Select Committee on Science and Technology Second Report



CHAPTER 2 VIEWS OF WITNESSES (continued)

Internal communication

  2.58     The following DGs have a significant role in managing FP4:

    --   DG III (Industry): information technology programme (ESPRIT);

    --   DG XII (Science, R&D): overall responsibility;

    --   DG XIII (Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research): advanced telecommunications (ACTS) and telematics programmes (in Brussels; this remit predates FP1) and dissemination and exploitation of research (in Luxembourg; under the same Commissioner as DG XII);

    --   JRC.

  2.59     In addition, specific programmes are administered by DG VI (Agriculture), DG VII (Transport), DG XIV (Fisheries) and DG XVII (Energy). DG III and DG XII were under the same Commissioner until 1973, and from 1981 to 1989; but they are currently under different Commissioners.

  2.60     The Commission assured us (p 129) that "Generally speaking, co-operation and co-ordination between DGs works well". According to the 1995 Monitoring Panel, "Useful experience has been gained through the joint management of some programmes by different DGs". However, poor communication between different Directorates-General of the Commission was viewed by several witnesses as a serious impediment to the efficient management of the Framework Programmes (QQ 84, 167; p 4). Sir William Stewart commended the United Kingdom structure, with a single Government Chief Scientific Adviser and an Office of Science and Technology with cross-departmental responsibilities (Q 419).

  2.61     The ESRC mentioned a further example of poor internal communication within the Commission, based on evidence from the Management Committee of the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) Programme. "We have a lot of evidence from within that programme Committee that DG XII, which runs the TSER programme, has rather weak links with, for example, the Directorates-General responsible for the economic and social policy, so the content of the TSER programme that relates to social exclusion, for example, seems to have been driven forward without a great deal of consultation and interaction between DG XII and DGV." They added, "there are lots of other examples one could give of a similar kind" (Q 252).

  2.62     Delays created by an apparent reluctance or inability to delegate mundane administrative tasks within the Commission were another source of complaint from witnesses (QQ 138, 213). The lack of delegation in Commission procedures for financial approvals was of particular concern (Q 417, p 9). Professor Georghiou said that "it is very difficult [for Commission staff] to delegate any powers at all. All commitments even of the smallest kind have got to be personally authorised by Directors-General and letters have to be countersigned by people one or two grades up the system" (Q 95).

Staff

  2.63     EU RTD 1996 (p 13) sets out the current position concerning staff responsible for managing the Framework Programmes: "99 new posts were created in 1995, bringing the research management staff up to 1453 authorized posts by 1 January 1996". Of these, 1100 are in DG XII (p 130). Several witnesses praised the high quality and degree of commitment of the Commission staff involved in administering the Framework Programmes (eg pp 66, 177, 182, 206). The OST pointed out that "at any one time they administer several thousand project contracts, far more than any other EU activity" (p 8).

  2.64     A number of witnesses, including the ESRC, expressed concern about the lack of continuity in Commission staffing (Q 260). The OST observed that "all bureaucracies suffer from too rapid turnover of staff in key positions" (Q 29). Professor Routti thought that the Commission had an adequate number of staff, and that staff turnover was not a major problem. "Of course we want to maintain a certain degree of staff renewal because it is important that you keep up with the latest developments of science and technology. Maybe the more difficult thing on the staff side is the contractual expertise, lawyers, auditors and so on, which is more and more demanding" (Q 342).

  2.65     The ESRC pointed to problems with the TSER programme and attributed them to the Commission having neither sufficient staff nor staff with the right expertise to ensure that the programme objectives could be met (pp 103, 106). The Royal Society said that the Commission should consider contracting out management of some programmes where it did not have the necessary internal scientific expertise (p 213), but the CVCP warned that parochial attitudes could develop with such fragmentation of responsibility (p 148).

  2.66     The BBSRC favoured an internal approach. It complained that "Scientific staff are used to perform routine administrative and clerical tasks and there is insufficient knowledge of the corresponding structures and procedures in Member States. This suggests that DG XII would benefit from a more appropriate balance (within existing administrative costs) between scientific and support staff and more staff with a background in science administration" (p 118).

