---

Lord Macaulay of Bragar: Will the Lord Advocate indicate what is the range of the monitoring? How far does it go? If someone lives in Perth, for example, and supports Glasgow Celtic or Glasgow Rangers and wants to go to a match on a Saturday and a monitoring device is put on by a local court in Perth, would the monitoring stretch to Ibrox Park or Parkhead? I am not being facetious, because young people like to follow sport. The offender does not have a great deal of input into the restriction imposed upon him as regards his movements. Is any technical knowledge available to the Committee relating to the range of the monitoring system? Is it 10, 20, 40, 100 miles or what?

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: I do not claim to have an expertise in the matter, but I understand that the monitoring system is designed to ascertain when the offender is not confined to the particular place where the order requires him to be. If he must be at home between the hours of seven in the evening and seven in the morning but goes elsewhere the electronic monitoring will pick that up. However, whether he goes to Muirtown Park to watch St. Johnston, to Ibrox Park to watch whichever team plays there, or to Murrayfield to watch Scotland is neither here nor there. If he is home by seven o'clock he will be all right; if he is not, the monitoring will pick that up.

That is what the curfew order is designed to achieve. If it deprives the offender of the opportunity of travelling to away games to follow his favourite team that is part of the punishment element of the

6 Mar 1997 : Column 1999

community-based disposal. As I mentioned when quoting from the English report, the offenders who were tagged accepted that there was a restriction on their liberty. It is one of the means of seeking to train them that offending behaviour is not a path they should follow.

Lord Macaulay of Bragar: That makes absolute nonsense of the tagging system. Does it mean that if someone living in Perth goes to a football match in Glasgow no harm is done so long as he is back by seven o'clock and that what he does between leaving Perth at two o'clock to go to Ibrox Park, or wherever, and returning home does not matter? He could commit 10 offences, but he will not be captured by the tag.

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: I do not know whether it is sensible to respond to each point one by one. However, the whole purpose of the legislation is to give the court power to vary the conditions. If a solicitor sought to explain to a Perth sheriff that it was absolutely essential that his client travelled to Ibrox Park every second week he might be able to obtain such a dispensation so that he will be home in time.

It is not proposed that the curfew order should confine the offender to the house 24 hours a day. It is a community-based disposal. The offender will at some time be out in the community, it is hoped, behaving himself wherever he may live. For the rest of the time he will be required to stay in a fixed place, presumably his home. It is hoped that the community-based disposal will encourage the offender to behave himself. There is no guarantee that he will do so, as I made clear earlier.

I hope that that assurance will satisfy the noble Lord's inquiry. If it will assist, I shall arrange for him to be sent a copy of the Home Office research report, which I am sure is available to some of his colleagues. That may answer some of the technical questions which I am currently not qualified to answer.

The Earl of Mar and Kellie: It may be helpful to suggest that the devices are monitoring and not tracking devices. The offender will be tied electronically to close proximity to the machine and the machine will recognise the fact that the person has left. Will restriction of liberty orders be orders for which it is mandatory to produce a social report and, I presume, a report from the monitoring company or contractor about the person's suitability?

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: I understand that the orders are not mandatory because there is a concern about people having different responsibilities for young offenders. However, I shall check that matter and before we leave the topic confirm whether my understanding is correct.

Lord Hughes: Let us suppose that a restriction order is made in respect of a child under the age of 16 and he or she pays no attention to it, knowing the consequences. Presumably, a person to whom the order is applied will not be a first offender but someone who, because of previous conduct, is regarded as suitable. If he

6 Mar 1997 : Column 2000

pays no attention to the order he may be subject to a fine not exceeding level 3. The chances of a 12 or 13 year-old child having the resources to pay a fine are limited. So does the order transfer to the parents? Alternatively, the court may vary the restriction order. Whether it is increased or reduced, the child is unlikely to pay any attention to the variation. Thirdly, the order can be revoked. The child will be delighted at that: it is an invitation to pay no attention to the order.

What exactly is the merit of the proposal if it will be so difficult to enforce a penalty? I know that the alternative is that the child should be shackled, as has been indicated. That does not stop him breaking the order but proves that at any particular time he is not obeying it. The Government appear to be providing for a situation whereby the difficult people to whom the order will be applied are not affected by it.

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: I regret that the noble Lord takes such a pessimistic view of the proposal. It does not accord with experience in England. Not every young offender benefits as much as we would wish from supervision requirements, probation orders, community service orders and the like, but many do. Contrary to what the noble Lord said, if an offender breached a restriction of liberty order and was brought back before the court, the order was increased and the conditions tightened up, and he still failed to obey it, there can be little doubt that if he came before the court again it would take a much harder view as to whether it was appropriate to have an alternative to custody disposal. That could be made clear to him.

My experience is that from time to time young offenders take account of advice that they receive from social workers and others with whom they are in contact. If we adopt a pessimistic attitude to working with young offenders we will never succeed. We cannot expect naively to succeed in every case, but I believe that this is a valid proposal and it is worth trying. The whole purpose of pilot schemes is to examine issues such as the noble Lord has raised in order to see, for example, whether it is necessary to amend Section 245F(2) to give the court alternative powers to "punish" a young offender who did not abide by a restriction of liberty order. I hope that that does not prove to be necessary, but if it is an option which is thrown up by the pilot scheme as worth considering no doubt Parliament and the government of the day will do so.

I invite the noble Lord, who has long experience of public life and the responsibility of those who have to deal with young offenders, to be a wee bit more hopeful that this will help in some cases. That is the basis on which it is being brought forward.

Lord Hughes: I thank the noble and learned Lord for that answer. Summarising it, we go ahead and hope for the best.

5.30 p.m.

Lord Sewel: If my memory serves me correctly, in the earlier part of this debate the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate made a number of comments

6 Mar 1997 : Column 2001

which were helpful. In fact, on a couple of issues, we have some helpful pieces of clarification of the Government's thinking.

I realise that words in English do not necessarily mean the same in statute as they mean in ordinary conversation. But if I take it that training is fairly close to guidance, then I am happy to rest with what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said at this stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Sewel moved Amendment No. 70:

Page 7, line 28, leave out ("and").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 71, which is the substantive amendment. This amendment imposes on the court an additional requirement for informing the offender of the need to take legal advice before agreeing to a restriction order.

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: Perhaps it may save the time of the Committee if I indicate, without giving any definite commitment, that the Government would like to look further at these amendments and consult on them. That may assist the noble Lord.

Lord Sewel: It is almost national assistance day. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 71 not moved.]

Lord Sewel moved Amendment No. 72:

Page 7, line 34, after ("agrees") insert ("in writing").

The noble Lord said: This amendment seeks to ensure that agreement to a restriction of liberty order should be made in writing. It is really to remove any doubt. At the end of the case, when the offender is asked whether he agrees to a restriction order, there is a hubbub and degree of noise and mumbling well known to Members of the Committee and it may well be that the precise words are not understood. This provision seeks to promote clarity and avoid ambiguity as to the offender's position. I beg to move.

---