CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 We were pleased
to find that Digital Images, which we initially thought might
create difficulties for the courts, do not.
5.2 But many people
think there will be difficulty in obtaining legal acceptance of
digital images. And many who understand there is no legal problem
fail to appreciate fully the potential for tampering that the
technology creates. The perceived difficulties mean that opportunities
are missed-a reluctance to use digital imaging technology or to
dispose of paper records, for example-and the failure to understand
fully the process means that too great a reliance can be placed
on photographic or video evidence. The doubts and scepticism normally
associated with unsubstantiated pieces of paper may be suspended
when confronted with a very believable picture.
5.3 To counter the
common misconception about the need for original documents, we
recommend that the Government encourage the appropriate legal
bodies to draw greater attention to the change to digital document
processing and to widen public awareness that paper originals
are rarely necessary. (Paragraph 3.11)
5.4 We do not support
moves to establish specific requirements before digital images
can be used as evidence and we recommend that evidence should
not necessarily be inadmissible because it does not conform with
some specific technological requirement. (Paragraph 3.18)
5.5 But we are in favour
of technical measures that assist with authentication of images
and we recommend that the Government encourage the use of authentication
techniques. Members of the legal profession should be made aware
of the benefits of these techniques, their value in adding weight
to evidence and the possible significance of their omission.
(Paragraph 3.20). Further, we recommend that the Government
encourages the adoption of technological measures for the authentication
of images as evidence by giving type approval to them. The Forensic
Science Service should provide ongoing advice for manufacturers
and users of imaging equipment on authentication technologies.
(Paragraph 3.33)
5.6 We were impressed
by the work that has already been undertaken in setting standards
for handling digital documents. We recommend the Government
produces guidance on the benefits of conformance with procedural
measures necessary to establish the reliability of evidence, with
particular reference to existing standards. When this guidance
is available, we recommend that the trade associations of those
organisations likely to be concerned with it produce training
material on its use. (Paragraph 3.21)
5.7 We were shown examples
of processed images and the capability of programmes designed
to manipulate photographs. They provide believable images that
are still very convincing even when the changes are explained
and well understood. We think this technology raises the possibility
that people who are not familiar with it can be too easily misled.
We recommend that consideration be given to the Turnbull Warning
being appropriately adapted so that the uncertainties inherent
in images as evidence are made clear to the jury, particularly
the implications of any measures to substantiate authenticity
and breaks in the audit trail, and any processing which the image
has undergone. This is a matter the Judicial Studies Board may
care to take up. (Paragraph 3.27)
5.8 The normal development
of case law is too slow a process to generate the required degree
of legal confidence in time to keep pace with developments in
digital imaging technology. We recommend that consideration
be given to measures to reduce the uncertainty over the use of
digital images in court and Government ensures that there is a
satisfactory resolution of the uncertainty. (Paragraph 3.28)
5.9 To help improve
the awareness of the potential difficulties with digital evidence
and to encourage the adoption of good practice in the preparation
of material for the courts we recommend that Government devise
incentives or put in place measures such as the endorsement of
relevant codes to increase the adoption of good practice.
(Paragraph 3.36)
5.10 Overall we see
a need for awareness by all those who are concerned with the potential
difficulties with digital evidence. We recommend that the Judicial
Studies Board consider establishing a programme of education on
the implications of digital technologies for the judicial system.
(Paragraph 3.34)
5.11 Although not a
major feature of our enquiry our examination of the use of CCTV
left us with concerns that what seems to be a very valuable technology
for crime prevention and the maintenance of law and order could
be in danger of losing public confidence through the perception
of improper use. But although we were convinced that it was a
valuable tool of law enforcement we were not convinced that sufficient
data exist to support the overall level of expenditure. We
recommend that the Government commission a substantial, rigorous
and independent study of the cost and effectiveness of publicly
funded surveillance systems. (Paragraph 4.6) We further
recommend that an interim report be available within 12 months
to provide a broad indication of the scale of any increase in
convictions, any reductions in crime and the fear of crime, and
separately, disorder, that has been achieved by public space surveillance
systems. (Paragraph 4.7)
5.12 One particular
practice that we felt was very likely to endanger public acceptance
of surveillance schemes was the use of material so obtained for
entertainment purposes, however apparently well justified it might
be as training or educational material. We recommend that the
Government establish a uniform policy on the control and release
of CCTV derived images from publicly owned surveillance systems.
(Paragraph 4.11)
5.13 We concluded that
to maintain public confidence in the use of CCTV surveillance
technology for the prevention of crime and disorder greater control
of its use was needed. We recommend that the Government give
urgent consideration to introducing tighter control over any system,
either publicly or privately owned, covering sites to which the
public has free access. To meet the requirement for continued
public support, we would expect this to cover, but not exclusively,
the need for some form of licensing; for statutory or other enforceable
codes of practice; and for powers to inspect and audit the use
and handling of surveillance systems, including the images, their
storage and disposal. (Paragraph 4.14)
5.14 Data matching
technology is advancing rapidly and although we felt some concerns
could be overstated we can see difficulties if insufficient attention
is paid to potential problems. We recommend that the Government
produces guidance for both the public and private sectors on the
use of data matching, and in particular the linking of surveillance
systems with other databases. (Paragraph 4.20)
5.15 We have not made
a specific legislative proposal for improved control over public
space CCTV systems but the similarity of our objectives with the
current Data Protection Act suggest this, or its successor, might
be an appropriate vehicle. We would like to see the new law
encompass CCTV and the DPR be given responsibility to issue or
oversee enforceable codes of practice for such systems. The maintenance
of public support for CCTV would be further strengthened if the
DPR were to be given powers to check, that is to audit, the operation
of these systems, and not to have to wait for a complaint to be
lodged before taking action. (Paragraph 4.17). The DPR
should also be given powers to audit the operation of datamatching
systems. (Paragraph 4.21)
5.16 Our recommendations
for a degree of greater control over the installation, use and
release of images from public space surveillance systems seek
to chart a way to achieve that balance. We want to see public
acceptance of surveillance, introduced to deter and assist in
the capture and prosecution of criminals, blossom and flourish.
This is more likely to be the case if there is wide public debate
of the issues involved, and we recommend that the Government should
promote such debate. (Paragraph 4.22)
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