Select Committee on Science and Technology Second Report



CHAPTER 3 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE

FOCUS OF THE FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

  3.1     There is general agreement (see above, paragraphs 2.1-7) that the first four Framework Programmes have suffered from too many objectives and too little focus. We recognise that this is a consequence of political life in a European Union with an expanding number of Member States, each with different political priorities and research needs, and indeed of life in a Commission of competing Directorates-General, each with its own agenda for research. The result has been that Framework funds have been spread too widely.

  3.2     In the Committee's view, the single most important reform which is needed for the Fifth Framework Programme is for it to be focused on a smaller range of subjects, and within each subject on a smaller range of better-defined programmes. This will enable more to be done in the areas selected; it will simplify administration; and it may reduce the number of unsuccessful applications for Framework funding, with all the attendant waste of resources. It will certainly require hard decisions, since programmes from FP4, which are of continuing merit but which do not match the themes of a more focused FP5, will require to be closed down; the Government should encourage the Commission to be rigorous in this respect.

  3.3     The Commission has repeatedly signalled its intention to exercise greater selectivity in its choice of Framework topics, most recently in Towards FP5 2, which commits FP5 to "a particular effort of selectivity and concentration on a limited number of areas and objectives". We are therefore astonished to see that the Key Actions and general activities proposed in the very same document (see above, paragraph 1.21) appear to reproduce all the programmes of FP4, as well as introducing new topics (e.g. food, water, multimedia contents, aeronautics, city of tomorrow). Although arranged into just three thematic programmes, the programme envisaged by the Commission is all-embracing; indeed we would challenge the Commission to name an area of research which could not find a place in one of its categories. Far from being a selective programme to complement and add value to the research programmes of Member States, the Commission's programme is of appropriate scope for the national programme of a leading scientific nation. We urge the Government to make every effort in the Council of Ministers to force the Commission to honour its commitment to a more focused Programme; to this end, some of the activities of FP4 must be explicitly terminated.

  3.4     It is not enough to agree that there must be focus; it must also be agreed what that focus is to be. The Commission proposes, as the leading criterion for selection of programmes, "high European value added" (see above, paragraph 1.19). This could mean various things: subjects with a general European dimension, or matters related to EU policies, or research whose applications could be Europe-wide. In the light of the prevailing doctrine of subsidiarity, we agree with the OST (paragraph 2.5) that none of these is sufficient justification for action at EU level. We had many discussions about the differences between themes appropriate for national, European and global research programmes and were unable to find any clear basis for distinguishing between them, apart from the obvious principle that research required by the Commission to support its executive and pre-legislative functions must be paid for out of the Commission's budget. The benefits of the Framework Programme to Europe lie more in promoting collaboration between scientists and laboratories in different countries, which has been one of the undoubted successes of the programme (paragraphs 2.21-23).

  3.5     The choice of focus must therefore be a matter for intelligent political decision, informed by perceptions of the social needs and scientific opportunities of the next five years. We recommend no particular agenda. However we recommend that, whatever agenda is chosen, it should play to the strengths of European research and development, with a view to maximising the achievements, and the return on the achievements, of Europe's best researchers and centres of scientific excellence.

  3.6     While we support international scientific collaboration beyond the borders of Europe, we consider that the Commission's proposals for "Confirming the international role of European research" envisage too wide a range of collaborations. They appear to extend the possibility of involvement in Framework programmes to far too many countries. Without greater selectivity, the Commission risks further dissipating the resources of the Framework Programme, and exposing an agenda supposedly built upon Europe's needs to the risk of serious distortion.

  3.7     We note the Commission's intention that FP5 should aim not only at technical achievement, but at meeting socio-economic need (see above, paragraph 2.10). Such an emphasis will no doubt help to commend FP5 to the European taxpayer. However history provides many examples of research money being wasted on problems which were urgent, but where science was not ready to provide solutions. The Government should not allow the Commission to fall into this trap.

