Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation Twenty-Ninth Report




13.  We take evidence in writing on each bill from the relevant Government department, including the departments responsible for the subject matter covered by private members' bills.[5] Most departments submit their memorandum automatically, without waiting to be invited to do so. The memorandum gives a concise account of the bill, and in particular-

  • identifies provisions for delegated legislation;
  • describes their purpose;
  • explains why the matter has been left to delegated legislation;
  • explains the degree of parliamentary control provided for the exercise of each power (affirmative, negative, or none at all) and why.

We make the memorandum available to the House by printing it with our report on the Bill.

14.  The memorandum is produced for all Government bills except Supply Bills, which the Lords are debarred from amending and on which the Committee does not therefore report.[6] The Committee does not consider consolidation bills because they do not seek to introduce new law.[7]

15.  The memorandum is normally submitted a few days after the bill's First Reading in the House of Lords. The sooner the memorandum is submitted, the easier is the Committee's task, because the deadline for the Committee's report is tight. If its report is to be of most use, the Committee must report in good time before committee stage, which is normally two weeks after Second Reading. The Committee has therefore about 8-10 working days to consider the bill and memorandum and to report.[8] The Committee has always managed to report on any matters which it considered should be drawn to the House's attention before committee stage. The sooner the Committee reports the better: both Government and Opposition find it helpful to know what the Committee's views are; there is more time for amendments based on the Committee's recommendations to be tabled; time can be saved by avoiding the tabling of unnecessary amendments;[9] and there is greater freedom of debate at committee stage than at other stages.

16.  In examining a bill we look to see whether the grant of secondary power is appropriate. This includes expressing a view on whether the power is so important that it should only be one granted by primary legislation. This is probably an area of growing significance, not least in the light of devolution. Our examination also includes commenting on whether a bill sufficiently particularises the principles on which, and the circumstances in which, secondary legislation may be passed, and so avoids being characterised as a "skeleton bill".[10] We go on to consider whether the legislation should provide for consultation in draft form before the instrument is laid before Parliament. We consider what form of parliamentary control is appropriate and, in particular, whether the proposed power calls for the affirmative procedure. We have also regarded secondary powers as potentially embracing the power of the Minister to make provision by Code or the issuing of guidance.

17.  When the Committee makes a recommendation which, if accepted by the House, would lead to an amendment,[11] the report is cited in an italic note in the second half of the minute when the bill is put down for its Committee stage, thereby alerting members of the House to the recommendation.

18.  The Committee sees its role as one of advising the House; and believes that it is for the House to decide whether or not to act on the Committee's recommendations. The Committee itself has no power to amend bills, but its advice has almost always been accepted by the Government and the House.

A bill raising constitutional issues - the Access to Justice Bill [HL]

19.  This bill was described as the greatest shake-up of legal services since legal aid was introduced by the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. Many of the changes were made in the bill itself but important issues were left to be settled by the use of delegated powers cast in wide, enabling terms. Some of the issues to which these delegated powers related are of fundamental importance within a democratic society. They affect the extent to which a citizen may be granted or denied access to justice to promote or defend rights and liberties. In our view, they raised for consideration how far control by the state of the means of access to justice may erode the separation of powers and put individuals at a disadvantage when seeking to defend themselves against claims brought by the very government which also has the power to prescribe how effectively they may be represented. So we considered the proposed delegated powers rigorously.

20.  In its 5th report the Committee drew the attention of the House to a number of issues affecting access to justice and the rights of the individual, including the power of the Lord Chancellor to give directions under clause 4 (paragraphs 5-7), the code about provision of funded services (paragraph 8), alteration of qualification regulations or rules of conduct (paragraph 11), and the Henry VIII power in Schedule 3 allowing the Lord Chancellor to amend the criteria for the grant of right to representation (paragraph 15). We also suggested affirmative procedure for the powers in clauses 68 and 72.

21.  At the start of the Committee stage the Lord Chancellor announced the Government's intentions in responding to our report. We believe that such an early and full response is exceptionally helpful to the House, and may save a considerable amount of time in debate.

