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Lord Alderdice: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for moving the amendment and I am happy to stand in support of what he says. In referring to Amendment No. 9, I shall also make general comments about the other amendments in the group.

Despite being happy to support the noble Lord, I feel a little depressed as a psychiatrist to find myself having to address your Lordships when a Bill comes to this stage in the legislative process with little apparent realisation of the different position of those who suffer mental disorders. Much was made at an earlier stage in the debate of the Secretary of State's famous coach and horses. Even at the time when a coach and horses was the mode of transport in general, people took a different view as to how to treat those who were mentally disordered and had offended. Often it is thought in the public mind that those who are mentally disordered are more likely to commit crimes. But that is not so, and it is particularly not so in respect of those who commit crimes against the person. Most of those who are mentally ill are very vulnerable people. They are often very timid people, more keen to stay away from others than to get involved in any fashion, particularly in a violent or disruptive one. But sometimes, through fear or the force of circumstances, they find themselves breaching the law.

There may be those suffering from mental disorder who knowingly break the law and should suffer appropriate consequences. But there are also those who--we now describe them as suffering from learning disability but they are more generally still described as the mentally handicapped--could hardly be held to have the same level of judgment as others who might commit crimes. There are those, too, who are disordered in their personalities, but very particularly there are those suffering from severe mental illnesses--schizophrenic disorders or manic depressive psychosis--who sometimes are completely misled by their disturbed thinking. It is that which has led to them committing a crime.

When we are thinking of a crime, we think of the behaviour that brings the person to the court. But we are also always aware of the thoughts, of the wishes, of the motivation and of the feelings that have generated the behaviour that is now before the court. There is always an appreciation, and always has been, that thoughts, motivation and wishes are important in these matters even in the normal course of events; and even more particularly in those whose thinking is disturbed, whose volition or motivation is damaged and whose behaviour is often born out of feelings that bear little relation to external reality and more to disturbed fantasies in their own minds. Yet we find a Bill coming forward which seems to have little to say to those matters except almost in a pejorative sense.

I find that disturbing because for such a long time there has been an appreciation of these matters in the public mind, particularly when the public reflect more

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thoughtfully on them. Sometimes the public have thrust upon professionals responsibility for dealing with these matters. Sometimes the public are keen for doctors, nurses and others to take away these problems and deal with them, not in a penal but a caring fashion. They know that these are difficult matters to judge.

This is not a world of coaches and horses. It is a world of high technology. Computers are now able to be increasingly flexible in their response. We expect computers to be able to respond increasingly flexibly to what is going on. Yet in this Bill we expect humankind to behave less flexibly than we would expect computers to behave. That is extraordinary, particularly when one element of the machine is missing--humanity. There are not only the elements of education, intellect, skills, professionalism and experience that have already been mentioned but the element of humanity in our approach to those who find themselves in these circumstances. There should not only be humanity for the victims but also for those who are mentally disordered. They are themselves victims.

I think it extremely important that the Government think sensitively about all the implications involved. Let us think of some examples. Let us take the case of a young man who is below the age of 16 and is, in the old terminology, mentally handicapped. He lives with a young sister. Sexual exploration leads to the commission of what is clearly a crime. Some years later he finds himself as the butt of abuse, whether in public or elsewhere. He lifts whatever comes to hand and hits someone and injures that person seriously. Yet we are to believe that there is to be no understanding about that person that he would be treated with sympathy alongside the terrorist coming to his second conviction. We may have someone whose mind is completely disordered, who is hearing voices telling him to do this, that or the other. There may be someone who is frequently well, but who sometimes falls victim to a psychotic episode. Unfortunately, these are not exceptional matters. We are talking about 1 per cent. of the population as a whole who at some point suffer from schizophrenic disorder. Many others will suffer from some other psychosis which is either passing or more chronic.

Even for a psychiatrist, it would be a very depressing matter that a Bill should pass from the other place to this Chamber and--worse still--for it to pass from this Chamber to the other place, without recognition that professionalism, experience, understanding and, most importantly, humanity, demand that we understand that those who are mentally disordered in many circumstances require to be considered otherwise than those who have their full faculties. I firmly trust that the Minister will give consideration to these matters.

9 p.m.

Lord Renton: My noble friend Lord Hacking has done a valuable service in putting this matter forward. Perhaps I may make just one comment on the interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. In view of what he said towards the end of it he should realise that the courts have become familiar with the difficulties of dealing with people who suffer from mental disorder.

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They take medical evidence and they have clear instructions as to what to do from the 1983 Act, which, by the way, is to be added to by the long new Clause 43.

Perhaps I may next refer to the amendment itself because that follows from what the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, was saying. The amendment begins,

"Where a person is convicted of an offence".

One cannot convict a person of an offence unless there has been criminal intent, which is mens rea. In many of these cases it will be found that the person is not fit to plead--in other words, he is not fit to stand trial--or in the course of the trial it will be found that he could not have had the intent because of his mental condition.

The amendment very wisely gives a definition of one of the matters included in the expression "exceptional circumstances". That is quite a useful precaution. I believe that technically my noble friends on the Front Bench will say, "If we start by giving one example of exceptional circumstances, where are we going to stop?". So I have that doubt about the best way of handling the matter.

The alternative way is to leave it to the courts when applying this Bill, after it becomes an Act, to decide whether in any particular case exceptional circumstances arise or whether we should write into the Bill what must be regarded as exceptional circumstances. At the moment I have an open mind about the issue. It is a little dangerous because for the first time the provision creates a specific example of exceptional circumstances.

I wish to add something which is not universally understood even by lawyers. There is a difference between what is defined in the 1983 Act as one kind of mental disorder, described as,

"mental impairment or severe mental impairment",

which, under the name "mental handicap", is most inaccurately described as "suffering from learning disabilities". We all have learning disabilities. I cannot play the piano with more than one finger and I find that a very severe handicap. That must be distinguished from the next kind of mental disorder mentioned, which is mental illness. That includes, incidentally, a psychopathic disorder. Mental illness is very often curable. However, mental handicap is completely incurable. I need not go into the medical reasons for that because the situation is so plain once it is understood.

However, I believe that the wording will have a bearing on this amendment. The courts would be bound to consider that, if a person has mental handicap and simply cannot understand that it was wrong to do what he had done, it would be very difficult to allow the jury to convict. However, people suffering from mental illness may sometimes be people with brilliant minds. Although they may be suffering severely from mental illness they know the difference between right and wrong and they may very well be guilty. That is a another factor that we have to bear in mind. We should be grateful to my noble friend, and I look forward to

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hearing what my noble friend Lady Blatch has to say in answer to this very important matter.

Lord Burnham: Before my noble friend sits down, is it not the case that this Bill in no way changes the conditions of the 1983 Act by which courts can always say that someone appearing before them needs hospital treatment rather than sentencing?

Lord Renton: That is so. There is nothing in the Bill that prevents that. It is something which I hope and believe my noble friend Lady Blatch will confirm.

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