  3.8     One area in which FP5 might offer real "value added" is in support for large scientific facilities. There is a range of installations, from neutron sources to wind tunnels, which are essential to researchers in particular fields but whose capital and running costs may be beyond the resources of any single institution and even those of most single states. "Big science" has its dangers: proposals may be motivated simply by the desire for funding on a grand scale, and may be agreed to for reasons of prestige rather than on the basis of need. Supporting greater use of an existing facility, as does the TMR Large Scale Facilities Programme in FP4, may be a better use of resources than the construction of a new one. Provided that these considerations are borne in mind, this is a line of possibilities which the Commission might do well to explore. We therefore welcome the proposal in Towards FP5 2 that each programme in FP5 should include support for research infrastructure.

  3.9     We support the Commission's proposal (paragraph 1.19) for a contingency fund or "free space" in FP5, to allow the focus to be sharpened or shifted as the Programme unfolds. In our view this will be a better way of dealing with contingencies than the procedure whereby the Commission's bid for 700 MECU of extra money for FP4 has been whittled down to 100 MECU in negotiations which have dragged on for over a year and are still continuing (paragraph 1.12). 35 MECU of this is to go to research into transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, a genuinely urgent problem with Europe-wide implications in need of research; but a contingency fund would provide a much better way to respond to such emergencies. Calls on the contingency fund must meet the same criteria as all other proposals; in addition it will have to be demonstrated that the research proposed is urgent, and that the need and opportunity for it were unforeseeable when FP5 was drawn up. There must be sufficient control for it to be impossible to use the contingency fund to cover up mismanagement of other programmes.

VALUE FOR MONEY

  3.10     Despite much dissatisfaction with the way the Framework Programme is run (see below), our witnesses generally support its continued existence, and so do we. However, we do not consider there to be a distinctive EU scientific agenda beyond the needs of the Commission; and we believe that similar outcomes could have been achieved by spending the same amounts of money at national or global level. National schemes start with the advantage of costing less in travel and translation. However it is our own experience and that of our witnesses that EU research funding offers substantial (though unquantifiable) added value by encouraging both universities and firms to collaborate and share knowledge across Europe's frontiers. Such encouragement was available before the Framework Programmes, for example through NATO, the European Science Foundation and the Royal Society; but the Framework Programmes offer much greater resources.

  3.11     Although the Training and Mobility of Researchers programme (paragraph 1.35) is one of the smallest parts of FP4 in terms of funding (six per cent), our witnesses spoke warmly in its favour. We agree: the Training and Mobility of Researchers programme, with its focus on people rather than projects, is one of the most valuable parts of the Framework Programme, and one which is in full accord with the principle of subsidiarity. For FP5, the coverage of TMR should be increased, for instance by reducing the minimum size of collaborative groups. The process of selection should be improved: selectors should be named; external referees should be used; and unsuccessful applicants should be notified promptly.

  3.12     For United Kingdom researchers, as well as for the British Government, there is good reason for wanting the Programmes to continue, since British universities and companies have been major beneficiaries; and European networks built up by the Framework Programmes complement the long-standing scientific relationships between the United Kingdom and the USA. However in one practical way, Framework grants to United Kingdom universities carry a cost which, in an extreme case, might outweigh the benefit: this is the matter of inadequate provision for the full costs associated with funded posts (paragraph 2.25). This is a real problem for United Kingdom universities, and does not enhance the standing of the Framework Programme; were a university to be too successful in winning Framework contracts, it might bankrupt itself. For FP5, funding for academic posts should be set at a more realistic level as regards associated costs, with appropriate audit controls. Another factor working against the benefits of the Framework Programmes to the United Kingdom is attribution; we consider this below.

EVALUATION, ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING

  3.13     We freely admit that our conclusions on the value for money represented by the Framework Programmes rest largely on anecdotal evidence. Consideration of value for money, and indeed of most of these issues, is bedevilled by inadequate systematic evaluation of the Framework Programmes so far (see above, paragraphs 2.89-93). Framework Programmes 1-4 will have cost 28,000 MECU (£21 billion), and the European taxpayer is entitled to evidence that this large sum has been well spent. The Annual Monitoring Report is a valuable innovation; but by its own admission it concentrates on administration, and has little to say about scientific quality and results. We recommend that improved evaluation systems be put in place for FP5, based on best practice in the United Kingdom and other Member States. This will include cost-benefit analysis, and where appropriate targets and milestones; but, in the case of more fundamental research, setting outcome targets may be by definition impossible.