Root and branch reform

  2.67     The Commission told us (p 126) that substantial reforms of their procedures are already in hand. Better information is to be given about conditions of eligibility and criteria for evaluation; pre-checking of project outlines is to be extended; evaluation manuals are to be published; independent high-level observers will monitor evaluations; the system of nomination of experts is to be made more transparent; the time from close of call for proposals to evaluation decisions is to be reduced from 4-5 months to 4 months; applicants are to receive early notice of whether they have scored high enough on evaluation to be short-listed for funding; and the time from evaluation decision to contract is to be cut from up to 4 months to 2 months "in normal circumstances". Towards FP5 2 suggests further possible reforms: for instance, whereas at present calls for project proposals are issued periodically, with fairly short deadlines for response, some calls might be left open permanently.

  2.68     Sir William Stewart (QQ 405, 417) considers that the whole approach of management from the centre, which pervades the Framework Programme, is outdated. Sir Dai Rees drew to our attention the AMICA Science European Economic Interest Grouping, a consortium between the Max Planck Institute for Plant Breeding in Cologne and the John Innes Centre in Norwich, formed by the Commission in 1993 to co-ordinate the "Plant Molecular Genetics for an Environmentally Compatible Agriculture" project. This was, in his opinion, a successful experiment in delegated management, which deserved to be repeated (Q 439).

  2.69     Professor Georghiou of PREST thought that root and branch reform of the Commission's existing procedures, including the setting of performance targets, was called for. "It is probably time for some business process engineering within the Commission and it is time to think what we really want them to do, and if we want them to be able to produce a contract within a month, it is up to them to design a process which is capable of doing that" (QQ 128-131). SmithKline Beecham also recommended that the Commission should "establish a roving working group dedicated to the review and simplification of every Framework Programme procedure" (p 66). Greater use of electronic information systems (e.g. the World Wide Web) and standardisation of documentation were called for by other witnesses (pp 144, 219). However Sir Dai Rees made the rueful observation (Q 453) that simpler procedures only encourage more applications, pushing the failure rate even higher.

VAT

  2.70     The University of Edinburgh (p 222) and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) (p 149) complained that United Kingdom universities were having difficulty reclaiming VAT incurred on contracts for research funded under FP4, because the Commission and the United Kingdom Customs and Excise were not agreed as to whether these contracts are within the scope of VAT or not. As a result, the universities were having to carry this cost themselves.

  2.71     The OST said in November that since the Committee brought this issue to their attention steps had been taken to address it. "Our colleagues at Customs and Excise, who have responsibility for the problem, have already started to negotiate a way forward with the relevant Directorates-General in the Commission, which will mean that universities should not be burdened in future with a need to reclaim VAT from the Commission. By dint of a sensible arrangement between the Commission and Customs and Excise, this problem should disappear very shortly" (Q 60). Ten weeks later, however, the OST were less optimistic (p 211): discussion between Customs and the Commission was continuing, with no prospect of early settlement.

ATTRIBUTION

  2.72     United Kingdom Government Departments which have interests matching those of EU programmes have their budget baseline reduced by the Treasury in proportion to their interest in the United Kingdom's notional contribution to the relevant part of the EU budget. This process is known as "attribution". Other Member States operate the contrasting principle of "additionality", whereby their EU budget contribution is top-sliced and not attributed to Departments.

  2.73     The OST explain, "Attribution is a budgetary discipline, not a mechanical process" (pp 1-2). More money available from Brussels need not mean less money from Whitehall; the Minister concerned may argue for attribution to be offset by additional resources for his departmental budget, or may reallocate resources within his budget to determine where the impact of attribution is actually felt.

  2.74     The Commission said, "The way in which each Member State approaches questions on national funding are, essentially, matters for that Member State" (p 127). However, they insisted, "In accordance with Article 130g of the Treaty, the funding which is allocated to Community RTD is for activities which complement those carried out by the Member States. By that token, a Community research activity should not lead automatically to a matching cut in activities in Member States".

