Select Committee on Privileges Second Report


APPENDIX 2

Case for the Lord Gray

INTRODUCTION

  1.  The House of Lords has referred to the Committee for Privileges the question whether the House of Lords Bill (as amended on Report) would, if enacted, breach the provisions of the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland.

  2.  The issues that are or may be raised, are set out in the Statement of Facts and Issues.

  3.  The primary issue is whether the Bill would breach Article XXII of the Treaty as enacted in the Union with England Act 1707 and the Union with Scotland Act 1706.

  4.  The position of HM Government with respect to this issue was set out on 22 June 1999 during the consideration of amendments on the Report of the House on the House of Lords Bill (602 HL Debs col 885). It was then suggested that Article XXII of the Treaty of Union "explicitly envisaged that the Parliament of Great Britain could amend or change the number both of the Peers of Scotland and of the representatives of Scotland who could sit in this House".

  5.  It is submitted, for the reasons hereinafter set out, that the position of HM Government is rested upon an erroneous interpretation of the wording of Article XXII of the Treaty of Union.

  6.  It is material to the status of Article XXII to ask this question:

    While the Union of 1707 endures, may Parliament lawfully enact that all Members of Parliament returned by Scottish constituencies, and all Peers of Scotland, shall henceforth be excluded from Parliament?

  7.  It is submitted that the answer is "No", for these reasons:—

    (i)  The Parliament of Scotland was entitled to impose conditions when in 1707 it transferred power to the Parliament of Great Britain;

    (ii)  The Parliament of Scotland did impose conditions when in 1707 it transferred power to the Parliament of Great Britain;

    (iii)  One condition imposed by the Parliament of Scotland was the right provided by Article XXII for Scotland to be represented in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons;

    (iv)  That right expresses a principle of representative Government that has the same force today that it had in 1707; and

    (v)  The terms of Article XXII do not explicitly envisage that the Parliament of Great Britain could remove the right of Scotland to be represented in the House of Lords.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE UNION AGREEMENT

  8.  In 1707 the Parliament of Scotland passed the Act of Union with England (APS XI, 406, c 7), and the Parliament of England passed the Act of Union with Scotland (6 Ann, c 11). The Acts give effect to the international Treaty of Union the terms of which had been settled in July 1706, between Commissioners appointed by the two kingdoms to negotiate a Union.

  9.  By virtue of the Personal Union of 1603, Queen Anne held both the Crown of Scotland and the Crown of England. The negotiation of the Legislative Union had its origin in 1705, when the Parliament of Scotland passed an Act authorising the Sovereign to appoint Scots Commissioners, and the Parliament of England likewise passed an Act authorising Her Majesty to appoint English Commissioners, so that the Commissioners might meet and negotiate a Union (APS XI, 295, c 50, and 3 & 4 Ann, c 7).

  10.  The Scots Commissioners were nominated by the Crown in February 1706, as were the English Commissioners in April of that year. In the same month, the Commissioners began their proceedings in London which concluded in July, 1706 with agreement upon 25 Articles of Union. Upon jointly presenting the Articles to the Queen, the senior English Commissioner, the Lord Keeper of England, described them as "the Terms, or Conditions upon which the intended Union is to take place". The senior Scottish Commissioner, the Lord Chancellor of Scotland, described them as "the Articles and Conditions of Union which we have treated of and agreed upon" (The Minutes of the Proceedings of the Commissioners appointed to treat for an Union betwixt the Kingdoms of Scotland and England, APS XI, 162 at page 191).

  11.  The Queen then recommended the Articles to the Parliament of Scotland, by whom they were first considered, before their passage through the Parliament of England.

  12.  The Articles were debated in the Scottish Parliament at Edinburgh between 3 October 1706 and 16 January 1707. On the latter date they received the Royal Assent as the Act of Union with England. On 16 January 1707, Royal Assent was also given to an Act for the security of the Church of Scotland (the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act 1707, c 6, APS XI, 402), which was incorporated into the Act of Union with England.

  13.  In England, Parliamentary consideration of the Articles of Union began with the Queen's Speech to both Houses of Parliament at Westminster on 28 January, and concluded with the Royal Assent on 6 March 1707. The resulting Act of Union with Scotland incorporated and approved the terms of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act.

THE EFFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF UNION ON THE NEW PARLIAMENT'S POWERS

  14.  The Scots and English Acts of Union thus give effect to the constitutional agreement reached by the Commissioners and ratified by the two Parliaments. The ordinary principles of construction require that, unless it is impossible to do so, the agreement as a whole and its express terms should be given effective content.