BASIC RESEARCH

  3.14     We have listened to much discussion as to whether Framework research should be basic, strategic-basic, applied-strategic, pre-competitive or near-market (paragraphs 2.27-30). We are inclined to agree with the Commission that this discussion is not fruitful; even if the blue sky and the market are usually two separate points between which may be discerned a line, which we do not necessarily admit, the line is sometimes so short, that in the time taken to decide where to start injecting funds and where to stop the opportunity may be lost. Therefore we do not support the Royal Society's proposal that 10 per cent of each programme budget should be for basic research; neither do we agree with the OST that basic research should be excluded from the remit of the Framework Programmes altogether.

  3.15     Instead we commend to the Commission the model of the United Kingdom Research Councils. Since Realising our Potential, the Science White Paper of 1993 (Cm 2250), each Council has had a "mission statement", dedicating it to meeting the needs of specified "users" and to enhancing competitiveness and quality of life. However each Council's mission includes support for basic research and for "the full range of underpinning disciplines". The White Paper said, "The Government does not wish to run the risk of separating basic researchers from those who are concerned with application; rather it wishes the whole effort to be brought into closer contact with potential users. It therefore favours Research Councils which are able to identify areas for cross-fertilisation and integration along the continuum of basic, strategic and applied research" (paragraph 3.18). Those were wise words, and the Government should commend them to the Commission: any part of the FP should be permitted to fund basic research to any level, if that research underpins the objective of the programme. We therefore welcome the proposal in Towards FP5 2 that each programme in FP5 should permit unlimited support for "generic technologies and basic research". The Programme must also allow for long-term funding, though not to the extent that decisions made under one five-year plan effectively commit resources available under the next.

COHESION

  3.16     Our evidence supports Sir William Stewart's bald assertion that "Cohesion has been used to justify mediocrity" (paragraph 2.32), and lends credence to the widely-held belief that researchers can improve their chance of securing EU funds simply by involving someone from a "cohesion country" in their proposal. Making cohesion an objective of the Framework Programmes takes resources away from the best and most necessary research; it smacks of tokenism, which patronises the people it purports to help and brings the Programme into disrepute; and it further weakens the weaker countries by discouraging them from setting their own research agenda. Cohesion in terms of R&D capacity is a proper objective for the EU, but is more appropriately served by the Structural Funds. We recommend that the explicit objective of fostering research capacity in the less developed regions of the EU be entrusted exclusively to the Structural Funds, and omitted from the mission of FP5, save in respect of activities in the fields of training-and-mobility and dissemination. With respect to the Training and Mobility of Researchers programme, researchers from less developed regions should not be preferred above others in the selection procedure merely by virtue of their home address; but, if successful on merit, it is right and helpful that they should benefit from the specific "top-up" measures noted above (paragraph 1.45), e.g. an extra year's grant on return home. Less developed regions are also a legitimate target for dissemination activities (see below).

SMALLER FIRMS

  3.17     Some smaller firms are well connected to the R&D activities of their larger customers; these will have no special difficulty joining the "mother" firm in a Framework collaboration, and do not require special measures. But many smaller firms not so securely fixed in a supply chain are ill-equipped and insufficiently staffed to undertake research; and it will be hard to reconcile additional effort to involve such firms with the overriding aim of improved focus (paragraphs 2.36-38). Rather than diverting resources from the Framework Programme's main thrust in an attempt to involve such firms, the Programme should concentrate on assisting them through research fellowships and through improved dissemination of research results.