22.  The Lord Chancellor, who tabled large numbers of amendments for Report stage, met all the Committee's recommendations apart from the power in clause 7 to give directions to the Legal Services Commission as to spending (paragraph 4 of the Committee's report). He also did not accept the recommendation that the principle enunciated by the Lord Chief Justice (paragraph 11 of the report) should be placed on the face of the Bill. But on the whole, the Lord Chancellor's response to the Committee's report accepted our recommendations.

A skeleton bill - The Pollution Prevention and Control Bill [HL]

23.  This Committee uses the term skeleton Bill to describe Bills which are little more than a licence to legislate and so give flesh to the "skeleton" embodied in the Bill. We are glad to say that although the Committee always considers whether the provisions of any Bill inappropriately delegate legislative power, during the six years of the Committee's existence we have found it necessary to denounce a Bill as skeletal on only four occasions.[12] One of these occasions was in our third report of this session, when we reported on the Pollution Prevention and Control Bill [HL].

24.  We described this Bill as "essentially enabling legislation conferring upon the Secretary of State powers to make regulations providing for a new system of pollution prevention and control. The width of the powers to be conferred by section 1 to regulate activities capable of causing environmental pollution or in connection with the prevention or control of such pollution is virtually unlimited". We concluded that we were "bound to report to the House that as at present drafted this is a "skeleton" Bill and so is an inappropriate delegation of secondary powers." We went on to list a number of areas in which the House might want to consider amending the Bill.[13]

25.  The Government responded to our 3rd report in the form of a letter to the Chairman from Lord Whitty, Minister for Roads, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The Minister's letter was placed in the Library of the House, and we drew attention to its existence in our 6th report, where we commented that it was for the House in Committee to consider the adequacy of the response.[14]

26.  During the Committee stage members of the House expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the response.[15] In his reply, Lord Whitty said: " … the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation … has given us something to think about. We have thought about parts of it - and amendments will come later this afternoon which deal with that. There are other parts which we will need to consider further, and we will also need to consider the remarks of noble Lords. I hope that we will allay most of the anxieties at a later stage."[16]

27.  The Government's amendments tabled for the Report stage enabled us to report in the following terms:

This Committee, and clearly the House as a whole, have found this a difficult bill. We believe that this stems from the framework nature of the bill. We therefore wish to reiterate the following general remarks which we made in our 3rd report. "Even if the House accepts the bill with any such amendments as being justified for the reasons which the DETR give for proceeding by such wide-ranging enabling legislation, the Committee would not wish this bill to be regarded as a precedent for the future. It remains important that the purposes and ambit of legislation, together with any important governing criteria, should be clearly specified within the primary legislation and not simply left to the exercise of delegated powers."

Nonetheless, the amendments printed in the Annex to this report which the Government proposes to move at the Report stage of the bill meet all but one of the issues which the Committee suggested in its 3rd report that the House might wish to consider if it wished to save the bill. As regards the remaining issue, relating to the use of best available techniques, we are satisfied with the assurance and explanation given by the Minister at Committee stage, subject only to formal confirmation on the point which we have referred to in paragraph 6. We are therefore satisfied with the Government's response to our 3rd report as set out in the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions' supplementary memorandum to the Committee dated 8 March 1999. Taken together, these amendments would circumscribe and provide criteria for what were previously excessively wide powers.

28.  We add for the sake of completeness that there have been occasions when we have found part of a bill to suffer from the "skeleton bill" vice even though the remainder of the bill was substantial. It is the framework for making the statutory instrument that matters, not the weight of the bill as a whole.


29.  The fact that the Committee has reported on a bill does not preclude the subsequent introduction of amendments providing for delegated powers. In January 1993 the Government's memorandum to the Committee said that "it would be undesirable for the new procedure [the Committee] to exclude any possibility of amendments introducing delegated powers at later stages in the House of Lords, although this should not, of course, be used as a manoeuvre to avoid scrutiny by the Committee".[17]

30.  Although it had not in the past been the practice of this Committee to report on amendments, our terms of reference clearly permit us to do so. Last session on a small number of occasions our view on amendments was specifically sought, and we decided, for the first time, to report on amendments.[18] As we said in our 32nd report of last session, "in general we would expect Government Departments to alert us in good time to any amendments of substance containing delegated powers. If time allows the Committee is willing to report on amendments when, as in the two instances covered by this Report, the amendments raise matters of considerable importance."