  15.  It was within the power of the Parliament of Scotland to qualify the legislative authority that it was giving to the new Parliament; it is only contingent that an instrument that creates a new legislature empowers that new legislature to amend the instrument itself. The Parliament of Scotland did qualify the authority that it was giving to the Parliament of Great Britain. This can be clearly discerned to have been the legislative intention of the Parliament of Scotland. It can be found in the Articles of Union. It has been acknowledged in the Parliament of Great Britain, and has been the subject of judicial and extra-judicial recognition.

  16.  The Articles disclose an intention that some provisions should be alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain, and that some provisions should not be alterable by the new Parliament; e.g., Article XIX with respect to the Court of Session.

  17.  It was not explicitly envisaged that the provisions of Article XXII with respect to the entitlement of Scotland to be represented in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons would be alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain.

  18.  The intention of the Parliament of Scotland that some matters should not be alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain is reflected in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland. For example:—

    (i)  In respect of Article XIV, and the exemption of Scotland from a tax on malt, the Minutes for 5 December 1706, record that "after some further Debate, The Vote was stated, "Whether the Exemption from any Imposition on Malt shall be Temporary or Perpetual". Then the vote was put, . . . and it carried "Temporary".

    Thereafter, it was proposed, that the Exemption shall be during this present War.

    It was also proposed, that the exemption shall be for a longer time. And after debate thereon, the vote was stated, "Whether the exemption . . . shall be during this present war, or for a longer time", and it carried "During this present war".

    (ii)  The Minutes for 3 January 1707 record a vote on whether, in Article XIX, the qualifications to be a Lord of Session "`shall be alterable by the Parliament of Great-Britain'; And after debate, it was put to the Vote, `Alterable' or `not', and it carried `Alterable'".

  19.  Daniel Defoe was present during the proceedings in the Scots Parliament, and in 1712 published a record of the debates, interleaved with the official Minutes, in his History of the Union. On 6 December 1706 the Scottish Parliament continued to debate Article XIV, and Defoe records that:—

    "The debate of this day ran only upon the affair mentioned before, viz Whether they should depend upon the British Parliament maintaining a just and equal regard to the good of the whole united island after the Union . . . or whether they should pin them down in all time coming, that no other burdens or taxes should be laid on than those already mentioned".

  (History of the Union between England and Scotland, 3rd edtn London, John Stockdale, 1786).

  20.  In respect of the earlier debate on Article III, on 18 November 1706, Defoe records that:—

    "The capital arguments made use of on this occasion . . . were such as these:—

      1.  That whatever agreement is now concluded between the two kingdoms, will never be binding to the new Parliament.

      2.  That the two kingdoms effectually subject themselves to the new Parliament, all the conditions stipulated on either side to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.

    To this it was answered, That the British Parliament were absolutely bound up by the stipulations of this treaty; that they being a subsequent power to the two respective Parliaments of either kingdom, had no other or farther power to act than was limited to them by the stipulations of both kingdoms . . . That the Parliament of Britain, being the creature of the Union, formed by express stipulations between the two separate Parliaments of England and Scotland, cannot but be unalterably bound by the conditions so stipulated, and upon which it received its being, name and authority." (op cit).

  21.  Five years after the Union, Cobbett's Parliamentary History records that, in the House of Lords on 18 January 1712:—

    "The Court proposed that an expedient might be found that the Peers of Scotland should not sit among them by election, but by descent, in case the rest of the Peers of that nation should consent to it. A debate followed concerning the Articles of Union, which of them were fundamental and not alterable; it was said, that by the Union no private right could be taken away, but by the consent of the persons concerned; therefore no alteration could be made in the right of the Peers of Scotland, unless they consented to it". (Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England, vol 6 (1702-1724)).

  22.  Of the Institutional writers, in 1752 Lord Bankton wrote that—

    "The supreme and legislative powers of two nations, by it [sc, the Union] are transfused and united into one common sovereignty"; but also that "The reservation of their respective laws, touching private right . . . was most necessary . . . by the treaty of union, our laws . . . concerning private right are not to be altered, but for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland . . . Presbyterian church-government, is secured to us by a separate act of parliament. As . . . Episcopal government . . . in England by an act of their Parliament; both which acts are declared to be fundamental articles of the union."

    "By the union likewise, all our courts of justice remain inviolate as before, except the privy-council . . . and the court of exchequer . . ." (Institute, IV, 1,16-19).

