NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS
The Commission's
proposals
106. At several points
in the Communication the Commission refers to the part NGOs have
to play in the formulation and implementation of legislative proposals.
This should be seen in the context of the separate proposals for
Community funding of environmental NGOs (see paragraph 6
above).
Witnesses' views
107. The DOE valued
the part played by NGOs in responding to consultation on policy
development and transposition of Community law; they also felt
that NGOs' role in triggering off Article 169 action was "a
valuable function" (Q 31). NGOs saw themselves, in WWF's
words, as "trusty environmental watchdogs", and stressed
the value of their extensive network of offices in Europe (Q 178).
English Nature acknowledged the "vital role" of NGOs
in gathering information and challenging public policy, but pointed
out that as membership was skewed towards Northern Europe, less
attention was paid by NGOs to areas of high biodiversity; they
did not regard enforcement as the most important part of the NGOs'
role, and had reservations about encouraging a "litigious
culture" (p 131, QQ 297-8). The WSA considered
that some NGOs had undue influence in Europe (Q 78).
108. Asked whether Commission
funding of NGO activities might compromise their independence,
Mr Hontelez (EEB) acknowledged that "any institutional donor
has some influence on the recipient"; but he pointed out
that the Commission did not, and would not, fund 100 per cent
of NGOs' work: this helped to keep down the Commission's influence.
He welcomed the introduction of a proper legal framework for the
Commission's support for NGOs (see paragraph 6 above), but
was concerned about increasingly bureaucratic procedures. He was
also concerned about the Commission's proposal to limit funding
to three or four years, which he saw as "violating the whole
idea of having permanent representation of environmental organisations
in Brussels" (Q 185).
109. The RSPB mentioned
their involvement in the Wildlife Law Enforcement Group, set up
by the DoE and the police, as an example of how NGOs' knowledge
and energies could be harnessed constructively: they considered
that it offered a model which could be adopted more widely in
Europe (p 61, QQ 188-9). Mr Osborn (EEA) said that
relatively few NGOs were in a position to supply data of the quality
collected by the RSPB:"most NGOs have more opinions than
data". But such opinions were, in his view, "very useful
in steering official bodies, such as the Agency, to what sort
of information will be useful and what will be relevant to the
concerns on which the NGOs are focusing....What the NGOs are worrying
about is very often what everybody is worrying about in five or
ten years' time" (Q 238).
Opinion-role of
non-governmental organisations
110. We consider
that the energy, enthusiasm and expertise of NGOs can contribute
significantly to the development, implementation and monitoring
of effective environmental policies. NGOs can help to raise the
profile of issues in advance of government thinking, by challenging
policies and sounding warning signals. We therefore support the
principle of some public funding for NGOs, subject to appropriate
safeguards.
111. We commend the
Department of the Environment's Wildlife Law Enforcement Group
as a model of constructive cooperation between NGOs and
enforcement authorities, which has the potential for wider application
in the Community.
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
Witnesses' views
112. It was outside
the scope of our enquiry to go in detail into questions of Community
enlargement. We took the opportunity, however, to ask some witnesses
for their views. The DOE suggested that since it would take time
for former Eastern bloc countries to bring their environmental
protection standards fully up the level of existing EU Member
States, there would be a need to determine priorities for harmonisation
of legislation (Q 32). The CBI considered that the prospect
of enlargement made subsidiarity all the more important-i.e. that
enforcement should be through local agencies overseen by a Community
audit capability; some flexibility of standards was an inevitable
price of enlargement (QQ 53-4).
113. Mr Osborn, English
Nature and the EEB saw the priorities as supporting the growth
of primary information sources in weaker or poorer Member States
and building the capacity of national enforcement agencies and
NGOs: the EEB had established contacts with a number of NGOs in
Eastern and Central Europe; and the opportunity for non-EU countries
to participate in the work of the EEA would help (QQ 243, 291-2, 190-1).
Dr David Slater of the Environment Agency referred to IMPEL's
policy of exchange visits and discussions with officials from
a number of those countries: he was optimistic about the effect
of peer pressure in raising standards and did not feel that enlargement
would pose intractable problems. Indeed, he did not rule out the
possibility that some existing Member States would have something
to learn from future accessions to the Community, as had happened
when Austria and Sweden joined (QQ 113, 117).
Opinion-implications
for Community enlargement
114. The prospect
of further accessions makes it all the more important to establish
the more transparent, systematic and focused procedures which
we recommend in this Report. We commend the efforts of the European
Environment Agency, IMPEL and the European Environment Bureau
in helping to build capacity in the national agencies and NGOs
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who aspire to join
the European Union. The PHARE programme of technical assistance,
provided that it is well targeted and that its procedures have
been reformed in line with the recommendations of our 1995 Report[51]
and the recent report of the European Court of Auditors[52],
should have an important part to play in supporting the process
of approximation of environmental law in those countries.
50
Made in 1994 but not yet implemented. Back
51
See Environmental issues in Central and Eastern Europe: the
PHARE programme, 16th Report, 1994-95, 18 July 1995, HL Paper
86. The PHARE programme was established by the European Community
in December 1989 under Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 (OJ
L375, 23 December 1989) in order to support the process of
reform in Poland and Hungary and, in particular, to finance economic
restructuring projects (the acronym PHARE stands for "Pologne/Hongrie:
Assistance à la Restructuration Economique"). Later
the programme was extended to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania
and Slovakia (1990), to Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
(1991), and to Slovenia (1992), Croatia (1995), Bosnia-Herzogovina
and Macedonia (1996). Following the Essen European Council meeting
of December 1994, the PHARE programme has become the main instrument
of financial support to countries applying to join the EU and
is designed to help them create the conditions necessary for future
membership. The programme covers a wide range of sectoral activities,
including infrastructure development (energy, transport and telecommunications),
education, health, training, research, private sector development
and enterprise support, and environmental development and protection. Back
52
Special Report 3/97 of the Court of Auditors concerning the decentralised
system for the implementation of the PHARE programme, 23 March
1997 (to be published in the Official Journal). Back