  2.75     In evidence to this Committee on the Fourth Framework Programme in 1993, Commissioner Ruberti suggested that the United Kingdom's attribution policy resulted in "negotiation problems": "when defining the overall budget for research in the context of the European budget, the United Kingdom is always very cautious because it must decide which part it has to take away from its national organisations ... This is why the United Kingdom, in the discussions, has difficulties in determining the resources to allocate to research" (Q 10 of 1993 evidence, printed with 1st Report, Session 1993-94, HL Paper 5, ISBN 010-400594-7).

  2.76     We invited the Treasury to comment. The Treasury's response did not touch on Professor Ruberti's allegation that the United Kingdom's attribution policy caused difficulties in negotiations. The Treasury also declined to agree that other Member States regard expenditure from the Community Budget on research as purely additional to such expenditure in national Budgets. It did, however, concede that "so far as the Treasury knows no other Member State routinely uses mechanisms for this purpose which are quite as formalised as those of the UK" (p 219). For Sir William Stewart (Q 413), being out of step is itself a strong argument against attribution, whose purpose he sees as "to cream off funds from the budgets of departments which support science for use in support of European policy".

  2.77     The OST said that it had "no reason to believe that the system has influenced the UK scientific community's priorities inappropriately" (p 207). Representatives of the Research Councils suggested otherwise. The ESRC said that "attribution may have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity and quality of UK inputs to debates on the Framework Programme" (p 106). They questioned whether Government Departments "facing the possibility of attribution would be inclined to be enthusiastic about research which had a very powerful cross-departmental character" (Q 285).[21] The BBSRC made a similar point: "an incidental consequence of the attribution policy of HMG is to reduce the quantity and quality of inputs to discussion on the Framework Programme in its key, early stages, as departments fear the financial consequence of suggesting new ideas" (p 118). Sir William Stewart suggested, as a reason for supporting the paucity of truly basic research in the Framework Programme, that more money for basic research at the EU level would, by attribution, mean less money for the Research Councils in the United Kingdom (Q 405).[22]

JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE

  2.78     Professor Contzen, Director-General of the JRC, set out for us (p 191) his criteria for assigning work to the JRC: European added value, the highest quality and integrity, and the clearly expressed needs of an identified customer. Professor Contzen considers that the JRC has three categories of customer: the EU itself, through the ring-fenced portion of the Framework programme; Commission DGs, for work in support of other policies; and other customers for R&D who select the JRC on a competitive basis. The concerns of our other witnesses focused on that part of the JRC's function which is sponsored by "the EU itself": we detected a widespread view that, in this area, there is no check on the criteria of European added value, quality and customer need.

  2.79     Curiously, in the light of the British Government's enthusiasm for Prior Options reviews of public sector research establishments, and for their privatisation, the OST did not admit to questioning the Commission's need for an in-house research capacity, and merely pressed for "agency status" for the JRC (QQ 50-55). The BBSRC took a different view, saying that it would be better if this research were commissioned "more independently" on an ad hoc basis (Q 321). Sir William Stewart went further (Q 421): large in-house research institutes are outmoded, and insufficiently "nimble" for the current pace of change; there was a case for a European facility for nuclear fusion research, but the work of the Environmental Institute, the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements, the Institute for Advanced Materials and the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies would be done better in national institutes or in universities.

  2.80     PREST considered that "the earmarked funding for the Joint Research Centre should be reduced to the level needed for the basic infrastructure of an international laboratory, accepting that such a thing would have perhaps a higher cost base than a purely national institution, but after that to make it compete for most of its project funding and certainly for all of the funding that it gets from the Framework Programme" (Q 112). Similarly, the BBSRC, which advocated exposing the JRC to competition, said that there could be a case for an element of core funding to ensure continuity. "Without that continuity there can be mission drift ... meaning that they can be distorted from the central feature and the importance of the work by having to earn money in some areas. So there is a very fine balance" (Q 318).

  2.81     The CBI criticised the ring-fencing of the JRC's Budget: "the principle of saying you will ring-fence this area, irrespective of quality, whilst there is tremendous pressure elsewhere is very difficult to defend" (Q 174). The CBI thought it was "difficult to see the added value of the Joint Research Centre activities, particularly in the context of the level of investment of funding in those organisations". They recommended that "other institutes, networks and technology organisations should be allowed to bid for the work content of the programmes ... wide publicity should be given to this opportunity and ... those organisations should be ... given the opportunity to bid on specific projects." They added, "to be fair, that process we believe has started, but it is moving very slowly, and we would like to see that particular thrust or initiative significantly accelerated" (Q 170). The CBI called for greater transparency in publishing the JRC's work programme, as an essential prerequisite to judging its effectiveness (Q 172). The 1995 Monitoring Panel commented, "Relatively little data are available by which to monitor the JRC's progress towards its objectives"; they also noted that JRC researchers have unusually long contracts.

