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Earl Russell: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlisle of Bucklow, has taken the words, and the bread, out of my mouth. He is, of course, quite right that half a loaf is better than no bread, but our problem has been to identify the quantity which constitutes that half loaf. We have made considerable progress on that, for which I warmly thank the Chief Whip. However, in respect for the sovereignty of Parliament, may I ask the Chief Whip to amend a single sentence of his statement? He said, "We will reverse this amendment after the next
election". Could the Chief Whip amend that to read, "We will attempt to reverse the amendment after the election"?
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate on my statement, and particularly to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank. I am delighted to have their acceptance that this is the best deal and that, in the words of my noble friend Lord Carlisle, half a loaf is better than none.
I understand the regrets of my noble friend Lord Hacking with regard to the arrangement that has been struck but, as he has heard, the House is united, (including if I understood him correctly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner), that we should progress business as expeditiously as possible. I hope that when we reach my noble friend's amendments he will seek to move them, if he must, as briefly as possible.
Perhaps I may conclude with the noble Earl, Lord Russell, to whom I always bow down because of the constitutional advice that he brings to your Lordships' House. We will attempt to overturn this decision when we come back after the general election.
Crime (Sentences) Bill
8.49 p.m.
Consideration of amendments on Report resumed.
Clause 3 [Minimum of seven years for third class A drug trafficking offence]:
Lord Ackner moved Amendment No. 10:
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I have been asked to be brief in my interventions and I can do so because I have been greatly assisted by the announcement that has just been made and because the amendments to Clause 1 now stand. We have frequently been told that Clause 1 has been visited by a coach and horses which have given back to the judges their discretion. We have, therefore, these two significant features: so far as the mandatory automatic life sentence is concerned, there is no restriction on the discount that can be awarded. The only difference is that the discount is featured in the tariff which the judge decides. The judge reflects in his tariff his evaluation of all the circumstances of the offence, including whether or not the accused has pleaded guilty, when he pleaded guilty, the nature of the assistance that he is given in pleading guilty, and so on. Therefore, in regard to an important section of the Bill, it is common ground that the discount which is available to a judge is in no way restricted by the legislation. So that is that--
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will excuse me for interrupting
Lord Ackner: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. In the spirit of harmony which is now persisting, the answer is, certainly.
We now come to the other situation; namely, minimum sentences. The noble Baroness fought valiantly in Committee to maintain that the discounts should be limited so that the minimum sentences could be, as she thought they would be--though others doubted it--a warning to those intent on committing offences that that might be the result. But that was all done on the basis that Clause 1 was open to this reversal. However, as Clause 1 now stands, according to the good tidings that we have received, and accepting the noble Baroness's strictures, the judge now has his full discretion.
The restriction imposed by "exceptional circumstances" has gone and gone for good and all. I am quite content to accept the criticism that that has resulted in a coach and horses being driven through those two clauses--now Clauses 3 and 4. In that situation, there is not the slightest justification for imposing any restriction at all because we are back to where we came in. Therefore, in relation both to the automatic life sentence (where the Bill does not propose any restriction) and in regard to Clauses 3 and 4 (where the restriction of "exceptional circumstances" has gone, and the judge is back to where he was to begin with), there would not be the slightest justification in imposing the artificial concept of 20 per cent. with all its disadvantages. Those disadvantages were described in detail by the Lord Chief Justice and we are, therefore, in the happy position of being able, as we should have been right from the start, to accept the wise advice of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chief Justice; namely, to continue as hithertofore. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I am not sure from what the noble and learned Lord said whether he is moving the amendments or withdrawing them.
Lord Ackner: I am so sorry; I thought that I was moving them. I said that I was moving the amendments and that they were unanswerable. However, as I did not make it clear, I said they were unanswerable because, as they stood, they drew an artificial line between the automatic life sentence in regard to which there is no restriction and the automatic minimum sentence. It is only in relation to the automatic minimum sentence that the restriction to 20 per cent. operates. The justification was that the automatic minimum sentence was a deterrent and should not in any way be reduced by allowing a greater discount than 20 per cent. But the automatic minimum sentence has now, for all practical purposes, gone, in the sense that there is no restriction on the trial judge in the cases to which the provision
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I am sorry that I asked. I listened to what the noble and learned Lord said, but I simply wanted to know whether he was moving the amendments. I was most interested in what he said. I was trying to argue with him that what he was doing was actually introducing a very wide discretion for the judges; and he argued against that view. However, the noble and learned Lord has just referred to the fact that we now have full discretion for the judges.
The Bill as it stands provides that a court may take a timely guilty plea into account, as long as the sentence posed is not more than 20 per cent. below the mandatory minimum. I know that it is accepted on all sides that there needs to be an incentive for defendants who are guilty to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity, to save witnesses from having to give evidence unnecessarily and to avoid wasting the court's time. That is why the Bill as it stands makes statutory provision for a discount below the mandatory minimum.
At present, Section 48 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides that the courts may reduce sentences to take account of guilty pleas but does not specify the proportion. The Court of Appeal's guidelines indicate a range of 20 per cent. to one third, and that is no doubt why the amendments propose a maximum discount of one third in relation to the mandatory minimum sentences. But we must also bear in mind the need for the mandatory minimum sentence to be set at such a level, even in cases where the defendant pleads guilty, so as to provide a real deterrent for persistent offenders. It will, of course, be open for the courts to allow more than a 20 per cent. discount in cases where they would, other than for the guilty plea, have sentenced above the mandatory minimum.
Both burglary and drug dealing are crimes characterised by persistence. The aim of mandatory minimum sentences is to ensure that burglars and drug dealers know that they will face a stiff sentence if they persist in offending. If the mandatory minimum is substantially reduced, I believe that we would run the risk of undermining the very purpose and rationale of Clauses 3 and 4.
There is, therefore, a balance to be struck. On the one hand, there needs to be a sufficient incentive to encourage those who are guilty to plead guilty; but, on the other hand, the mandatory penalty must be such as to provide a real deterrent and salutary punishment to persistent offenders. Our judgment is that that balance is struck at about a 20 per cent. discount, which represents the lower end of the normal range for guilty pleas. We believe that that strikes the right balance. For those reasons, and due to the fact that I have answered the unanswerable question, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will not press the amendment.
Lord Ackner: My Lords, the noble Baroness is wrong in regard to suggesting that I have ever done other than accept that the amendments which this House achieved gave back to the judge the discretion that the clause purported to take away. I have never argued against the horses for courses proposition. If the Minister refers to the final instalment on the fourth day of the Committee stage, she will find that I said in terms that we should proceed in regard to the merits of the amendment on the basis of the Bill as it stood amended.
With the deepest respect, I must tell the Minister--and this is not meant as any criticism of the noble Baroness, for whom I have an undying admiration for all she has achieved--that her brief is out of date. It is drawn on the basis that there was not the concession which we have heard announced. Her brief was drawn on the basis that Clauses 3 and 4 were still available to be amended. They are not. They have been amended and the consequence is that we are back where we started. The trial judge is there to do justice and the mandatory minimum sentences do not in any way bind him if he considers that to impose them would be other than doing justice. That was the whole purpose of the amendment.
Page 3, line 29, at end insert--
("(3A) In the case of an offence which falls to be imposed under subsection (2) above, nothing in that subsection shall prevent the court, after taking into account any matter referred to in section 48(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, from imposing any sentence which is not less than two-thirds of that specified in that subsection.").
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