31.  We have continued to report on Government amendments this session when we have been asked to do so. In addition, several Ministers have asked the Committee or its Chairman for informal advice on whether amendments proposed by the Government are likely to raise new issues for the Committee to consider. We are always happy to give such informal advice, when time allows.

32.  Reporting on amendments more generally raises certain issues of which the House may wish to be aware. Firstly, amendments are much more of a moving target than the second reading print of a bill, on which the Committee normally reports. Several hundred Government amendments may be tabled to a Government bill, over a period of days or even weeks. So the volume of paper is both greater and less manageable. Secondly, the timescale between the tabling of amendments and their consideration by the House is often pressingly tight. Just as this creates difficulties for front-bench spokesmen and individual members of the House, so too it can make it hard for the Committee to be properly informed and advised and thus to be able to report at short notice, although we have always managed to do so when required.

33.  Exceptionally, on two successive days at the end of the present session suggestions were made on the floor of the House that the opinion of this Committee should be sought before the House proceeded to consider the large number of amendments which had been tabled by the Government for Report stage of the bills concerned.[19] In the first instance, the Immigration and Asylum Bill, where many of the amendments created new regulatory powers which had not been included in the Bill at an earlier stage, the Government proposed withdrawing those of its amendments which contained new powers, and re-tabling them for Third Reading. In the case of the Greater London Authority Bill the majority of the Government amendments tabled in the Report stage did not contain delegated powers, but the Minister undertook to look subsequently at any concerns which the Committee might have.[20]

34.  The Committee considered the Government's report stage amendments to the Greater London Authority Bill at its meeting on 20 October, on the basis of advice from our Legal Adviser, in the absence of a memorandum by the Government setting out the new powers proposed by the amendments. The Committee saw no need to draw any of the amendments to the attention of the House, and communicated this in a letter to those who had spoken on the subject on the floor of the House the previous day.

35.  The Committee produced a separate report on the Government's report stage amendments on the Immigration and Asylum Bill.[21] In doing so we had the benefit of a supplementary memorandum by the Home Office.

36.  For the future, we commend to the House the procedure followed by Baroness Hollis of Heigham, the Minister in charge of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill in the House of Lords. In this instance the Minister wrote to the Chairman drawing the Committee's attention to Government amendments which would either introduce new delegated powers or affect delegated powers currently in the bill. The Minister's letter set out the Government's case for the amendments. This procedure enables the Committee to consider the amendments and agree a report on them[22] so that its views are known when the House considers the amendments at Committee (or Report) stage. The need to follow this procedure emphasises the importance of amendments being tabled in good time.

37.  In addition, it is clearly helpful if the Committee has advance warning when front-bench spokesmen are intending to state on the floor of the House that they believe that the House would benefit from its views. This can most conveniently be done by writing to the Chairman, copying the letter to the Committee clerk. It is normal practice with other Select Committees for all formal correspondence to the Chairman to be copied to the Committee Clerk, and we hope that this practice will be adopted for the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee in the future.

38.  The House may also wish to note that the Committee has only considered Government amendments. More often than not, when the substance of Opposition or back-bench amendments is accepted by the Government they are withdrawn and later tabled in proper form at the next stage of the bill. If the House so wished, the Committee could comment at that stage.


39.  There is as yet no Joint or House of Lords Select Committee on Human Rights. An announcement was made in the House of Commons on 14 December 1998 that a Joint Committee would be set up "before the Human Rights Act 1998 comes fully into force so that it will have time to prepare its work" (col. 604). Pending the appointment of any parliamentary Human Rights Committee, during the present session we have taken care to comment on those proposals for delegated legislative powers which appeared to us to raise issues connected with the Convention.

