Select Committee on Science and Technology Second Report



CHAPTER 2 VIEWS OF WITNESSES (continued)

COHESION

  2.31     In 1994, the Commission published Evaluation of the Effects of the EC Framework Programme of RTD on economic and social cohesion in the Community. It concluded that the Framework Programmes were making a significant positive impact on the research community of the less developed regions, and helped scientists in such regions by allowing them to participate in only the most advanced European research and development and forcing them to "raise their game". See POST 5.2.2.

  2.32     Sir William Stewart took the contrary view: "Cohesion has been used to justify mediocrity" (Q 411). The OST said in written evidence that "the Framework Programmes make a valuable contribution to the EU's cohesion objectives" (p 8). On the other hand, during oral evidence the OST witnesses said that the cohesion objective was not best achieved through the R&D programme, and that quality should be the sole criterion on which research was funded. As they put it: "there is a risk in some senses of using cohesion as an excuse for supporting less than good research as a means of supporting the less favoured regions. We do not agree with that." They considered, however, that the Framework Programme should remain open to the less developed regions (QQ 38-41, 43). However, the BBSRC said that there was no evidence from the Biotech programme in FP4 that scientific standards had been compromised in order to include participants from less developed regions (p 4)[18]; and the Commission insisted (p 128), "proposals [for fellowships] are selected for funding according to strict criteria of scientific excellence, although a proposal involving a less favoured region may be preferred above another without such involvement if the scientific quality is equivalent".

  2.33     The OST thought that the Structural Funds were particularly suited to helping the less developed regions improve their scientific capability (Q 42). As the Commission explained (p 128), "The EU Treaty establishes a clear separation of roles between the Framework Programme and the Structural Funds regarding the actions related to Research and Technology Development. The RTD Framework Programme finances high quality trans-national research projects of community interest, while the Structural Funds finance RTD-related actions contributing to local, regional or national development". In 1994-99, 7,200 MECU, 5 per cent of the resources of the structural funds, will be devoted to research infrastructure, equipment and training in the less developed regions. This compares with the total budget for FP4, 1994-98, of 12,300 MECU.

  2.34     The Royal Academy of Engineering thought that the cohesion objective should be tackled through a separate programme, possibly TMR (Q 233). Loughborough University and the Royal Society also emphasised the importance of technology transfer via individual people. Loughborough University suggested that successful research programmes should be followed up by technology transfer through a European-wide equivalent of the Teaching Company Scheme (p 195). The Royal Society said that "The simple inclusion of partners from less scientifically advanced countries is not the most effective way to improve standards across the EU". They proposed that an element of funding be attached to each Framework grant to support training fellowships. These fellowships should only be open to individuals of Member States not already represented in the grant-holding consortium and should also include a period of funding to facilitate technology transfer when the fellow returned home (p 214, cp QQ 411, 422-5).

  2.35     Sir Dai Rees agreed (Q 436) that building research capacity and encouraging individual scientists in less developed regions was a right objective; but doing it through projects in the Framework Programmes encouraged the less developed countries (notably Ireland, Portugal and Greece) to rely on handouts rather than make their own research agenda, and patronised researchers who wanted to win funding on the basis of merit rather than geography. The Commission's First Cohesion Report (p 72) acknowledges the danger that research funds directed to less developed countries will be monopolised by the local centres of academic excellence, with the results that "the research agenda loses its relevance to the development needs of the poorer countries" and the divide between academic and applied research in the region may be exaggerated. The University of Edinburgh argued that cohesion would be served better through continued support for large-scale facilities which might not be available in some Member States, and by improving the availability of research results to less developed regions (p 221). Tim Gatland, a member of the UK Foresight panel on information technology, said (p 185): "I believe that the Framework Programme must be totally driven to achieve excellence in its chosen areas of research. This means that the project partners must be selected on purely meritocratic grounds. The cohesion objectives should be achieved using technology transfer mechanisms and these must be treated as a separate activity from the main projects".

SMALLER FIRMS

  2.36     Professor Georghiou of PREST said that a number of evaluations had suggested that only a small minority of high-technology small firms performed the type of research covered by the Framework Programme. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that only a fairly small proportion even of technology-based smaller firms benefit from Framework. Most such firms could not afford either the overheads or the long time scales for exploitation which most Framework Programme activities offered. "However, rather than give them alternative instruments of support, great effort goes into trying to help them apply to and participate in the Framework Programme. Our point was that these firms would benefit more from assistance with project development or acquisition of technology from outside the firm-licensing and so on". He added, "there are both costs and benefits to collaboration, but the costs tend to be up front (the costs of making applications, of holding up your work while you wait for an unpredictable period to get a response from the Commission and so on) whereas the benefits come some way downstream when the results are exploited" (QQ 69-70, 73). The most recent evaluation had shown a clear difference in the demands made by large companies and smaller ones. "Large firms in the biotechnology sector supported the kind of longer-term research which was going on in the programme and were well equipped to make good use of the science base. The pressure from SMEs was for much nearer-market work which would result in a clear product at the end of the project, a type of project which is outside the remit of the present Framework Programme" (Q 73). The Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council thought that few smaller firms were involved in the EU biotechnology programme, although more of those involved were from the United Kingdom than from any other country (Q 303).

