Previous Section Back to Table of Contents Lords Hansard Home Page


Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish: We are either at cross-purposes or I am confused and not understanding clearly what the noble Baroness says. There is a huge difference between data matching, which is what we are discussing here--the ability of the department to data match with the Inland Revenue, and so on--and the ability of local authorities then to data match with the department through the system I mentioned. That is not information sought on a one-off basis; it is continuous. A huge amount of data comes into the data matching centre. It runs the data through, corrects and cleans the data, and picks up any inconsistencies. It will be the same for local authorities.

In seeking to be helpful, I think that I understand the noble Baroness's point. We intend to have discussions between ourselves, local authorities and tax authorities to see what we can do about individual cases which are outwith data matching. The noble Baroness raises questions that are not within what I understand, perhaps wrongly, to be the concept of data matching in which great batches of data are matched. She is looking for a little detective work on one individual case which has arisen for an entirely different reason. If it has arisen thanks to data matching, she does not have a problem.

I understand the points she makes. We intend to have discussions with local authority people and the tax authorities to see what we need to do in individual cases. I hope that with my assurance that that will occur, and that we are as aware of the problem she raises as she is and do not wish to inhibit local authorities from finding people who are conducting multiple fraud against the system, we can leave these amendments.

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I thank the Minister. He understands my concern. The whole point of data matching is to detect fraud. It is not an abstract, intellectual exercise to see whether systems mesh and whether the detail is accurate. The concern with accuracy is to deter and detect fraud. If that fraud has arisen because there is clear and perceived incompatibilities between two files, two bodies of information, that will be a straightforward exercise. However, it will often not occur like that in practice. In practice, the detection of fraud will come from local authorities, from door to door work, by knocking on doors, checking electoral registers, and the like. It is not a fishing exercise but an exercise to check whether well-founded suspicions are validated by other sources of information held by other departments such as the Inland Revenue. Those can then be checked through the data matching exercise. Data matching is not an end in itself but a tool in the detection of fraud.

The Minister shares our concerns. If departments have to go via the DSS every time they wish to use data matching as a tool to see whether the suspicions of fraud are validated, it will produce delays. However, I take the Minister's assurance that there will be further consultations. I assure him that in practice that is how

11 Mar 1997 : Column 202

local authorities are likely to continue to work. That is why we put forward these probing amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.15 p.m.

Earl Russell moved Amendment No. 4:


Page 1, line 24, at end insert ("but in any case where that information relates to a particular individual only in circumstances where there is doubt about that individual's entitlement to benefit").

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 4, I speak also to Amendment No. 12 which makes the identical point in a different context.

The amendments seek to provide that where information is being supplied which relates to a particular individual, it should be done,


    "only in circumstances where there is doubt about that individual's entitlement to benefit."
I heard with considerable optimism what the Minister said about not wanting fishing expeditions. That is precisely what the amendment is intended to prevent. It is intended to ensure that where information is collected about someone to check on the accuracy of his claim to benefit, it should be as the result of a pre-existing suspicion about his entitlement. There is a good legal reason for it. In my understanding--I admit it is that of an amateur--it would do something to ensure that the provisions of the Bill are within our legal international obligations. Under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights a right is laid down for respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, and that,


    "there shall be no interference by public authority with the exercise of this right except ... as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

In a case in the European Court of Human Rights, which we are told will be brought as soon as this Bill reaches the statute book, the Government must rely on one of those exceptions under Article 8(2). There are several on which they might optimistically rely and on which they might possibly win. But the Government know that they are often optimistic in relation to their chances in the Court. The obvious ground on which they should rely is the prevention of crime. It is an objective which this Bill clearly has, an objective which we all share, and an objective whose legality under the European Convention is unquestionable. In my submission, that would be the sensible way for the Government to approach the case when it is brought.

The Minister made the point just now that the data matching exercise may throw up evidence against someone against whom there has been no previous suspicion. It may throw up information of all kinds. We are sadly familiar these days with the way information, not in itself criminal, consistently finds its way into the newspapers. A number of Conservative Members of Parliament have learnt of that to their sorrow and to my great regret. To have information floating around the place creates risks. There is no guarantee under the

11 Mar 1997 : Column 203

provisions of the Bill that any information collected under its provisions is collected for the purposes of fighting crime.

If the amendment were accepted, and it was necessary to show a ground of suspicion before the DSS could access a person's data, under the wording of the European Convention, and, I understand, the case law under it, the Government's safety would be materially increased. I should have thought that that was in their interests, in the interests of anyone else whoever they may be who might sit in their shoes in future, and in the interests of the reputation of this country as a whole. I beg to move.

Baroness Turner of Camden: I support the amendment. I have listened carefully to what the noble Earl said. It seems a civilised and humane amendment. I share the views already expressed by my noble friends on the Front Bench.

We have to take steps to ensure that taxpayers' money is not wasted and not subject to fraud. That is what the Bill is all about. On the other hand, when the Bill was first mooted, and before I considered it in detail, I was most anxious that we did not have a snooper's charter. That would be a rather unpleasant measure; people could be informed upon by neighbours and individuals investigated as a result of that kind of information. I also share the view expressed by the noble Earl: we have a press that is anxious to exploit fallacious details. We have had in recent times plenty of evidence of leaks of unauthorised information of which the press have made much.

The amendment would assist in "humanising" this piece of legislation. As I said, I am against fraud. I do not want to see public money frittered away and subject to fraudulent usage. On the other hand, we are talking about individuals who in the main are vulnerable; otherwise they would not be on benefits in the first place. We have an obligation to ensure that they are treated in a civilised fashion. I support the amendment.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish: We have had an interesting short debate. I have noted, as the noble Earl tells me, that we are to be taken to court immediately the Bill is enacted. I just wonder how he possibly knows that, especially as the High Court of Parliament will have determined and enacted the Bill.

Earl Russell: A press release to that effect has been put out by Liberty and reported in the daily press. The Minister might be wise to take that seriously. I do not know whether it is true, but it perfectly well might be.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish: I do take it seriously that people continuously try to take us to the European Court. I believe that we have a reasonable and proper defence against any attempt that they might make. As I said earlier, we believe that our Bill is fully in line with the data directives. However, perhaps

11 Mar 1997 : Column 204

I might explain the Bill. It seems to me that if I am to bow to a threat like that from Liberty, then Parliament might as well pack up for ever.

Lord Carter: If the Minister has not seen the press release, how does he know that he has a good defence?

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish: I have not seen the press release, but I know that Liberty has put out something about the Bill. In fact, I quoted it in my introductory remarks this afternoon. It takes the view that the balance is so much in favour of individual liberty that no effort should be made on data matching. However, I do not subscribe to that; and as I understand it neither does the party opposite. I choose the singular this time quite deliberately. I believe that it does not agree with that; it agrees with data matching and that we should use the modern tools that are at our command to prevent fraud.

The new section--


Next Section Back to Table of Contents Lords Hansard Home Page