  2.82     A minority of the JRC's work is carried out directly for the Commission, to support it in its policy and regulatory functions. Professor Georghiou of PREST said that "in many countries, although not under current policy here [in the United Kingdom], it is considered legitimate for a Government or a ministry to have a laboratory which is able to provide independent advice. Indeed, many people in industry support that concept. They do not want potential competitors developing regulations and standards that affect them, for example. In those capacities therefore I believe that the Commission does have a legitimate argument. Those arguments do not apply though to the majority of its work which is taken out of the Framework Programme budget" (Q 117). He added that some longer-term monitoring duties, such as maintenance of databases and infrastructural activities, were probably best carried out in public sector laboratories (Q 118).

  2.83     Professor Routti stressed that the JRC was going through a "rather challenging transition period", the outcome of which was hoped to be a smaller core JRC and a wider network of collaborating national research facilities-"a distributed Joint Research Centre". He pointed out that the "history of the European Communities started in the Steel and EURATOM exercise, and the Joint Research Centre was first established in those days. That mission has been completed, although there is still an important task to provide the safety criteria for nuclear power, for instance, on a European level. In today's world also I think there is a need to have a European reference laboratory and many questions related ... to food safety, environmental questions, let alone the more controversial issues of safety of weapons tests somewhere in the Pacific, would make it difficult for a national laboratory to address these questions. There is also a benefit of having an infrastructure where European scientists can work in a totally international environment on science projects. The Joint Research Centre has also formed close links with Eastern Europe. It is managing some of the programmes which are devoted to the conversion of defence industries into civilian use" (Q 349). Plans to reduce or close any of the JRC's institutes would no doubt be resisted by its host country (QQ 115-6, 421).

  2.84     The high profile of nuclear research in the JRC's work has been questioned (QQ 241-3). Professor Routti said that an independent evaluation of nuclear-related matters by experts appointed by Member States had recommended that the Framework Programme needed to maintain "about the current level of EURATOM activities" (Q 350). Mr Escritt, Director of Framework Planning in DG XII, said that this represented "roughly 30 per cent of the total Joint Research Centre activity, rather than the four-sevenths which might appear from the simple counting of the number of institutes" (Q 353).

DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION

  2.85     A succession of recent reports has repeated the truism that "it is one of the paradoxes of the European Union that despite its internationally acknowledged scientific excellence, it launches fewer new products, services and processes than its main competitors."[23] Inadequate translation of research results into commercial applications is seen as a major source of this problem.[24] Exploitation of research efforts has been identified as one of the priority areas for FP4; 2.7 per cent of the Budget, 330 MECU, is allocated to this area. By way of comparison, the Joint Research Centre was allocated 900 MECU, 7.3 per cent of the Framework Budget.

  2.86     The OST called for 5 per cent of the FP5 budget to be allocated to the follow-through of research, and for exploitation plans to be built integrally into project proposals (p 17). The BBSRC said that the categorisation of dissemination as a separate activity in FP4 was "not optimal", and actions within specific programmes would be more effective. The development of industrial platforms in the Biotech programme had been a good example. There could be more funding within individual projects to enable researchers and their institutions to promote their findings and interact with industry and the public (p 116).

  2.87     The CBI said that "much greater emphasis should be placed upon the outcomes and exploitation routes of Framework Programmes" (p 87). Mrs McNally MEP agreed (p 197): "the criteria for selection of participants in projects could include at least a reasonable attempt at showing the path to implementation of R&D results with particular reference to capital for innovation". The 1995 Monitoring Panel recommended "the active involvement of users throughout the programme lifecycle ... The IT and Telematics programmes are noted as particularly successful examples of user involvement". The Commission's recent Action Plan for Innovation (COM(96)589, 20 November 1996) includes a proposal to bring together the European Investment Bank and the Structural Funds to provide venture capital for innovation by firms in the less developed regions.

