Select Committee on Science and Technology Third Report


CHAPTER 2  SEED CAPITAL (Continued)

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE

  2.20     Since our last report there have been many very welcome changes in both the availability of finance for small start-up companies and the willingness of individuals to form these companies. This latter change in attitude is particularly encouraging. Nonetheless there is evidence of a market failure in the provision of seed capital to technology-based start-up firms, due in part to an asymmetry of information (or understanding) between suppliers and users of finance leading to different assessments of the risk/reward ratio for such enterprises. However, while we go on to recommend some specific changes to help correct this assymetry, our first objective is to ensure that existing schemes fulfil their original aim. Financial stability is itself an important objective. All concerned with the formation of new companies need to feel confident that the decisions they make are not likely to be rendered nugatory by dramatic changes in the business environment.

  2.21     The role of Business Angels is widely recognised (for example, DTI, Q 36) and supported by the tax incentives supplied by the EIS. However, although there is recent research[4] which emphasises the importance of their role, there are more anecdotes than firm information. Some universities and budding entrepreneurs seem to have little difficulty gaining access to angel networks, others seem unaware of the opportunities available. Existing efforts to create a national network of Business Angels are supported by the charitable donations of a few benefactors. To increase the number and scope of Business Angel activities we need to know more about the extent of their present involvement and any constraints that prevent expansion of their role. EIS data provides a new and potentially revealing source of information on the characteristics and interests of these individuals. We recommend that the role of Business Angels be examined further by Government, universities and leading financial institutions to determine the extent of their present involvement and the conditions that influence their activities, and to identify ways of expanding their role. We believe particular attention should be paid to the potential value of Business Angel networks and ways of supporting a national network.

  2.22     The perceived risk/reward ratio can be reduced if understanding of the technology and the business can be improved. "Second tier" or "serial" Angels, who are reinvesting in the area of their own entrepreneurial success, have this instinctively but we have received evidence (for example Mr Harvey, Q 271 and memorandum from Save British Science) of schemes in the US which help young technology-based companies provide the necessary reassurance to investors. The effect there of programmes such as the Small Business Innovative Research Programme (SBIR), which sets aside a fixed but small percentage of government contracts for small innovative companies, is to bestow both managerial and technological accreditation, a "seal of approval", for new start-ups. Originally started in 1982 with the requirement that federal agencies set aside 0.2 per cent of their external R&D budget for small companies, the scheme is regarded by Congress as an unqualified success-to the extent that the set-aside is now 2.5 per cent. Such schemes, where a technical evaluation is necessary before Government awards a contract and management and marketing experience is gained in completing the order, provide the degree of reassurance which encourages private investors to come forward. They also address the practical inequality of access faced by small firms in their dealings with government.

  2.23     Existing United Kingdom schemes do offer some similar "accreditation" effects. Mr Adrian Piper, Bank of England (Q 125), outlined the Bank survey which showed 70 per cent of successful start-ups in the United Kingdom had at some stage been recipients of awards, in the majority of cases SMART and SPUR. These had "a leveraging effect that really makes a difference" (Q 127). Some witnesses expressed opposition to "set-aside" schemes (Mr Brian Kent, Engineering Council, Q 248) and there will be instinctive objections to SBIR-like schemes from those whose budgets would be pre-empted in this way. Nonetheless, although there was considerable scepticism about the operation of such schemes in practice we recommend that the Government examines ways in which its own existing programmes might be used to underpin the innovation process, following the example of SBIR in the US.

  2.24     We identified two other potential obstacles to the provision of seed capital. Firstly the reluctance of some entrepreneurs to accept equity investment with voting rights owing to the perceived loss of control, and secondly the reluctance of venture capitalists to invest small seed capital amounts, typically from £100K to £500K, owing to the relatively high setting up costs (due diligence) of such small investments. Reducing these obstacles would contribute to overcoming the innovation-exploitation barrier and would also deter companies from over-reliance on bank loans with resulting high gearing. In practice, an initial reluctance to cede equity can often be overcome by good advice, particularly when successful examples of those who have followed this route are at hand. But we recommend that the DTI should examine how the disincentive of disproportionately high costs of due diligence with respect to the small investments needed by start-up companies could be reduced.

  2.25     Our concern over the cost of due diligence and the inhibiting effect this has on the ability of start-up firms to raise funds is heightened by the report we have received that the "Big Six" accountancy firms are acting together to impose standard terms on venture capital firms to limit their liability on venture capital due diligence work. This action could result in fundamental changes in current practice which would restrict the venture capital available to UK companies. We did not take evidence on this issue and we are not in a position to comment on the merits of the representations being made by the venture capital industry but we draw it to the reader's attention.

  2.26     Although we have received some suggestions that income tax relief on investments in technology-based companies could be used to stimulate investment in various chosen sectors (eg ABPI, Q 245), we are not in favour of any such sector-specific approach. Nonetheless the treatment of capital gains can have a profound influence on the investment decisions of the individual investor and here we heard evidence (Mr Quysner, Q 206) that there is an apparent inequality of treatment between the individual entrepreneur who has just founded an organisation and the co-investor institutions. We recommend that the Government considers equality of CGT treatment between the individual founding shareholders and the institutional shareholders.

  2.27     We share the views expressed in the Bank of England's report that the operation of EIS and Venture Capital Trust (VCT) Schemes should be kept under close review. These two schemes do not appear to have achieved in practice their potential for funding technology-based start-ups and there are signs that the VCTs are drifting towards a risk averse strategy. The announcement of Venture Capital Trusts in November 1994 said "the aim, in particular, is to help provide more funds where they are most needed, among dynamic, innovative growing businesses" (Treasury statement 29 November 1994). Speaking to the Association of Investment Trust Companies in May 1995 the Financial Secretary to the Treasury spoke of the "general thrust of the legislation to encourage risk". The initial intent of this innovative scheme, which is explicitly aimed at the funding gap experienced by start-up companies and therefore of prime significance to new entrepreneurial technology based companies, would seem to go a long way towards meeting many of our concerns in this area. It is perhaps inevitable that any such novel scheme will undergo change as it develops, but we were concerned to hear, for example from Sir David Cooksey at the Royal Society conference on 3 May, that these trusts are now being used to fund asset backed schemes with significant investments in property. This completely diverts the intent of VCTs and by so doing reduces the availability of funds to the intended sector. We recommend that the Government re-examines the VCT scheme to see if the present direction is consistent with the original intent. If there are indications that changes are needed to ensure these trusts do not become risk averse those changes should be made promptly. The EIS should also be kept under review to ensure that the final economic impact of this scheme fulfils the original aims.

  2.28     Other measures can be taken that, if they do not increase the availability of start-up capital, can reduce the need for it. We cover in particular the role of incubators and science parks in Chapter 5. None of these measures alone can make a dramatic breach in the innovation-exploitation barrier but each can make a valuable contribution to increasing the number of entrepreneurs starting up new companies.


4   Business Angels: Tapping the Potential, Coveney, Moore and Nahapiet, Templeton College. Back


 
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