  2.37     The CBI commented on the existence of "multiple points of contact for the European Framework Programme, the innovation relay centres, the business innovation centres, the Euro-info centres, which are primarily associated with libraries." They called on the Department of Trade and Industry to take a lead in focusing these contacts, particularly in dealing with the needs of smaller firms. The CBI thought that in the United Kingdom the Business Links Programme was "an ideal vehicle to have this responsibility" (QQ 145, 148-151).

  2.38     The Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) thought that the participation of smaller firms in the Framework Programmes had not been "terribly successful". The degree of bureaucracy and the low success rates for applications were cited as major deterrents. "The amount of work you have to put in in order to link up with the other European companies and universities is so large that if you do not succeed within the first two or three attempts you are inclined to give up" (QQ 204-205, p 90). The RAEng cautioned, however, that the term "SME" covered a wide range of businesses. A company such as Oxford Instruments, which was a world leader in a small area, was already close to the main science stream "and no doubt much more capable of collaborating in Framework Programmes" than a company with a more mundane business (Q 206). The RAEng favoured supporting smaller firms through finding appropriate mechanisms for the dissemination of research results (p 8). The OST, however, said that they were encouraged by the level of participation from smaller United Kingdom firms and that a broadly similar level of special provision should be maintained in FP5 (p 8).

TASK FORCES

  2.39     The majority of witnesses agreed that Task Forces had a valuable role to play in the co-ordination of research efforts across programme areas, between Directorates-General and between Community and national programmes, and that they, or some similar mechanism, should be maintained in FP5 (pp 105, 117, 184, 220, 222). We ourselves looked into the role of the Task Force on the Car of Tomorrow in the context of our recent inquiry entitled Towards Zero Emissions for Road Transport, and were favourably impressed (1st Report, Session 1996-97, HL Paper 13, p 47). However, some witnesses criticised the "arbitrary" way in which the Task Force topics emerged without consultation with Member States and the "bizarrely unbalanced" or "skewed" set of priorities which resulted (pp 5, 40, 65, 204).

  2.40     Professor Georghiou of PREST said that "there should be a more systematic process for identifying areas to be explored in this way" (Q 83). The CBI expressed a similar view: "the Task Forces ... were a laudable attempt, and they are a laudable attempt, to build the perspectives of the different players, academia, industry and anyone else with a pertinent comment to make, and we would like to see that continue and to be strengthened ... in its coverage of the key players and ... its coverage of the scientific areas that are of importance to Europe, rather than a somewhat bizarre collection as seems to be true of the first choices." The CBI proposed that the Task Force should become "the senior research board", charged both with consulting widely, with appropriate membership to reflect this responsibility, and with overseeing the running of the programmes (Q 164).

  2.41     Professor Routti accepted that there had been criticism of the initial choice of Task Force topics, and saw the Task Forces-whose name might be changed-as "a management and co-ordinating tool". In future the Commission would not choose Task Force subjects without consultation, and it had only done so initially because "the time available for making those proposals regarding task forces was very limited. There was not a chance to invite proposals for this new concept and its priorities and to analyse these in detail. The task forces were launched as a pilot phase and we actually now see that the funds will not be available in the quantities originally planned for" (QQ 326-327, 334, 337-339).

  2.42     Another role proposed for the Task Forces should be to watch technological developments and establish research priorities (pp 53, 89, 220, 222): for example, identifying important topics that might slip between two programme areas, or research that would be better done on a European level. The University of Edinburgh suggested that the Task Forces should follow this through by helping to evaluate proposals in these priority areas and then monitoring the selected projects as they are undertaken (p 220). The Commission also said that the existing co-ordination activities of the Task Forces were very important and examples were cited of how links between research groups and industry had persisted beyond the original Framework Programme collaborations (Q 339).

  2.43     Most witnesses agreed that the Task Forces should not have their own research budgets to control, nor should they be involved directly in the allocating of funds, and that instead they should operate from within the specific programmes (e.g. pp 91, 118, 181). The opposing view was expressed by Loughborough University which said that the existing Task Forces should be expanded and that "There is little point to having a Task Force without its own budget" (p 195).