  23.  Similarly Erskine (writing before 1768) acknowledges Parliamentary sovereignty as a general principle (Institutes, I, 1, 19 and I, 3, 8), but at the same time says this—

    "it must be observed, that nothwithstanding the Treaty of Union in 1707, by which the kingdoms of England and Scotland were made one nation, under one king and one parliament, all the laws of Scotland concerning private right, whether statutory or customary, are reserved entire, not to suffer any alteration, but for the evident utility of the subject." (Institutes, I, 1, 4).

  24.  In 1873 the Supreme Court of Appeal Bill to create an Imperial Court of Appeal was replaced by the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill in the face of the objection that the former was inconsistent with the prohibition on appeals from Scotland to the Courts in Westminster Hall in Article XIX of the Act of Union; 210 HL Deb 1990 (30 April 1872); 214 HL Deb 1738 (11 March 1873).

  25.  Judicial opinion is apparent from—

    (i)  The Memorial by the Senators of the College of Justice to the House of Lords of 1807 concerning Article XIX of the Articles of Union. The full text is in Laing MSS, Add 4/7, but is quoted by JDB Mitchell, Constitutional Law (2nd edition, 1968), page 73:—

    "We are of opinion that on fair bona fide construction, as between two independent nations, it cannot be held to have been in the contemplation of either, that any law should, in future times, be considered as merely a regulation for the better administration of justice which goes to subvert the supreme jurisdication of the Court of Session, and to render it subordinate to a new court, unknown to our ancestors".

    (ii)  In the case of Minister of Prestonkirk v Heritors of Prestonkirk, 3 February 1808 (reported in Connell on Tithes, Vol II, pages 112-123 and Vol III, Appendix No CXVIII, page 310; affirmed by the House of Lords, 20 May, 1808 (Connell, Vol II, pages 122-123)), a Court of Thirteen Judges, sitting as the Court of Teinds, was satisfied that there were certain fundamental provisions of the Articles of Union which were not alterable by Parliament.

    (iii)  In Earl of Kinnoull v Presbytery of Auchterarder (The Auchterarder Case) (1838) 16 S 661 Lord Moncrieff said that a breach of the ecclesiastical provisions of the Union would be a direct breach of what was fundamental and essential in the political state of the United Kingdom.

    (iv)  In the case of Laughland v Wansborough Paper Co Ltd (1921) I SLT 341, the Court appears to have been entirely satisfied that a statute might be invalid if it breached Article XVIII of the Articles of Union.

    (v)  In the case of MacCormick v Lord Advocate, 1953 SC 396 (First Division), the Lord Advocate, Lord Clyde, on behalf of the Crown expressly acknowledged that there were fundamental and unalterable provisions of the Articles of Union which Parliament could not legally repeal.

    (vi)  This is a matter in respect of which the Court have in later cases consistently reserved their opinions; Gibson v Lord Advocate, 1975 SC 136, per Lord Keith; Pringle, Petitioner, 1991 SLT 330, per Lord President Hope.

  26.  The Articles of Union should be interpreted in the flexibile manner appropriate to constitutional interpretation. However, as Lord Sankey LC observed in Re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (1932) AC 54 at 70:—

    "The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of the provisions of ss 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon, the federating bodies."

  27.  The Union of Scotland and England was founded upon the agreement expressed in the Articles of Union. The agreement qualified the legislative power of the Parliament of Great Britain with respect to the Articles of Union. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland can have no greater power than its author the Parliament of Great Britain.

THE STATUS OF ARTICLE XXII

  28.  Given that certain provisions in the Articles were alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain, while others are conditions of the Union, enacted to endure so long as the Union endures, the question arises of the particular status of Article XXII.

  29.  Article III of the Articles of Union transferred authority to legislate for Scotland from the Parliament of Scotland to the Parliament of Great Britain. Article XXII provided that, in the new Parliament, Scotland would be represented in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords.

  30.  It is apparent from the purpose of Article XXII that the Parliament of Scotland did not intend the Parliament of Great Britain to be able to alter it so as to remove Scotland's representation. The numbers of Scots Peers and members had been the subject of detailed negotiation by the Commissioners. Those negotiations, and the debates upon their enactment into law by the Scottish Parliament would have been rendered otiose had it been granting the new Parliament power to remove Scotland's representation.