40.  We bore Convention rights very much in mind in our consideration of the Access to Justice Bill [HL]. In our 5th report we commented as follows:

"In respect of the Criminal Defence Service, it is not clear why the Lord Chancellor should need power to give directions. Legal assistance in criminal cases is of particular importance as the defendant's reputation and liberty are at risk. Moreover, the state is a party to the case and it would be disturbing if a minister has an undefined power to change the arrangements for giving legal assistance to the impecunious defendant. It appears to us, as we would expect, that directions in relation to legal assistance in criminal matters are intended to be limited to purely administrative arrangements. If so, it would be helpful if this were made clear on the face of the bill. If not, and the directions can deal with matters of principle and substance, it has to be remembered that one of the Convention rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 is the right of a person charged with a criminal offence who "has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require" (Article 6.3(c)). Parliament will wish to be confident that the bill will ensure that this Convention right is guaranteed. The difficulty in establishing that this will be the case is that the general terms of clause 4 would allow directions to be given which might restrict the protection that the Commission are able to provide under clause 12. If the general power to give directions is to apply to criminal matters, the House may consider that unless the bill is amended to establish appropriate criteria for the way directions can be used, it will not be possible to guarantee that Convention rights will be respected."[23]

41.  We commented on human rights issues again in our seventh report of this session, on the Health Bill [HL]. In that report we drew the attention of the House to the drafting of clause 15 (functions of the Commission). Under that clause regulations will set out the limitations and conditions on which the Commission will exercise its powers to inspect premises and obtain information. The Department's explanatory memorandum stated that it had deliberately placed safeguards regarding confidential personal information, in particular information about patients, on the face on the bill rather than leaving them to regulations. "In part they [the safeguards] are to ensure that the provisions are compatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life)."[24] The Committee hopes that this Bill may help to establish a precedent whereby provisions designed to ensure that legislation is implemented compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights are not normally left to secondary legislation but included on the face of the bill.

42.  The Committee again considered Convention rights in its first report on the Immigration and Asylum Bill.[25] In this connection we recommended the amendment of clause 4 to place on the face of the bill the exemption from fees of asylum-seekers under the 1951 Refugee Convention and those claiming Article 3 ECHR protection.[26] We further recommended that a further amendment should insert a proviso to clause 4 that no fee should be chargeable in respect of an application where it has been occasioned by a mistake of the Secretary of State.

43.  We also recommended the amendment of the bill to provide for the affirmative procedure for those powers which raise ECHR concerns. Although the Minister had certified that, in his view, the bill as a whole is compatible with ECHR, we further recommended that when the House had to consider a resolution approving an instrument under any of these powers, the minister moving the resolution should inform the House whether he is satisfied that the instrument is compatible with the Convention rights. We thought that such statements would be particularly important prior to the establishment of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Human Rights. We draw attention to the fact that much potential incompatibility may lie with secondary legislation.


44.  In our last Special Report, for Session 1997-98, we welcomed the practice of some Government Departments of responding in writing to the Committee's recommendations, and invited the Liaison Committee to consider whether all Departments should, in future, respond succinctly in writing to those recommendations from the Committee for which they were responsible. We considered that it could assist the House's deliberations if such letters were routinely made available to front-bench spokesmen on the Bill in question, and placed in the Library of the House.

45.  In its 1st report of this session, which was agreed to by the House on 22 April, the Liaison Committee endorsed this recommendation, including the proposal that copies of responses should be provided to front-bench spokesmen and placed in the Library of the House. The Liaison Committee noted: "Whereas responses to reports from other committees are expected to be produced within two months (or six months in the case of the Science and Technology Committee), it would not be appropriate to lay down a time limit for such responses. They need to be made in good time for amendments to be tabled to the bill in question. In some cases that will require Departments to act within a few days, and we recognise that occasionally the timetable for the passage of a bill may make the provision of a written response impracticable."

46.  This procedure has settled down during the present session, during which most Government Departments have produced their responses in a manner which we can only describe as exemplary.

47.  In most cases the Government has accepted all, or the vast majority, of our recommendations. In two cases this session the Government's initial response did not accept a significant number of our recommendations. We discuss these two cases - the Pollution Prevention and Control Bill [HL] and the Immigration and Asylum Bill - in greater detail elsewhere in this report. We believe that the prompt production of Government responses to our reports - or, if there is insufficient time for a written report before the start of Committee stage, an indication from the Minister in charge of the bill of the Government's thinking at the start of the Committee's proceedings[27] - can assist the House's deliberations considerably, and may well save time on the floor of the House.

48.  It has not normally been our practice to publish Government responses to our reports - and indeed it would not always be practicable for us to do so as they are sometimes received only shortly before the bill is considered in Committee. Clearly publishing such responses would have cost implications, and this is one of the factors which we have taken into account when deciding not to publish them. We would, however, welcome feedback on whether members of the House would find it helpful for these responses to be published.


