INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY
71. Greater integration
of Europe's rail network to allow easier cross-frontier movement
of goods and people was a key element in the development of the
Single Market, according to the CER. In order to exploit the
growing international rail market, the railways needed to overcome
the "frontier factors" which reduced demand for cross-frontier
journeys to around a fifth of that for equivalent journeys within
a Member State (Q 184). The FTA believed that closer integration
of national systems was "essential" if rail transport
was to survive and grow in the next century (p 106).
72. The principal problem
confronting the members of the Rail Freight Group was not a lack
of integration between European rail networks, however, but a
lack of co-operation and the lack of a common approach. Traffic
through the Channel Tunnel was hampered by the failure of Eurotunnel
and the railway authorities to agree a suitable commercial package
flexible enough to accommodate, for example, regular shuttle services
the charges for which did not depend on the goods conveyed (QQ 22-4).
EWS believed that the railways of Europe were "going to
have to change the way they operate both in a commercial and a
technical operational manner" from the way things were at
present, which was "singularly unsuccessful" (Q 90).
73. The FTA wanted the
interoperability Directive for high speed trains adopted in 1996
to be treated as "a model for the development of future standards
for freight services", but the CER warned that doing so would
"often be inappropriate for existing conventional railways
including freight" (pp 41, 106)[9].
74. The Commission believed
it had a role in promoting interoperability and proposing legislation
where it offered real benefits in making rail more competitive,
but a selective approach was necessary if the benefits of interoperability
were to be achieved without excessive cost. This was likely to
concentrate on routes carrying large volumes of international
freight, whereas changes to domestic loading gauges were less
likely to be viable (Q 319).
75. For EWS, however,
the restricted loading gauge in the United Kingdom was a real
disadvantage. Special rolling stock was needed for cross-Channel
services, which was more expensive and less able to accommodate
a range of loads. Such difficulties put rail at a commercial
disadvantage and the company believed that selective alteration
to bridges, although very expensive, could be justified in some
cases (QQ 82-9).
76. Many witnesses expressed
concerns about the potential costs of interoperability. EWS,
for example, was keen to avoid expensive changes to equipment
that was only used within the United Kingdom (Q 91). Most
agreed with the CER that technical harmonisation should remain
"firmly anchored to cost benefit principles", and Railtrack
cautioned against "allowing engineering dreams to run
to a level where standards are set which nobody can ever afford
to implement" (QQ 148, 152).
77. Train operating
companies agreed that the main benefit of greater harmonisation
would be in rolling stock procurement. Instead of each national
railway designing and building its own stock, there would be more
of a single market that would lead to lower costs and better reliability
(Q 138). According to Railtrack, a Continent-wide industry
would be "much stronger than ... separate industries in each
Member State with a small market to look to and a more limited
prospect for selling its products" (Q 152).
SOCIAL ASPECTS
78. In Mr Knapp's view,
the Commission's proposals presented a threat to British jobs,
despite the fact that in the United Kingdom the re-organisation
of the industry had already taken place. The Commission wanted
to see a reduction of state aid to the railways, and this "must
mean that jobs will go". There was also a danger that railway
workers would be expected to work longer hours (Q 247).
GNER certainly expected greater flexibility from its workforce,
saying that "the disciplines and freedoms of the private
sector" created "a much more alert and focused workforce"
and made it "much easier to change manning levels and working
practices" (p 19).
79. Mr Kinnock accepted
that the unions were "bruised and in substantial parts very
resistant to change", having lost around half a million jobs
in the past 15 years, but they faced a harsh choice "between
losing virtually all the jobs in rail because change has not taken
place or making changes which probably will bring about workforce
reduction, but in a controlled and controllable way". The
Commission knew it had to consult and gain the support of the
unions, as forcing change on a suspicious and demotivated workforce
would make it impossible to achieve the early improvements it
felt necessary (Q 299).
80. The CER said that
its member railways accepted the need for restructuring and the
inevitable reduction in jobs this would entail, but was concerned
that this should be achieved by "natural wastage" rather
than redundancy wherever possible. Rail was becoming a customer-oriented
service industry whose commercial attractiveness would depend
on the quality of its staff (Q 181). The social dimension
was "crucial in the delivery of the restructuring envisaged
by the White Paper" (p 42).
81. Much of the opposition
to the White Paper in France was based on fears of job losses.
Since 1945, the number of railway workers had fallen by more
than half and was continuing to decline. But for SNCF, the level
of opposition in France to changes in the organisation of the
railway could not be explained simply in economic or political
terms. There was also a distinct cultural element exemplified
by the distinctive place it and other major public bodies occupied
in public loyalties (Q 211).
82. The Minister said
that the United Kingdom's privatisation legislation included measures
to ensure that the interests of the workforce were "properly
protected in matters such as pensions and conditions of employment".
The Community's Social Fund should not be used "to bail
out financially poorly performing Continental railways".
The Rail Regulator believed he could best protect the interests
of railway workers by promoting a more efficient railway, and
would not welcome being "required by Parliament, or the European
Commission, to intervene in aspects of social policy and industrial
relations" (Q 269).
9
Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the European
high speed train network, OJ L 235, 17.9.96. Back