  2.44     The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, SmithKline Beecham and the OST questioned whether the Task Forces were needed at all (pp 5, 65, 146). The OST suggested that a total reorganisation of the management of the Framework Programmes was required in which only certain aspects of the existing Task Forces would be preserved in Advisory Groups. These Advisory Groups would work closely with the scientific community to identify research and development needed to achieve stated thematic objectives, they would oversee the programmes, and they would act as a proxy customer for the research outcomes (p 5, cp ESRC Q 262). The European Commission told us that the Task Forces had a future as a "management tool" for identifying the problem areas where research was needed, and what research teams would be needed to provide the answers (Q 337).

ADMINISTRATION

Cost

  2.45     The administrative costs of the Framework Programmes are high, with an average of 8 per cent[19] of programme budgets set aside for administration. The OST said that "though the Commission themselves claim that their costs compare well with those of similar organisations in Member States, comparable costs for UK Research Councils are well under 5 per cent and are subject even then to continual downward pressure" (pp 8-9). Far from guaranteeing effective management, these high costs have failed to prevent a constant stream of criticisms about the administration of the programmes.

  2.46     The European Court of Auditors reported in November 1996[20] that eight research projects revealed, on random audit, irregularities amounting to 28 per cent of their total cost to the EU (1.7 MECU out of 6.3 MECU). The Commission has responded by trebling the internal financial audit staff of DG XII from 4 to 12. The Court of Auditors has now begun a major "systems audit" of the whole of EU research activity.

Failure rate

  2.47     Most witnesses drew attention to the waste of time and effort expended by unsuccessful applicants for Framework funding (QQ 22, 174, 178, 204-206, 212, 215, 245, 309, 313). Inventing Tomorrow (p 10) said that there was a "continual increase in the number of proposals not accepted: on average only 1 in 6 has received funding"; in written evidence to us, the Commission gave the figure of 1 in 5 (p 126); according to the 1995 Monitoring Panel, "most of the programmes had success rates in the range 20-30 per cent" (i.e. 1 in 5-1 in 3). Inventing Tomorrow concluded that "these preliminary figures clearly indicate a need for better targeting of calls for proposals and for more concentrated efforts as a way of reducing the dispersal of resources and the administrative burden. A detailed evaluation of projects will accompany the formal proposal for FP5". For comparison, the success rate of new project grant applications to the United Kingdom Medical Research Council for 1996-97 was just under 1 in 5; the BBSRC success rate is similar (Q 311).

  2.48     The CBI was one of a number of witnesses to comment that the success rate was "very much worse" than 1 in 6 in certain areas (Q 174). According to the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), in the Developing Countries Programme, the success rate was as low as 1 in 12 (p 88). The ESRC said that 548 proposals had been submitted for the Targeted Socio-Economic Research Programme, out of which 38 projects had been awarded, a success rate of only 1 in 14 which they attributed in part to the insufficient targeting of the call for funding applications (Q 245). Another particularly over-subscribed area is life sciences, where the success rate is 1 in 15 (Q 344). In 1995 the TMR programme saw considerable oversubscription; the acceptance rates were below 1 in 10 for PhD grants, and under 1 in 15 for funding of research networks. Professor McCleverty (p 217) blamed this on the high level of awards, about 1.3 MECU per network.

  2.49     The BBSRC spoke of the discouragement encountered by the large numbers of unsuccessful applicants (Q 313). Professor Routti of the Commission thought that response times for processing applications were important in relation to the impact of failure-"in this field sometimes we say that there is nothing worse than "slow - no" " (Q 343).

  2.50     Professor Tom Husband of Salford University put a more positive light on the Framework Programme failure rate (Q 366). "Actually, 1 in 6 is not too bad compared to some of the research council programmes in Great Britain. Also in most cases the costs which are associated with an individual university making a bid to Europe tend to be marginal costs for a very good reason in that very commonly the bid that is being made by an academic plus his industrial collaborators is lifted in part from other bids for other funding sources, from industry perhaps in the past or a recycled bid from a previous project or from a rejected research council bid or whatever. It is very unusual actually to start ab initio and say, "I shall write a bid for a particular project"." Professor Amman of the ESRC made the same point (Q 255).

  2.51     The 1995 Monitoring Panel found that, as a consequence of oversubscription, the Commission often puts successful bidders under pressure either to reduce their budget or to merge with other groups. They deprecated both approaches; they recommended instead budgetary reallocations from under-subscribed programmes to oversubscribed programmes.

