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Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I agree very much with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Sewel. But I am not sure that he should polish off this idea quite so easily. Not long ago I stayed in a small glen in Argyllshire. Night after night and evening after evening houses were broken into and small possessions were stolen. It turned out that that was being done by four boys aged 10 and 11 who lived in the glen.

It is very difficult to persuade the Scottish establishment to try anything new. I believe that the public would like to see something new tried in such cases. In order to get this issue in proportion, perhaps we could be told how likely it is that children will be subject to tagging. Can my noble and learned friend say whether or not my information is right? Will this disposal be available to the courts but not to children's panels? I understand that a comparatively small number of children come before the courts under those circumstances and, if they do, very few will be, so to speak, suitable subjects for trying out tagging.

The noble Lord talked as though everybody who had a restriction of liberty order would be tagged. That would not be the case. As the Bill stands at present, it would be only for those for whom it would be suitable. I may have misunderstood but it seems to me that very few children indeed will be affected. But there may be a few--I am not sure whether the young people in the glen that I mentioned might not be a good example--who, if they were given a very small restriction of liberty order, could be assisted in mending their ways.

It seems to me that one should not lightheartedly turn down this proposal. I too was surprised when I heard about it. In fact, I was listing in another place when the change was made. I heard the arguments and the noble Lord has repeated them. However, I should like to know from my noble and learned friend whether my assumptions are correct.

Lord Macaulay of Bragar: Before the noble Baroness sits down, perhaps I may say that I understand that part of the Government's philosophy at the moment is to induce parental responsibility for the behaviour of their children. Does she agree that tagging takes away from parents the responsibility to look after their children and therefore is contrary to present government policy? In other words, if the parents know that a child has been tagged and is being supervised by electronic or other such means, they do not have to bother but leave social workers and others to get on with supervision at public expense.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: Perhaps the noble Lord will just think for a moment about what it would be like to have one's child--say, in the glen about which

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I spoke--subjected to a restriction of liberty order with or without a tag, and indeed very likely without a tag in that case. The parents would be unaffected and their sense of responsibility would not be enhanced.

The Earl of Mar and Kellie: Some people are undoubtedly attracted by the thought of children being electronically tagged. However, I suggest that those who think deeply about the matter are horrified by the idea of children being tagged--in effect, branded--and marked out as offenders for all to see. I believe that in fact no harm and only good come from the process of curfewing young troublemakers and placing them on that form of temporary or partial house arrest, provided that it is within the context of a supervision requirement.

The Bill proposes the more humane form of monitoring; namely, human monitoring by visits and telephone and with guidance and advice. However, I understand that the electronic monitoring version is favoured. This amendment rightly excludes children from remote and guidanceless electronic monitoring, which is the main proposal in the Bill. There is a considerable risk of a child or a young person under 16 developing an offender status or basking in notoriety and showing off. Frequently they have little else to show off.

Also unhelpful is the other risk: namely, that of heaping shame on an embarrassed youngster or young girl, however bad, and possibly drawing vigilante attention to that young person. Especially, it does not allow such a person to grow up and move on to maturity and, it is to be hoped, avoid offending behaviour. Let me create the slogan: tags stifle progress.

I criticise the Bill, despite it having a useful strategy of curfewing, for taking a faulty technical approach.

Lord McCluskey: From the list of groupings, it will be seen that my amendment, Amendment No. 67A, and others are not grouped with Amendments Nos. 66 and 74. I should perhaps have urged that they should be so grouped because they are all to the same effect. The substance of my amendments which go along with Amendment No. 66 can be seen positively in Amendment No. 68:

"No [such] order made in respect of a child offender shall require monitoring of the offender by mechanical means".

As the Committee will be aware, in Scottish criminal practice, a child is, generally speaking, one who is under the age of 16. But, except in the most serious cases, children do not go into the criminal justice system at all. If the charge is one of murder or rape--I have presided over trials of children of less than 16 years in both murder and rape cases fairly recently--the penalty is bound to be custodial in some form or another. Similarly, if another serious offence--for example, a serious drugs offence--is charged, one would expect the penalty to be a custodial one.

