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Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Perhaps I may say a brief word about the committee to which the noble Lord, Lord Howell, referred. If I understand it correctly, it is intended, effectively, to turn a committee which was based in all the capitals and met about once a fortnight into a standing committee in Brussels. In my view, that is absolutely necessary once you have a High Representative, Mr Solana, who, under the Treaty of Amsterdam, has been given wide- ranging powers and duties in the field of foreign policy and security.

The committee should be seen in a quite different way. It will be a way of giving him advice from the member states, which are his masters, and he will be able to use it at any time of the day or night, at any time of the week or month, as a sounding board for his own thoughts and for matters on which he has been working. It is a modest, sensible step forward.

Most other international organisations which have responsibilities in the field of foreign policy and security, such as NATO or the Security Council, have such committees. In the Security Council it is "the" Security Council and in NATO it is the NATO Council meeting at official level. It is only sensible that the European Union should have an institution of this kind.

Turning to the wider issue, these debates tend to confuse two issues, one of which is the issue of territorial defence. Members of NATO continue to depend, totally and solely, for their territorial defence on Article 5. That is what we will invoke if we are attacked, and we will join in if another member of NATO is attacked. That of course does not apply to the non-NATO members of the EU.

In regard to security policy, we are discussing whether the European Union should have some capability to project power as well as trade policy, aid and all the other instruments it has. I believe that it is sensible for it to do so. The tasks which have been identified for the proposed force—peacekeeping, humanitarian and so on—are admirable and do not relate to territorial defence. They do not therefore duplicate those of NATO.

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In the discussion about whether or not there will be duplication and autonomy, a phrase which is embedded in all the texts for this rapid reaction capability has not yet been quoted—that is, that the force should be able to act autonomously if NATO as a whole decided that it did not wish to be involved. That, of course, is shorthand for saying, "If the United States should decide not to be involved". Autonomy is absolutely crucial.

We have to face the fact that in the future such circumstances are more rather than less likely to occur, whether we like it or not. One of the implications of the events of 11th September and the reaction of the United States is that it will expect the Europeans to handle problems in what it would regard as their own backyard more on their own—in other words, autonomously. The case for proceeding in this way is sound. The amendment would weaken that effort. We would be deluding ourselves if we believed that we will not have to find a response of this kind, on a European basis, to a significant extent in the years to come.

Lord Blackwell: The problem that many of us have with the language of these treaties is that it can evoke a "glass half full or glass half empty" approach, depending on the direction one is coming from. It is almost the nature of treaty language that, because there are compromises hammered out between governments, it may be deliberately intended to be interpreted in different ways by people who have different meanings in mind. One of the concerns that many of us have is that, in the past, we may have been culpable of believing that the interpretation that we in this country put on a set of words was the meaning agreed by everyone else, and we then learned to our cost that others had a different interpretation. That lies behind some of the questions about the language.

Under Article 25, the provisions of the committee could, as my noble friend Lord Tugendhat said, be considered merely as putting in place a fleet, ready to be used in exceptional circumstances if and when we want it to operate independently. But that wording has to be juxtaposed with the wording in Article 17 of the previous treaty referring to,

"the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . which might lead to a common defence".

As so often, one set of words points to a direction, as against a specific provision which, it could be argued, on its own might mean something much more limited. In this case, Article 25 goes on to refer to the committee exercising political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. Can the Minister define clearly the term "crisis management operations"? How would it be interpreted? What is a "crisis management operation" and what is a "defence" operation? The meaning may appear simple in terms of shortness of intent and overall size of an operation. But it is against the broader wording of Article 17 that the precise question must be asked. We must ask the Government to attempt to define the term, or to point to the part of the treaty where that language is defined, so as to have clarity in relation to the new provisions.

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For those reasons, I have sympathy with Amendment No. 40 in this group: given all these complexities, should we not have a clear exposition from the Government of how all these changes relate to our existing defence arrangements? The Government's interpretation would be on the record; then, in any situation where there was ambiguity or a difference of opinion, at least we should have clarity regarding what we think we have agreed to.

6 p.m.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question. I apologise for not giving her notice of it. I do not expect her to give an instant response. It is simply that I did not have the opportunity to consider the issue prior to this debate.

My reference is to Article 17. We have made amendments to Articles 6 and 7—Article 6 stating that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy etc. and Article 7 dealing with serious breaches of those principles by any member state. In relation to Article 17, would it be possible for a member state to have a foreign or security policy that was considered to be in breach of the democratic policy of the majority of member states so as to give rise to action under parts 1 or 2 of Article 7?

My second question relates to the language of Article 17.1. It states:

"The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States".

The treaty is a legal document; in effect, it is law. Presumably it is written in terms of such clarity that member states can see whether they are on the wrong or right side of it. I find those words extremely difficult to interpret even in the abstract. I wonder whether they are justiciable. If they are not, in regard to some express anxieties is not the consolation that is being given unfounded? In short, can the Minister give an example where a member state would be entitled under this provision to take action in its own defence against a common policy that was in breach of the specific character of the security and defence policy?

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: One agrees with the noble Lords, Lord Watson of Richmond and Lord Hannay, that the United States would like Europe to do more about its own defence and military action in general, but, as I understand it—and this is the key point—not at the expense of NATO. Perhaps I may put one or two brief questions to the Minister.

First, has any calculation been made of the extra money that will be required to put this military ambition into operation; and how much has actually been guaranteed by the EU countries concerned?

Secondly, has the United States agreed that it will contribute all that it is assumed it will contribute, certainly in the French presidency declaration on the European security and defence policy? I refer in particular to Annex VII to the appendix to the French presidency conclusions. We see items such as

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guaranteed access to NATO's planning capabilities and the presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities. We also see a paragraph that says that the entire chain of command,

"must remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation after consultation between the two organisations. In that framework the operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. NATO will be informed of developments",

and so on. Those are serious questions which might decide whether this thing will ever really fly.

Leaving the French Presidency Conclusions and returning to the main article, my final question goes a little further than that of my noble friend Lord Blackwell. Article 17.2 states that the new "army", as President Prodi insists on calling it, will be involved in,

"tasks of combat forces in crisis management".

This seems to me to be a very important matter. What does that mean?

I am aware that this phrase appeared in earlier versions of the treaty before Nice came about. But with the new autonomy and powers being granted to an EU army, that particular expression seems to assume much greater importance. To an ordinary mind, the words could surely include what one might call ordinary war. It depends on the interpretation. I do not want to be in the least facetious, but surely it could include putting down civil unrest. Can the Minister give an unequivocal assurance that that source will never, ever, be used, let us say, to disperse a crowd of several hundred UK citizens in Trafalgar Square in 10 years' time protesting about our membership of the European Union?

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