TASK FORCES

  3.18     Our witnesses criticised the manner in which the Commission set up the Task Forces in 1995, and the initial choice of Task Force themes (paragraphs 2.39-44); but they generally welcome the Task Force concept itself, and so do we. The device of highly focused groups, working to improve communication between the Commission's resources, the scientific and industrial communities and the needs of users, should be developed in FP4 and carried forward into FP5. We agree with the OST and most of our witnesses that the Task Forces should be developed into advisory groups, rather than into management committees with their own budgets; this way, they are likely to contribute to the main aim of focusing the Framework Programme without further complicating the administrative structure (see below).

ADMINISTRATION

  3.19     Several of our witnesses expressed a high opinion of the Commission staff working on the Framework Programmes (see above, paragraph 2.63); but their collective opinion of the administrative procedures of the Programmes could scarcely be lower. This comes as no surprise; the Framework Programmes have long been notorious in the United Kingdom scientific community for their exasperating inefficiency. The litany of complaint is as familiar as it is comprehensive: the cost of administration is unacceptably high (paragraph 2.45); the failure rate of applications for funding is unacceptably high, in some programmes if not in all (paragraph 2.47); the peer review process is too centralised, too slow and too secretive, and its outcomes do not always command confidence (paragraph 2.52); once a grant has been awarded, the time from award to contract is too long (paragraph 2.57); and the Commission suffers from poor internal financial audit (paragraph 2.46), poor internal communication (paragraph 2.58) and inadequate delegation (paragraph 2.62). In consequence, the resources of both the Commission and those dealing with it are wasted, and the Framework Programmes and the EU as a whole are brought into disrepute.

  3.20     We do not doubt that Professor Routti and his colleagues are painfully aware of the shortcomings of the systems which they have inherited, and are determined to put things right (paragraph 2.67). We recommend root and branch reform of the business processes of DG XII, as sketched for us by Professor Georghiou of PREST (paragraph 2.69), in time for the start of FP5. In addressing the process of peer review, the Commission should take advice from national research funding organisations, such as the United Kingdom Research Councils, and international bodies such as the European Molecular Biology Organisation.

  3.21     Behind much of the inefficiency of the Framework Programmes lie two of their fundamental features: centralisation, and lack of focus. For FP5, we recommend that the management and evaluation of programmes should involve individuals and national or international organisations closer to the actual conduct of the research, including representatives of research-led industry (paragraph 2.68). The question of focus has already been dealt with (paragraph 3.2).

VAT

  3.22     United Kingdom universities are currently the innocent victims of a disagreement between Customs and Excise and the Commission about VAT and Framework research contracts (see above, paragraph 2.70). We urge them to settle this dispute promptly so as to enable the universities to recover VAT from one side or the other in the usual way. The OST told us in November 1996 that "this problem should disappear very shortly"; we are surprised that it remains unresolved.

ATTRIBUTION

  3.23     The United Kingdom's unique policy of attribution (see above, paragraph 2.72) is intellectually respectable; but its effects on British behaviour in respect of the Framework Programme are perverse. Each Government Department seeks to minimise the effect of attribution on its budget baseline by having as little to do with the Programme as possible; in the Council of Ministers, while other Member States bid eagerly for what they perceive as extra money, Her Majesty's Minister prefers to talk down sums which the Treasury will take from his budget; in the scientific community, it is widely believed that every penny won in Brussels is liable to be clawed back by Whitehall.

  3.24     It is in the United Kingdom's interest, and that of Europe as a whole, that we should be enthusiastic champions of the Framework Programmes (see above, paragraph 3.10); though we acknowledge the rationale of attribution, the Government must face the fact that in this respect they may be "the only one in step". We call on the Government to reconsider the policy of attribution in the light of the perverse effect noted above, and of the policies of other Member States, and to consider whether attribution as applied to research expenditure should be modified in time for FP5, so as to give those negotiating for the United Kingdom an interest in success rather than in failure.

JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE

  3.25     The concept of protected funding for a large corporate research laboratory is outmoded, and neither we nor most of our witnesses (paragraph 2.79) can see any justification for the continuation of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in its present form. It is evidently a legacy of EURATOM, and its mission has been allowed to drift beyond recall. A considerable part of the JRC's activities are still related to nuclear research and safety, and the relevance and the scope of this need review.