One sees that Section 42 of the 1995 Act permits the Lord Advocate to indict children into the High Court, the ordinary court or indeed the summary sheriff court, but not the district court. So children can be dealt with in the ordinary way through the courts. But the vast

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majority of them are not dealt with in that way. As the noble Baroness indicated, they go to the children's hearing system. Under the system, they go, usually via the reporter, to the children's hearing system and may appear before the sheriff to see whether or not the grounds of referral are established. Afterwards, the hearing determines the disposal. I would be interested to know the answer to the noble Baroness's question as to whether this power is intended to be made available to children's hearings.

I understand that many of those who were consulted and expressed views support the same view; that is, that the attaching of a mechanical monitoring device to a child will be wholly unproductive and perhaps even counter-productive. It cannot possibly assist in rehabilitation. The whole idea of rehabilitation depends upon the philosophy of co-operation by the person who is to be rehabilitated. These provisions run entirely counter to the philosophy of the Kilbrandon Report upon which the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 was based. The current provisions reflect the scheme under that Act.

Even if the Lord Advocate chooses to prosecute in a court on indictment or in a summary court, the court will normally use its powers under Part V of the 1995 Act to send the child, via the principal reporter, to the children's hearing under Sections 48 or 49. I should have thought that it was entirely counter-productive for a child, who was not to be dealt with by a form of custody, to be dealt with in this fashion. The choice should be either protecting the public by putting the child in some form of secure custody or rehabilitating the child. To shackle a child to a mechanical device runs counter to winning a child's co-operation. It has been described as the modern equivalent of branding. One can see that we should not be mechanically branding children aged between nine and 15, even though one readily concedes the point made by the noble Baroness that children can be a nuisance.

With all due respect to the noble Baroness, "Let's try something new" is not a proper approach to criminal justice in relation to young people. That is a taxi driver approach to the matter. One should not introduce an anti-Kilbrandon measure on the basis that it is time we tried lightheartedly to introduce something new. The matter ought to be researched and it has not been researched.

I can guess the answer to a question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel. I do not know who is in favour, but he asked why the scheme is being introduced in Scotland. The answer may be: because it is being introduced in England. The treatment of children in England in relation to their offending is entirely different from the treatment of children in Scotland. It may or may not be a good idea in England, but that sheds no light on whether or not it is a good idea in Scotland.

I strongly oppose the provision. I see it as an electronic step back into the dark ages and urge the Committee to support the amendments.

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4.30 p.m.

Lord Hope of Craighead: I should like to say a few words, mainly in support of the observations made by the noble Baroness. My understanding is that measures which give powers of disposal to children's hearings have always been included in civil legislation and not in criminal legislation. Your Lordships had the occasion, the year before last, to review in great detail the powers of children's hearings. They are about to receive those new powers, which are to come into effect at the beginning of next month.

My understanding--perhaps the Lord Advocate will confirm this--is that this measure is confined to a small area; that is, those children who, in the Lord Advocate's discretion, need to be dealt with in the criminal courts. If that is the approach, it would not be right to describe it as an anti-Kilbrandon measure. Lord Kilbrandon himself recognised that there would be exceptions where criminal justice would be required to play its part.

The other point I should like to make is this. Difficult questions are raised by this issue and I regret that the matter was not the subject of more complete consultation. However, it would be a mistake to regard it as an issue which can be the subject of absolute answers. I recall at least one case which came before me in the Criminal Appeal Court involving a child who was very much out of control. The child was from a remote area and a great deal of harm was done locally. All their Lordships who sat with me regretted the fact that it had not been possible to intercept the child's behaviour in some effective way before he reached the stage of coming before the High Court.

It is because one has to regard the methods of dealing with children as open to a wide variety of cases that there may be some wisdom in the measure. Whether or not that is so is a matter which would have been better explored by more consultation. For that reason I have some reservations about the wisdom of the course being adopted at this time.

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