49.  In our 21st report we commented on the Delegated Powers in the Draft Freedom of Information Bill. This draft Bill contained a provision to exempt an instrument made under one of its powers from the Hybrid Instruments procedure. We took no exception to this particular power, but commented on the Hybrid Instruments procedure in general:

50.  The concept of a hybrid instrument exists only in the House of Lords and not in the House of Commons. A hybrid instrument is a statutory instrument subject to affirmative Parliamentary approval containing provisions which, if contained in a public bill, would cause it to be hybrid. In other words, it affects specific private or local interests. Petitions against hybrid instruments may be presented to the House by those affected and are referred to the Hybrid Instruments Committee, which reports whether the petitioner has a locus standi and if so whether there ought to be a further inquiry by a select committee into all or any of the matters complained of.

51.  The Hybrid Instruments Committee has eight members. It last met in 1990. The infrequency of meetings reflects the fact that bills often include provisions to exempt instruments made under them from the hybrid instrument procedure.

52.  We believe that there is an issue for the House as a whole to consider as to whether there is still a need to make special provision for considering affirmative instruments which affect private or local interests.


53.  The Committee commented in its 19th report on the proposed new Clause on Transfer of Undertakings. We had already reported on the Bill in our 13th report of this session, and had received a helpful Government response to that report from Lord Simon of Highbury. When we reported we had not had the opportunity of seeing the new Clause on transfer of undertakings which the Government proposed to insert after Clause 32 at Committee stage.

54.  The new clause on transfer of undertakings extended the power to make regulations under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, which relates to the general implementation of the Community Treaties. That exceptionally important power was conferred in the widest terms, allowing (subject to exceptions set out in Schedule 2 to the Act) any provision "as might be made by Act of Parliament", because it was to be used to give effect to obligations which would result from the UK's membership of the Community. So far as the Committee is aware it has not been extended in subsequent legislation to circumstances where the regulations are not needed to implement existing obligations. The fact that there is no precedent of this kind in itself emphasises the special nature of section 2(2). There is, indeed, a convention that the power to make regulations under section 2(2) is only used in the absence of powers in more specific primary legislation.

55.  Had the new Clause been in the bill as introduced in the Lords we would have wished to comment on it. At the Chairman's suggestion, the Minister did not move the amendment at Committee stage on 16 June, in order to allow this Committee time to consider the amendment.

56.  We reported in the following terms: "We understand the Government's objective in seeking this order-making power, the subject matter of which is entirely reasonable, and, moreover, is one which could properly be exercised by the negative resolution procedure. But we see it as a point of principle that section 2(2) should not be used for matters which are not the subject of an European obligation. We therefore suggest that the House may wish to consider whether the amendment should be re-drafted to create a new power to make appropriate regulations. We appreciate that this will require two sets of regulations, but consider it important that the convention regarding the restriction of the use of the regulation-making power under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act should be upheld."

57.  During the Bill's report stage on 8 July Lord Sainsbury of Turville moved an amendment to meet the Committee's concerns, which he acknowledged in his speech (HL Deb. cols. 1137-8).


58.  The concept of two-session parliamentary scrutiny of public bills, to allow a substantially increased time for consultation and a less pressured parliamentary timetable, is gaining wider currency. In our last special report we said that we would welcome the greatly increased involvement of House of Lords Committees in public consultation over proposed legislation, perhaps making use of the potential for easier written communication with Parliament now that the Parliamentary Data and Video Network (PDVN) offers access to the Internet. Our experience of consultation on deregulation proposals had led us to the unsurprising, and welcome, conclusion that those most immediately affected by legislative change often make important comments on proposals. We believe that increasing the involvement of House of Lords Committees in pre-legislative consultation could make Parliament more effective, and lead to the production of better legislation.