  31.  The first three Articles of Union contain the essentials of the Union; the union of the two Kingdoms, Crowns, and Parliaments. The purpose of the bulk of the following 22 Articles is to protect Scottish interests. The comparative absence of a perceived need to protect English interests is as apparent from the Articles' silence on the point as it was from England's greater size, population and wealth. Amongst the conditions inserted in Scotland's favour, Article XXII had and has unique importance. That is because a continuing right to representation in the Parliaments of Great Britain and the United Kingdom is the sole guarantee that representatives of Scotland may participate in the passage of legislation on all of the matters over which Parliament has, by virtue of Article III, authority to legislate for Scotland. Indeed, as Lord Bankton observed (Institute, IV, 1,18), Article XXII is almost the only provision by which England allowed any alteration to its law and custom. The singular importance of Article XXII is that its absence from the Articles would have reduced Scotland to the position of a dependent territory.

  32.  The proposition that is being advanced may be tested thus:—

    Was it intended by the Parliament of Scotland when it enacted Article XXII, that immediately after 1 May 1707, the new Parliament of Great Britain would be entitled to enact that all Members of Parliament returned by Scottish constituencies, and all Peers of Scotland, should henceforth be excluded from Parliament?

  To attribute to the Scottish legislators and the words of Article XXII such a statutory intention is, to say the least, highly improbable.

  33.  It follows that the reason why the House of Lords Bill would, if enacted, breach the Act of Union, is because it would infringe Scotland's right to representation in the House of Lords. The fact that the Bill grants discretionary powers that might be exercised so as to admit 16 peers from Scotland is irrelevant; if Article XXII gave Scotland an entitlement; it is no answer to say that that entitlement is fulfilled by a discretion that might, or might not, be exercised in Scotland's favour.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARTICLE XXII

  34.  It does not follow that the legislators intended every word of Article XXII to be absolutely or perpetually unalterable, or that that is the proper construction to be put upon it. It is clearly the case that some of its provisions should be alterable; for example, the passage from the words "And that when Her Majesty . . ." to the end of the Article; which was redundant once the Parliament of Great Britain had been held and the Privy Council of Scotland abolished. This was recognised by Parliament in the partial repeal of Article XXII by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 (6 Edw 7, c 38).

  35.  In respect of the opening words of the Article a proper construction is one that preserves its content so far as is consistent with the need for the constitution to evolve as the nation evolves.

  36.  Applying the foregoing to Article XXII, two points emerge:

    Firstly, its purpose so far as Scotland is concerned is to secure representation for Scotland in the Upper House. Such need for that as there was in 1707, necessarily remains unchanged, so long as (a) the Kingdoms of Scotland and England continue to be acknowledged by the law to be distinct entities, and (b) the House of Lords continues to have a function in the passage of legislation for Scotland.

    Secondly, the drawing of those representatives from the hereditary peerage always had the potential to become inconsistent with a changing society. Whilst any need for Scottish participation in the legislative mechanism necessarily endures unaltered so long as the Union endures, that might not be said of the rights of the hereditary peerage.

  37.  It is thus evident on the face of Article XXII that its provision for a hereditary element was contingent upon the politics of the day, whereas the need in 1707 for a minimum level of Scottish representations in both Houses of Parliament remains unchanged as long as the Union endures.

  38.  Article XXII provided for hereditary peers of Scotland to sit in the House of Lords because at that time only Bishops and hereditary peers sat in the House. In Scotland the established Kirk had no Bishops,so there was no question of Scottish Lords spiritual. It followed that the Scots who would sit in the House were drawn from the hereditary peerage.

  39.  Since 1707 the criteria for selecting those to sit in the House have evolved. It is not suggested that Article XXII should be construed as preventing such evolution.

  40.  What has not changed since 1707—which the legislators of 1707 could see would not change—is that as long as the Union endures, Scotland has an interest in a guarantee of representation in both Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament. The Union legislation provides provision with respect to the House of Lords that sixteen persons should sit "on the part of Scotland" (Election Act 1707; Report from the Committee for Privileges in the Petition of the Earl of Antrim and Others, 1966, per Lord Reid of Drem at page 66).

  41.  Article XXII can straightforwardly be construed to have the flexibility needed for the development of constitutional government, while also securing its central purpose; it requires that Scotland has the right to representation in the House of Lords.

  42.  It follows that there would be no breach of the principle of representation in Article XXII, if the Bill provided that sixteen seats would remain reserved for Scotland.

  43.  For so long he sits in this House, Lord Gray is entitled to maintain that he is one of a class of Peers, of whom no fewer than sixteen are entitled to sit in fulfilment of Scotland's constitutional right, unless and until another criterion is provided for selecting those who shall sit in virtue of Scotland's right of representation. In the absence of any provision for what shall come in place of the present arrangements for the representation of Scotland the Bill would, if enacted, be a breach of the Articles of Union.