  2.88     The Royal Academy of Engineering were particularly concerned for small firms. "The question ... of transferring new technology into SMEs is perhaps as important as encouraging them to be involved in doing pre-competitive research ... one of the problems we have in engineering is that we are simply not implementing enough of the things we know already and the transfer of technology into industry is not happening as widely as perhaps it should ... if something can be done within the European Commission's programme to facilitate this, perhaps using the analogy of our Teaching Company Scheme in the United Kingdom, that would be helpful particularly to SMEs" (Q 206).

EVALUATION, ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING

  2.89     As noted above, POST goes into the question of evaluating the Framework Programmes in considerable depth. Its conclusions, though expressed in tones appropriate to a neutral body, are unfavourable: "Despite the efforts of the Commission and experts outside it, it is not clear that it is possible to select a number of evaluation techniques and state that they will correctly assess the impact of the Framework programmes, and provide information about possible future options. While economic indicators can give the broad context within which research and development is being carried out, and individual evaluations such as UKIMPACT or horizontal work can give `snap-shots' of particular Member States or sectors, the current approach is very piecemeal and inconsistent, with results often depending on who is asking the questions" (POST 5.3).

  2.90     POST also notes "the extent to which evaluations rely on Framework Programme participants to assess the value of the programmes from which they have benefited". We can testify to this problem from our own experience of this inquiry: our witnesses have proved reluctant to criticise the goose which lays such golden eggs.

  2.91     POST records the outcome of a "meta-evaluation" done by PREST in 1990 for the Commission: The Impact and Utility of European Commission Research Programme Evaluation Reports. Its conclusions were "generally positive about the composition, independence and methodology of the Commission's evaluations, as well as a high take-up of the suggestions included in these `meta-evaluations'. The main deficiencies of the evaluation reports so far were the lack of dissemination of the reports and their results to Member States and programme participants, in addition to the length of the evaluations which, combined with a lack of executive summaries, made them difficult to read and unattractive. There were also problems to do with timing (with follow-on programmes being decided before evaluations had been completed), inadequate attention being paid to policy consideration, particularly those relating to regulations, and the need to interview non-participants in programmes to gain an alternative view" (POST 5.2.4).

  2.92     POST makes some recommendations of its own. It suggests that the Commission could take lessons in evaluation of research from the DTI: it should expand its evaluation unit and widen its remit to include the activities of other DGs besides DG XII, adopt a more coherent strategy along the lines of the approach known in the DTI as "ROAME", and get beyond its own programme managers to talk to researchers themselves (POST 5.3). "More effective and flexible procedures for evaluation are also needed during the programmes in a timescale which can inform `mid-course' corrections ... the system should ensure that:

  2.93     The 1995 Monitoring Panel also made specific recommendations for evaluation. They called for a system of performance indicators, applicable consistently to all programmes. "Examples of basic indicators should include overall expenditure, management costs, and numbers of students, PhDs, publications and patents." The Commission replied, "The Commission Services fully accept this recommendation and have set about co-ordinating the collation of new and existing performance indicators through the recently established Inter-Service Group on Monitoring and Evaluation. Furthermore, a project commissioned at the start of 1996 with two groups of external evaluation experts should provide some additional advice on possible project level performance indicators". Tim Gatland (p 186) sounded a warning about use of milestones: "This leads project teams to retain focus in unfruitful areas (which might have appeared relevant at the start of the project) and to achieve milestones in those areas, at the expense of more applicable work".


21   See also POST, Box 6.1. Back

22   In 1994 and 1995, the United Kingdom Framework contribution was attributed 13.5 per cent to the OST/Science Budget/Research Councils, and 60 per cent to the rest of the DTI: Technology Foresight, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 1st Report, Session 1995-96, HC 49, p xxvii. Back

23   EU RTD 1996, p 16. This Committee will report on The Innovation/Exploitation Barrier during 1997. Back

24   Research and technology: FP4 (1994-98), European Commission, January 1995, p 12. Back


 


© Parliamentary copyright 1997
Prepared 5 March 1997