Tuesday, 29th July 1997.
Iraqi Military Personnel in the UK
The Countess of Mar asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether within the knowledge of their officials, there are any Iraqi officers or military advisers currently in the United Kingdom in any capacity.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean): We are not aware of any Iraqi officers or military advisers from the Iraqi armed forces currently in the United Kingdom.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Control of Arms Provision
Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government:
Who is responsible for monitoring that the arming of Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces by a United States mercenary firm complies with the arms control provisions of the Dayton Agreement.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The arms control agreement negotiated under Article IV of Annex 1B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides for an intrusive inspection regime. Inspections are carried out by the parties to the agreement to verify weapons holdings in the five categories covered by the agreement. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides support on request.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Weapons and Training Provision by UAR
Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government:
What is the status under the Dayton Agreement of the weapons and training being provided by the United Arab Emirates to the Bosnian Muslim forces.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Assistance provided by the United Arab Emirates to Federation forces is part of the Train and Equip programme run by Military Professional Resource Incorporated (MPRI). Such assistance must be consistent with the agreements on transparency and arms control negotiated under Articles II and IV of Annex 1B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Lord Gladwin of Clee asked Her Majesty's Government:
What criteria will be used in considering licence applications for the export of conventional arms.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence industry which is a strategic part of our industrial base, as well as of our defence effort. Defence exports can also contribute to international stability by strengthening bilateral and collective defence relationships in accordance with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter. But arms transfers must be managed responsibly, in particular so as to avoid their use for internal repression and international aggression.
It will be important to avoid a situation in which our policy of seeking to prevent certain regimes from acquiring certain equipment is undermined by foreign competitors supplying them. We will therefore work for the introduction of a European code of conduct, setting high common standards to govern arms exports from all EU member states.
Licences to export strategic goods are issued by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the Export Control Organisation of the DTI is the licensing authority. All relevant individual licence applications are circulated by DTI to other government departments with an interest, as determined by them in line with their policy responsibilities. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.
The present Government were not responsible for the decisions on export licences made by the previous Administration. We do not, however, consider it would be realistic or practical to revoke licences which were valid and in force at the time of our election.
The criteria set out below will be used when considering all future individual applications for licences to export goods entered in Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994, and existing licence applications on which a decision has not yet been made. The criteria will also be applied when considering advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence, and licence applications for the export of dual-use goods when there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or the internal security forces of the recipient country.
The criteria will constitute broad guidance. They will not be applied mechanistically and judgment will always be required. Individual applications will be considered case by case.
Criteria Used in Considering Conventional Arms Export Licence Applications
1. An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, or by concern that the goods might be used for internal
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repression or international aggression, or by the risks to
regional stability, or other considerations as described in these criteria.
The United Kingdom's international obligations
2. An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with:
(a) the UK's international obligations and commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, together with any national embargoes or other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;
(b) the UK's international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the UK's commitments to the international export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement);
(d) the EU Common Criteria for Arms Exports, the Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers;(e) the UK's commitment not to export all forms of anti-personnel land mines and their component parts.
The United Kingdom's national interests
3. Full weight should be given to the UK's national interests when considering applications for licences, including:
(a) the potential effect on the UK's defence and security interests and those of allies and EU partners;
(b) the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
(c) the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country;
(d) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
(e) the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.
Human rights and internal repression
4. The Government:
(a) will take into account respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country;
(b) will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.
5. For these purposes equipment which might be used for internal repression will include:
(a) Equipment where there is clear evidence of the recent use of similar equipment for internal
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repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression;
(b) Equipment which has obvious application for internal repression, in cases where the recipient country has a significant and continuing record of such repression, unless the end-use of the equipment is judged to be legitimate, such as protection of members of security forces from violence.
6. The nature of the equipment proposed for export will also be carefully considered. Certain goods have more obvious potential for use in internal repression than others, such as armoured personnel carriers specially designed for internal security. In other cases, there may be prima facie reasons for believing that a particular equipment might be used in such roles in certain circumstances. Any proposed export which is to be used by the recipient country for internal security purposes should be considered particularly carefully.
7. Internal repression includes extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, suppression or major violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In some cases, the use of force by a government within its own borders does not constitute internal repression. The use of such force by governments is legitimate in some cases--e.g. to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals. However, force may only be used in accordance with international human rights standards.
8. The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused.
9. When considering the risk that the country for which arms are destined might use them for international aggression, the Government will take into account:
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
(c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient.
10. The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way will also be considered. The balance of forces between neighbouring states, their relative expenditure on defence, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension, will all be taken into account.
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11. In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
(c) whether the purchase would seriously undermine the economy of the recipient country, taking into account its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF/World Bank sponsored economic reform programme;
(d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to an undesirable end-user, including terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).
12. The following factors will also be taken into account:
(a) the risk of use of the goods concerned against UK forces;
(b) the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities;
(c) the potential for the equipment to be a force multiplier in the region;
(d) the risk of reverse engineering or technology transfer.
13. In the application of all the above criteria, account should also be taken of, for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence, and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.
Reporting to Parliament
To ensure full transparency and accountability to Parliament the Government will report annually on the state of strategic export controls and their application, thereby providing for parliamentary consideration of the application of the criteria. The Government will also inform Parliament of any changes to the criteria.