  44.  A construction of the Act of Union that is impractical or unreasonable should be avoided. It is not, however, impractical or unreasonable that a constitutional measure should provide an unalterable protection for the principle of representation in the legislature. Eg, in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Grundgesetz, article 79(3) prohibits amendment to Articles 1 and 20. Article 20(1) and (2) guarantee the representative, democratic nature of the German legislature. It is wholly consistent with constitutional principle and legal policy that a smaller nation entering into a Union with a larger nation should have a right, unalterable so long as that union lasts, to a minimum level of representation in the united legislature.

THE LAWFUL WAY TO REFORM ARTICLE XXII

  45.  The Articles of Union are the conditions of the Anglo-Scottish Union. They were referred to as such at the time of their enactment. They are not a perpetual restraint on Parliament. They are the conditions of the present Union, which was created by Article I. If the Union is dissolved, the conditions in the Articles cease to have effect.

  46.  The United Kingdom Parliament can dissolve the Union. Article I is not entrenched. That is apparent (1) because the Articles only bind Parliament as conditions of the Union established by Article I; and (2) because it would be contrary to common sense to argue that the English and Scottish peoples could never by a lawful route democratically decide upon independence from one another.

  47.  Comparison with membership of the European Union is apt. So long as the European Communities Act 1972 is in force, the conditions of membership of the European Union fetter Parliament's legislative powers (R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1990] 2 AC 85 (HL); [1991] 1 AC 603 (ECJ and HL)). The effect of European Union law is that Parliament cannot legislate inconsistently with the EC treaty, short of the United Kingdom leaving the Union by Act of Parliament.

  48.  There is a constitutional route to reform of the Articles. It is the explicit dissolution of the Union by an Act of Parliament repealing Article I. What would follow would be a situation which is familiar to Parliament, because it has granted independence to many other territories for which it formerly legislated.

  49.  Absent an express repeal of Article III, the United Kingdom Parliament would retain authority to legislate for England and Scotland after the dissolution of the Union. It would of necessity have to have and exercise that authority, so as to legislate for what should replace it. In this way Section 1 of the Canada Act 1982 (c11) provided a constitution for Canada in place of Parliament's former sovereignty over that country, which Section 2 extinguished.

  50.  This has already happened in the United Kingdom. The effect of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922 was to dissolve the Kingdom of Ireland which had entered into the Union of 1801 with Great Britain (Petition of the Earl of Antrim and Others, supra, per Lord Reid of Drem). The effect was not, however, to extinguish this Parliament's authority to legislate for Ireland.

  51.  Article I of the Union of England and Scotland, and the conditions attached thereto, can both be repealed. In enacting such a repeal, Parliament would inevitably make provision for the constitutional position thereafter. This could involve the independence of the two countries or the settlement of the terms of a new Union of the two countries.

THE EFFECT OF THE PEERAGE ACT 1963

  52.  Section 4 of the Peerage Act 1963 (c.48) provided that all of the Peers of Scotland should have the right to sit in the House of Lords. Schedule I to the Act purported to repeal Article XXII in consequence of that provision.

  53.  There is no reason why Scotland's representation should not be thus have been increased. That was not in conflict with the essential requirements of Article XXII. However the purported repeal of Article XXII in consequence of the provisions of the 1963 Act not only went further than was necessary for the purposes of the 1963 Act, but was ultra vires.

CONCLUSIONS

  54.  In the circumstances Lord Gray respectfully submits that the question which the House has referred to the Committee should be answered in the affirmative. In doing so Lord Gray relies on the following among other:

REASONS

  1.  Because when the Parliament of Scotland transferred power to the Parliament of Great Britain it was possible for it to impose restrictions on that power as a condition of Union.

  2.  Because the Parliament of Scotland did not intend the Parliament of Great Britain to be free to exclude the representation granted to Scotland by Article XXII.

  3.  Because the present Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has no greater power than its author, the Parliament of Great Britain.

  4.  Because the House of Lords Bill, as amended on Report, would if enacted extinguish the right of Scotland to representation in the House of Lords in terms of the Articles of Union.

  5.  Because the Bill, as amended, would purport to repeal a fundamental condition of the Union without dissolving the Union.

  6.  Because the Bill, as amended, would not provide Scotland with a right to representation in the House of Lords.

  7.  Because when the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland passed the Peerage Act 1963 it had no power to repeal Article XXII to the extent of denying Scotland the right to representation in the House of Lords.

Richard S Keen, QC

Michael G J Upton, Advocate


 
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