Selection process

  2.52     DG XII submits all Framework project proposals to peer review, i.e. assessment by independent experts in the relevant field, but not in the same way as (for example) the United Kingdom Research Councils. In the United Kingdom, a Research Council committee receives proposals, sends them out to appropriate experts for comment on quality, receives their observations and decides against its own priorities which alpha-rated proposals will receive funding. The Commission described their procedure for us (p 129): proposals are submitted to an evaluation panel of independent experts, who award each a numerical mark. The Commission then selects proposals for funding, taking into account not only the mark, but also the objectives of the programme and the size of the budget. The Commission's selection is submitted for approval to a programme management committee of representatives of the Member States.

  2.53     The University of Edinburgh approved of the Commission's reliance on external evaluators to assess proposals, but thought that "the timescales they are given to do their evaluations are very short and can lead to insufficient review of certain proposals. This is ultimately a waste of time and resources" (p 221). Professor McCleverty, who has served as an evaluator for FP3 and FP4 in the TMR field, is content with the process and the timescale, but considers that the large number of applications and the absence of focus reduce selection to the level of a "lottery draw" (p 218). Sir Dai Rees considers the system a highly inefficient use of money (Q 434); and Sir William Stewart told us, "I see researchers winning grants in the Framework Programme who would not stand a chance in the peer review system in the UK" (Q 405). Sir Dai suggested that the Commission might do here what it does in other areas, and delegate the peer review function to national bodies with the necessary expertise; but he acknowledged that this would run counter to the prevailing culture of central management of research (Q 446).

  2.54     The OST believed that all Member States shared the United Kingdom's concern about the "excessive length" of the initial selection process and the lack of transparency in a number of aspects (Q 25, p 9). The Commission had proposed setting itself targets "that will be excellent (if they meet them) for increasing the speed of flow-through of project applications which is a source of great frustration to applicants at the moment". A number of improvements were in train to make the peer review process more transparent. The Government were seeking better feedback both to the applicants and to the management committees, and to improve the contract negotiation process following the initial selection "both to make it quicker and to try to avoid some of the ... unnecessary chopping and changing of projects at that stage, which again is a source of aggravation and inefficiency" (Q 25). One recent innovation which was now available to applicants for Framework funding was "a kind of self-help manual in which you can check your own proposal against the evaluation criteria" (Q 30). We learn from the report of the 1995 Monitoring Panel that some programmes are experimenting with electronic "on-line" application systems and pre-screening of applications; the Panel were not convinced that either would improve the situation. The OST would welcome, as a step towards greater transparency, identification of the members of peer review panels (Q 31). The Royal Society went further and called for independent observers to be present at panel meetings, saying that "Secrecy does not engender confidence within the scientific community and is not required to protect panel members from lobbyists" (p 213).

  2.55     The 1995 Monitoring Panel's report echoes the general dissatisfaction with the selection process. With nearly 5,000 experts involved, the process is very complicated to organise. Evaluators are recruited at short notice, sometimes as little as four weeks. "Industry is generally poorly represented in the evaluation panels, even in the industry-oriented programmes." The evaluators' reports are of variable quality and consistency. The final selection by the Commission is "the least transparent part of the application process".

  2.56     Professor Routti agreed that the Commission needed to process proposals more quickly. He thought that the minimum length of time needed to satisfy rules of impartiality and transparency was three to four months (Q 335).

Issuing of contracts

  2.57     The long time between a funding decision being taken and the issuing of a contract was a cause of particular complaint (QQ 309, 449). The Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) identified some specific problems. Firstly, although the process of receiving approval for Framework funding was a lengthy one-"anything from nine to 12 months or even longer" (Q 214)-the Commission often gave successful applicants only very short notice of the start dates for projects. "The rule of the game is that the contract will start on the first day of the month after signing the contract. Contracts are only signed by very senior people in Brussels and if they happen to be out of the country and turn up on the 30th of the month they sign it then and you are expected to start a day after or two days after." This caused problems for universities in particular, as it was usually necessary to recruit research assistants to work on the projects "and you cannot do that at a moment's notice". Second, it was "extremely difficult to get an extension to a contract to compensate maybe for a late start consequent upon you wishing to recruit staff" (Q 213). The RAEng called for a notice period of about three months between definite approval of a project and its start date, with "some degree of flexibility" (Q 214). The Commission told us (p 127) that this was already the case: "Many contracts are subject to specific agreed start dates, up to a year beyond the time of contract negotiation".


18   The BBSRC told us that, out of 206 Biotech projects funded so far, 71 included a Spanish partner, 13 a Portuguese partner, 15 a Greek partner and 22 an Irish partner. 106 had no participation from a "cohesion country". 156 had United Kingdom participation. Back

19   The range is 5-14 per cent according to OST (p 8), or 5-12 per cent according to the 1995 Monitoring Panel, who commented on the "lack of available data". Back

20   OJ C340, 12 November 1996, p 214. Back


 


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Prepared 5 March 1997