  3.26     While there may be a requirement for a small "in house" research capacity to support some of the Commission's activities, most of the advice and research needed by the Commission and the Parliament could be more effectively and economically carried out on a contract basis with national institutions including universities. The list of JRC activities provided by the Commission (p 192) is worthy, but most of it amounts to data collection and analysis which could be carried out by any one of a number of research units around Europe working in the relevant field, without risk to quality or integrity. The JRC's directly-funded core operations should be confined to the few matters where a distinctively EU view of the questions involved is essential.

  3.27     At present less than 20 per cent of the JRC's finances are subject to competitive tender and indeed most of this part of the JRC's activities are commissioned by Directorates of the Commission. We can see no justification for the current level of ring-fencing of the JRC's finances. We recommend that the work of the JRC should be open to competition, to peer review and to assessment by an independent group.

  3.28     The evidence which we received during our inquiry led us to believe that the Commission was already moving in this direction. We are therefore most concerned to read in Towards FP5 2, "the institutional and operational role of the JRC in implementing FP5 would be at least on a par with its role in FP4". This endorsement of the status quo, unsupported by scientific justification, reveals the same inertia as the continuity of scientific programmes from one Framework to the next. The role of the JRC in FP5 should depend on its success in open competition, not on any unconditional prior commitment.

DISSEMINATION AND EXPLOITATION

  3.29     While new knowledge is valuable for its own sake, everyone involved in research hopes for outcomes which can be applied and exploited, either to create wealth or to improve the quality of life or both. Yet we note evidence (paragraph 2.85) that dissemination and exploitation have been weak in FP4. The Commission are right to envisage dissemination and exploitation as an important "horizontal activity" in FP5, concentrating on smaller firms (see above, paragraph 3.17) and less developed regions. We urge them to consider the advice of several of our witnesses that, where appropriate, research proposals should chart the pathway to exploitation of the outcomes. This would involve a requirement to address from the start the difficult but vital question of intellectual property arising from the collaboration, and the equally important question of venture capital or "seed capital". We welcome the proposal in Towards FP5 2 to address the problem of venture capital for technological innovation. Of course, Framework funds themselves must not be diverted into venture capital; and what is proposed must not duplicate existing activities of DG XIII. In this connection, we draw attention to our forthcoming report on the Innovation-Exploitation Barrier.

  3.30     This presupposes, of course, that the outcomes of Framework-funded research are worthy of dissemination and fit for exploitation. We have noted already our doubts as to the overall worth of the outcomes to date, in the absence of reliable evaluation.

  3.31     It is unhelpful for the Commission to have one Directorate-General responsible for research and another for exploitation of research (paragraph 2.58). This problem is compounded by the fact that the former DG is based in Brussels, and the latter in Luxembourg, thereby rendering impossible regular informal contacts of Commission officials based in the two DGs. We recommend that responsibility for exploitation should be united with responsibility for research in time for the start of FP5.

CONCLUSION

  3.32     We support the Framework Programmes; and we consider that the extra cost of R&D collaboration across frontiers is worth paying. But the value for money represented by EU research activities must be improved, and must be demonstrated by better evaluation. From FP5 the Government should look for a higher overall standard of scientific outcomes, leading to a better record of industrial exploitation.

  3.33     We are grateful to Professor Routti and his colleagues for their co-operation in this inquiry. However we are dismayed by the approach to FP5 set out in Towards FP5 2. Where the Commission promised focus and selectivity, they offer instead a programme of vast scope and unlimited geographical extent; they promised a reduced role for the JRC, but now it appears that its role is to be maintained or enhanced. The United Kingdom and the European Union have much to gain from FP5. All those involved in the negotiations over the coming months need to work together to ensure that the Programme is focused, adequately resourced, properly managed on the basis of uniformly open competition, and capable of meeting the needs and opportunities of the future.


 


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Prepared 5 March 1997