required to respond to the risks posed by proliferation it was important to ensure that the work was taken forward through the existing machinery of the alliance. It would have been a waste of the effort involved if the practical implications were not felt by the troops on the ground. In those cases where additional capabilities were identified, that meant making use of

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the established alliance force planning machinery. Given the importance of the work for the adaptation of the alliance to the new security environment, it would have been inappropriate to wait until 1988 for the next cycle of the force planning cycle to address the capabilities identified. The alliance therefore agreed in June to initiate an accelerated process which will report to Ministers next month. In future years, the capabilities identified in this process will be handled alongside all other military requirements placed on nations through the force planning process in the normal way.

I have explained the work that the alliance has undertaken to respond to the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The UK played an important role in the development of the conclusions and it warmly welcomes this work. It represents one of the initiatives arising from the NATO summit in 1994 and is an important element in the adaptation of the alliance to the new security environment.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, referred to a techno-military bandwagon. The United States defence budget is substantial, as I have already said. However, I cannot share the conclusions that he drew from that. Our defence and industrial links with the United States remain first-class and we are intimately involved in a number of cutting-edge industrial projects. Prominent among those is the joint strike fighter, a joint UK-US project to develop a new generation of fighter aircraft designed to meet the needs of the US air force, US navy and US marine corps as well as those of the Royal Navy. However, it is fair to say that the United States does possess and is developing further unique military capabilities which are not available to other allies or which they are simply not prepared to fund.

The strategic airlift comes to mind. But the United States lead in command control communications and information systems is substantial. It is not surprising therefore that much of NATO's capability in that field is based on US assets; for example, most, by far, of the satellite communications channels used by IFOR are on US satellites. I believe that that is all the more reason why the European defence identity must be built within NATO if that is to amount to anything. The Europeans, having not made the same investment as the United States, should not now be contemplating creating vastly expensive and now unnecessary alternatives.

The noble Lord referred to our approach to the ballistic missile defence system. A pre-feasibility study carried out by a BAe-led consortium, together with associated studies within the pre-feasibility programme as a whole, is being used to inform the continuing work on the potential risks to UK interests from ballistic missiles and response options.

The conclusions of that work will be announced to Parliament in due course. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, mentioned Professor Brown's fundamental issues study. That study is another part of the wider pre-feasibility programme. I understand that Professor Brown has expressed a personal wish to publish his study report. We are discussing with him the work which would be necessary to allow the creation of an unclassified version.

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I have made clear that no single capability was singled out as more important than anything else in the conclusions which have been reached. The important conclusion was that a mix was required with particular emphasis on the need for protection of alliance forces which may be deployed out of the NATO area, as I have mentioned.

Lord Kennet: My Lords, before the noble Earl leaves Professor Brown's study report, perhaps I may clarify whether what he is saying now is a departure from what he said in a recent Written Answer. In that Answer he said that neither Professor Brown's work nor the work of BAe would be published. If it is possible that there may be a sanitised version of it published, we may take great hope from that, since Professor Brown has published an ordinary article under his own name which approaches the problem with extraordinary good sense and realism.

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