59.  It was with these general observations in mind that in March 1999 we accepted, and indeed welcomed, an invitation from the joint committee on the draft Financial Services and Markets Bill to submit a memorandum on the delegated powers in the bill. This was the first occasion on which we had been invited to submit our views to a Committee charged with pre-legislative scrutiny. In our submission, which was made direct to the Joint Committee and which we did not ourselves print, we said that in principle we were happy to be involved in this way on future occasions. We can see some advantage to Parliament in our undertaking this work, since we scrutinise the delegated powers in all Government Bills, and are thus well placed to provide an overview of the use of such powers, and the appropriate level of parliamentary control for them.

60.  There were, however, some caveats we entered about the value of our comments at the pre-legislative scrutiny stage. There is the difficulty - of which all those who have been involved in the pre-legislative scrutiny exercises are acutely aware - of hitting the moving target of successive draft bills and consultation documents. Nor do we benefit, as we usually do, from a memorandum from the sponsoring Government Department on the delegated powers in the bill, or from the second reading debate, which may expose concerns about powers in the bill.

61.  Our approach to draft bills is to consider each bill in a similar way as if it had been a bill introduced in the House of Lords. In the case of the draft Financial Services and Markets Bill we then went on to highlight a number of issues to which, if the draft bill were to be introduced in its draft form, the Committee would have had to draw the attention of the House.

62.  In its 1st report of this session, which was agreed by the House on 22 April, the Liaison Committee commented as follows:

"We welcome this development, and we hope that the example may be followed in future. When a draft bill is made available for pre-legislative scrutiny, it can only be beneficial for the delegated powers to be subject to scrutiny at an early stage."

63.  We subsequently commented on the powers contained in the Draft Freedom of Information Bill (21st report) and Draft Local Government (Organisation and Standards) Bill (23rd report). We warmly welcome the development of pre-legislative scrutiny in both Houses of Parliament. Our experience of having been involved with three draft bills leads us to the following general observations:

Departments are not required to produce memoranda on private members' Bills, but have provided them on bills in which the Government has a close interest or on request by the Committee. Back

6   The Committee reports on those Money Bills which are not Supply Bills. Back

7   The Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills examines and reports on consolidation bills, statute law revision bills, bills prepared pursuant to the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949, and bills to give effect to recommendations of the Law Commissions, and certain other matters (Standing Order 49). Back

8   The Procedure Committee report which confirmed the Jellicoe recommendations noted that if for any reason the Scrutiny Committee's report was not ready for committee stage, the House would be under no obligation to delay proceedings. Back

9   There is an informal understanding that when the Committee has approved provisions in a bill for delegated powers, those powers should not normally be the subject of debate during the bill's subsequent passage. This avoids duplication of effort and saves time in the House. Back

10   For how we categorise a skeleton bill see paragraph 23. For example, the Committee reported of the Jobseekers Bill during the 1994-95 session that there was "a strong argument that the bill is no more than a skeleton bill", and suggested a number of amendments to it (6th Report 1994-95, HL Paper 54). See also our comments below on the Pollution Prevention and Control Bill [HL] during the present session. Back

11   For ease of reference such recommendations are usually indicated in the Committee's reports in bold type. Back

12   The other occasions were the Child Support Act 1991, which we touched on in our 1st report of session 1992-93 (HL Paper 57, paragraph 15) and the Jobseekers Bill in session 1994-95 (5th report, HL Paper 50) and 6th report, HL Paper 54). On two other occasions the Committee has made clear that it had come very close to describing a particular bill as skeletal (the Child Support Bill in session 1994-95 - 10th report, HL Paper 71) and the Fireworks Bill in session 1997-98 (16th report, HL Paper 96). Back

13   HL Paper 12. Back

14   HL Paper 21. Back

15   HL Deb., 15 February 1999. Back

16   col. 476. Back

17   The Government's memorandum on the Committee's terms of reference and methods of work was printed with our 1st report session 1992-93 (HL Paper 57), pp 13-15.  Back

18   32nd and 33rd reports, session 1997-98. Back

19   See HL Debates for 18 and 19 October 1999. Back

20   HL Deb. 19 October 1999, esp. cols. 938-939. Back

21   27th Report, HL Paper 110. Back

22   19th report, HL Paper 75. Back

23   5th report, HL Paper 17. Back

24   Paragraph 91. Back

25   22nd report, HL Paper 85. Back

26   This was done by a later amendment to the bill. Back

27   This was the procedure followed by the Lord Chancellor for the Access to Justice Bill [HL]. Back

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